Background Briefing:
Cambodia US Congressmen
Threaten Aid Cuts
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 11, 2013
[client name deleted]
We request your assessment of a threat to cut aid to Cambodia after the national
elections. The threat comes in the form of resolutions before the U.S. Congress.
1) These do you think the chances are that Congress and the White House would go
through with aid cuts if the elections are finally deemed not free or fair?
ANSWER: It is unlikely that all outside electoral observers will reach agreement that
Cambodia's July elections results were not free and fair. The situation will be
confused. If the U.S. Embassy, U.S. electoral observers and other western observers
agree that the elections are not free or fair, there is likely to be some Executive
reaction.
2) If aid cuts were imposed, what are the chances they would have the desired
effect?
ANSWER: The congressional resolutions at the moment are too blunt an object to be
effective. They are more punitive.
Hun Sen would react to external sanctions by brazening it out. He would pull populist
nationalist strings to attract domestic support. China would likely come on board.
While China is unlikely to fill all gaps in aid cuts in response to unfair elections, China
will act to ensure that the Hun Sen regime is not destabilized. U.S. sanctions will be
counter-productive.
3) When the World Bank funding freeze went public in 2011, Hun Sen signed a plan
to give the remaining families at Boeng Kak land titles within a few weeks and
followed through over the following months, after years of protest from the families
that had achieved nothing. How telling do you think that is?
ANSWER: Hun Sen takes threats to cut aid seriously. In the past he has acted preemptively
to forestall any termination or lessening of foreign aid by making
concessions. In 2006, for example, when a senior U.S. diplomat was dispatched to
Phnom Penh to review U.S. sanctions, Hun Sen gave a "gift to the United States" (his
words) by releasing several human rights and civil society activists in advance of the
visit. This move also was designed to pre-empt any aid cuts by the foreign donor
community that was due to meet. Foreign aid accounted for half of Cambodia's
budget at that time. At Hun Sen's request the King pardoned Sam Rainsy who was
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
then permitted to return home from exile. Sam Rainsy was then reinstated in the National Assembly after have been expelled in 2005. In 2013: déjà vu?
A large cut in foreign aid would be destabilizing to his regime but also for the people who are most vulnerable.
4) Did aid cuts in 1997 have their desired effect?
ANSWER: Aid cuts and other sanctions in response to the so-called 1997 coup resulted in the "miracle on the Mekong", the holding of the 1998 national elections with the participation of the opposition. Hun Sen does not want to be isolated, rather he seeks to play off external powers to ensure his regime remains in power.
5) The resolution before the U.S. Senate calls for cutting only military and direct aid at first, and the rest gradually. It appears that initially only a small amount of U.S. assistance would be affected. Would the impact be more financial or symbolic?
ANSWER: Cutting aid to the military achieves no immediate purpose towards improving the quality of democracy or human rights in Cambodia. It would also undermine the ability of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to contribute to UN peacekeeping in Africa and the Middle East. The professionalism of the Cambodian armed forces would deteriorate. Cutting military aid would make it much more difficult to restore it. In the past China has stepped in and provided equipment that the U.S. cancelled. Cambodia would be able to adjust to gradual aid cuts. The U.S. is not the only external donor.
6) U.S. military aid to Cambodia does not seem to be large. How important is it for Cambodia? And how does it stack up to military aid from China?
ANSWER: The U.S. gives more military aid to Cambodia than China but China is gradually closing the gap. U.S. aid, valued at around U.S. $7 million, is important for professional and military education, training and UN peacekeeping. China and possibly other countries would pick up the slack. The effect on Cambodia would immediately impact on current programmes. In reality, if the U.S. cut its aid in a blunt fashion, it would only be shooting itself in the foot. The U.S. must adopt a long-range perspective. The resolutions before Congress should have come years earlier in order to influence the current elections. There is nothing Cambodia can do between now and the elections that would satisfy congressional critics. The U.S. should be aiming for the next national election. It other words, congressional action now is too late.
7) What are the chances that other democratic countries and international donors like the IMF and ADB would follow America's lead?
