North Korea: Structured for Survival
Jun 8, 2017
Summary
Since
the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the founder of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Il Sung, died, experts have
warned that the North Korean regime was on the brink of collapse. And
since the 1990s, the experts have been wrong. North Korea has been
remarkably resilient in the face of war, international sanctions, famine
and natural disaster. Twice has a system that supposedly functioned
only by the will of its supreme leader transferred power to a chosen
successor, and in doing so it has created a dynasty that is, for better
or worse, unlike any other. Now, under its third leader, Kim Jong Un,
the grandson of the founder, it is commanding the world’s attention like
never before. In the following report, we set forth to answer a simple
question: What explains the longevity of the government in Pyongyang?
Introduction
North
Korea as we know it was created by an agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union in 1945. Before then, the peninsula had been
occupied by foreign powers off and on for years, but it had never been
divided like it is today.
Visions of Korea
The
Soviets installed Kim Il Sung in 1948, shortly after the partition, and
conditions were ripe for his ascension. North Korea had been occupied
by the Japanese for nearly four decades, and the country was eager for a
Korean leader. He lived, perhaps ironically, most of his early life
outside Korea – his parents escaped the Japanese occupation, so he grew
up in Manchuria in northern China. When he grew up, he became a
guerrilla, fighting the very people his parents had fled.
Once
it was founded, North Korea couldn’t escape Soviet influence; Moscow
propped it up, and in any case the countries share a border. In fact,
Kim Il Sung was educated in the Soviet Union and served as a major in
the Soviet military during World War II. He left the Soviet Union only
after the war ended.
And
though the party Kim would lead was, in part, a consequence of Soviet
influence, it was not simply an extension of it. It’s best thought of as
an instrument of “oriental despotism,” an oft-forgotten political
philosophy popularized by Karl Marx that describes an extremely
centralized regime with absolute power of its central bureaucracy. The
government in this system is the sole business proprietor and organizer
of economic activity. It uses coercion and military force to govern. The
people who live under it have no personal liberties. Oriental despotism
concedes that, for a variety of reasons, including geography, despots
of the “East” simply function differently from those of the West –
predisposing them to anti-colonialism, nationalism and fierce
self-sufficiency.
Indeed,
Kim Il Sung was, at his heart, a Korean nationalist. It didn’t take him
long to subvert Soviet interests to his own. He was, after all,
responsible for the invasion of the South in a failed bid to reunify the
peninsula. Kim never fully endorsed the measures Nikita Khrushchev
introduced to break the cult of personality that surrounded Stalin – it
was a tool that had served Kim well – and never really took part in
China’s Cultural Revolution. Put differently, his regime was never
prototypically communist – power rested in the Kim family and a handful
of elite party members, not the party writ large.
Kim’s
philosophy is perhaps best captured by a policy known as Juche, which
was the foundation of the North Korean regime. Usually translated as
“self-reliance,” Juche emphasizes the role of the individual as the
master of his or her destiny, the driving force behind, in Kim’s words,
the “revolution and construction.” It rests on three pillars:
independence in politics, self-sufficiency in economics and
self-reliance in defense. In some ways, it was just what Koreans needed
to hear after decades of occupation: “Reject foreign powers, and create
the country you want.”
After
Kim died, his son and successor, Kim Jong Il, reinforced one particular
aspect of the Juche policy: the military. In what came to be known as
the Songun policy, Kim prioritized the development of the North Korean
military and gave its leaders more power in the government. The policy
harkens back to the anti-imperialist sentiment that existed even before
North Korea became a country, and so it was relatively easy to enact
what the policy called for: arming the nation, training all soldiers to
fulfill responsibilities above their rank, fortifying the country and
modernizing the armed forces.
The
transition from Juche to Songun was fairly smooth – it was less of a
radical departure than it was a natural evolution of one policy to the
next. Songun merely elevated the military, with Kim as its leader, to a
higher role in government. And though the policy may have empowered the
military over the other aspects of Juche – political independence and
self-sufficient economics – it didn’t forsake them. Kim Il Sung’s vision
for the Korean Peninsula was still intact; it just featured the
military more prominently than it once did.
This
vision of Korea evolved further when Kim Jong Il’s son and successor,
Kim Jong Un, introduced Byungjin in 2013. An early attempt for the
newest Kim to make his mark, Byungjin called for the parallel pursuit of
economic development and nuclear weapons. (Observers of North Korea
initially thought Byungjin would open the North Korean economy to the
rest of the world. It did no such thing.) Pyongyang had, of course, been pursuing a nuclear weapon for some time,
conducting tests as early as 2006. Much like Songun had done to Juche,
Byungjin formalized and prioritized aspects of North Korean policy that
were already there: self-sufficiency in economics and self-reliance in
defense.
One Purpose
With
so much power placed in the supreme leader, it’s little wonder that the
North Korean government is structured for one purpose above all others:
survival. State organizations exist only to support the supreme leader
and a select group of officials (read: the regime) and serve one of two
specific purposes. The first is to create policy and regulations that
align with Kim’s philosophy and advance his agenda. The second is to
enforce government policies and ensure compliance by military members,
government members and civilians.
Law
The
legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly, is the highest organization
in North Korea, at least according to the constitution. It has 687
members and a presidium that can perform the same functions as the
assembly when it has recessed. The assembly has the power to change the
constitution, set basic policies for domestic and foreign policy, pass
laws, ratify budgets and treaties and, ostensibly, elect and recall
officials. In theory, the chairman of the State Affairs Commission
(whoever is the supreme leader, in this case Kim Jong Un), the State
Affairs Commission, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, the
Cabinet and the Committees of the Supreme People’s Assembly can submit
legislation to the assembly for consideration. But in practice, the
assembly’s actions are largely dictated by the supreme leader.
