NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
The Schiller Institute
PO BOX
20244
20244
Washington, DC 20041-0244
703-771-8390 or 888-347-3258
April 24, 1974
National Security Study Memorandum 200
--------------------------------------
[Ed
Note: The following Memo 200 is the predicate
and foundation of the synthesis of Ft. Detrick “Cancer” research for DNA recombinant
function to synthesize HIV , EBOLA, and MARBURG
retrovirus bio weapons for Medicide of Demographic
Management of the global population that would impact U.S. National
Security interests Overseas
Note: The following Memo 200 is the predicate
and foundation of the synthesis of Ft. Detrick “Cancer” research for DNA recombinant
function to synthesize HIV , EBOLA, and MARBURG
retrovirus bio weapons for Medicide of Demographic
Management of the global population that would impact U.S. National
Security interests Overseas
Generally,
it was reduce the global planet of useless eaters and non-working life to the
extent the global elite can enjoy the benefits of all of the global resources
for the Central Committee.
it was reduce the global planet of useless eaters and non-working life to the
extent the global elite can enjoy the benefits of all of the global resources
for the Central Committee.
Arden Gifford, MD
NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL
SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 24, 1974
National Security
Study Memorandum 200
Study Memorandum 200
--------------------------------------
TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
Administrator, Agency for
International Development
International Development
SUBJECT:
Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S.
Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S.
Security and Overseas Interests
The President has
directed a study of the impact of world population
directed a study of the impact of world population
growth on U.S. security
and overseas interests. The study should
look
and overseas interests. The study should
look
forward at least
until the year 2000, and use several alternative
until the year 2000, and use several alternative
reasonable
projections of population growth.
projections of population growth.
In terms of each
projection, the study should assess:
projection, the study should assess:
- the corresponding pace of development,
especially in poorer
especially in poorer
countries;
- the demand for US exports, especially of
food, and the trade
food, and the trade
problems the US may face arising from
competition for re-
competition for re-
sources;
and
and
- the likelihood that population growth or
imbalances will
imbalances will
produce disruptive foreign policies and
international
international
instability.
The study should
focus on the international political and economic
focus on the international political and economic
implications of
population growth rather than its ecological, socio-
population growth rather than its ecological, socio-
logical or other
aspects.
aspects.
The study would
then offer possible courses of action for the United
then offer possible courses of action for the United
States in dealing
with population matters abroad, particularly in
with population matters abroad, particularly in
developing
countries, with special attention to these questions:
countries, with special attention to these questions:
- What, if any, new initiatives by the United States
are needed
are needed
to focus international attention on the
population problem?
population problem?
- Can technological innovations or
development reduce
development reduce
growth or ameliorate its effects?
- Could the United States improve its
assistance in the population
assistance in the population
field and if so, in what form and through
which agencies --
which agencies --
bilateral, multilateral, private?
The study should
take into account the President's concern that
take into account the President's concern that
population policy
is a human concern intimately related to the
is a human concern intimately related to the
dignity of the
individual and the objective of the United States is to
individual and the objective of the United States is to
work closely with
others, rather than seek to impose our views on
others, rather than seek to impose our views on
others.
The President has
directed that the study be accomplished by the
directed that the study be accomplished by the
NSC Under
Secretaries Committee. The Chairman,
Under Secretaries
Secretaries Committee. The Chairman,
Under Secretaries
Committee, is
requested to forward the study together with the
requested to forward the study together with the
Committee's action
recommendations no later than May 29,
recommendations no later than May 29,
1974 for
consideration by the President.
consideration by the President.
HENRY
A. KISSINGER
A. KISSINGER
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSSM 200:
IMPLICATIONS OF WORLDWIDE
POPULATION GROWTH
POPULATION GROWTH
FOR U.S. SECURITY AND OVERSEAS
INTERESTS
INTERESTS
December 10, 1974
CLASSIFIED BY Harry C. Blaney,
III
III
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF
SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWN-
AUTOMATICALLY DOWN-
GRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1980.
This document can
only be declassified by the White House.
only be declassified by the White House.
----------------------------------------------------------
Declassified/Released on 7/3/89
-----------
under provisions of E.O.