ANSWER: The reality is that Cambodia's July national elections will be judged overall as "free and fair" with some caveats by foreign diplomatic and electoral observers. I would think many western countries, and Japan, would view U.S. sanctions as a gross over-reaction. There would have to be some spectacular incident such as killing opposition members at a rally or gross act of electoral malfeasance, such as stuffing or hijacking ballot boxes to prevent the opposition from winning seats, to precipitate the kind of united action by other western countries. It would be up to the U.S. to
3
use its voting power in the IMF to affect policy changes. Japan leads in the ADB and its support for the U.S. cannot be taken for granted.
8) Do you think Hun Sen looks at Burma as a cautionary tale? Or does he really have to worry about that, considering that no one is talking about a full economic embargo on Cambodia?
ANSWER: There are two tales about Burma. The first is that an authoritarian regime can survive decades of western imposed sanctions. The second tale is that political reform can result in international support. There is no figure in Cambodia comparable to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who could win the current elections only to have electoral victory denied by the Cambodian military. Hun Sen, like all authoritarian rulers, is mainly worried about the veracity of what subordinates report to him. Hun Sen has to be concerned that he is not being misled by false reporting by officials too afraid to tell him unpalatable facts. Hun Sen has been able to influence election results using a variety of levers including the influence of local CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] officials. The bottom line is that despite electoral deficiencies the opposition just does not appear to command majority support. If all the imperfections of past elections were rectified the final result would still be a CPP government led by Hun Sen.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia US Congressmen Threaten Aid Cuts,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 11, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Background Briefing:
Cambodia: Sam Rainsy’s Second
Coming
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 20, 2013
[client name deleted]
We are drawing up an analysis on Sam Rainy's return to Cambodia from exile abroad.
One thing that concerns us is all the optimism. Do you think it's misplaced? The
move to pardon Rainsy struck us as a masterstroke, to add a sheen of respectability
to the elections. Do you agree? Or do you think the government misplayed its cards
on this one?
ANSWER: Sam Rainsy’s return is “de ja vu all over again.” In 2005, Sam Rainsy was
stripped of his immunity and fled overseas. U.S. diplomatic pressures, criticism by
the chairman of the U.S. House International Relations Committee, and the visit of
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, led Hun Sen to give “a gift to the
United States” in his words. Several human rights and civil society activists were
released from jail. King Norodom Sihamoni, acting at the request of Prime Minister
Hun Sen, granted a royal pardon. Rainsy returned to Cambodia in February 2006. He
and two other opposition deputies were reinstated in the National Assembly. Hun
Sen was motivated to improve relations with the U.S. and to forestall any cuts in
foreign aid by donors who were about to hold their annual meeting. In 2005 foreign
aid accounted for half of Cambodia’s budget. Hun Sen’s about face led to an
improvement in relations with the U.S. including military-to-military relations. Hun
Sen won the 2008 national elections.
Sam Rainsy, his party and other opposition parties, are strong in urban areas. The
tumultuous welcome for Sam Rainsy on his return is an indication of his popularity.
Cambodian-based political analysts are tipping the opposition to win more seats
than the last national election. This will not, however, prevent Hun Sen’s CPP from
winning a majority of the seats. Hun Sen did not overplay his hand. Rather he
shrewdly diffused external pressure by giving a veneer of respectability to the
national elections.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: Sam Rainsy’s Second Coming,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 20, 2013. All background briefs are posted
on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type
UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Background Briefing:
Cambodia: Hun Sen’s Sons
Groomed for Future Roles
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 24, 2013
Zsombor Peter, Associate Editor, The Cambodia Daily:
We are drafting a report about the promotions in June of Hun Sen's sons, Hun Manet
to lieutenant general and Hun Manith to brigadier general. Manet has moved from
colonel to three-star general in about three years. We request your assessment of
the following:
Q1. Can you give us an idea of roughly how long it might take to move from colonel
to lieutenant general in Australia?
ANSWER: A fast track promotion for an Australian Colonel to Brigadier could take
place in three years; from Brigadier to Major General, two-four years; from Major
General to Lieutenant General, three years; so in total between eight and ten years.
