Summit of Failure: How the EU Lost Russia over Ukraine
November 24, 2014
DPA
One
year ago, negotations over a Ukraine association agreement with the
European Union collapsed. The result has been a standoff with Russia and
war in the Donbass. It was an historical failure, and one that German
Chancellor Angela Merkel contributed to.
Only
six meters separated German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych as they sat across from each other in the
festively adorned knight's hall of the former Palace of the Grand Dukes
of Lithuania. In truth, though, they were worlds apart.
Yanukovych
had just spoken. In meandering sentences, he tried to explain why the
European Union's Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius was more useful
than it might have appeared at that moment, why it made sense to
continue negotiating and how he would remain engaged in efforts towards a
common future, just as he had previously been. "We need several billion
euros in aid very quickly," Yanukovych said.
Then
the chancellor wanted to have her say. Merkel peered into the circle of
the 28 leaders of EU member states who had gathered in Vilnius that
evening. What followed was a sentence dripping with disapproval and cool
sarcasm aimed directly at the Ukrainian president. "I feel like I'm at a
wedding where the groom has suddenly issued new, last minute
stipulations."
The
EU and Ukraine had spent years negotiating an association agreement.
They had signed letters of intent, obtained agreement from cabinets and
parliaments, completed countless diplomatic visits and exchanged
objections. But in the end, on the evening of Nov. 28, 2013 in the old
palace in Vilnius, it became clear that it had all been a wasted effort.
It was an historical earthquake.
Everyone
came to realize that efforts to deepen Ukraine's ties with the EU had
failed. But no one at the time was fully aware of the consequences the
failure would have: that it would lead to one of the world's biggest
crises since the end of the Cold War; that it would result in the
redrawing of European borders; and that it would bring the Continent to
the brink of war. It was the moment Europe lost Russia.
For
Ukraine, the failure in Vilnius resulted in disaster. Since its
independence in 1991, Ukraine has strived to orient itself towards the
EU while at the same time taking pains to ensure that those actions
don't damage its relations with Moscow. The choice between West and
East, which both Brussels and Moscow have forced Kiev to make, has had
devastating consequences for the fragile country.
But
the impact of that fateful evening in Vilnius goes far beyond Ukraine's
borders. Some 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and almost 70
years after the end of World War II, Europe is once again divided. The
estrangement between the Russians and the Europeans is growing with
Moscow and the West more inimical toward each other today than during
the final phase of the Cold War. It's a reality that many in Europe have
long sought to ignore.
The
story of the run-up to Vilnius is one filled with errors in judgment,
misunderstandings, failures and blind spots. It is a chronicle of
foreign policy failure foretold -- on all sides. Russia underestimated
the will of Ukrainians to steer their country toward the EU and was
overly confident in its use of its political power over Kiev as a
leverage.
For
its part, the EU had negotiated a nearly 1,000-page treaty, but
officials in Brussels hadn't paid close enough attention to the
realities of those power politics. Even in Berlin, officials for too
long didn't take Russian concerns -- about the encroachment of NATO and
the EU into Eastern Europe -- seriously enough. The idea that Moscow
might be prepared to use force to prevent a further expansion of the
Western sphere of influence didn't seem to register with anyone.
With
the special role it plays and the special responsibility it has for
Europe, the meltdown also represented a failure for Germany. Foreign
policy has long been considered one of Chancellor Angela Merkel's
greatest strengths, but even she ignored the warning signs. Merkel has
proven herself over the years to be a deft mediator who can defuse
tensions or work out concrete solutions. But crisis management alone is
not enough for good foreign policy. Missing in this crisis was a wider
view and the ability to recognize a conflict taking shape on the
horizon. Instead, officials in Berlin seemed to believe that because
nobody wanted conflict, it wouldn't materialize.
Merkel
did say at the summit that, "The EU and Germany have to talk to Russia.
The Cold War is over." But the insight came too late.
