Saturday, August 23, 2008

How Algeria created their "aL Qaeda" cell

How Algeria created their "aL Qaeda" cell
Greg Bacon, The People's Voice, 08/20/08

Need to maintain control over your country's energy resources and political machinery, and at the same time, turn that nation into a model of political repression that would make Joe Stalin proud?

Easy, just create a local branch of the CIA financed and MOSSAD run boogieman, aL Qaeda, add in a very compliant lapdog, Zionist controlled MSM to help spread this fear and some MOSSAD trained assassins and voilà, you have "McQaeda" operating in your country. Take this op abroad and repeat in other countries, like France, in preparation for the world's leading CIA/MOSSAD false-flag of the century, 9/11. Now that the pump is primed, with the Zionist media disseminating bogus aL Qaeda stories all over the world, you're ready to go Prime Time, with the most masterful false-flag of the them all, 9/11.

After 9/11, you have that image of airliners crashing into the WTC burned into people's minds, making them so scared, they'll agree to anything, including invading countries at Israel's behest and establishing a police state in the USA, purportedly looking for "terrorists," when the two of the world's leading terrorists are easy to find:
One lives in the White House and the other, on the grounds of the US Naval Observatory in DC, the home of the Vice-President.

1991: Algerian Army Helps Create Al-Qaeda Linked Militant Group

Mohammed Samraoui. [Source: Rachad]
Mohammed Samraoui, the Algerian army’s deputy chief counterintelligence specialist, will later desert in disgust and explain in a French trial that the Algerian army helped create the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), supposedly an Islamist militant group linked to al-Qaeda fighting the Algerian government. He will say that in the months before an Algerian army coup in January 1992 the Algerian army “created the GIA” in an attempt to weaken and destroy the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist political party poised to take power in elections. He will say, “We established a list of the most dangerous people and demanded their arrest, but in vain: they were needed [to be free] to create terrorist groups. Instead, we arrested right, left, and center. We were trying to radicalize the movement.” Army intelligence identified Algerians returning from the Soviet-Afghan war and many times recruited them. “They all took the flight home via Tunis because it was half-price. As soon as they landed in Algiers, we took them in hand.” [RANDAL, 2005, PP. 169-170]

October 27, 1994-July 16, 1996: Government Mole Takes Over Algerian GIA, Causes Group to Splinter and Lose Popularity

Djamel Zitouni. [Source: Fides Journal]
Djamel Zitouni takes over the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). There are allegations that the Algerian government manipulated the GIA from its creation in 1991 (see 1991). After going through several leaders, it appears that the GIA’s new leader Zitouni is in fact an agent of the Algerian intelligence agency. For instance, in 2005 the Guardian will report that Algerian intelligence “managed to place Djamel Zitouni, one of the Islamists it controlled, at the head of the GIA.” [GUARDIAN, 9/8/2005] And journalist Jonathan Randal will write in a 2005 book that according to Abdelkhader Tigha, a former Algerian security officer, “army intelligence controlled overall GIA leader Djamel Zitouni and used his men to massacre civilians to turn Algerian and French public opinion against the jihadis.” [RANDAL, 2005, PP. 170-171]

Indeed, prior to Zitouni taking over, the GIA tried to limit civilian casualties in their many attacks (see December 1991-October 27, 1994). But Zitouni launches many attacks on civilian targets. He also attacks other Islamist militant groups, such as the rival Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). He also launches a series of attacks inside France. [CROTTY, 2005, PP. 291-292] Zitouni also kills many of the genuine Islamists within the GIA. [NEW ZEALAND LISTENER, 2/14/2004] These controversial tactics cause the GIA to slowly lose popular support and the group also splits into many dissident factions. Some international militant leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Qatada continue to support the GIA. He will finally be killed by a rival faction on July 16, 1996. [CROTTY, 2005, PP. 291-292]

July-October 1995: Wave of Attacks in France Blamed on Algerian Islamist Militants Were Likely Masterminded by Algerian Government

Ten French citizens die and more than two hundred are injured in a series of attacks in France from July to October 1995.

Most of the attacks are caused by the explosion of rudimentary bombs in the Paris subway. The deaths are blamed on the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) Algerian militant group. Some members of the banned Algerian opposition Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) living in exile in France are killed as well. For instance, high-level FIS leader Abdelbaki Sahraoui is assassinated on July 11, 1995. The GIA takes credit for these acts. The attacks mobilize French public opinion against the Islamic opposition in Algerian and causes the French government to abandon its support for recent Algerian peace plans put forth by a united opposition front (see January 13,1995). [BBC, 10/30/2002; RANDAL, 2005, PP. 171, 316-317; GUARDIAN, 9/8/2005]

However, in September 1995, French Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré says,

“It cannot be excluded that Algerian intelligence may have been implicated” in the first bombing, which hit the Saint-Michel subway stop in Paris on July 25 and killed eight. [BBC, 10/31/2002; RANDAL, 2005, PP. 316-317]

And as time goes on, Algerian officials defect and blame Algerian intelligence for sponsoring all the attacks. Ali Touchent is said to be the GIA leader organizing the attacks (see January 13,1995). But Mohammed Samraoui, former deputy chief of the Algerian army’s counterintelligence unit, will later claim that Touchent was an Algerian intelligence “agent tasked with infiltrating Islamist ranks abroad and the French knew it.” But he adds the French “probably did not suspect their Algerian counterparts were prepared to go so far.” [RANDAL, 2005, PP. 316-317]

A long-time Algerian secret agent known only by the codename Yussuf-Joseph who defected to Britain will later claim that the bombings in France were supported by Algerian intelligence in order to turn French public opinion against the Islamic opposition in Algeria. He says that

intelligence agents went sent to France by General Smain Lamari, head of the Algerian counterintelligence department, to directly organize at least two of the French bombings. The operational leader was actually Colonel Souames Mahmoud, head of the intelligence at the Algerian Embassy in Paris. [OBSERVER, 11/9/1997]

In 2002, a French television station will air a 90-minute documentary tying the bombings to Algerian intelligence.

In the wake of the broadcast, Alain Marsaud, French counterintelligence coordinator in the 1980s, will say, “State terrorism uses screen organizations. In this case, [the GIA was] a screen organization in the hands of the Algerian security services… it was a screen to hold France hostage.” [NEW ZEALAND LISTENER, 2/14/2004]

Greg Bacon


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