Q2. Cambodia now has well over 2,000 generals. How does that compares with
Thailand and the relative size of its army? And what does that say about Cambodia's
army?
ANSWER: Thailand has a similar number of two-star or higher ranking officers as
Cambodia. But if the number of generals is taken as a percentage of the total size of
the armed forces, Cambodia would be more top heavy than Thailand. The CPP
[Cambodian People’s Party] regime ensures the loyalty of the army by its top heavygeneral
officer structure. They are well rewarded and/or given the opportunity to
enrich themselves.
Q3. Regarding Manet, what does his promotion say about predictions that he is
being groomed to take over from his father, Hun Sen?
Authoritarian regimes tend to rely on family and close personal connections (usually
patron-client relations) to fill sensitive positions. This is because authoritarian states
lack a legal basis for legitimacy and do not trust persons appointed by a merit based
system. Hun Manet is no doubt being promoted to ensure control over and loyalty of
the armed forces. The clear understanding is that the armed forces stand behind the
regime - the CPP-dominated state led by Hun Sen. It is unclear if Hun Sen is grooming
his eldest son Hun Manet to replace him. If so, Hun Manet would have to wait for a
decade or more if Hun Sen stays in power as long as HunSen has vowed to do so.
If Hun Sen is thinking long-term about his successor, in addition to Hun Manet, one
would also have to take into account Hun Sen's other two sons, Hun Manith , deputy
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
chief of intelligence, and Hun Many, deputy chief of cabinet. Hun Sen has clearly advanced the careers of his three sons; perhaps he may be grooming and testing each of them to see who earns the right to succeed him.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: Hun Sen’s Sons Groomed for Future Roles,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 24, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Background Briefing:
Cambodia: Hun Sen and Sam
Rainsy & the National Elections
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 28, 2013
[client name deleted]
We request a brief assessment of Cambodia’s election on Sunday, 28 July. We seek
your views on the following:
Q1. How has Prime Minister Hun Sen managed to stay in power for so long?
ANSWER: Hun Sen has used the resources of incumbency to stay in power. His first
use came after the 1993 elections when the Cambodian People’s Party failed to win
a majority of the vote but no party won the two-thirds of the votes necessary to
form a government. Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party refused to leave
office and forced his opponents to form a coalition government.
In 1997 Hun Sen and armed groups under his command attacked coalition partners
and forced them from office. From that point on coercion and intimidation combined
with incumbancy to keep Hun Sen and the CPP in power. The CPP won ever larger
electoral majorities culminating in a majorty in 2008. Hun Sen has been adept at
humiliating his political opponents by stripping opposition deputies of their
immunity and orchestrating the exile of Sam Rainsy. The CPP is a national
organisation and has used government funding at local level to win over rural
support. Finally, Hun Sen is also a genuinely popular figure.
Q2. The return of Sam Rainsy and the merger of opposition parties appears to have
galvanized the opposition – how do you see their prospects for this election – is it
their best chance yet of unseating Hun Sen?
ANSWER: The united opposition will be strong mainly in urban areas. The former
Sam Rainsy Party has been the mainstay of the opposition, with royalist and other
secular nationalist parties declining in support. The party commanding the majority
of the seats will form the next government. Because the oppositon lacks deep and
widespread support in the provinces their best prospect is to reduce the number of
seats held by the CPP. They do not have the electoral support to unseat Hun Sen.
Q3. Hun Sen appears to be grooming his sons as potential successors – do you think
he will manage to build a dynasty and pass on power or will the opposition’s day
come eventually?
ANSWER: Semi-authoritarian regimes like Cambodia rely on family members and the
sons and daughters of the elite to ensure the security of incumbent elites. They do
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
not trust outsiders. Cambodia faces three possible political futures. First, the present regime can perpetuate itself through patrimonialism, nepotism and patron-client relations. Second, the elites supporting the Hun Sen regime could fracture and seek either the removal of Hun Sen and his family or make common cause with the opposition. Third, in parallel with Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, the Hun Sen regime could become dysfunctional and open the door for political change by a concerted push by the opposition.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy & the National Elections,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 28, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Cambodia US Congressmen
Threaten Aid Cuts
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 11, 2013
[client name deleted]
We request your assessment of a threat to cut aid to Cambodia after the national
elections. The threat comes in the form of resolutions before the U.S. Congress.
