Op-Ed Contributor
China’s Dangerous Ambiguity in the South China Sea
Bratislav Milenkovic
By LISELOTTE ODGAARD
December 10, 2015
COPENHAGEN
— In October, Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu of the Academy of Military Science
in Beijing asked in a speech at the Xiangshan Forum, the Chinese
military’s annual dialogue with other states: What does militarization
mean? She was responding to American concerns that China’s efforts to build up islands in the South China Sea contribute to international tensions.
General
Yao poses a fair question. Why is China singled out as the culprit when
the United States is the dominant military power in Asian waters? The
United States maintains a naval presence in the Asia-Pacific that
entails military cooperation with numerous regional powers, including
other claimants to disputed territory and maritime zones, such as the
Philippines and Vietnam.
But two aspects of
Beijing’s passive-aggressive strategy explain why China is the main
contributor to tensions in the region: China has deliberately not openly
declared all of its South China Sea land claims, and it has committed to defending these undefined claims by using force.
The
repercussions of this diplomatic minuet were illustrated a few days
after Gen. Yao’s comments. On Oct. 27, the U.S.S. Lassen, a
guided-missile destroyer, sailed within 12 nautical miles of the
Chinese-controlled Subi Reef in the South China Sea. The Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the action an illegal entry into
neighboring waters that threatened China’s sovereignty and security
interests — without specifying exactly which sovereignty claim the
United States was violating. Days later, China conducted aerial and
maritime drills in the South China Sea and deployed two ships to counter
further incursions.
Chinese maps with a
nine-dash line covering approximately 80 percent of the area have been
circulating for decades. Chinese leaders have stated repeatedly that
islands within the area have been part of the country for centuries. In
his speech at the National University of Singapore on Nov. 7, President
Xi Jinping stated that “the South China Sea islands have been Chinese
territory since ancient times. It is the bounded duty of the Chinese
government to uphold China’s territorial sovereignty and legitimate
maritime rights and interests.”
When
responding to alleged provocation, Chinese officials have used similarly
vague language to protest. In the case of the U.S.S. Lassen maneuver,
China’s Ministry of National Defense did not accuse the United States of
violating China’s territory or exclusive economic zone. Instead, it
stated that the United States had “threatened China’s sovereignty and
security interests” and “endangered regional peace and stability.” In
keeping its protest so general, China avoids all reference to a specific
claim to the Subi Reef, a recently created island, and avoids the
question of whether such a claim on Subi would give China controlling
rights of the surrounding waters.
For want of
clear official pronouncements, other countries act on the assumption
that the controversial nine-dash map shows China’s claims. Other states
may also be asking for more than they are entitled to, but they have
made their claims public. China’s claims are enigmatic.
To
complicate matters further, several issues in the South China Sea are
legal gray zones. One is the vagueness of the Law of the Sea in defining
which maritime features are islands or rocks that can sustain human
habitation and economic life of their own. This matters because only
geographical features that can support humans are entitled to special
legal rights beyond a 500-meter safety zone that allows the controlling
nation to enforce restrictions on the behavior of foreigners. Many
features in the South China Sea are difficult to classify.
A
second legal question is whether military activities can be restricted
in so-called exclusive economic zones, which give countries rights over
the exploration and use of marine resources within 200 nautical miles of
their coast. Some states, such as China and India, claim that other
states cannot carry out military activities in or over their exclusive
economic zones without consent. Are surveillance activities allowed in
such zones? From Chinese statements and practice near its mainland, it
is clear that these activities are seen as illegal in Beijing.
But
the point is we do not know if Beijing will apply this view to islands,
some newly manmade, occupied by China in the South China Sea because we
do not know the Chinese claims. In legal gray zones, international law
develops from the customs established by state practice.
China
makes its deliberate ambiguity more dangerous in its apparent
commitment to defend undefined claims by force. Beijing’s 2015 defense
white paper states that one objective of its military is to “safeguard”
the country’s “maritime rights and interests” in a situation where “some
of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their
military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally
occupied.” Hawkish military leaders give more reason for concern.
Retired Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan has stated, for example, that if China is
biding its time, its military should at least be ready to defend Chinese
interests in the event of war.
Since China’s
maritime claims are not clarified, it is impossible for others to
determine where and when China is willing to use force, thus increasing
the chance of conflict. The majority of small and middle powers in
Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia
and Singapore, react to an uncertain security environment by hedging:
They seek to accommodate China’s growing influence primarily by
establishing closer economic ties with Beijing while at the same time
strengthening defense cooperation with Washington. Their priority is not
to be seen as choosing sides in the ongoing China-U.S. strategic
competition.
China’s policy of ambiguity
leads to one conclusion: Beijing wants to expand its military presence
in the South China Sea as a direct challenge to the U.S. alliance system
because to do so would allow China to interfere with the free movement
of military vessels and aircraft.
American
leaders cannot afford to sit back and do nothing. Washington needs to
show that international waters cannot be turned into special zones with
restrictions on other nations.
China’s
behavior suggests that it sees the American presence as a threat. If
Beijing wishes to lower tensions, it should, as a starting point to
negotiations, reassure Washington that it accepts the United States as
part of Asia’s future. This requires avoiding changing the status quo in
ways that ratchet up tensions.
Sending warships
to oppose American displays of the freedom of navigation without
explaining which legal principles Washington has violated is not a good
start.
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