Background Brief
Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap:
The Last Centurion
Carlyle A. Thayer
October , 2013
Vo Nguyen Giap’s career effectively spans sixty-four years
from 1927, when he was expelled from Lycee Quoc Hoc for
political activism, to 1991 when he formally retired from all
party and state positions.
His career can be broken into five phases: (1) 1927-1944
when he was a student activist, journalist, political agitator,
prisoner, teacher and post-graduate student; (2) 1944-73
when he held several posts including commander of the
People’s Army of Vietnam, Minister of National Defence and
member of the Politburo; (3) 1974-80 when he gave up operational control of the
military and held the posts of Vice Premier, Minister of National Defence, and
member of the Politburo; (4) 1980-1991 when he ceased to be Minister of National
Defence and member of the Politburo; in this period he took responsibility for
science and technology, demography and family planning, and then education; and
(5) 1991-2013 Giap relinquished his last government post as Deputy Premier and
went into permanent retirement.
General Giap’s main legacy derives from his
role as commander of the People’s Army of
Vietnam in phase two (1944-73). He began
as leader of a 34-man platoon and
developed it into a people’s army of
several hundred thousand in less than ten
years. At the same time he integrated the
military writings of Napoleon, Clausewitz
and Mao with Vietnam’s ancient military
tradition.
General Giap mastered the art of people’s war by mobilizing the population to fight
and to become porters in his vast logistic network. Giap combined political and
military struggle. He aim was to drive the French out of Vietnam in a protracted war.
His masterstroke was his execution of the campaign that led to the defeat of the
French at Dien Bien Phu. Giap feinted by sending his forces into Laos and then
rapidly changed direction to invest the valley of Dien Bien Phu. General Giap quickly
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
discarded the advice of Chinese advisors to launch human wave assaults on the French garrison. Giap employed siege tactics fed by a logistics train that brought him food, supplies, weapons and ammunition.
The importance of the battle of Dien Bien Phu is that it marked not only the defeat of French colonialism in Indochina but colonialism as a worldwide system. Within eight years the French would suffer defeat in Algeria.
Giap’s Biography – The Official and the Unauthorised Versions
There are two versions of the life and career of General Vo Nguyen Giap. The first is the authorized official hagiography that credits General Giap with all of Vietnam’s military successes since 1944 and portrays him as the brilliant flawless general.
The second version of General Giap’s career is unofficial and it reveals that he was a strong-willed – some would say intellectually arrogant - individual who bristled at interference in his role as commander of the armed forces. He was once described as the “snow capped volcano” because of his rumoured hot temper.
Giap had many supporters but many detractors as well. His active career was dogged by constant friction with his detractors and rivals who never hesitated to criticize him. His critics were motivated both by ideological dogmatism and jealousy that Giap’s popularity would undermine their power. This was the era of the faceless collective leadership.
During his career Giap faced criticism for seeking a scholarship from French colonial authorities, some even intimated - if not accused him - of being an agent of the French Surete. He was also lambasted for his French education by earning the baccalaureate, studying at the prestigious Lycee Albert Sarraut where he ranked first in philosophy, and University of Hanoi Law School where he graduated with a first in political economy. Giap’s academic achievements were turned against him by his rivals. Giap, after all, was the only member of the party’s inner leadership to have received a western education.
The unauthorized account of Giap’s career reveals a divided collective leadership and sharp rivalries between individuals. Giap’s clash with ideologue Truong Chinh is legendary, as were his later clashes with General Nguyen Chi Thanh and Le Duan, first secretary of the party.
In 1946 Truong Chinh, second in rank after Ho Chi Minh, unsuccessfully opposed Giap’s elevation to the rank of full general and commander of the People’s Army. Truong Chinh and Giap disagreed over the scope and extent to which Chinese military advisers should influence Vietnam’s battlefield strategy and over Giap’s authority to unilaterally appoint key aides.
In 1951 General Giap prematurely went on the offensive and ordered his troops to attack fortified French positions in the Red River Delta. The offensive failed and the People’s Army suffered heavy casualties. Giap was forced to undergo self-criticism,
3
dismiss several key aides, permit the establishment of a political commissar system within the military, and accept Chinese military advisers at various levels in the People’s Army.
After the end of the first Indochina War (1946-54) Vietnam was partitioned. Although Giap had enormous prestige his critics continued to challenge his authority and question his conduct of the war in South Vietnam. Party first secretary Le Duan pushed for the overthrow of the southern regime, Giap was more cautious and they locked horns.
