Revolution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
The overthrow of the Saudi royals is finally a possibility. In an excerpt from a new Brookings Institution briefing book for Obama’s second term, Bruce Riedel on what a catastrophe it would be for Obama.
By Bruce Riedel
January 29, 2013 "Daily Beast" - -Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy. Like Louis XIV, King Abdullah has complete authority to do as he likes. But while a revolution in Saudi Arabia is still not likely, the Arab Awakening has made one possible for the first time, and it could come in President Obama’s second term.
The overthrow of the Saudi royals is finally a possibility. In an excerpt from a new Brookings Institution briefing book for Obama’s second term, Bruce Riedel on what a catastrophe it would be for Obama.
By Bruce Riedel
January 29, 2013 "Daily Beast" - -Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy. Like Louis XIV, King Abdullah has complete authority to do as he likes. But while a revolution in Saudi Arabia is still not likely, the Arab Awakening has made one possible for the first time, and it could come in President Obama’s second term.
Revolutionary change in the kingdom would be a disaster for
American interests across the board. Saudi Arabia is
America’s oldest ally in the Middle East, a partnership that
dates to 1945. The United States has no serious option for
heading off a revolution if it is coming; we are already too
deeply wedded to the kingdom. Obama should ensure the best
possible intelligence is available to see a crisis coming
and then try to ride the storm.
Still , the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a proven
survivor. Two earlier Saudi kingdoms were defeated by
the Ottoman Empire and eradicated. The Sauds came back.
They survived a wave of revolutions against Arab
monarchies in the 1950s and 1960s. A jihadist coup
attempt in 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca but was
crushed. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda staged a four-year
insurrection to topple the Sauds and failed less than a
decade ago. Saudi al Qaeda cadres remain in the kingdom
and next door in Yemen.
Today the Arab Awakening presents the kingdom with its
most severe test to date. The same demographic
challenges that prompted revolution in Egypt and Yemen,
a very young population and very high underemployment,
apply in Saudi Arabia.
Extreme gender discrimination, long-standing
regional differences, and a restive Shia minority add to
the explosive potential. In recognition of their
vulnerability, the Saudi royals have spent more than
$130 billion since the Arab Awakening began to try to
buy off dissent at home. They have made cosmetic reforms
to let women sit in a powerless consulting council.
Abroad they have sent tanks and troops across the King
Fahd Causeway to stifle revolution in Bahrain, brokered
a political deal in Yemen to replace Ali Abdullah Salih
with his deputy, and sought closer unity among the six
Gulf Cooperation Council monarchies. They also have
invited Jordan and Morocco to join the kings’ club. But
they are pragmatists too and have backed revolutions in
Libya and Syria that fight old enemies of the kingdom
If
an awakening takes place in Saudi Arabia, it will
probably look a lot like the revolutions in the other
Arab states. Already demonstrations, peaceful and
violent, have wracked the oil rich Eastern Province for
more than a year. These are Shia protests and thus
atypical of the rest of the kingdom. Shia dissidents in
ARAMCO, the Saudi oil company, also have used
cyberwarfare to attack its computer systems, crashing
more than 30,000 work stations this August. They
probably received Iranian help.
Much more disturbing to the royals would be protests in
Sunni parts of the kingdom. These might start in the
so-called Quran Belt north of the capital, where dissent
is endemic, or in the poor Asir province on the Yemeni
border. Once they begin, they could snowball and reach
the major cities of the Hejaz, including Jeddah, Mecca,
Taif, and Medina. The Saudi opposition has a vibrant
information technology component that could ensure rapid
communication of dissent within the kingdom and to the
outside world.
The critical defender of the regime would be the
National Guard. Abdullah has spent his life building
this Praetorian elite force. The United States has
trained and equipped it with tens of billions in
helicopters and armored vehicles. But the key unknown is
whether the Guard will shoot on its brothers and sisters
in the street. It may fragment or it may simply refuse
to suppress dissent if it is largely peaceful,
especially at the start.
The succession issue adds another layer of complication.
Every succession in the kingdom since its founder, Abdel
Aziz bin Saud, died in 1953 has been to his brothers.
King Abdullah and Crown Prince Salman are the end of the
brood; only a couple of possible remaining half brothers
are suitable. Both the king and crown prince are ill,
and both are often unfit for duty. If Abdullah and/or
Salman die as unrest begins—a real possibility—and a
succession crisis ensues, then the kingdom could be even
more vulnerable to revolution.
As in other Arab
revolutions, the opposition revolutionaries will not be
united on anything except ousting the monarchy. There
will be secular democrats but also al Qaeda elements in
the opposition. Trying to pick and choose will be very
difficult. The unity of the kingdom could collapse as
the Hejaz separates from the rest, the east falls to
Shia, and the center becomes a jihadist stronghold.
For the United States, revolution in Saudi Arabia would
be a game changer. While the U.S. can live without Saudi
oil, China, India, Japan, and Europe cannot. Any
disruption in Saudi oil exports—whether due to unrest,
cyberattacks, or a new regime’s decision to reduce
exports substantially—will have a major impact on the
global economy. In addition, the CIA war against al
Qaeda is heavily dependent on the kingdom: Saudi
intelligence operations foiled the last two attacks by
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula on the American
homeland. The U.S. military training mission in the
kingdom, founded in 1953, is the largest of its kind in
the world. The Saudis also have been a key player in
containing Iran for decades.
The other monarchs of Arabia, meanwhile, would be in
jeopardy if revolution comes to Saudi Arabia. The Sunni
minority in Bahrain could not last without Saudi money
and tanks. Despite all their money, Qatar, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emirates are city states that would be
unable to defend themselves against a revolutionary
regime in what had been the kingdom. The Hashemite
dynasty in Jordan would be at risk as well without Saudi
and Gulf money and oil. Only Oman is probably isolated
and strong enough to endure.
America has no serious options for effecting gradual
reform in the kingdom. The Saudis fear, probably
rightly, that real power sharing is impossible in an
absolutist state. But we should plan very quietly for
the worst. The intelligence community should be directed
to make internal developments, not just
counterterrorism, its top priority in the kingdom now.
We cannot afford a surprise like Iran in 1978, and we
need to know the players in the opposition, especially
the Wahhabi clerics, in depth. This will be a formidable
challenge, but it is essential to preparing for a very
dark swan.
Bruce Riedel (born 1953) is one of America's leading experts on U.S. security, South Asia, and counter-terrorism. He is currently a senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He also serves as a senior adviser at Albright Stonebridge Group. Bruce, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst and counter-terrorism expert, served in the Agency for 29 years until his retirement in 2006. He has advised four presidents advising on Middle East and South Asian issues in the White House on the staff of the National Security Counsel (NSC).
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