Different. Just got it. Certainly some truth (what
percentage?). As for the stuff on Sweden, folks there might want to sell their
goods, but they’d never be so stupid as to get involved in conflict against
Washington neocons or Moscow… Also, this liberal road is dreamland. Finland will
fight, does seek “free” weapons and knowledge, won’t risk losing it’s life over
Kiev.
Another view of the Ukrainian
situation
Events
in Ukraine and the growing assertiveness of Russia have very much revived the
discussion about Finland’s defence strategy, in particular its potential bid for
membership in NATO. In a broader sense, the discussion revolves around the
definition of the country’s position in the emerging post-Cold War geopolitical
order. Despite being somewhat geographically remote and culturally different,
Finland shares many historical experiences and geopolitical similarities with
many of the Central and Eastern European countries. The country had to face
Bolshevik sponsored subversive activity after becoming independent in 1917, a
Soviet military attack in 1939 and then was under Moscow’s sphere of influence
during the Cold War period. Just as Central European countries, Finland was only
able to pursue a truly independent foreign and defence policy after the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
Already
in 1995, Finland became a member of the European Union clearly underlining its
western orientation. Finland’s political and economic integration, however
unlike countries like Poland and Hungary, was not accompanied with military
integration through NATO membership.
Capable
and self-reliant
The
question of national defence remains in the very centre of national politics and
the army constitutes an integral part of Finnish national identity. The defence
doctrine is based on its own national capabilities and is total in scope; it
assumes harnessing all the necessary resources to defend the entire country.
Russia is perceived as a main potential military threat, though Finland is very
diplomatic in its defence-oriented rhetoric avoiding unnecessary antagonising
relations with Moscow.
Despite
a relatively small population of 5.5 million and a modest level of military
spending, Finland commands a capable military force. The professional component
is highly trained and fully compatible with NATO standards. It is complemented
by a system of mass conscription which assures that the majority of the male
population receives basic military training. The vast availability of trained
reserves allows for mobilising 230,000 and possibly up to 350,000 of reasonably
well-trained and equipped reservists in case of war.
The
ground forces increasingly rely on mostly modern equipment such as German
Leopard tanks or Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. The air force operates
62 F/A-18 multi-role fighters which, apart from their primary role, can also
serve as launch platforms for the recently purchased JASSM cruise missile
systems – which allows for delivering a precision strike to a ground target with
an effective range exceeding 370 kilometres. The navy, despite reliance on
mostly small vessels such as missile boats, poses nevertheless a real threat of
effectively disrupting maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland, a region of
strategic importance for Russia.
Finland
further complements its own defence capabilities with bi- and multi-lateral
military cooperation initiatives. Historically, Sweden has been considered as
Finland’s closest ally. Both countries are currently in the process
of deepening their security cooperation. However despite close
relations, there is no formal mutual defence pact between the countries.
Furthermore Sweden’s ability and willingness to act as an effective military
ally have been recently questioned both in Stockholm and Helsinki.
Finland
is also pursuing close defence cooperation with the United States. The depth of
the relationship came recently to light as Finland was allowed by Washington to
purchase the JASSM tactical cruise missile system – the only other country
allowed to do so is Australia. Helsinki also supports the development of defence
capabilities within the EU.
The
pivotal question of Finland’s security strategy, however, is related to
potential membership in NATO. The topic has been ever-present since 1989 and the
recent events in Ukraine brought it again to the forefront of political and
public debate.
The
NATO debate
Overall,
the Finnish society is sceptical about prospects of immediate membership in
NATO. A recent poll taken after events in Crimea showed that only about 22
per cent of Finns declared support for joining the Alliance. The
sentiment is largely shared by the majority of the political elites, though
there are prominent politicians, such as outgoing Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen
or former President Martti Ahtisaari, who openly voice their pro-NATO stance.
Given the lack of critical mass in both the society and the political elite, one
should not expect the issue to be decided upon or even put up for a referendum
in the short-term.
Despite
limited prospects of formal membership, Finland-NATO cooperation is being
continuously strengthened. The Finnish army is fully compatible with NATO
standards and for practical purposes can be considered as a de facto member.
Furthermore, Finland has recently signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with the Alliance, which confirms its country’s
readiness to receive military assistance from the allied forces and to support
their military assets. However, there is clearly no political consensus
regarding becoming a fully-fledged NATO member.
