Vietnam and the Philippines: Allies Against Leviathan
HANOI
– “They were really unprepared for that and were really embarrassed by
it,” one of Vietnam’s top experts on Chinese diplomacy told me during my
recent visit to Hanoi, referring to the Philippines’ bringing its case
against China’s aggressive illegal actions in the West Philippine Sea to
the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal.
This
confirmed my assessment that the Aquino government’s action was a
master move. It put China on the defensive, said another Vietnamese
analyst, and was one of the factors that prompted Beijing last year to
agree to begin discussions with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) on a Code of Conduct for the “East Sea,” the Vietnamese
designation for the West Philippine Sea.
The downside of this for the Philippines was that its legal move made it the “number one target” of Beijing, replacing Vietnam. “They’re now isolating you, while relations between Vietnam and China are getting back to normal.” Despite the leaders of both countries exchanging visits, however, “we still feel the chill,” said a top China expert at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. “In terms of China’s least favored countries in ASEAN, we’re number nine for the moment and you’re number 10. In the long run, however, Vietnam is Beijing’s main strategic problem.”
Invited to Hanoi to give a series of lectures on foreign policy and economic issues by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the legendary head of the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s (PRG) of South Vietnam’s delegation to the Paris talks that ended the Vietnam War, I took advantage of the opportunity to elicit Vietnamese views on the territorial disputes in the Philippine Sea.
How do the Vietnamese interpret China’s “Nine-Dash Line” map that claims virtually the whole of the South China Sea as Chinese territory? There are, interestingly, several schools of thought. The first sees the Nine-Dash Line as delineating the maritime borders of China and not necessarily possession of the islands in the area. The second interprets it as saying only that the islands and other terrestrial formations in the area belong to China, leaving the status of the surrounding waters ambiguous. A third opinion is that the map asserts that both the islands and surrounding waters belong to China.
The downside of this for the Philippines was that its legal move made it the “number one target” of Beijing, replacing Vietnam. “They’re now isolating you, while relations between Vietnam and China are getting back to normal.” Despite the leaders of both countries exchanging visits, however, “we still feel the chill,” said a top China expert at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. “In terms of China’s least favored countries in ASEAN, we’re number nine for the moment and you’re number 10. In the long run, however, Vietnam is Beijing’s main strategic problem.”
Invited to Hanoi to give a series of lectures on foreign policy and economic issues by Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the legendary head of the Provisional Revolutionary Government’s (PRG) of South Vietnam’s delegation to the Paris talks that ended the Vietnam War, I took advantage of the opportunity to elicit Vietnamese views on the territorial disputes in the Philippine Sea.
Figuring out Beijing’s Motives
The Vietnamese are very well positioned to analyze the Chinese. Not only have they fought the Chinese off and on for over a thousand years, they also have remarkably similar ways of interpreting political developments. This is due to the fact that communist parties rule both countries, and these parties filter realities through a Leninist analytical paradigm that is the common ideological heritage of Marxist-Leninist parties. It is a shared method of analysis that is, however, hitched to different, indeed, conflicting national interests.How do the Vietnamese interpret China’s “Nine-Dash Line” map that claims virtually the whole of the South China Sea as Chinese territory? There are, interestingly, several schools of thought. The first sees the Nine-Dash Line as delineating the maritime borders of China and not necessarily possession of the islands in the area. The second interprets it as saying only that the islands and other terrestrial formations in the area belong to China, leaving the status of the surrounding waters ambiguous. A third opinion is that the map asserts that both the islands and surrounding waters belong to China.
There
is a fourth perspective, and though it is held by only a handful of
experts, it is intriguing. This view holds that the Nine-Dash Line is an
aggressive negotiating device.
According
to a diplomat and academic expert who has had first-hand experience
with Chinese negotiating behavior, their style of resolving territorial
issues has the following steps. “First, the two parties agree on the
principles guiding negotiations. Second, both sides draw up their maps
of reflecting their respective territorial claims, with China pushing
its territorial claims as far as possible. Third, they compare the maps
as to overlapping or disputed and undisputed areas. Fourth, the parties
negotiate to resolve the disputed areas. Fifth, if there is agreement,
draw up a new map. Finally, go to the United Nations to legalize the
new map.”
