South China Sea: Vietnam’s Land Reclamation 0.19%

Background Briefing:
South China Sea: Vietnam’s
Land Reclamation 0.19%
Carlyle A. Thayer
May 9, 2015
Client name deleted.
We request your assessment of the report on Vietnam’s Land Reclamation just
released by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Center for
International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C.
http://amti.csis.org/vietnam-island-building/
What do you make of it? Has Vietnam been reclaiming land in the South China Sea
for a while
ANSWER: The CSIS AMTI Report will be
music to China's ears because China
and its supporters are claiming that
China is merely catching up with
regional states. China has already
alleged that regional states have
reclaimed land, built military
installations and even installed
missiles.
The CSIS report provides new
information to the extent that it
depicts construction on Sand Cay and
West London Reef from 2010. These
are the latest photos Sand Cay and
West London Reef in the public
domain. The CSIS report may be
misleading in using the description
"significant" and giving stress to
military facilities. These features have
been occupied by Vietnam since 1956,
first the Republic of Vietnam and then
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The
lighthouses were erected in the 1990s (if not earlier). All Vietnam's occupied islands
and features have military personnel. They also have "fortifications" for defensive
purposes. These are flimsy positions of concrete that are not very thick.
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
West London Reef 2010 and 2015
2
There are several points to be made. First, do these activities indicate a lack of selfrestraint
that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability in
there South China Sea? These are the injunctions of the 2002 Declaration on
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The evidence presented by CSIS
AMTI regarding Vietnam land reclamation depicts normal activities that are of a
defensive nature and do not threated regional peace and stability.
Second, given the figures released by CSIS, Vietnam's land reclamation amounts to
0.19% of the land reclaimed by China (0.03 square miles of Vietnamese reclaimed
land divided by 1.55 square miles of Chinese reclaimed land). Or, the total land
reclaimed by Vietnam amounts to 9.5% of land reclaimed by China on Fiery Cross
Reef alone.
Third, China has a track record of
using armed force to secure islands
and features in the South China Sea
(January 1974 western Paracels, and
March 1988 Johnson South Reef and
adjacent features). China suddenly
and without warning occupied
Mischief Reef and has continually
built on it since 1995 up to the
present. China has also virtually
annexed Scarborough Shoal and invested (in a military sense) Second Thomas Shoal
in the Philippines. China’s actions have aroused security concerns in the Philippines
because Chinese officials insist they have the right to declare an Air Defence
Identification Zone over their features. In the past six months Chinese officials have
requested that Philippine military aircraft leave air space that the Philippines claims
is international air space.
Fourth, all the so-called military "fortifications" and buildings on Vietnam’s tiny
features are defensive in nature and are not large enough to support any offensive
action. CSIS photos show "gun emplacements" but no guns.
China needs to specify what kinds of missiles are allegedly stationed on Vietnamese
islands and features. The first charges of this nature were made by Taiwan and
related to hand held anti-aircraft missiles. Taiwan later retracted its allegations.
Fifth, because of the way CSIS has reported on this new imagery, they have muddied
the waters by using terms such as "significant" and “military” without putting it in
proper context with respect to the DOC.
CSIS does report, however, that China's land reclamation activities are much greater
than Vietnam's land reclamation. Vietnam’s land reclamation may be “significant” if
CSIS means that Vietnam expanded a tiny speck by 66% of the total land area, for
example.
Sixth, all this release of satellite imagery cries out for transparency by all parties
concerned. Why are China and Vietnam reclaiming land? What do they ultimately
intend to do as a result of land reclamation?
Sand Cay 2015
3
Vietnam's airstrip on Truong Sa island pre-dates the 2002 DOC by many years. But
China's track record, coupled with its construction of two new airstrips, one large
enough to take military aircraft of any size, raise concerns about its intentions in the
long run. They may provoke regional states to take counter-measures. And it is in
this sense that Chinese activities complicate the present situation and could result in
an escalation of disputes and affect peace and stability in there South China Sea.
ASEAN and Chinese diplomatic interlocutors on the Joint Working Group to
Implement the Guidelines on the DOC should determine if Chinese and Vietnamese
land reclamation activities breach the clause on "self-restraint" and whether they
affect peace and stability in the region. They are unlikely to do so, however.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea: Vietnam’s Land Reclamation
0.19%,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 9, 2015. All background briefs
are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing
list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.