1) These do you think the chances are that Congress and the White House would go
through with aid cuts if the elections are finally deemed not free or fair?
ANSWER: It is unlikely that all outside electoral observers will reach agreement that
Cambodia's July elections results were not free and fair. The situation will be
confused. If the U.S. Embassy, U.S. electoral observers and other western observers
agree that the elections are not free or fair, there is likely to be some Executive
reaction.
2) If aid cuts were imposed, what are the chances they would have the desired
effect?
ANSWER: The congressional resolutions at the moment are too blunt an object to be
effective. They are more punitive.
Hun Sen would react to external sanctions by brazening it out. He would pull populist
nationalist strings to attract domestic support. China would likely come on board.
While China is unlikely to fill all gaps in aid cuts in response to unfair elections, China
will act to ensure that the Hun Sen regime is not destabilized. U.S. sanctions will be
counter-productive.
3) When the World Bank funding freeze went public in 2011, Hun Sen signed a plan
to give the remaining families at Boeng Kak land titles within a few weeks and
followed through over the following months, after years of protest from the families
that had achieved nothing. How telling do you think that is?
ANSWER: Hun Sen takes threats to cut aid seriously. In the past he has acted preemptively
to forestall any termination or lessening of foreign aid by making
concessions. In 2006, for example, when a senior U.S. diplomat was dispatched to
Phnom Penh to review U.S. sanctions, Hun Sen gave a "gift to the United States" (his
words) by releasing several human rights and civil society activists in advance of the
visit. This move also was designed to pre-empt any aid cuts by the foreign donor
community that was due to meet. Foreign aid accounted for half of Cambodia's
budget at that time. At Hun Sen's request the King pardoned Sam Rainsy who was
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
then permitted to return home from exile. Sam Rainsy was then reinstated in the National Assembly after have been expelled in 2005. In 2013: déjà vu?
A large cut in foreign aid would be destabilizing to his regime but also for the people who are most vulnerable.
4) Did aid cuts in 1997 have their desired effect?
ANSWER: Aid cuts and other sanctions in response to the so-called 1997 coup resulted in the "miracle on the Mekong", the holding of the 1998 national elections with the participation of the opposition. Hun Sen does not want to be isolated, rather he seeks to play off external powers to ensure his regime remains in power.
5) The resolution before the U.S. Senate calls for cutting only military and direct aid at first, and the rest gradually. It appears that initially only a small amount of U.S. assistance would be affected. Would the impact be more financial or symbolic?
ANSWER: Cutting aid to the military achieves no immediate purpose towards improving the quality of democracy or human rights in Cambodia. It would also undermine the ability of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces to contribute to UN peacekeeping in Africa and the Middle East. The professionalism of the Cambodian armed forces would deteriorate. Cutting military aid would make it much more difficult to restore it. In the past China has stepped in and provided equipment that the U.S. cancelled. Cambodia would be able to adjust to gradual aid cuts. The U.S. is not the only external donor.
6) U.S. military aid to Cambodia does not seem to be large. How important is it for Cambodia? And how does it stack up to military aid from China?
ANSWER: The U.S. gives more military aid to Cambodia than China but China is gradually closing the gap. U.S. aid, valued at around U.S. $7 million, is important for professional and military education, training and UN peacekeeping. China and possibly other countries would pick up the slack. The effect on Cambodia would immediately impact on current programmes. In reality, if the U.S. cut its aid in a blunt fashion, it would only be shooting itself in the foot. The U.S. must adopt a long-range perspective. The resolutions before Congress should have come years earlier in order to influence the current elections. There is nothing Cambodia can do between now and the elections that would satisfy congressional critics. The U.S. should be aiming for the next national election. It other words, congressional action now is too late.
7) What are the chances that other democratic countries and international donors like the IMF and ADB would follow America's lead?
