US
'pivots' on the Philippines
By Richard Javad Heydarian
MANILA - With tensions intensifying between China and Japan over contested islands and reefs in the East China Sea, the Philippines is exploiting the distraction to push its claims vis-a-vis China in the South China Sea, via a controversial and potentially destabilizing administrative order.
On September 5, Philippine President Benigno Aquino issued Administrative Order 29, which officially renames the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea on national maps. After making the executive order, he notably failed days later to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held in Russia.
The controversial order, which will be submitted to the United Nations, aims to firm up Manila's claims to disputed maritime
territories lying within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including over the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. Chinese and Philippine military vessels squared off over the disputed outcropping for several weeks earlier this year.
Aquino justified the action by saying "it is important to clarify which portions we claim as ours versus the entirety of the South China Sea." At the same time, he expressed hopes for "a dialogue [with China] where we can have a heart-to-heart talk and share our thoughts in total honesty and openness".
China's Foreign Ministry swiftly dismissed the order, saying in a statement that "China claims indisputable sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea." Invoking Beijing's wide-ranging nine-dash map of its claimed territories over the maritime area, those claims include areas within the Philippines' 200-mile EEZ.
The Philippines' growing assertiveness in the face of veiled Chinese threats is more than a calculated strategy to push claims while China is preoccupied with a potentially more volatile dispute with Japan. Rather, Manila's emboldened position banks on expected United States' assistance in the event heated rhetoric boils over into armed confrontation.
Outmanned, outgunned
In terms of military expenditures, China's spending on naval capacities dwarves that of other claimants in South China Sea. While the Philippines' decrepit and under-equipped armed forces subsists on annual expenditures of around US$1.5 billion (ranking 59th in the world), China is the world's second-largest military spender with a scheduled annual budget of $129 billion in 2015.
Much of that spending is focused on the country's fast expanding naval capabilities, including ramped up "anti-access" and "blue water" capabilities. Many strategic analysts contend that China's official military expenditure is grossly understated to avoid panic among its lesser armed Southeast Asian neighbors.
The Philippines' acute military weakness is a reflection of many factors, including an excessive strategic orientation towards internal threats such as insurgency and terrorism, chronic under-investment in military modernization, high levels of official corruption in military procurements, and a heavy strategic reliance on treaty allies such as the US.
Two decades after the closure of American bases in the country, the Philippines has failed to establish even a minimum deterrence capability. When faced with Chinese incursions in 1995 at Mischief Reef, Manila had no choice but to rely on moral suasion and regional multilateral mediation. Over the next decade-and-a-half, Manila's foreign policy with Beijing focused on diplomacy and trade to avoid any territorial confrontation.
That changed in 2010 when China stepped up its paramilitary and military activities in adjacent waters, pressing its territorial claims with a new sense of vigor and destiny. To many Southeast Asian states, those military moves marked the end of China's two-decade long "charm-offensive", where its diplomacy focused on economic aid and exchange, and the beginning of rising territorial tensions in both the South and East China Seas.
"The situation is made more complex with China's navy becoming more influential within the internal power equation in China, using the territorial issue as a springboard to legitimize their rising influence within the establishment," says prominent Filipino intellectual and legislator Walden Bello. "There is a new sense of China in the region. In the past, it was seen as a big and influential neighbor, focused on internal development with low profile external posturing. But now we are entering a 'post-Deng Xiaoping' era of greater assertiveness, whereby you have a big neighbor that is laying claim to the whole South China Sea."
Enter Uncle Sam
The Philippines is arguably at the center of the US's declared "pivot" policy towards Asia. Already zeroed in on Asia's booming markets as an antidote to its flailing domestic economy, and seemingly aware of its strategic over-extension in the Middle East, the US has returned to the region in force to counterbalance China's rising power and influence.
Rhetorically the pivot's accent has been on benign issues such as trade, investment and economic integration. But strategic analysts believe the policy is a clear attempt to draw lines against heightened Chinese assertiveness and preserve America's national interest in freedom of navigation in economically important Asian waterways.