The
debate about NATO membership is not due to an ideological view of the Alliance,
but rather reflects differences in the interpretation of Finland’s current and
prospective geopolitical situation. The pro-NATO argument is based on
acknowledging the fact that Finland’s capabilities are insufficient in case of
direct confrontation with Russia, while membership in the Alliance would provide
necessary military support. It is also mentioned that membership would be a
natural confirmation of Finland’s pro-western and transatlantic orientation.
However, perhaps the most salient argument is based on the belief that for all
practical purposes Russia may already consider Finland as a de facto NATO member
and a close US ally. Therefore, it is argued, Finland bears the political costs
of membership while not enjoying any of its benefits.
Opponents
of NATO membership point out that becoming a member would automatically and
unequivocally designate Finland as a potential enemy of Russia, at least for as
long as Moscow perceives the Alliance as a military threat. While remaining
non-aligned provides a degree of strategic flexibility vis-à-vis Russia. It’s
also argued, based on previous Russian
declarations, that membership would provoke Moscow’s retaliation. Thus, the
membership in the Alliance could paradoxically result in the deterioration of
Finland’s security situation as the probability of a conflict with Russia could
actually increase as a result. Apart from the larger and more aggressive Russian
military presence along its borders, Finland would also likely need to face some
form of economic sanctions. Given that Russia is Finland’s third export market,
its main energy supplier and also hosts several large Finnish direct investments
the impact of potential sanctions could be significant.
Geostrategic
aspect
One
of the key reasons why the debate about NATO membership is so complex stems from
the character of Finland’s geostrategic situation. Not only does Finland share a
1,340 km long border with Russia, it also is located in a close proximity to
several strategic areas of the Russian Federation. St Petersburg, the
second-largest city in Russia and an important political and economic centre
lies only about 300 kilometres from Helsinki. There is also a significant amount
of the Russian energy infrastructure located in the vicinity of the Finnish
territory; including the country’s largest oil terminal in Primorsk and the Nord
Stream pipeline. In the north, the border lies close to several strategically
important Russian military installations on the Kola Peninsula.
Proximity
to vital areas of the Russian Federation bestows Finnish territory with
significant geostrategic value, which will be further affected by several
factors. First is the general level of antagonism between the US and Russia. As
relations between both powers become more hostile, Finland’s geostrategic
position becomes more important for both Moscow and Washington. In a
hypothetical confrontation, Finland would constitute a potential great offensive
platform for the US and a strategically important buffer zone for Russia.
Furthermore, the increasing significance of the Arctic region makes Finnish
territory very relevant in a potential NATO-Russia stand-off in the far north as
it provides strategic depth and enhances power projection capabilities towards
the Barents Sea. Finally, the modernisation of the Finnish Army, in particular
the acquisition of cruise missile systems, naturally increases Finland’s value
as a geostrategic actor.
It
is clear in this context that Finland’s membership in NATO would have
significant repercussions. It would remove current strategic ambiguity and
formally designate Helsinki as an American ally. It would also extend and
reinforce the presence of the Alliance in the immediate vicinity to several
areas of strategic importance to Russia. The degree of Russian control over the
Baltic Sea would be weakened further making it a “NATO lake”. Finnish membership
could also prompt Sweden to follow suit; the resulting bloc of four Nordic NATO
countries would constitute a formidable politico-military challenge for
Russia.
Therefore,
it would be somewhat paradoxical if Moscow’s strategic gains in the Black Sea
region would result in the deterioration of its position in the arguably more
important Baltic-Barents area. However this scenario is unlikely as it seems
that the Ukrainian crisis has not yet crossed the red line for the Finnish
society and the country’s political elites. For NATO membership to become
realistically considered in Finland a major escalation of tensions would be
required, possibly consisting of open Russian military attack on Ukraine.
However
the real “tripwire” is likely located in the Baltic States, in particular
Estonia and Latvia. If the Ukrainian scenario was to be repeated in these
countries, one could expect that the topic of NATO membership would gain
significant traction in both Finland and Sweden. The perspective of Helsinki and
Stockholm joining NATO in response to Russian threats to Tallinn and Riga may be
actually a very viable insurance policy for the latter.
Despite
remaining formally non-aligned with NATO, Finland will nevertheless become
increasingly important for both Moscow and Washington. As such, the country will
be more central to global geopolitical rivalries with all the benefits and
disadvantages that it entails.
Adam
Klus is a PhD student of the Past, Space and Environment in Society
Doctoral Programme at the University of Eastern Finland. His research interests
include; geopolitics of Eastern Europe, country risk analysis, asymmetric
threats, unconventional use of military force, and geopolitically disruptive
technologies. He works as an investment professional and has several years of
experience from financial companies in London and
Helsinki.
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