Kiev, The Presidential PalaceFeb. 25, 2010
Viktor
Yanukovych was sworn in as president of Ukraine on Feb. 25, 2010 by the
Verkhovna Rada, the country's national parliament. The first guests he
would receive as president were chief European Union diplomat Catherine
Ashton and European Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighborhood Policy Stefan Füle.
Was it a sign?
During
his inaugural address, Yanukovych had rejected the clear Western
orientation of his predecessor Viktor Yushchenko. Instead, he said
Ukraine should become a "bridge" between the East and West. He
envisioned Ukraine's future as a "European bloc-free state."
But
not long later, he found himself sitting together with Ashton and Füle
inside Mariyinsky Palace in Kiev, the official presidential residence.
The two had brought a piece of paper with them, which they used to
present what they called the "matrix," Yanukovych's choices. It was
their own, very bureaucratic way, of describing Ukraine's path to a
European future. They handed him the matrix as if it were some kind of
gift.
"We
have never done this before for anybody," Füle said. Both European
leaders considered the paper to be a pledge of confidence.
The
"matrix" listed in detail what it would mean for Yanukovych if he
engaged himself with the EU. To the left were the conditions he had to
fulfill, including things like EU standards or the demands of the
International Monetary Fund. On the right, the money was listed that
Ukraine would receive if it went down this path toward the West.
Yanukovych
was primarily interested in the right-hand column. When he needed
money, he had always been in the habit of simply taking it -- from
everyone: from his own people; from the Russian Federation; and, of
course, also from the EU. Previously, during a stint as prime minister,
he had mostly used his power to secure lucrative posts for members of
his own clan. Indeed, Yanukovych had enjoyed a dubious reputation dating
back to the clan wars in his home region, the Donbass coal basin. Even
if he claimed the contrary, he never cared much about Western values.
But would Yanukovych really do anything for money?
The
president thanked his guests for the "matrix," the "pledge of
confidence" that he hadn't actually earned. He had experienced the
Europeans as naive do-gooders who were constantly going on about values
and human rights but who had no idea about money. He promised both
guests that the first trip he would take as Ukrainian president would be
to Brussels. They understood it to be a sign, but instead it was but
the first of many misunderstandings to come.
Kiev Jan. 10, 2011
Enlargement
Commissioner Füle traveled to Ukraine again that January to warn
Yanukovych against making any serious mistakes. Füle was genuinely
alarmed.
On
Dec. 20, 2010, the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office had filed
charges against Yulia Tymoshenko accusing her of misuse of state funds.
It appeared as though Yanukovych was seeking to get a former political
opponent out of the way.
"Don't do it," Füle implored.
Füle
was then and remains now a great believer in Europe, in the grand
promise of freedom. He believes in Western values, in transparency, in
the rule of law and in the EU's soft power. It was inconceivable to Füle
that someone who had the opportunity to become a part of Europe could
possibly refuse.
"Mr.
President," Füle warned. "You're walking on thin ice." The president
and the commissioner were meeting alone. Füle, who is Czech, studied in
the 1980s at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, an
institution for the Soviet elite and he speaks fluent Russian, obviating
the need for an interpreter. He reminded Yanukovych of his promise to
reform the Ukrainian justice system. The EU even had a term, "selective
justice," for the arbitrariness that prevailed in the Ukrainian legal
system. Füle also reminded Yanukovych that, as expansion commissioner,
it was also his job to convince EU member states of why Ukraine should
belong to Europe.
Was
it absolutely necessary for the European public to see just how far
removed Ukraine still remained from the Western idea of rule of law?
Tymoshenko is one of, if not the only, Ukrainian who is recognizable to
people living in the West. She was the icon of the Orange Revolution
and, despite her shortcomings as prime minister, had lost little of the
glamour the revolution had bestowed upon her. Now Tymoshenko, with her
trademark crown braid, threatened to become a martyr.
"You
have to be 100 percent sure that this will not become a politically
motivated justice," Füle said at the time. Yanukovych smiled. "I promise
you that our judiciary is independent," he said.
