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Asia bucks military spending decline
By John Feffer
WASHINGTON - For the second year in a row, the world is spending a
little less on the military. Asia, however, has failed to get the
memo. The region is spending more at a time when many others are
spending less.
Last year, Asia saw a 3.6% increase in military spending, according to
figures just released by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute. The region - which includes East Asia, South Asia, Central
Asia and Oceania - posted topping off a 62% increase over the last
decade.
In 2012, for the first time Asia outpaced Europe in its military
spending. That year, the world's top five importers of
armaments all came from Asia: India, China, Pakistan, South Korea, and
(incredibly) the city-state of Singapore.
China is responsible for the lion's share of the
increases in East Asia, having increased its spending by 170% over the
last decade. It has also announced a 12.2% increase for 2014.
But China is not the only driver of regional military
spending. South Asia - specifically the confrontation between India
and Pakistan - is responsible for a large chunk of the military
spending in the region. Rival territorial claims over tiny islands -
and the vast resources that lie beneath and around them - in both
Northeast and Southeast Asia are pushing the claimants to boost their
maritime capabilities.
Even Japan, which has traditionally kept its military
spending to under 1% of Gross domestic product (GDP), is getting into
the act. Tokyo has promised a 2.8% increase in 2014-15.
The United States, a Pacific power whose military
spending is not included in the Asia figures, has also played an
important role in driving up the expenditures in the region. The
Barack Obama administration's "Pacific pivot" is designed to reboot the
US security presence in this strategically critical part of the world.
To a certain extent, the arms race in Asia is
connected not to the vast expansion of the Pentagon since 2001 but
rather to the relative decline of Asia in US priorities over much of
that period.
As US allies, South Korea and Japan were expected to
shoulder more of the security burden in the region while the United
States pursued national security objects in the Middle East and Central
Asia.
China, meanwhile, pursued a "peaceful rise" that also
involved an attempt to acquire a military strength comparable to its
economic strength. At the same time, China more vigorously advanced
its claims in the South China Sea even as other parties to the
conflict put forward their counter claims.
The Pacific pivot has been billed as a way to halt the
relative decline of US influence in Asia. So far, however, this highly
touted "rebalancing" has largely been a shifting around of US forces
in the region.
The fulcrum of the pivot is Okinawa, where the United
States and Japan have been negotiating for nearly two decades to
close an outdated Marine Air Force base in Okinawa and transfer those
Marines to existing, expanding, and proposed facilities elsewhere.
Aside from this complex operation, a few Littoral
Combat Ships have gone to Singapore. The Pentagon has proposed putting
slightly more of its overall fleet in the Pacific (a 60-40 split
compared to the current 50-50). And Washington has welcomed closer
coordination with partners like the Philippines and Vietnam.
Instead of a significant upgrade to US capabilities
in the region, the pivot is largely a signal to Washington's allies
that the partnerships remain strong and a warning to Washington's
adversaries that, even if US military spending is on a slight downward
tilt, the Pentagon possesses more than enough firepower to deter
their power projection.
This signaling function of the pivot dovetails with
another facet of US security policy: arms exports. The growth of the
Pentagon over the last 10 years has been accompanied by a growth in US
military exports, which more than doubled during the period 2002 to
2012 from US$8.3 billion to $18.8 billion.
The modest reduction in Pentagon spending will not
necessarily lead to a corresponding decline in exports. In fact, the
opposite is likely to be true, as was the case during the last
Pentagon slowdown in the 1990s. The Obama administration has pushed
through a streamlining of the licensing process in order to facilitate
an increase in military exports - in part to compensate US arms
manufacturers for a decline in orders from the Pentagon.
Asia and Oceania represent the primary target for US
military exports, absorbing nearly half of all shipments. Of that
number, East Asia represents approximately one-quarter (South Asia
accounts for nearly half).
The biggest-ticket item is the F-35 fighter jet,
which Washington has already sold to Japan, South Korea, and
Australia. Long-range missile defense systems have been sold to Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan. Overall between 2009 and 2013, Australia and
South Korea have been the top US clients. With its projected increase
in military spending, Japan will also likely rise much higher on the
list.
The more advanced weaponry US allies purchase, the more
they are locked into future acquisitions. The United States
emphasizes "interoperability" among its allies. Not only are
purchasers dependent on the United States for spare parts and
upgrades, but they must consider the overall system of command and
control (which is now C5I - Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Combat systems and Intelligence).
Although a French fighter jet or a Russian naval
vessel might be a cheaper option in a competitive bid, the purchasing
country must also consider how the item integrates with the rest of its
hardware and software.
The United States has argued that its overwhelming
military presence in the region and lack of interest in territorial gain
have dampened conflict in Asia. But the security environment has
changed dramatically since the United States first presented itself as
a guarantor of regional stability.
Japan no longer abides by a strict interpretation of
its "peace constitution". North Korea has developed nuclear weapons.
China has dramatically increased its capabilities. South Korea has
created its own indigenous military manufacturing sector and greatly
expanded its exports. Territorial disputes in the South China, Yellow,
and East China Seas have sharpened. The only flashpoint that has
become more peaceful in the last few years has been the Taiwan Strait.
The continued increase in military spending by
countries in East Asia and the massive influx of arms into the region
are both symptoms and drivers of conflict. Until and unless the region
restrains its appetite for military upgrades, the risk of clashes and
even all-out war will remain high.
In such an increasingly volatile environment,
regional security agreements - on North Korea's nuclear program, the
several territorial disputes, or new technological threats like
cyberwarfare - will be even more difficult to achieve.
Most importantly, because of these budget priorities,
the region will have fewer resources and less political will to
address other pressing threats, such as climate change, which cannot be
defeated with fighter jets or the latest generation of battle ship.
(Inter Press Service)
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