Giap’s detractors succeed in promoting Nguyen Chi Thanh (1959) and later Van Tien Dung (1974) to the rank of full general. Up until their promotions Giap was the only full general. Both generals took operational control of the war in the south out of Giap’s hands.
In 1960, Giap was dropped from fourth to sixth in Politburo rankings at the third national party congress. Nikita Khrushchev’s advocacy of peaceful coexistence in the 1960s was anathema to many in the Vietnamese leadership. Giap, who leant towards the Soviet Union for its military support and who was critical of China, was out of step with his colleagues. Once again he came under criticism by his peers.
In 1965, when the United States introduced combat troops into Vietnam, Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh ordered northern People’s Army units into the fray. Thanh engineered the 1968 Tet Offensive but died of a heart attack before it was executed. The southern communist underground suffered enormous casualties. Giap was vindicated and his fortunes rose.
Following Ho Chi Minh’s death in 1969 a new leadership triumvirate emerged: Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap at that time held three important posts: member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Military Party Committee and Minister of National Defence. But he never regained operational control of the armed forces. Giap opposed both the Tet Offensive and 1972 Nguyen Hue Offensive (Spring or Easter Offensive) and was overruled on both occasions.
In April 1972 General Van Tien Dung led the Nguyen Hue Offensive and in October 1973 was named commander of the final offensive of the war, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. Tellingly, it was a senior civilian member of the Politburo, Le Duc Tho, not Giap, that directed the People’s Army to begin their final offensive by attacking Ban Me Thuot in the highlands.
After the reunification of Vietnam, General Giap remained as Minster of National Defence until 1980. But it was General Van Tien Dung who commanded the Vietnamese forces that invaded Cambodia in late 1978 and defended northern Vietnam in February-March 1979 when China invaded in retaliation.
Clearly Giap’s star was fading fast. In 1976 General Van Tien Dung delivered the military report to the fourth national party congress. Giap was given the task of delivering the party’s policy on science and technology. Giap unsuccessfully opposed the post-war assignment of the military to domestic construction tasks; nonetheless he bowed to the party’s principles of “democratic centralism” and defended party policy in public.
4
In February 1980 Giap relinquished the defence portfolio but retained his position as Deputy Premier. In 1981,Giap was demoted from first to third Deputy Premier. In March 1982 Giap was dropped from the Politburo at the fifth national party congress but retained his seat on the Central Committee.
Giap had enormous popularity and had strong support in the party. In the-mid 1980s his supporters pushed unsuccessfully for Giap to replace Pham Van Dong as Premier. It was also strongly rumoured that Giap’s supporters also campaigned for him to become party leader. Giap then shuttled between various posts first with responsibility for demography and family planning and then education. His government service ended in 1991 when he retired as Deputy Premier.
It is difficult to make an evaluation of Giap’s contributions during this period. Vietnam was led by a collective leadership that until 1986 continued to follow the failed Soviet model of central planning. What is remarkable is that Giap continued in government service until aged eighty.
The China Factor
General Giap’s long career clearly indicates that he was willing to accept Chinese aid and even advice but struggled to retain Vietnam’s autonomy and independence of action. Giap leaned more towards Moscow than Beijing during the war because of the “big ticket” military hardware the Soviet Union provided including anti-aircraft missiles. Although the Soviets reportedly advised Giap “to do an Afghanistan” by invading Cambodia and overthrow the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge, Giap opposed large-scale military intervention. Giap was fully retired when China and Vietnam normalized relations in 1991.
During his retirement years Giap is best known for two famous interventions. In 2004 he penned an open letter to the Politburo complaining about the intervention of military intelligence (Tong Cuc II) in internal party affairs. In 2009 he attracted much public attention when he wrote three open letters to party and state leaders warning of the environmental impact of Chinese-financed bauxite mining in the Central Highlands. He took the matter further by arguing that it was a threat to national security. This struck a resonant cord among the general population who were growing increasingly restive about Chinese assertiveness in Vietnam’s Eastern Sea.
Military Strategist Par Excellence
General Vo Nguyen Giap was a world-class military strategist. Who could have imagined in 1944, when he took command of a 34-man platoon, that in ten years he would raise an army of several hundred thousand and defeat the French, one of the most powerful military forces at that time. Giap gained enormous prestige and credibility for his victory at Dien Bien Phu which lasted throughout his lifetime.
His popularity rests on several foundations. First, millions of Vietnamese served in the People’s Army when Giap was their commander and Minister of National Defence. He inspired them. These war veterans and their families constitute a very large constituency in Vietnam.