"You are talking about a US that understands it is overstretched in its commitments in the Eurasian region. However, on the question of the pivot to Asia, a large part of US interest in the region is centered on China," says Herman Kraft, former director of the Manila-based Institute for Strategic and Developmental Studies (ISDS). "In one sense it is a logical rebalancing. But the primary push in pivot to Asia is strategic competition with China."
Frontline treaty allies like the Philippines and Japan have been among the most vocal proponents of a stronger American presence in the region, legitimizing Washington's long-time claim to serve as the Pacific's "anchor of stability and prosperity." China's recent actions, fueled in part by growing popular nationalism, have pushed a new convergence of American and its Asian treaty allies' strategic interests.
Whether that convergence fosters stability or stokes confrontation is yet to be seen. When US allies such as the Philippines openly called for enhanced military relations and defense cooperation to counterbalance China, a flustered Beijing has responded with even greater assertiveness in recent months.
"Ironically in its attempt to avoid strategic encirclement, China has - through its increasingly aggressive posture - legitimized the US's pivot to Asia, which is obviously to contain Beijing," says Bello.
Crucial node
True to its historical role as an American colony, the Philippines is emerging as a crucial node in America's "pivot".
Subic and Clark, the former site of the US's largest overseas military bases, are expected to play a key role in the implementation of the US's new strategic policy. Although there is an explicit constitutional prohibition against the establishment of permanent US bases in the Philippines, Manila has recently expressed its willingness to host an increased "rotational" US presence at the bases.
In June, Defense Undersecretary for defense affairs Honorio Azcueta said, "They can come here provided they have prior coordination from the government." Manila has recently welcomed US warships and fighter planes to enhance the two sides' interoperability. The US is set to deploy its most advanced jets and warships to the region, including the EA-18G fighter plane which is capable of flying faster than the speed of sound and is geared to jam enemy air defense capabilities.
Washington has said it intends to deploy 60% of its surface ships to the region, amounting to six aircraft carriers and the majority of its submarines, littoral combat ships and destroyers. It has already reportedly deployed 60% of its aircraft carrier battle groups and nuclear submarines to the region.
Despite growing fiscal challenges, Washington recently tripled its Foreign Military Fund (FMF) allocation to the Philippines, from $11.9 million to $30 million. Apart from selling two Coast Guard Cutters to the Philippines, Washington has also apparently agreed to provide Manila with the P-3 Orion, the US Navy's frontline maritime patrol aircraft. The US has also recently deployed the USS North Carolina nuclear submarine to Subic, a move met by increased Chinese naval activity in nearly waters.
In April, the US and Philippines conducted their annual joint Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) exercises with notable modifications. The site of the exercises was shifted to an area nearer to the disputed maritime territories off the coast of Palawan); the number of United States Air Force trainers was double the size of the Armed Forces of the Philippines trainees; and, the mission was primarily focused on enhancing combined planning, readiness and interoperability, including for sea-based operations. All of these efforts came under US's expressed commitment to enhance Manila's "minimum credible defense posture".
In that direction, reports revealed last month that the US intends to install a second land-based early detection radar system against ballistic missiles, known as X-Band 2, in Japan. The US has claimed the radar is aimed against the threat of North Korea, but strategic analysts view the installation as part of an emerging wider regional missile defense shield against China's growing anti-access and ballistic missile capabilities.
Those same analysts believe that the Philippines could be a primary site for expanding such a defensive arc into Southeast Asia. The US is known to have concerns about China's ability to target with ballistic missiles US forces based on the Pacific island of Guam, making the installation of X-Band radar in the Philippines a potential frontline strategic priority.
Fiscal, geopolitical realities
That said, there are several considerable constraints against a full and credible American "pivot" towards Asia. Manila and other Asian allies are now anxiously evaluating the extent of American assistance they can expect to receive should tensions with China flare up into armed conflict.
With an anemic economic recovery and constant bipartisan wrangling over fiscal and debt legislation, the US Pentagon now faces across-the-board budget cuts to the tune of $500 billion. America's weak fiscal position could thus badly undermine its ability to redeploy forces to the Asia-Pacific.
