Why the Next US President Should Pivot to the South China Sea
By Thuc D. Pham
May 05, 2015
Image Credit: Official U.S. Navy Page
A
handful of Democrats and Republicans have expressed an interest in
running for their party's 2016 presidential nomination while others are
considering. Whoever is elected as the next president of the United
States, he/she should place higher priority on the South China Sea
(SCS). Why?
First,
the SCS has emerged as a central aspect of regional geopolitics of the
Indo-Pacific. The issue has been high on agenda of both track I and
track II diplomacy, from day-to-day discussions to regional strategic
calculations and beyond. It encompasses both traditional and
non-traditional security issues, and engages major players in
Indo-Pacific, including the U.S., China, India, Japan, ASEAN, and its
member states. More importantly, the SCS is widely seen as a litmus test
of Beijing's strategic intentions and actions, and of Washington's
resolve.
Second,
U.S. policy towards the disputes in the SCS has been largely reactive.
In retrospect, Washington has modified the content of its policy in
response to tensions triggered by China's assertive posture in the SCS.
For example, the first U.S. policy statement on the Spratlys and the SCS
was released in 1995 in response to growing instability deriving from
China's move to seek control of Mischief Reef. Meanwhile, when then
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton declared at the 2010 ASEAN Regional
Forum that the U.S. has national interest in freedom of navigation, it
was a corollary of a series of aggressive Chinese actions, including
harassment of the USNS Impeccable. A U.S. State Department document,
Limits in the Seas, released in consequence of China's unilateral
actions, particularly the HD-981 episode, found that Beijing's 9-dash
line is inconsistent with international laws.
Third,
regardless of Washington's call for upholding a rules-based stability
in the region, Beijing insists on altering status quo by "sheer size and
muscle." Most recently, the U.S. warned China against "militarizing"
the SCS through its land reclamations and constructions on some of the
features it has occupied in the Spratly archipelago, which fuel anxiety
within the region, and urged it to avoid destabilizing activities.
Beijing responded by arguing that it is "building shelter, aids for
navigation, search and rescue, etc.," and it "does not affect and is not
targeted against any country." However, the Fiery Cross Reef images
published by CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency on its website show
different outcomes of the constructions (for instance, a 3,110-meter
airstrip that can accommodate almost any type of aircraft; and port
facilities that may be capable of docking military tankers). Once the
constructions are complete, American military bases in the region will
be under growing threat from these outposts.
Clearly,
the U.S. should make some adjustments to its SCS policy, so that it
becomes more proactive. Specifically, (i) Verbal assertions of freedom
of navigation remain insufficient. The U.S. naval and air presence in
the SCS must be maintained or increased; (ii) The U.S. should reinforce a
new web of partnerships throughout Asia that includes traditional
allies but goes beyond them. Among the new team in Southeast Asia,
Washington should deepen ties and seek to expand the scope of joint
activities with Vietnam in the maritime domain
Thuc
D. Pham is a SCS researcher at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. The
opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and do not
represent the views of the institutions to which the author is attached
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