5
Secondly, after Ho Chi Minh and perhaps Pham Van Dong, General Giap was the only national leader to stand out from the colourless collective leadership. He was charismatic and articulate and inspired the general populace. He was the national hero Vietnam needed when it was faced with foreign aggression from 1946 until 1973 and again in the 2000s when China threatened Vietnam’s sovereignty in the East Sea.
Giap’s post-military career took him into important areas related to development: science and technology, demography and family planning, and education. This was a third foundation for his popularity.
General Giap’s popularity rests on successful career spanning sixty-four years of active service to the Vietnam Communist Party, the People’s Army of Vietnam and the Vietnamese nation. He will be forever remembered for creating the People’s Army of Vietnam and masterminding the defeat of two major foreign powers.
General Giap has clearly captured the emotions of both the younger and older generations in Vietnam. This is witnessed by the spontaneous outpouring of grief by citizens of all ages who flocked to his home to light candles and incense. General Giap embodied the Vietnamese character of using their intellect to devise tactics and strategies by which the seemingly weak could defeat the strong.
Selected Bibliogaphy
Boudarel, Georges. 1977. Giap! Paris: Editions Atlas.
Colvin, John 1996. Giap: Volcano Under Snow. New York: Soho Press Inc.
Currey, Cecil B. 1997. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. London: Brassey’s Inc.
Jenkins, Brian. 1972. Giap and the Seventh Son. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.
Le Quang, Gerard. 1973. Giap: ou la guerre du people. Paris: Denoel.
Macdonald, Peter. 1993, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam. London: Fourth Estate.
O’Neill, Robert J. 1969. General Giap: Politician and Strategist. Melbourne: Cassell Australia and New York: Praeger.
O’Neill, Robert J. 1969. The Strategy of General Giap Since 1964. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 6. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
Stetler, Russell. 1970. The Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap. London: Monthly Review Press.
Vo Nguyen Giap. 1968. Big Victory, Great Task. New York: Praeger.
6
Vo Nguyen Giap. 1970. Banner of People's War: The Party's Military Line. Preface by Jean Lacouture ; introduction by Georges Boudarel. London: Pall Mall.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap: The Last Centurion,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October , 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap:
The Last Centurion
Carlyle A. Thayer
October , 2013
Vo Nguyen Giap’s career effectively spans sixty-four years
from 1927, when he was expelled from Lycee Quoc Hoc for
political activism, to 1991 when he formally retired from all
party and state positions.
His career can be broken into five phases: (1) 1927-1944
when he was a student activist, journalist, political agitator,
prisoner, teacher and post-graduate student; (2) 1944-73
when he held several posts including commander of the
People’s Army of Vietnam, Minister of National Defence and
member of the Politburo; (3) 1974-80 when he gave up operational control of the
military and held the posts of Vice Premier, Minister of National Defence, and
member of the Politburo; (4) 1980-1991 when he ceased to be Minister of National
Defence and member of the Politburo; in this period he took responsibility for
science and technology, demography and family planning, and then education; and
(5) 1991-2013 Giap relinquished his last government post as Deputy Premier and
went into permanent retirement.
General Giap’s main legacy derives from his
role as commander of the People’s Army of
Vietnam in phase two (1944-73). He began
as leader of a 34-man platoon and
developed it into a people’s army of
several hundred thousand in less than ten
years. At the same time he integrated the
military writings of Napoleon, Clausewitz
and Mao with Vietnam’s ancient military
tradition.
General Giap mastered the art of people’s war by mobilizing the population to fight
and to become porters in his vast logistic network. Giap combined political and
military struggle. He aim was to drive the French out of Vietnam in a protracted war.
His masterstroke was his execution of the campaign that led to the defeat of the
French at Dien Bien Phu. Giap feinted by sending his forces into Laos and then
rapidly changed direction to invest the valley of Dien Bien Phu. General Giap quickly
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
discarded the advice of Chinese advisors to launch human wave assaults on the French garrison. Giap employed siege tactics fed by a logistics train that brought him food, supplies, weapons and ammunition.
The importance of the battle of Dien Bien Phu is that it marked not only the defeat of French colonialism in Indochina but colonialism as a worldwide system. Within eight years the French would suffer defeat in Algeria.
Giap’s Biography – The Official and the Unauthorised Versions
There are two versions of the life and career of General Vo Nguyen Giap. The first is the authorized official hagiography that credits General Giap with all of Vietnam’s military successes since 1944 and portrays him as the brilliant flawless general.