ANSWER: The reality is that Cambodia's July national elections will be judged overall as "free and fair" with some caveats by foreign diplomatic and electoral observers. I would think many western countries, and Japan, would view U.S. sanctions as a gross over-reaction. There would have to be some spectacular incident such as killing opposition members at a rally or gross act of electoral malfeasance, such as stuffing or hijacking ballot boxes to prevent the opposition from winning seats, to precipitate the kind of united action by other western countries. It would be up to the U.S. to
3
use its voting power in the IMF to affect policy changes. Japan leads in the ADB and its support for the U.S. cannot be taken for granted.
8) Do you think Hun Sen looks at Burma as a cautionary tale? Or does he really have to worry about that, considering that no one is talking about a full economic embargo on Cambodia?
ANSWER: There are two tales about Burma. The first is that an authoritarian regime can survive decades of western imposed sanctions. The second tale is that political reform can result in international support. There is no figure in Cambodia comparable to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who could win the current elections only to have electoral victory denied by the Cambodian military. Hun Sen, like all authoritarian rulers, is mainly worried about the veracity of what subordinates report to him. Hun Sen has to be concerned that he is not being misled by false reporting by officials too afraid to tell him unpalatable facts. Hun Sen has been able to influence election results using a variety of levers including the influence of local CPP [Cambodian People’s Party] officials. The bottom line is that despite electoral deficiencies the opposition just does not appear to command majority support. If all the imperfections of past elections were rectified the final result would still be a CPP government led by Hun Sen.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia US Congressmen Threaten Aid Cuts,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 11, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Background Briefing:
Cambodia: Sam Rainsy’s Second
Coming
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 20, 2013
[client name deleted]
We are drawing up an analysis on Sam Rainy's return to Cambodia from exile abroad.
One thing that concerns us is all the optimism. Do you think it's misplaced? The
move to pardon Rainsy struck us as a masterstroke, to add a sheen of respectability
to the elections. Do you agree? Or do you think the government misplayed its cards
on this one?
ANSWER: Sam Rainsy’s return is “de ja vu all over again.” In 2005, Sam Rainsy was
stripped of his immunity and fled overseas. U.S. diplomatic pressures, criticism by
the chairman of the U.S. House International Relations Committee, and the visit of
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, led Hun Sen to give “a gift to the
United States” in his words. Several human rights and civil society activists were
released from jail. King Norodom Sihamoni, acting at the request of Prime Minister
Hun Sen, granted a royal pardon. Rainsy returned to Cambodia in February 2006. He
and two other opposition deputies were reinstated in the National Assembly. Hun
Sen was motivated to improve relations with the U.S. and to forestall any cuts in
foreign aid by donors who were about to hold their annual meeting. In 2005 foreign
aid accounted for half of Cambodia’s budget. Hun Sen’s about face led to an
improvement in relations with the U.S. including military-to-military relations. Hun
Sen won the 2008 national elections.
Sam Rainsy, his party and other opposition parties, are strong in urban areas. The
tumultuous welcome for Sam Rainsy on his return is an indication of his popularity.
Cambodian-based political analysts are tipping the opposition to win more seats
than the last national election. This will not, however, prevent Hun Sen’s CPP from
winning a majority of the seats. Hun Sen did not overplay his hand. Rather he
shrewdly diffused external pressure by giving a veneer of respectability to the
national elections.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: Sam Rainsy’s Second Coming,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 20, 2013. All background briefs are posted
on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type
UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Background Briefing:
Cambodia: Hun Sen’s Sons
Groomed for Future Roles
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 24, 2013
Zsombor Peter, Associate Editor, The Cambodia Daily:
We are drafting a report about the promotions in June of Hun Sen's sons, Hun Manet
to lieutenant general and Hun Manith to brigadier general. Manet has moved from
colonel to three-star general in about three years. We request your assessment of
the following:
Q1. Can you give us an idea of roughly how long it might take to move from colonel
to lieutenant general in Australia?
ANSWER: A fast track promotion for an Australian Colonel to Brigadier could take
place in three years; from Brigadier to Major General, two-four years; from Major
General to Lieutenant General, three years; so in total between eight and ten years.