Despite varying
views on China’s intentions, however, the Vietnamese are one on two key
points: 1) that Nine-Dash Line claim is illegal, and 2) that owing to
the number of parties involved in the South China Sea dispute, with
overlapping claims, only multilateral negotiations can set the basis for
a lasting comprehensive solution.
Also,
whatever may be their different readings of China’s motives for
advancing its Nine-Dash Line claims, there seems to be a consensus among
Vietnamese officials and experts that China’s strategic aim is to
eventually assert its full control of the South China Sea. In other
words, Beijing’s aim is to legally transform the area into a domestic
waterway governed by Chinese domestic laws. Some of Beijing’s acts are
explicit, such as the establishment of Sansha City as a domestic
governing unit for the whole South China Sea and the recent passage of a
fisheries law requiring non-Chinese vessels fishing in the area to
obtain a license from the Chinese government. Some are ambiguous, such
as Beijing’s views on the issue of freedom of navigation in the disputed
area, and the reason for this is because ambiguity serves their purpose
at a time that they do not yet have the capability to match their power
to their ambition.
“But
there is no doubt that when they reach that point, of having the power
to impose their ambition,” said one Vietnamese analyst, “they will
subject the area to Chinese domestic law.”
Vietnam on the Philippines’ Legal Case against Beijing
As
to the Philippines’ initiation of arbitral proceedings against China
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, the
Vietnamese government is said to be in full support of it at an informal
level, but cannot “fully publicly support it,” according to one
academic. What this meant was captured in the carefully crafted response
to a reporter’s question about Vietnam’s position on the Philippine
move by Nguyễn Duy Chiến, Deputy-Director of the National Border
Committee under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “It is Vietnam’s
consistent position that all issues related to the East Sea should be
solved by peaceful means, on the basis of international law, especially
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
He
continued, “In Vietnam’s opinion, all nations have the full right to
choose peaceful means to solve disputes in conformity with the United
Nations Charter and international law, including the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
During
his visit to Washington, DC, in July last year, President Truong Tan
Sang attacked the Chinese Nine-Dash Line claim as being “legally
groundless.” He remained silent, however, on whether Vietnam would join
the Philippines’ in filing a case at the UN against China, though he was
quick to add that as a member of the UN, the Philippines “has all legal
rights to carry on with any proceedings they would like.”
Part
of the reason for the lack of more explicit support appears to be that a
judgment on the case would clarify not only the Philippines and China’s
claims but also Vietnam’s, and some implications of this might not be
positive for Hanoi. But uppermost is a desire not to enrage China at a
time that high-level exchanges are returning relations between the two
countries to “normal” or something close to it.
Despite
their hesitations in giving the Philippines’ legal case their full
public endorsement, the decision of the Philippines to bring it to an
international court is eliciting widespread admiration in official
circles, with one retired ambassador calling it “heroic.”
A key reason for the popularity of the move is obviously that it blindsided Beijing and upset China’s careful calculations. According to one expert on Chinese diplomacy, “the reason they’re upset is because they already have five battlefields—the political, diplomatic, mass media, security, military—and now you’ve added a sixth: the legal battlefield.”
He continued, “The Chinese have a saying, ‘when the flag is in your hands, don’t yield it to others.’” Beijing, in other words, feels very much at sea on the legal front, where experts in international law will be calling the shots.
For the same reason, they approve of the US military build-up in the Philippines. Their position on this matter has not changed since I met with foreign ministry officials during a visit to Hanoi in 2011, where I was told that being a long-time ally of the United States, it was the role of the Philippines to ask the United States to increase its military presence in the Western Pacific. Hanoi’s thinking is classic Leninist balance-of-power logic: China is the ascendant force, the US is a power in decline, so the weaker parties, including the Philippines, Vietnam, ASEAN, and Japan, must band together with the US to contain the rising imperial power.
To conclude, I may have differences with the Vietnamese—and the Aquino administration, for that matter—on the role of the United States, but I think Vietnam is our most important ally in our territorial dispute with China in the West Philippine Sea.