The second version of General Giap’s career is unofficial and it reveals that he was a strong-willed – some would say intellectually arrogant - individual who bristled at interference in his role as commander of the armed forces. He was once described as the “snow capped volcano” because of his rumoured hot temper.
Giap had many supporters but many detractors as well. His active career was dogged by constant friction with his detractors and rivals who never hesitated to criticize him. His critics were motivated both by ideological dogmatism and jealousy that Giap’s popularity would undermine their power. This was the era of the faceless collective leadership.
During his career Giap faced criticism for seeking a scholarship from French colonial authorities, some even intimated - if not accused him - of being an agent of the French Surete. He was also lambasted for his French education by earning the baccalaureate, studying at the prestigious Lycee Albert Sarraut where he ranked first in philosophy, and University of Hanoi Law School where he graduated with a first in political economy. Giap’s academic achievements were turned against him by his rivals. Giap, after all, was the only member of the party’s inner leadership to have received a western education.
The unauthorized account of Giap’s career reveals a divided collective leadership and sharp rivalries between individuals. Giap’s clash with ideologue Truong Chinh is legendary, as were his later clashes with General Nguyen Chi Thanh and Le Duan, first secretary of the party.
In 1946 Truong Chinh, second in rank after Ho Chi Minh, unsuccessfully opposed Giap’s elevation to the rank of full general and commander of the People’s Army. Truong Chinh and Giap disagreed over the scope and extent to which Chinese military advisers should influence Vietnam’s battlefield strategy and over Giap’s authority to unilaterally appoint key aides.
In 1951 General Giap prematurely went on the offensive and ordered his troops to attack fortified French positions in the Red River Delta. The offensive failed and the People’s Army suffered heavy casualties. Giap was forced to undergo self-criticism,
3
dismiss several key aides, permit the establishment of a political commissar system within the military, and accept Chinese military advisers at various levels in the People’s Army.
After the end of the first Indochina War (1946-54) Vietnam was partitioned. Although Giap had enormous prestige his critics continued to challenge his authority and question his conduct of the war in South Vietnam. Party first secretary Le Duan pushed for the overthrow of the southern regime, Giap was more cautious and they locked horns.
Giap’s detractors succeed in promoting Nguyen Chi Thanh (1959) and later Van Tien Dung (1974) to the rank of full general. Up until their promotions Giap was the only full general. Both generals took operational control of the war in the south out of Giap’s hands.
In 1960, Giap was dropped from fourth to sixth in Politburo rankings at the third national party congress. Nikita Khrushchev’s advocacy of peaceful coexistence in the 1960s was anathema to many in the Vietnamese leadership. Giap, who leant towards the Soviet Union for its military support and who was critical of China, was out of step with his colleagues. Once again he came under criticism by his peers.
In 1965, when the United States introduced combat troops into Vietnam, Le Duan and Nguyen Chi Thanh ordered northern People’s Army units into the fray. Thanh engineered the 1968 Tet Offensive but died of a heart attack before it was executed. The southern communist underground suffered enormous casualties. Giap was vindicated and his fortunes rose.
Following Ho Chi Minh’s death in 1969 a new leadership triumvirate emerged: Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap at that time held three important posts: member of the Politburo, secretary of the Central Military Party Committee and Minister of National Defence. But he never regained operational control of the armed forces. Giap opposed both the Tet Offensive and 1972 Nguyen Hue Offensive (Spring or Easter Offensive) and was overruled on both occasions.
In April 1972 General Van Tien Dung led the Nguyen Hue Offensive and in October 1973 was named commander of the final offensive of the war, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. Tellingly, it was a senior civilian member of the Politburo, Le Duc Tho, not Giap, that directed the People’s Army to begin their final offensive by attacking Ban Me Thuot in the highlands.
After the reunification of Vietnam, General Giap remained as Minster of National Defence until 1980. But it was General Van Tien Dung who commanded the Vietnamese forces that invaded Cambodia in late 1978 and defended northern Vietnam in February-March 1979 when China invaded in retaliation.
Clearly Giap’s star was fading fast. In 1976 General Van Tien Dung delivered the military report to the fourth national party congress. Giap was given the task of delivering the party’s policy on science and technology. Giap unsuccessfully opposed the post-war assignment of the military to domestic construction tasks; nonetheless he bowed to the party’s principles of “democratic centralism” and defended party policy in public.
4
In February 1980 Giap relinquished the defence portfolio but retained his position as Deputy Premier. In 1981,Giap was demoted from first to third Deputy Premier. In March 1982 Giap was dropped from the Politburo at the fifth national party congress but retained his seat on the Central Committee.