Q2. Cambodia now has well over 2,000 generals. How does that compares with
Thailand and the relative size of its army? And what does that say about Cambodia's
army?
ANSWER: Thailand has a similar number of two-star or higher ranking officers as
Cambodia. But if the number of generals is taken as a percentage of the total size of
the armed forces, Cambodia would be more top heavy than Thailand. The CPP
[Cambodian People’s Party] regime ensures the loyalty of the army by its top heavygeneral
officer structure. They are well rewarded and/or given the opportunity to
enrich themselves.
Q3. Regarding Manet, what does his promotion say about predictions that he is
being groomed to take over from his father, Hun Sen?
Authoritarian regimes tend to rely on family and close personal connections (usually
patron-client relations) to fill sensitive positions. This is because authoritarian states
lack a legal basis for legitimacy and do not trust persons appointed by a merit based
system. Hun Manet is no doubt being promoted to ensure control over and loyalty of
the armed forces. The clear understanding is that the armed forces stand behind the
regime - the CPP-dominated state led by Hun Sen. It is unclear if Hun Sen is grooming
his eldest son Hun Manet to replace him. If so, Hun Manet would have to wait for a
decade or more if Hun Sen stays in power as long as HunSen has vowed to do so.
If Hun Sen is thinking long-term about his successor, in addition to Hun Manet, one
would also have to take into account Hun Sen's other two sons, Hun Manith , deputy
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
chief of intelligence, and Hun Many, deputy chief of cabinet. Hun Sen has clearly advanced the careers of his three sons; perhaps he may be grooming and testing each of them to see who earns the right to succeed him.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: Hun Sen’s Sons Groomed for Future Roles,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 24, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Background Briefing:
Cambodia: Hun Sen and Sam
Rainsy & the National Elections
Carlyle A. Thayer
July 28, 2013
[client name deleted]
We request a brief assessment of Cambodia’s election on Sunday, 28 July. We seek
your views on the following:
Q1. How has Prime Minister Hun Sen managed to stay in power for so long?
ANSWER: Hun Sen has used the resources of incumbency to stay in power. His first
use came after the 1993 elections when the Cambodian People’s Party failed to win
a majority of the vote but no party won the two-thirds of the votes necessary to
form a government. Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party refused to leave
office and forced his opponents to form a coalition government.
In 1997 Hun Sen and armed groups under his command attacked coalition partners
and forced them from office. From that point on coercion and intimidation combined
with incumbancy to keep Hun Sen and the CPP in power. The CPP won ever larger
electoral majorities culminating in a majorty in 2008. Hun Sen has been adept at
humiliating his political opponents by stripping opposition deputies of their
immunity and orchestrating the exile of Sam Rainsy. The CPP is a national
organisation and has used government funding at local level to win over rural
support. Finally, Hun Sen is also a genuinely popular figure.
Q2. The return of Sam Rainsy and the merger of opposition parties appears to have
galvanized the opposition – how do you see their prospects for this election – is it
their best chance yet of unseating Hun Sen?
ANSWER: The united opposition will be strong mainly in urban areas. The former
Sam Rainsy Party has been the mainstay of the opposition, with royalist and other
secular nationalist parties declining in support. The party commanding the majority
of the seats will form the next government. Because the oppositon lacks deep and
widespread support in the provinces their best prospect is to reduce the number of
seats held by the CPP. They do not have the electoral support to unseat Hun Sen.
Q3. Hun Sen appears to be grooming his sons as potential successors – do you think
he will manage to build a dynasty and pass on power or will the opposition’s day
come eventually?
ANSWER: Semi-authoritarian regimes like Cambodia rely on family members and the
sons and daughters of the elite to ensure the security of incumbent elites. They do
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
not trust outsiders. Cambodia faces three possible political futures. First, the present regime can perpetuate itself through patrimonialism, nepotism and patron-client relations. Second, the elites supporting the Hun Sen regime could fracture and seek either the removal of Hun Sen and his family or make common cause with the opposition. Third, in parallel with Suharto’s regime in Indonesia, the Hun Sen regime could become dysfunctional and open the door for political change by a concerted push by the opposition.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cambodia: Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy & the National Elections,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 28, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
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