RSIS presents the following commentary Australia's new Defence White Paper: Shifting the Goal Posts by Sam Bateman. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg
No. 098/2013 dated 23 May 2013
Australia's new Defence White Paper:
Shifting the Goal Posts
Shifting the Goal Posts
By Sam Bateman
Synopsis
The new Australian Defence White Paper issued earlier this month re-focuses Australia’s strategic attention on its nearer region – the so-called Indo-Pacific arc. What are the implications for Australia’s regional neighbours?
The new Australian Defence White Paper issued earlier this month re-focuses Australia’s strategic attention on its nearer region – the so-called Indo-Pacific arc. What are the implications for Australia’s regional neighbours?
Commentary
THE
AUSTRALIAN Government released a new Defence White Paper in early May,
less than four years after the previous White Paper in 2009. Coming
just a few months before a Federal election with the polls pointing
strongly to a change of government in Canberra, the Federal Opposition
has already said that if elected, they will issue their own White Paper.
The
Government claims a new White Paper was required because of the
Australian Defence Force’s operational drawdown from Afghanistan,
Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands; the ongoing economic strategic and
military shift of influence to the Indo-Pacific; the US re-balance to
the Asia-Pacific; and the persistent impact of the Global Financial
Crisis.
The Indo-Pacific Arc
Critics have suggested, some say unfairly, that the document is just a political gimmick to gain support at the upcoming Federal election by showing that the government is serious about defence. However the document does include new elements that would likely have bipartisan support.
The Indo-Pacific Arc
Critics have suggested, some say unfairly, that the document is just a political gimmick to gain support at the upcoming Federal election by showing that the government is serious about defence. However the document does include new elements that would likely have bipartisan support.
The
White Paper refocusses Australia’s strategic attention back to its
nearer region. The lingering expeditionary considerations of the 2009
White Paper are gone. The 2013 Paper makes much of a new strategic
construct - the Indo-Pacific strategic arc - connecting the Indian and
Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia. It emphasises the growing
strategic importance of India and Indonesia, noting that Australia’s
longstanding partnership with Indonesia remains Canberra’s most
important defence relationship in the region.
The
security of Australia itself is the first key strategic interest
identified in the White Paper. The security, stability and cohesion of
the immediate neighbourhood, which is shared with Papua New Guinea,
Timor-Leste and South Pacific states, is the second key interest; the
third key strategic interest is the stability of the Indo-Pacific,
particularly Southeast Asia and the maritime environment.
Rather
than focussing on a narrow set of bilateral relationships, the paper
emphasises the importance of multilateral approaches. It says
Australia’s security environment will be significantly influenced by how
the Indo-Pacific and its architecture evolves. Hence Australia will do
what it can to help strengthen the regional security architecture so
that it embraces the US, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of
Korea and other regional states within a community that is able to
discuss political, economic and security issues and act cooperatively to
address them. Accordingly, Canberra will actively support institutions
such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and
the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus).
Australia’s shifting posture towards China
Canberra’s
view of China is very different in the 2013 White Paper from that of
the 2009 document that reflected some hawkish views about the possible
threat posed by China and its military expansion. The 2013 paper
acknowledges that China is an important partner for Australia in the
region and that the defence relationship is a key component of the
broader bilateral relationship. Accordingly Canberra “does not approach
China as an adversary. Rather its policy is aimed at encouraging China's
peaceful rise and ensuring that strategic competition in the region
does not lead to conflict”.
Prime
Minister Gillard’s visit to China in April 2013 was a major
breakthrough in the bilateral relationship. The two sides agreed to
designate this relationship as a ‘strategic partnership’ in recognition
of its breadth and complexity. They also agreed to conduct annual
dialogues at the leaders-level, as well as annual bilateral
ministerial-level Foreign and Strategic Dialogues and a Strategic
Economic Dialogue, to promote closer cooperation across a range of
issues. These will be in addition to the longstanding Defence Strategic
Dialogue held annually between the Department of Defence and the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
The
defence relationship is articulated further in the Australia-China
Defence Engagement Action Plan. The Plan includes initiatives to enhance
maritime engagement, peacekeeping cooperation, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief engagement, working-level activities, academic
exchanges and senior level dialogue.
Maritime dimension
The White Paper notes that the emerging Indo-Pacific system is predominantly a maritime environment with Southeast Asia at its geographic centre. That means a strategic focus on the archipelagic arc to Australia’s north stretching from Indonesia through Papua New Guinea to Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
The White Paper notes that the emerging Indo-Pacific system is predominantly a maritime environment with Southeast Asia at its geographic centre. That means a strategic focus on the archipelagic arc to Australia’s north stretching from Indonesia through Papua New Guinea to Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
Arguably
this arc also includes the Philippines through which vital Australian
trade routes pass and which has a pressing need to improve its maritime
security. While relations with Indonesia, Timor-Leste and Papua New
Guinea are all mentioned in the White Paper as strategic priorities,
the Philippines is rather down-played, being put together with Thailand
as a more remote but long-standing defence partner.
The
2012 Philippines-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement is now
in place, and the White Paper notes that Canberra will seek to enhance
practical engagement with the Philippines, particularly in
counter-terrorism and maritime security.
Where’s the money?
The
major weakness of the White Paper is its lack of detail on money. It
has a short chapter on Defence Budget and Finances that discusses the
process but has no dollars.
The
Australian Government has ruled out further funding cuts in the Defence
Budget after a AUD$5.5 billion cut last year, but retains its
commitment to the ‘big money’ items of 12 Australian-designed and built
submarines, 12 Boeing EA-18 G "Growler" fighters and 72 Lockheed Martin
stealth Joint Strike Fighters. Two new Australian-built supply ships and
24 new Australian-built patrol boats are also to be fast-tracked.
Simple
‘back of the envelope’ calculations throw real doubt on how all these
acquisitions will be accommodated within realistic projections of the
Defence Budget. The money may simply not be there, unless there is some
sudden deterioration in Australia’s strategic circumstances
necessitating a marked increase in defence spending.
Sam
Bateman is a Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University. He is a former Australian naval commodore who
had several postings in the Strategic Policy area of the Department of
Defence in Canberra.
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