Giap had enormous popularity and had strong support in the party. In the-mid 1980s his supporters pushed unsuccessfully for Giap to replace Pham Van Dong as Premier. It was also strongly rumoured that Giap’s supporters also campaigned for him to become party leader. Giap then shuttled between various posts first with responsibility for demography and family planning and then education. His government service ended in 1991 when he retired as Deputy Premier.
It is difficult to make an evaluation of Giap’s contributions during this period. Vietnam was led by a collective leadership that until 1986 continued to follow the failed Soviet model of central planning. What is remarkable is that Giap continued in government service until aged eighty.
The China Factor
General Giap’s long career clearly indicates that he was willing to accept Chinese aid and even advice but struggled to retain Vietnam’s autonomy and independence of action. Giap leaned more towards Moscow than Beijing during the war because of the “big ticket” military hardware the Soviet Union provided including anti-aircraft missiles. Although the Soviets reportedly advised Giap “to do an Afghanistan” by invading Cambodia and overthrow the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge, Giap opposed large-scale military intervention. Giap was fully retired when China and Vietnam normalized relations in 1991.
During his retirement years Giap is best known for two famous interventions. In 2004 he penned an open letter to the Politburo complaining about the intervention of military intelligence (Tong Cuc II) in internal party affairs. In 2009 he attracted much public attention when he wrote three open letters to party and state leaders warning of the environmental impact of Chinese-financed bauxite mining in the Central Highlands. He took the matter further by arguing that it was a threat to national security. This struck a resonant cord among the general population who were growing increasingly restive about Chinese assertiveness in Vietnam’s Eastern Sea.
Military Strategist Par Excellence
General Vo Nguyen Giap was a world-class military strategist. Who could have imagined in 1944, when he took command of a 34-man platoon, that in ten years he would raise an army of several hundred thousand and defeat the French, one of the most powerful military forces at that time. Giap gained enormous prestige and credibility for his victory at Dien Bien Phu which lasted throughout his lifetime.
His popularity rests on several foundations. First, millions of Vietnamese served in the People’s Army when Giap was their commander and Minister of National Defence. He inspired them. These war veterans and their families constitute a very large constituency in Vietnam.
5
Secondly, after Ho Chi Minh and perhaps Pham Van Dong, General Giap was the only national leader to stand out from the colourless collective leadership. He was charismatic and articulate and inspired the general populace. He was the national hero Vietnam needed when it was faced with foreign aggression from 1946 until 1973 and again in the 2000s when China threatened Vietnam’s sovereignty in the East Sea.
Giap’s post-military career took him into important areas related to development: science and technology, demography and family planning, and education. This was a third foundation for his popularity.
General Giap’s popularity rests on successful career spanning sixty-four years of active service to the Vietnam Communist Party, the People’s Army of Vietnam and the Vietnamese nation. He will be forever remembered for creating the People’s Army of Vietnam and masterminding the defeat of two major foreign powers.
General Giap has clearly captured the emotions of both the younger and older generations in Vietnam. This is witnessed by the spontaneous outpouring of grief by citizens of all ages who flocked to his home to light candles and incense. General Giap embodied the Vietnamese character of using their intellect to devise tactics and strategies by which the seemingly weak could defeat the strong.
Selected Bibliogaphy
Boudarel, Georges. 1977. Giap! Paris: Editions Atlas.
Colvin, John 1996. Giap: Volcano Under Snow. New York: Soho Press Inc.
Currey, Cecil B. 1997. Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Viet Nam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. London: Brassey’s Inc.
Jenkins, Brian. 1972. Giap and the Seventh Son. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.
Le Quang, Gerard. 1973. Giap: ou la guerre du people. Paris: Denoel.
Macdonald, Peter. 1993, Giap: The Victor in Vietnam. London: Fourth Estate.
O’Neill, Robert J. 1969. General Giap: Politician and Strategist. Melbourne: Cassell Australia and New York: Praeger.
O’Neill, Robert J. 1969. The Strategy of General Giap Since 1964. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 6. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
Stetler, Russell. 1970. The Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap. London: Monthly Review Press.
Vo Nguyen Giap. 1968. Big Victory, Great Task. New York: Praeger.
6
Vo Nguyen Giap. 1970. Banner of People's War: The Party's Military Line. Preface by Jean Lacouture ; introduction by Georges Boudarel. London: Pall Mall.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap: The Last Centurion,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October , 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
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