Kiev, Presidential PalaceDec. 12, 2011
Events
then proceeded as Füle feared they would. In May, the Prosecutor
General's Office indicted Tymoshenko a second time. At this point, she
had already been in pre-trial detention for three months. It started to
look as though she would get convicted. Füle asked if he could visit her
in jail.
Yanukovych
went over to his desk, which had a Soviet-era desktop switchboard. He
pushed a button and the Ukrainian General Prosecutor quickly answered.
"I have here the commissioner," Yanukovych said. "He wants to see the
Lady in prison."
Kharkiv, Women's PrisonFeb. 14, 2012
It
was bitterly cold on the morning the gate to the Kachanivska women's
prison was opened for a bus carrying German doctors. A group of
protesters stood in front of the gate shouting, "Yulia, Yulia." The
group, led by neurologist Karl Max Einhäupl, the head of Berlin's
Charité university hospital, then crowded into Tymoshenko's cell, a room
with a small barred window beneath the ceiling. Her lawyer was also
present, along with two guards. There were two doctors from Germany,
three from Canada and one from Ukraine. Tymoshenko was lying on the bed.
Her hair was freshly done as was her make-up. She turned to face her
visitors, but the pain was so great that she could hardly move.
The
EU had transformed Tymoshenko into a symbol of whether Ukraine was
indeed compatible with Europe. If she were released, Kiev would be given
the seal of approval for its judiciary. If she remained imprisoned,
Ukraine would continue to be stigmatized as a country with an arbitrary
legal system.
The
doctors diagnosed a protracted slipped disc and stated that it wasn't
possible to treat Tymoshenko inside the prison. The diagnosis had been a
medical one, but it also served as a political verdict. "We traveled
there as doctors and not politicians," Einhäupl would later say, "but
that's only half the truth."
Brussels, L'Eccailler du Palais Royal RestaurantMay 30, 2012, 7 p.m.
On
May 30 of that year, Füle invited two acquaintances for dinner at
L'Ecailler du Palais Royal, one of the better restaurants on Brussels'
noble Place du Grand Sablon. The guests included former Polish president
Aleksander Kwasniewski, who had just been named as the official
negotiating Tymoshenko's release on behalf of the EU, as well as
Ukrainian oligarch Victor Pinchuk. They sat upstairs on the second floor
so they could enjoy a bit more peace and quiet. Füle ordered a nice
bottle of wine for the evening so that he could toast Ukraine's future
in Europe.
"To Europe," Füle said.
Two
months ago, the European Union and Ukraine officially approved the
Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. Brussels had begun paving the way for
the "Eastern Partnership" four years ago. The partnership envisions
tight political and economic ties between the EU and the six former
Soviet republics in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The agreements had
actually been envisioned as consolation prizes for countries that were
unlikely to be granted EU membership at any time in the foreseeable
future.
Like
so many things in the EU, the Eastern Partnership is also a compromise.
The Eastern Europeans, particularly the Poles, would prefer to give
Ukraine full EU membership. At the very least, they want some kind of
buffer placed between their countries and Moscow. But Southern and
Western Europeans are not interested in an additional enlargement round.
The result is a complicated situation for EU bureaucrats. Sometimes
they get so caught up in policy that they fail to see the forest for the
trees.
When
considering the association agreement with Ukraine, EU officials
clearly didn't pay enough attention to what it might mean for Russia.
And that night, although Pinchuk didn't want to spoil the positive
atmosphere, he also had the feeling that the commissioner was
underestimating the danger that Russia might not sit back passively as
Brussels sought to bring Ukraine into its sphere of influence. He warned
the commissioner.
But
Füle had assumed Russia wouldn't have any objections to the treaty.
"Russia had never had a problem with the EU," said sources in Brussels
familiar with the negotiations. After all, hadn't Putin offered his
backing for closer ties back in 2004? During a visit to Spain at the
time, the Russian president said, "If Ukraine wants to join the EU and
if the EU accepts Ukraine as a member, Russia, I think, would welcome
this."