Treaty allies such as the Philippines are already complaining about their small absolute and relative share of FMF allocations. Despite a recently tripling of Manila's allocation, the Philippines' share of FMF earmarked for East Asia is half the amount it received in 2006.
"We hope this is not indicative of the priority placed on the Philippines as a regional partner, as even non-treaty allies appear to be getting a bigger share of the FMF allocation," lamented Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario in recent public comments.
The interpretation of the US-Philippine 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is a thornier issue. Unlike previous US administrations, including the Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton administrations, Barack Obama's government has yet to explicitly affirm its commitment to come to the Philippines' defense over contested maritime territories. Some analysts believe Aquino pushed through the recent Western Philippine Sea order to compel Washington to take a stronger public stand on the issue.
So far, America's expressed commitment has been vague and scenario-based, meaning there has been no clear indication of where, when, and how Washington will come to Manila's rescue in the case of an armed clash with China over disputed territories. Washington has maintained this vague footing despite frequent requests from Philippine leaders to make a public statement in defense of their claims.
Many in the Philippines are thus wary of the centrality of US-China relations. Locked in virtual economic co-dependence, Washington likely sees its ties with Beijing as the most consequential bilateral relationship of the next few decades. Many in Manila fear America could for the sake of systemic stability give policy priority to the preservation of great power harmony over defending marginal treaty allies like the Philippines.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the US will be able to disengage quickly from the Middle East and South Asia and place strategic priority on its Asia-Pacific "pivot". With Iran threatening to close the strategically important Strait of Hormuz if it comes under attack from Israel, America has recently rapidly bolstered its naval presence in the Persian Gulf.
"I doubt that US will be able to fully and smoothly pivot to Asia because it is heavily pinned-down in the Middle East, especially in light of growing tensions over Iran's nuclear program and Israel's constant blackmailing," says Filipino legislator Bello. "Russia and China also have an interest in keeping US pinned down elsewhere, away from Asia."
Richard Javad Heydarian is a foreign affairs analyst based in Manila. He can be reached at jrheydarian@gmail.com
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing).
By Richard Javad Heydarian
MANILA - With tensions intensifying between China and Japan over contested islands and reefs in the East China Sea, the Philippines is exploiting the distraction to push its claims vis-a-vis China in the South China Sea, via a controversial and potentially destabilizing administrative order.
On September 5, Philippine President Benigno Aquino issued Administrative Order 29, which officially renames the South China Sea as the West Philippine Sea on national maps. After making the executive order, he notably failed days later to meet Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held in Russia.
The controversial order, which will be submitted to the United Nations, aims to firm up Manila's claims to disputed maritime
territories lying within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including over the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. Chinese and Philippine military vessels squared off over the disputed outcropping for several weeks earlier this year.
Aquino justified the action by saying "it is important to clarify which portions we claim as ours versus the entirety of the South China Sea." At the same time, he expressed hopes for "a dialogue [with China] where we can have a heart-to-heart talk and share our thoughts in total honesty and openness".
China's Foreign Ministry swiftly dismissed the order, saying in a statement that "China claims indisputable sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea." Invoking Beijing's wide-ranging nine-dash map of its claimed territories over the maritime area, those claims include areas within the Philippines' 200-mile EEZ.
The Philippines' growing assertiveness in the face of veiled Chinese threats is more than a calculated strategy to push claims while China is preoccupied with a potentially more volatile dispute with Japan. Rather, Manila's emboldened position banks on expected United States' assistance in the event heated rhetoric boils over into armed confrontation.
Outmanned, outgunned
In terms of military expenditures, China's spending on naval capacities dwarves that of other claimants in South China Sea. While the Philippines' decrepit and under-equipped armed forces subsists on annual expenditures of around US$1.5 billion (ranking 59th in the world), China is the world's second-largest military spender with a scheduled annual budget of $129 billion in 2015.
Much of that spending is focused on the country's fast expanding naval capabilities, including ramped up "anti-access" and "blue water" capabilities. Many strategic analysts contend that China's official military expenditure is grossly understated to avoid panic among its lesser armed Southeast Asian neighbors.
