from STRATFOR
Next Steps for the U.S.-Iran Deal
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Tehran after talks in Geneva on Nov. 24.
ARASH KHAMOOSHI/AFP/Getty Images
Summary
What was unthinkable for many people over many years happened in the early hours of Nov. 24 in Geneva: The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran struck a deal.
After a decadelong struggle, the two reached an accord that seeks to
ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains a civilian one. It is a
preliminary deal, and both sides face months of work to batten down
domestic opposition, build convincing mechanisms to assure compliance
and unthread complicated global sanctions.
That is the easy part. More difficult will be the process to
reshape bilateral relations while virtually every regional player in the
Middle East seeks ways to cope with an Iran that is no longer
geopolitically encumbered.
Analysis
The foreign ministers of Iran and the six Western powers that constitute the so-called P-5+1 Group clinched a six-month deal that
begins the curtailment of Iran's nuclear program while relaxing as much
as $6 billion in sanctions -- basically those embargoes that do not
require U.S. President Barack Obama to secure approval from Congress.
Allowing Iran to enrich uranium to "civilian" levels while making sure
the know-how is not diverted to military purposes will be complex.
There will be disruptive events along the way, but the
normalization process is unlikely to derail. Both sides need it. The
real stakes are the balance of power in the Middle East.
Iran is far more concerned with enhancing its geopolitical prowess
through conventional means. Meanwhile, the United States wants to
leverage relations with Iran in order to better manage the region in an
age of turmoil. Contrary to much of the public discourse, the Obama
administration is not facilitating a nuclear Iran.
Washington and the Middle East
The United States is prepared to accept that Iran will consolidate
much of the influence it has accumulated over the 12 years since the
Sept. 11 attacks. From the point of view of the Iranians, they had
reached the limits of how far they could go in enhancing their
geopolitical footprint in the U.S. war against Sunni Islamist militancy.
The tightening sanctions threatened to undermine the gains the Islamic
republic had made. Thus the time had come for Iran to achieve through
geopolitical moderation what was no longer possible through a radical
foreign policy.
Though the United States is prepared to accept an internationally
rehabilitated Iran as a major stakeholder in the Greater Middle East
region, it does not wish for Tehran to exploit the opportunity in order
to gain disproportionate power. The strategic focus must now shift from
nuclear politics to the imperative that the United States balance Iran
with other regional powers, especially the Sunni Arab states.
The post-Arab Spring turmoil in the region has plunged U.S.-Arab
relations into a state of uncertainty for two reasons: First, the
autocratic regimes have become unreliable partners; second, the region
is seeing the rise of radical Sunni Islamist forces.
A rehabilitated Iran, along with its Shiite radical agenda, serves as a counter to the growing bandwidth of Sunni radicalism.
All strategies have unintended consequences. A geopolitically unchained
Iran, to varying degrees, undermines the position of decades-old
American alliances in the region. These include Turkey, Israel and the
Arab states (the ones that have survived the regional chaos defined by
anti-autocratic popular agitation, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
others).
Washington is not the only actor anticipating a shift in its regional ambitions. France initially challenged earlier attempts at a U.S.-Iranian accord,
placing greater pressure on the Iranians -- much to the enjoyment of
regional states such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Though Paris has been
eying the Middle East -- specifically the Sunni monarchies of the
Persian Gulf -- as a larger potential market for its energy firms and
defense exporters, France stands to gain little from unilaterally
opposing a U.S.-Iranian deal. Rather, France sought to shape the talks
and regional reactions to the benefit of its domestic industries.
Germany and the United Kingdom, the other EU powers present at the
talks, are hoping to gain greater exposure for their energy firms and
exports to Iran's large domestic consumer base. Germany in particular
enjoyed one of the largest non-energy trade relationships with Iran
before the most recent sanctions program took effect.
Regional Reverberations
The United States and the rest of the P-5+1 are not the only ones
attempting to reset their relationship with Iran. Ankara, though
initially opposed to Iranian ambitions in Syria and competing for
influence in Iraq, has pursued a warming of ties with Tehran over the past several months.
Turkey is a rising regional power in its own right, but domestic
infighting within Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party is
coinciding with a slump in the national economy. Meanwhile, Ankara is
struggling to find a peaceful, political solution to its Kurdish issue.
Turkey faces an uphill challenge in moving beyond the ring of Iranian
influence on its borders, but a potential normalization of relations
between Washington and Iran provides some opportunities for Ankara, even
at the risk of empowering Iran's regional ambitions. The two countries
face similar challenges from Kurdish separatism in the region, and the
Iranian market and potential energy exports could help mitigate Turkey's
rising dependence on Russian energy exports and potentially boost its
slowing economy.
For all its rhetoric opposing the deal, Israel has very little to
worry about in the immediate term. It will have to adjust to operating
in an environment where Iran is no longer limited by its pariah status,
but Iran remains unable to threaten Israel for the foreseeable future.
Iran, constrained by its need to be a mainstream actor, will seek to
rebuild its economy and will steer clear of any hawkish moves against
Israel. Furthermore, Iran is more interested in gaining ground against
the Arab states -- something that Israel can use to its advantage. The
report about the Israeli security establishment seeing the deal as a
positive development (in contradiction to the position of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government) speaks volumes about the true extent of Israeli apprehension.
That leaves the Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, for whom a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement is a nightmare scenario. Riyadh and its neighboring monarchies are caught in the middle of the Arab Spring,
which challenges them from within, and were long concerned with the
rise of Iran. But now that their biggest ally has turned to normalizing
ties with their biggest adversary, these countries find themselves
bereft of good options with which to manage an Iran that will gain more
from normalizing relations with the United States than it did with the
American response to the 9/11 attacks.
Iran has played a large and visible role in bolstering the
beleaguered al Assad regime during the Syrian civil war. Iran's
potential reset in relations will bring no easy or quick resolution to
Damascus. The Syrian regime will still face the daunting task of having
to rout the rebels and secure large swathes of Syrian territory, a
difficult task even in the unlikely scenario of a precipitous drop in
Sunni Arab backing for the rebels following a more comprehensive
agreement between Tehran and the West. Indeed, the Syrian conflict,
Iran's support of Hezbollah and the future of Iranian influence in Iraq
will form the more contentious, difficult stages of U.S.-Iranian
negotiations ahead.
The Saudis, domestically at a historic crossroads,
are trying to assert an independent foreign policy given the shift in
American-Iranian ties. But they know that such a move offers limited
dividends. Riyadh will try to make most of the fact that it is not in
Washington's interest to allow Tehran to operate too freely in the
region.
Likewise, the Saudi kingdom will try to work with Turkey to
counterbalance Iran. But again, this is not a reliable tool, given that
Turkish interests converge with those of Iran more than they do with
Saudi Arabia's. Quietly working with Israel is an option, but there are
limits to that given the Arab-Israeli conflict and the fact that Iran
can exploit any such relationship. In the end, the Saudis and the Arab
states will have to adjust most to the reality in which American-Iranian
hostility begins to wither.
Read more: Next Steps for the U.S.-Iran Deal | Stratfor
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