The
State Affairs Commission is the source and arbiter of all policy. It is
primarily responsible for defense and economic development –
unsurprisingly, the two components of Kim Jong Un’s Byungjin policy. As
chairman, Kim not only is responsible for the commission’s general
operations but also is the head of the armed forces.
This role confers on him the power to call a state of emergency,
declare war, mobilize the military inside the country and, in times of
war, direct the National Defense Commission. (The State Affairs
Commission replaced the National Defense Commission in 2016, but it can
be revived in wartime.)
Kim Jong Il (R) and Kim Il Sung (L) inspecting a soccer ground in Pyongyang in 1992. AFP/Getty Images
There
are other areas in which executive political powers bleed into military
powers. North Korea even has structures in place to harmonize political
affairs and martial affairs. One such structure is the Korean People’s
Army General Political Department, which is controlled by the party. It
liaises between the party and the military to ensure that the supreme
leader retains control of the armed forces, and it monitors military
behavior, discipline, promotions, indoctrination, education and general
administration. It also surveils the public.
It
coordinates its actions with the Central Military Commission, the
institution that puts the party’s military and defense policies into
action. It works closely with the State Affairs Commission. The CMC has
the authority to commission research projects, weapons development and
manufacturing, outside acquisition and defense spending. It also
determines how resources from military-controlled production units will
be allocated. Under Kim Jong Un, the CMC has been reduced from 15-20
members to 12 members, many of whom are senior officials either in the
Ministry of State Security or the Ministry of People’s Security rather
than the military itself. Some reports suggest that some members also
occupy seats on the Political Bureau, giving them even more influence
over military and state affairs.
Other
notable entities include the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and the
Korean People’s Army General Staff Department. The ministry oversees the
logistical, political and personnel aspects of the military. It also
coordinates relations with foreign militaries, regulates military-owned
businesses ventures and helps to indoctrinate servicemen.
The
General Staff Department, on the other hand, is the traditional
institution of military management. It coordinates the different
branches of the military, formulates strategy and issues orders to
the branches. It also manages specialty bureaus such as electronic
warfare, weapons supply, equipment, training and transportation.
Order
Policy
and procedure, of course, are meant to be enforced, and North Korea has
a variety of ways it can enforce them. The Ministry of State Security
is North Korea’s primary counterintelligence service and reports
directly to Kim. It operates prison camps, investigates cases of
domestic espionage, repatriates defectors and conducts overseas
counterespionage activities. (This differs from the Ministry of People’s
Security, which is responsible for public order and civilian control.)
The
Military Security Command, on the other hand, is the eyes and ears of
the military. It monitors the activities of military commanders and
political loyalists – a mandate that gives it far-reaching powers to
investigate and arrest in a variety of jurisdictions.
There
are also government agencies meant specifically to protect the supreme
leader and the government. The Pyongyang Defense Command, for example,
is a corps-level mobile unit that protects the capital city and secures
select buildings in the event of a coup. The command has tank divisions,
an artillery brigade and heavy weapons brigade. It is linked closely to
the Supreme Guard Command, the Kim family’s personal security service,
and the III Corps, an army unit that defends the areas immediately
outside Pyongyang. (The Supreme Guard Command also monitors the
electronic communications of the country’s leaders.)
A New Complexion
The
structure of the regime is built around a single leader with absolute
authority. But even absolute leaders need supporters. He is therefore
compelled to purge, appoint and reorganize upon assuming control.
Subsequent purges and appointments are used to maintain control. (Since
the party and the military are the only vehicles of power in North
Korea, there are always people willing to fill vacant posts.) The
process takes about three to five years, and once he consolidates power
he formalizes his policy priorities and tailors the system by making
changes in the constitution.
This
goes a long way to explain the Kims’ staying power. Specific roles,
titles and offices have changed, but the general apparatus has remained
the same. There is strong party leadership, a strong military and total
control over civilian life. What differences exist under each Kim
reflect only subtle changes in political philosophy.
Kim
Jong Un’s tenure is a case in point. After assuming power, he spent the
first two years or so dismissing and executing potential rivals. In May
2016, during the 7th Congress of the ruling Workers’ Party, Kim
reinstated the Workers’ Party chairmanship and several vice
chairmanships. (He was, naturally, elected its chairman.) He also
reduced the number of military personnel on the Political Bureau. Then
in June 2016, during the 13th Supreme People’s Assembly, he modified the
constitution, formally replacing the National Defense Commission with
the State Affairs Commission. (Kim was, naturally, chosen to head it.)
The new commission assumed the responsibilities of the previous one and
added things like the economy and foreign policy to its portfolio.
Kim
Jong Un appears to have given his government a new complexion that
de-emphasized the military and brought the economy back to the fore.
That’s partly true, but the larger point is that he installed people
who would be loyal to him, just as his father had, albeit in slightly
different ways.
Conclusion
And
so the current incarnation of the regime survives because it’s loyal
enough to the founding principles of the country but just innovative
enough to adapt to the times. The power of its leader, who reigns
absolute, is fueled by nationalism and sustained by a structure that has
every reason to keep him in place. That, and a zero-tolerance policy
toward dissent, explains why the regime has stood stalwart these many
years.
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