The Philippines' acute military weakness is a reflection of many factors, including an excessive strategic orientation towards internal threats such as insurgency and terrorism, chronic under-investment in military modernization, high levels of official corruption in military procurements, and a heavy strategic reliance on treaty allies such as the US.
Two decades after the closure of American bases in the country, the Philippines has failed to establish even a minimum deterrence capability. When faced with Chinese incursions in 1995 at Mischief Reef, Manila had no choice but to rely on moral suasion and regional multilateral mediation. Over the next decade-and-a-half, Manila's foreign policy with Beijing focused on diplomacy and trade to avoid any territorial confrontation.
That changed in 2010 when China stepped up its paramilitary and military activities in adjacent waters, pressing its territorial claims with a new sense of vigor and destiny. To many Southeast Asian states, those military moves marked the end of China's two-decade long "charm-offensive", where its diplomacy focused on economic aid and exchange, and the beginning of rising territorial tensions in both the South and East China Seas.
"The situation is made more complex with China's navy becoming more influential within the internal power equation in China, using the territorial issue as a springboard to legitimize their rising influence within the establishment," says prominent Filipino intellectual and legislator Walden Bello. "There is a new sense of China in the region. In the past, it was seen as a big and influential neighbor, focused on internal development with low profile external posturing. But now we are entering a 'post-Deng Xiaoping' era of greater assertiveness, whereby you have a big neighbor that is laying claim to the whole South China Sea."
Enter Uncle Sam
The Philippines is arguably at the center of the US's declared "pivot" policy towards Asia. Already zeroed in on Asia's booming markets as an antidote to its flailing domestic economy, and seemingly aware of its strategic over-extension in the Middle East, the US has returned to the region in force to counterbalance China's rising power and influence.
Rhetorically the pivot's accent has been on benign issues such as trade, investment and economic integration. But strategic analysts believe the policy is a clear attempt to draw lines against heightened Chinese assertiveness and preserve America's national interest in freedom of navigation in economically important Asian waterways.
"You are talking about a US that understands it is overstretched in its commitments in the Eurasian region. However, on the question of the pivot to Asia, a large part of US interest in the region is centered on China," says Herman Kraft, former director of the Manila-based Institute for Strategic and Developmental Studies (ISDS). "In one sense it is a logical rebalancing. But the primary push in pivot to Asia is strategic competition with China."
Frontline treaty allies like the Philippines and Japan have been among the most vocal proponents of a stronger American presence in the region, legitimizing Washington's long-time claim to serve as the Pacific's "anchor of stability and prosperity." China's recent actions, fueled in part by growing popular nationalism, have pushed a new convergence of American and its Asian treaty allies' strategic interests.
Whether that convergence fosters stability or stokes confrontation is yet to be seen. When US allies such as the Philippines openly called for enhanced military relations and defense cooperation to counterbalance China, a flustered Beijing has responded with even greater assertiveness in recent months.
"Ironically in its attempt to avoid strategic encirclement, China has - through its increasingly aggressive posture - legitimized the US's pivot to Asia, which is obviously to contain Beijing," says Bello.
Crucial node
True to its historical role as an American colony, the Philippines is emerging as a crucial node in America's "pivot".
Subic and Clark, the former site of the US's largest overseas military bases, are expected to play a key role in the implementation of the US's new strategic policy. Although there is an explicit constitutional prohibition against the establishment of permanent US bases in the Philippines, Manila has recently expressed its willingness to host an increased "rotational" US presence at the bases.
In June, Defense Undersecretary for defense affairs Honorio Azcueta said, "They can come here provided they have prior coordination from the government." Manila has recently welcomed US warships and fighter planes to enhance the two sides' interoperability. The US is set to deploy its most advanced jets and warships to the region, including the EA-18G fighter plane which is capable of flying faster than the speed of sound and is geared to jam enemy air defense capabilities.
Washington has said it intends to deploy 60% of its surface ships to the region, amounting to six aircraft carriers and the majority of its submarines, littoral combat ships and destroyers. It has already reportedly deployed 60% of its aircraft carrier battle groups and nuclear submarines to the region.
