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Crimean conquest shows China the way
By Euan Graham
Moscow's annexation of Crimea and continuing tensions over Ukraine are
being felt primarily as a crisis in European and US relations with
Russia. Yet Russia's challenge to the international order has global
ramifications that extend to East Asia. Implications for the region can
be understood in terms of three broad categories: demonstration,
distraction, and disruption.
Some of Moscow's East Asian neighbors may be concerned about the direct
threat that a revived, recidivist Russia could turn its focus toward
them. The reality, however, is that Moscow is more concerned with
maintaining its territory east of the Urals than expansionist
adventures. Russia's Far Eastern demographic
decline is especially pronounced, while its borders are largely fixed.
Demonstration
The "demonstration" value of Russia's recent actions, although indirect
and contingent, carries more serious implications for East Asia. China
is not the only relevant regional audience, but it is the most important
given Beijing's prickly relations with the West, its budding
partnership with Moscow, and rising territorial tensions with other
Asian neighbors.
With the UN Security Council immobilized by Russia's permanent veto,
Moscow has shown, first, that it can use undeclared military force
against a neighboring state with virtual impunity, in open defiance of
past treaty commitments and Western protests. Secondly, the March 16,
2014, referendum in Crimea and its rapid incorporation into the Russian
Federation presented the West with a fait accompli "land grab" that
poses fundamental challenges to the international order.
Irrespective of the exceptionalist arguments used to justify its actions
in Crimea, Russia has set a disturbing precedent that goes well beyond
the narrower objectives of its 2008 conflict with Georgia. Given the
overlap of territorial disputes and diaspora populations across North
and Southeast Asia, loose parallels could be drawn to justify similar
strong-arm tactics.
From an operational viewpoint, Russia's success at gaining control of
Crimea quickly and almost bloodlessly reflected four unusual advantages:
the presence of pre-positioned forces in military bases; deep local
knowledge; substantial popular support; and confusion faced by the new
authorities in Kiev. Crimea is therefore not an easily transposable
template for forcible takeovers.
Yet a territorial fait accompli on this scale inevitably commands
demonstration value. China's Global Times, for example, drew the lesson
that "It is not the ballots of Crimean residents that decide the fate of
this region, it is Russia's warships, jet fighters and missiles,"
prompting the wider conclusion that "in the whole field of international
politics (p)ower struggles instead of referendums are the decisive
element".
The Global Times is not a proxy for China's official thinking; the tenor
of China's interventions at the UN was more equivocal, stressing the
importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nonetheless, those
advocating a harder line on maritime territorial claims may conclude
that the Crimean crisis presents both a precedent and a window of
opportunity to press China's sovereignty claims harder, especially in
the South China Sea where Beijing is currently subjecting the
Philippines to coercive tactics.
The takeover of Crimea has imposed tangible international costs on
Russia, in the form of dented economic confidence as well as targeted
sanctions imposed by the West. But in his March 17 Kremlin speech,
President Vladimir Putin essentially claimed victory in his own terms,
invoking the recovery of "historically Russian land" and protecting
compatriots in the former Soviet diaspora.
Putin's Crimean gambit is not universally supported in Russia, as
revealed by a rare anti-government demonstration in Moscow. But the
Russian president has unquestionably received a boost to his domestic
standing. Putin's emotive framing of Russia's intervention in Crimea as
standing up to Western "hypocrisy" and "aggression" will resonate in
China and beyond.
Distraction
The second area of fallout concerns the risk of prolonged distraction,
as Western countries devote more political resources to deal with the
ongoing crisis over Ukraine. For the European Union, Russia's proximity
ensures that it will divert attention that could otherwise be devoted to
East Asia, stymieing Brussels' efforts to diversify its narrowly
economic regional profile. For the US, a crisis in US-Russia relations
is yet another problem added to a burgeoning global list of distractions
from the intended "rebalance" to Asia.
The more acute risk of distraction, however, links back to the
demonstration value of Russia's actions in Crimea, namely the perception
that a window of opportunity has been opened by Russia's actions,
within which miniature "land-grabs" can be attempted in the South China
Sea at reduced cost.
Disruption
Distraction aside, there is the diplomatic fallout to consider,
including implications for China's partnership with Russia under
President Xi Jinping. Beijing abstained from the March 15 UN Security
Council Resolution criticizing the then upcoming referendum in Crimea.
However, Russia's permanent veto is likely to spare Beijing's further
blushes at the UN. Fallout could nonetheless spread to US-China
relations if Washington and Brussels press hard for punitive action
against Moscow outside the UN.
In his Kremlin speech, Putin was careful to thank China for its
diplomatic support over Crimea, appealing to common anti-Western
sentiments with the aim of sharpening China's choices. If Beijing elects
to prioritize solidarity with Moscow over its relations with the EU and
Washington, the resulting alignment could take on more than short-term
significance. Cooperation with Russia is also important for China's
plans to leverage economic connectivity with Central Asian states.
Beijing will not want to jeopardize this.
For Japan, Crimea has already had a disruptive impact. Early in Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo's second term, Russia was identified as a priority
country for enhanced cooperation, Moscow being one of his earliest
visits. After a slow start, Japan-Russia cooperation appeared to be
yielding progress across a broad front. However, Japan, also feeling the
weight of US pressure, has refused to recognize the Crimean referendum
and has frozen progress on a new investment agreement, cooperation in
outer space, and an accord for preventing dangerous military activities.
Diplomatic disruption could extend beyond the key bilateral ties to
Russia's expanded interface with East Asia's multilateral architecture,
including membership of the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense
Ministers Meeting Plus. Russia, sharing a land border with North Korea,
also has a seat at the semi-defunct six-party talks. Moscow's role in
these forums remains essentially peripheral, though its continuing
participation alongside the US could prove tricky to isolate from
tensions over Ukraine.
Asian countries' appetite for dealing with Moscow as a long-term energy
supplier could wane in the aftermath of Crimea's annexation, as it is
doing in Europe. Increased political risk associated with Russia could
weigh on Northeast Asia's commercial interest in Arctic shipping routes.
Moscow will have to work harder to persuade Asian partners that it is
business as usual, even as the region becomes more important to Russia
economically.
Euan Graham is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He can
be contacted at isesgraham@ntu.edu.sg. This article originally appeared
as an RSIS Commentary on March 25, 2014, and can be viewed here.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed.
(Copyright 2014 PacNet. Posted with permission of PacNet)
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