We need to continue deepening our bilateral ties with them and coordinate closely with them in ASEAN and other multilateral fora. We should also deepen our bilateral security coordination, with the aim of laying the foundations for an ASEAN security force for the South China Sea. Finally, if we can get the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to formally join the Republic of the Philippines in its legal case against China at the United Nations, that would be a decisive move that would not only further weaken China’s already weak legal position; it would also be a significant psychological blow to Leviathan.
A key reason for the popularity of the move is obviously that it blindsided Beijing and upset China’s careful calculations. According to one expert on Chinese diplomacy, “the reason they’re upset is because they already have five battlefields—the political, diplomatic, mass media, security, military—and now you’ve added a sixth: the legal battlefield.”
He continued, “The Chinese have a saying, ‘when the flag is in your hands, don’t yield it to others.’” Beijing, in other words, feels very much at sea on the legal front, where experts in international law will be calling the shots.
The U.S.: From Enemy to Ally
On the question of the United States’ increased military presence in the region, the Vietnamese welcome this to “balance” China. Once an enemy, Hanoi now has good security relations with the United States, whose Navy they have invited to use the former Soviet naval base at Cam Ranh Bay for its logistical and ship repair needs.For the same reason, they approve of the US military build-up in the Philippines. Their position on this matter has not changed since I met with foreign ministry officials during a visit to Hanoi in 2011, where I was told that being a long-time ally of the United States, it was the role of the Philippines to ask the United States to increase its military presence in the Western Pacific. Hanoi’s thinking is classic Leninist balance-of-power logic: China is the ascendant force, the US is a power in decline, so the weaker parties, including the Philippines, Vietnam, ASEAN, and Japan, must band together with the US to contain the rising imperial power.
Flaws in the Balance-of-Power Approach
In my various talks over three days, I articulated my disagreement with this logic on the following grounds:- the United States cannot be counted on to support the Philippines and Vietnam’s territorial claims;
- inviting
the United States to have a larger military presence is
counterproductive if the aim is to resolve our territorial disputes with
China since a larger US presence would transform the regional context
into a superpower conflict, thus marginalizing the territorial question
and its resolution;
- the United States cannot be assumed to
be motivated simply by balance of power considerations, but will
advance its own strategic and economic interests as a quid pro quo for
requests for assistance;
- an even bigger military footprint
of the US in the Philippines would convert our country into a frontline
state like Afghanistan and Pakistan, with all the terrible consequences
of such a status, including the subordination of our economic
development to the strategic military priorities of a superpower;
- it
is too early to tell if the US decline is temporary or irreversible,
and in this regard it is instructive to remember that the US snapped
back strongly in the 1990’s, after many experts regarded as inevitable
its being replaced by Japan as No. 1;
- similarly, it is not
a foregone conclusion that China will displace the United States,
especially since its model of export-led development is in crisis and it
is not at all sure it can make the transition to a domestic market-led
growth path without massive internal upheaval; and finally,
- a balance of power situation is unstable and prone to generate conflict, since although no one may want a war, the dynamics of conflict may run out of everyone’s control and lead to war.
Cam Ranh Bay instead of Subic Bay?
My Vietnamese audiences listened politely but were unconvinced. But they were game enough to laugh when I said, “Well, since you have offered them Cam Ranh Bay, the Americans may no longer have any need for Subic Bay.”To conclude, I may have differences with the Vietnamese—and the Aquino administration, for that matter—on the role of the United States, but I think Vietnam is our most important ally in our territorial dispute with China in the West Philippine Sea.
We need to continue deepening our bilateral ties with them and coordinate closely with them in ASEAN and other multilateral fora. We should also deepen our bilateral security coordination, with the aim of laying the foundations for an ASEAN security force for the South China Sea. Finally, if we can get the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to formally join the Republic of the Philippines in its legal case against China at the United Nations, that would be a decisive move that would not only further weaken China’s already weak legal position; it would also be a significant psychological blow to Leviathan.
This article previously ran in Inquirer.net.
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