Despite growing fiscal challenges, Washington recently tripled its Foreign Military Fund (FMF) allocation to the Philippines, from $11.9 million to $30 million. Apart from selling two Coast Guard Cutters to the Philippines, Washington has also apparently agreed to provide Manila with the P-3 Orion, the US Navy's frontline maritime patrol aircraft. The US has also recently deployed the USS North Carolina nuclear submarine to Subic, a move met by increased Chinese naval activity in nearly waters.
In April, the US and Philippines conducted their annual joint Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) exercises with notable modifications. The site of the exercises was shifted to an area nearer to the disputed maritime territories off the coast of Palawan); the number of United States Air Force trainers was double the size of the Armed Forces of the Philippines trainees; and, the mission was primarily focused on enhancing combined planning, readiness and interoperability, including for sea-based operations. All of these efforts came under US's expressed commitment to enhance Manila's "minimum credible defense posture".
In that direction, reports revealed last month that the US intends to install a second land-based early detection radar system against ballistic missiles, known as X-Band 2, in Japan. The US has claimed the radar is aimed against the threat of North Korea, but strategic analysts view the installation as part of an emerging wider regional missile defense shield against China's growing anti-access and ballistic missile capabilities.
Those same analysts believe that the Philippines could be a primary site for expanding such a defensive arc into Southeast Asia. The US is known to have concerns about China's ability to target with ballistic missiles US forces based on the Pacific island of Guam, making the installation of X-Band radar in the Philippines a potential frontline strategic priority.
Fiscal, geopolitical realities
That said, there are several considerable constraints against a full and credible American "pivot" towards Asia. Manila and other Asian allies are now anxiously evaluating the extent of American assistance they can expect to receive should tensions with China flare up into armed conflict.
With an anemic economic recovery and constant bipartisan wrangling over fiscal and debt legislation, the US Pentagon now faces across-the-board budget cuts to the tune of $500 billion. America's weak fiscal position could thus badly undermine its ability to redeploy forces to the Asia-Pacific.
Treaty allies such as the Philippines are already complaining about their small absolute and relative share of FMF allocations. Despite a recently tripling of Manila's allocation, the Philippines' share of FMF earmarked for East Asia is half the amount it received in 2006.
"We hope this is not indicative of the priority placed on the Philippines as a regional partner, as even non-treaty allies appear to be getting a bigger share of the FMF allocation," lamented Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario in recent public comments.
The interpretation of the US-Philippine 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is a thornier issue. Unlike previous US administrations, including the Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton administrations, Barack Obama's government has yet to explicitly affirm its commitment to come to the Philippines' defense over contested maritime territories. Some analysts believe Aquino pushed through the recent Western Philippine Sea order to compel Washington to take a stronger public stand on the issue.
So far, America's expressed commitment has been vague and scenario-based, meaning there has been no clear indication of where, when, and how Washington will come to Manila's rescue in the case of an armed clash with China over disputed territories. Washington has maintained this vague footing despite frequent requests from Philippine leaders to make a public statement in defense of their claims.
Many in the Philippines are thus wary of the centrality of US-China relations. Locked in virtual economic co-dependence, Washington likely sees its ties with Beijing as the most consequential bilateral relationship of the next few decades. Many in Manila fear America could for the sake of systemic stability give policy priority to the preservation of great power harmony over defending marginal treaty allies like the Philippines.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the US will be able to disengage quickly from the Middle East and South Asia and place strategic priority on its Asia-Pacific "pivot". With Iran threatening to close the strategically important Strait of Hormuz if it comes under attack from Israel, America has recently rapidly bolstered its naval presence in the Persian Gulf.
"I doubt that US will be able to fully and smoothly pivot to Asia because it is heavily pinned-down in the Middle East, especially in light of growing tensions over Iran's nuclear program and Israel's constant blackmailing," says Filipino legislator Bello. "Russia and China also have an interest in keeping US pinned down elsewhere, away from Asia."
Richard Javad Heydarian is a foreign affairs analyst based in Manila. He can be reached at jrheydarian@gmail.com
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing).
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