But
a lot of time had passed since then and relations had also
deteriorated. It is no coincidence that the turning point was an event
in Ukraine, the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004, that ensured the
election of pro-European President Viktor Yushchenko. Since then,
Brussels and Moscow have been both been vying to deepen ties with
countries located in the region between Russia and the EU. The term used
for this in the West is "competition of integration." But in Moscow, it
is seen as a battle over spheres of influence.
"You
will have to find a solution that is also acceptable to Putin," Pinchuk
warned the commissioner. "Things could get difficult with the
Russians." But Füle believed he knew the Russians better. "It's always
difficult with the Russians," he said.
Berlin, the ChancellerySpring 2012
Brussels, European Council headquartersFeb. 25, 2013
The
Kremlin then proposed to Brussels that negotiations be conducted
between the EU and the Eurasion Union -- directly between the two blocs
of power. But European Commission President José Manuel Barroso refused
to meet with the leaders of the Eurasion Union, a bloc he considered to
be an EU competitor.
"One
country cannot at the same time be a member of a customs union and be
in a deep common free-trade area with the European Union," the
commission president said on February 25. He said that Kiev had to
decide which path it wanted to take. The message was clear: Kiev had to
choose either Brussels or Moscow.
Kiev, Premier Palace HotelJuly 27, 2013
His
name wasn't anywhere on the official program and no one appeared to
know that he was coming. The Russian Embassy in Kiev hadn't even been
informed that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be making an
appearance at a conference of his Ukrainian supporters at the Premier
Palace Hotel.
"We
will respect whatever choice the Ukrainian government and people
make...," he said. "But there are facts that speak for themselves." The
statements are far from friendly. Whereas they may have sounded like a
promise to those listening in the hall, Putin's comments were both a
slap in the face and a threat to the Ukrainian government.
Prior
to his speech, Putin had spoken for nearly an hour with Yanukovych in
the presidential palace, leaving the Ukrainian president vexed. The talk
would fundamentally change Russia's position towards Kiev. Previously,
officials in Moscow hadn't believed that the association agreement with
Brussels could actually come to pass. The general consensus in the
Russian capital had been that the EU would insist on Tymoshenko's
release and that Yanukovych would never push through all the
uncomfortable reforms that Brussels had demanded.
But now, Putin realized that Yanukoych actually was considering signing the agreement.
Moscow, the Interfax News AgencyJuly 29, 2013, 9:24 a.m.
Two
days later, the Kremlin-aligned news agency Interfax issued a news
alert warning Russian consumers against consuming Ukrainian candies and
chocolates. The article quoted Gennadiy Onishchenko, Russia's chief
sanitary inspector at the time, who had just imposed a sales ban on
candy by Variete, Montblanc pralines and Ukrainian milk chocolate
because of alleged quality and safety problems. The sweets are made in
factories that belonged to Petro Poroshenko (the oligarch and current
Ukrainian president) and a television station he owned had been
promoting Ukraine's pro-European policies. Shortly thereafter, Moscow
imposed other measures in an escalation between Moscow and Kiev dubbed
by the international media as the "chocolate war". Although the term may
sound sweet, the realities were anything but nice.
Washington, IMF HeadquartersOct. 14, 2013
It
was the second trip Arbuzov had made to Washington within a period of
only two weeks. By then, it had become clear in eyes of the Ukrainians
that there could only be an agreement with the EU if Ukraine were to be
granted a multi-billion-dollar loan from the IMF.
On
Oct. 3, during their first visit, they had sought American support to
secure better conditions for a possible IMF loan. The IMF had named
conditions during the spring that Kiev considered to be unacceptable.
They included a provision that the subsidized price for natural gas be
raised by 40 percent and for the Ukraine's currency, the hryvnia, to be
devaluated by 25 percent. For Yanukovych, who would have to face
re-election in 2015, those steps would have been political suicide. But
the Ukrainians also had the impression the IMF was ready to negotiate,
not least because Victoria Nuland, the US assistant secretary of state
for European affairs, had given her assurances that Washington backed an
IMF loan for Ukraine.- Part 1: How the EU Lost Russia over Ukraine
- Part 2: Four Thousand Deaths and an Eastern Ukraine Gripped By War
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