August 2, 2017 9:30 am JST
William Pesek
China's debt troubles are rapidly going global
Beijing's debt binge is a clear danger to the global economy
When exactly did China become like South Korea?
The search for cautionary tales to explain where the world`s second-biggest economy is headed lead most observers to Tokyo. Certainly, Beijing's dueling bubbles in credit, debt, shadow banking and complacency are too Japan-like for comfort. But the sudden and panicky crackdown on a handful of companies -- Anbang Insurance Group, Dalian Wanda Group, Fosun Group, HNA Group -- suggest Beijing also has a chaebol problem on its hands. The reference here is to the giant, family-run conglomerates that toppled South Korea`s economy in 1997. Signs are that Beijing faces a similar tail-wagging-the-dog problem.
Consider what happened this month. For years, investors angled for a gateway to China's $10 trillion bond market. It was the next logical step after foreigners gained access to Shanghai and Shenzhen stocks. But when they got their mainland bonding experience, most stayed away.
That is not just a blow to President Xi Jinping's campaign to boost global use of the yuan. It is a harbinger of trouble for China's lopsided economy nine years after investors thought the Communist Party had deftly avoided the "Lehman shock."
The problem with Beijing's crushing debt load is borrowed time. China's 2008 response to the post-Lehman-chaos was to create overlapping bubbles in credit, local government borrowing and shadow banking. In 2012, Xi inherited this unholy trinity of stimulus. And despite assurances to the contrary, Xi stuck with it.
The first hint that the bill is coming due came in May, when Moody's Investors Service downgraded Beijing's sovereign rating for the first time since 1989. Claims by Xi's men that the step was "absolutely groundless" look even more delusional now that foreign investors are avoiding Chinese debt. The newest concern, though, is political risk imperiling Beijing's credit rating and economic stability as a uniquely chaotic 2017 unfolds.
For a government that prides itself on extreme competence, Xi's is certainly generating lots of volatility going after prominent tycoons -- especially those with big footprints abroad. Chinese media call them "gray rhinos," obvious dangers that you ignore until it is too late. Whereas Silicon Valley obsesses over "unicorn" success stories and Wall Street over "black swans" no one saw coming, Beijing is preoccupied with giant, highly indebted and politically connected companies it deems threats to financial safety at home.
Few foreigners had even heard of HNA before Xi's headline-making inquisition. What started as a little-known airline operator has grown into a global colossus, making more than $40 billion of acquisitions since January 2016. Those debt-financed deals pushed HNA's tentacles into financial services (Deutsche Bank), tourism (Hilton Hotels), logistics and even President Trump's orbit.
Trump's short-lived communications chief, Anthony Scaramucci, is trying to sell his SkyBridge Capital hedge fund to a company whose ownership structure is up for debate. Recently, HNA said it is controlled by two charities, one in New York and one on China's Hainan Island. That prompted Eric Schneiderman, the New York Attorney General, to send a letter asking for more information about one of the charities. The plot thickens when you consider that Anbang Chairman Wu Xiaohui, who bought New York's Waldorf Astoria last year for $2 billion, was detained by Chinese police in June. Fosun's Guo Guangchang, often called the "Warren Buffett of China," also is under scrutiny by Beijing.
Xi's clampdown speaks to China's chaebol quandary. As regulators focus their attention on a handful of companies, let us not forget how China got here. Its debt, competing bubbles and opacity have created a mergers and acquisitions monster Xi is not sure he can tame. Is the recent boom in junk bond issuance a sign of bigger M&A deals to come? Investors should watch more carefully a financial system that is top-heavier than Xi admits. The problem is bigger, though. China is the world`s second biggest economy, whereas Korea's was barely in the top 12 in 1997. Also, the troubles facing HNA and other highly-leveraged, overstretched companies extend to the state sector that towers over China.
The search for cautionary tales to explain where the world`s second-biggest economy is headed lead most observers to Tokyo. Certainly, Beijing's dueling bubbles in credit, debt, shadow banking and complacency are too Japan-like for comfort. But the sudden and panicky crackdown on a handful of companies -- Anbang Insurance Group, Dalian Wanda Group, Fosun Group, HNA Group -- suggest Beijing also has a chaebol problem on its hands. The reference here is to the giant, family-run conglomerates that toppled South Korea`s economy in 1997. Signs are that Beijing faces a similar tail-wagging-the-dog problem.
Consider what happened this month. For years, investors angled for a gateway to China's $10 trillion bond market. It was the next logical step after foreigners gained access to Shanghai and Shenzhen stocks. But when they got their mainland bonding experience, most stayed away.
That is not just a blow to President Xi Jinping's campaign to boost global use of the yuan. It is a harbinger of trouble for China's lopsided economy nine years after investors thought the Communist Party had deftly avoided the "Lehman shock."
The problem with Beijing's crushing debt load is borrowed time. China's 2008 response to the post-Lehman-chaos was to create overlapping bubbles in credit, local government borrowing and shadow banking. In 2012, Xi inherited this unholy trinity of stimulus. And despite assurances to the contrary, Xi stuck with it.
The first hint that the bill is coming due came in May, when Moody's Investors Service downgraded Beijing's sovereign rating for the first time since 1989. Claims by Xi's men that the step was "absolutely groundless" look even more delusional now that foreign investors are avoiding Chinese debt. The newest concern, though, is political risk imperiling Beijing's credit rating and economic stability as a uniquely chaotic 2017 unfolds.
For a government that prides itself on extreme competence, Xi's is certainly generating lots of volatility going after prominent tycoons -- especially those with big footprints abroad. Chinese media call them "gray rhinos," obvious dangers that you ignore until it is too late. Whereas Silicon Valley obsesses over "unicorn" success stories and Wall Street over "black swans" no one saw coming, Beijing is preoccupied with giant, highly indebted and politically connected companies it deems threats to financial safety at home.
Few foreigners had even heard of HNA before Xi's headline-making inquisition. What started as a little-known airline operator has grown into a global colossus, making more than $40 billion of acquisitions since January 2016. Those debt-financed deals pushed HNA's tentacles into financial services (Deutsche Bank), tourism (Hilton Hotels), logistics and even President Trump's orbit.
Trump's short-lived communications chief, Anthony Scaramucci, is trying to sell his SkyBridge Capital hedge fund to a company whose ownership structure is up for debate. Recently, HNA said it is controlled by two charities, one in New York and one on China's Hainan Island. That prompted Eric Schneiderman, the New York Attorney General, to send a letter asking for more information about one of the charities. The plot thickens when you consider that Anbang Chairman Wu Xiaohui, who bought New York's Waldorf Astoria last year for $2 billion, was detained by Chinese police in June. Fosun's Guo Guangchang, often called the "Warren Buffett of China," also is under scrutiny by Beijing.
Xi's clampdown speaks to China's chaebol quandary. As regulators focus their attention on a handful of companies, let us not forget how China got here. Its debt, competing bubbles and opacity have created a mergers and acquisitions monster Xi is not sure he can tame. Is the recent boom in junk bond issuance a sign of bigger M&A deals to come? Investors should watch more carefully a financial system that is top-heavier than Xi admits. The problem is bigger, though. China is the world`s second biggest economy, whereas Korea's was barely in the top 12 in 1997. Also, the troubles facing HNA and other highly-leveraged, overstretched companies extend to the state sector that towers over China.
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