12356
12356
by F. Graboske, National Security
Council
Council
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
World Demographic
Trends
Trends
1. World Population growth since World War
II is quantitatively and qualitatively different from any previous epoch in
human history. The rapid reduction in death rates, unmatched by corresponding
birth rate reductions, has brought total growth rates close to 2 percent a
year, compared with about 1 percent before World War II, under 0.5 percent in
1750-1900, and far lower rates before 1750. The effect is to double the world's
population in 35 years instead of 100 years. Almost 80 million are now being
added each year, compared with 10 million in 1900.
II is quantitatively and qualitatively different from any previous epoch in
human history. The rapid reduction in death rates, unmatched by corresponding
birth rate reductions, has brought total growth rates close to 2 percent a
year, compared with about 1 percent before World War II, under 0.5 percent in
1750-1900, and far lower rates before 1750. The effect is to double the world's
population in 35 years instead of 100 years. Almost 80 million are now being
added each year, compared with 10 million in 1900.
2. The second new feature of population
trends is the sharp differentiation between rich and poor countries. Since
1950, population in the former group has been growing at 0 to 1.5 percent per
year, and in the latter at 2.0 to 3.5 percent (doubling in 20 to 35 years).
Some of the highest rates of increase are in areas already densely populated
and with a weak resource base.
trends is the sharp differentiation between rich and poor countries. Since
1950, population in the former group has been growing at 0 to 1.5 percent per
year, and in the latter at 2.0 to 3.5 percent (doubling in 20 to 35 years).
Some of the highest rates of increase are in areas already densely populated
and with a weak resource base.
3. Because of the momentum of population
dynamics, reductions in birth rates affect total numbers only slowly. High
birth rates in the recent past have resulted in a high proportion in the
youngest age groups, so that there will continue to be substantial population
increases over many years even if a two-child family should become the norm in
the future. Policies to reduce fertility will have their main effects on total
numbers only after several decades. However, if future numbers are to be kept
within reasonable bounds, it is urgent that measures to reduce fertility be
started and made effective in the 1970's and 1980's. Moreover, programs started
now to reduce birth rates will have short run advantages for developing
countries in lowered demands on food, health and educational and other services
and in enlarged capacity to contribute to productive investments, thus
accelerating development.
dynamics, reductions in birth rates affect total numbers only slowly. High
birth rates in the recent past have resulted in a high proportion in the
youngest age groups, so that there will continue to be substantial population
increases over many years even if a two-child family should become the norm in
the future. Policies to reduce fertility will have their main effects on total
numbers only after several decades. However, if future numbers are to be kept
within reasonable bounds, it is urgent that measures to reduce fertility be
started and made effective in the 1970's and 1980's. Moreover, programs started
now to reduce birth rates will have short run advantages for developing
countries in lowered demands on food, health and educational and other services
and in enlarged capacity to contribute to productive investments, thus
accelerating development.
4. U.N. estimates use the 3.6 billion
population of 1970 as a base (there are nearly 4 billion now) and project from
about 6 billion to 8 billion people for the year 2000 with the U.S. medium
estimate at 6.4 billion. The U.S.
medium projections show a world population of 12 billion by 2075 which implies
a five-fold increase in south and southeast Asia and in Latin American and a
seven-fold increase in Africa, compared with a
doubling in east Asia and a 40% increase in the presently developed countries
(see Table I). Most demographers, including the U.N. and the U.S. Population
Council, regard the range of 10 to 13 billion as the most likely level for
world population stability, even with intensive efforts at fertility control.
(These figures assume, that sufficient food could be produced and distributed
to avoid limitation through famines.)
population of 1970 as a base (there are nearly 4 billion now) and project from
about 6 billion to 8 billion people for the year 2000 with the U.S. medium
estimate at 6.4 billion. The U.S.
medium projections show a world population of 12 billion by 2075 which implies
a five-fold increase in south and southeast Asia and in Latin American and a
seven-fold increase in Africa, compared with a
doubling in east Asia and a 40% increase in the presently developed countries
(see Table I). Most demographers, including the U.N. and the U.S. Population
Council, regard the range of 10 to 13 billion as the most likely level for
world population stability, even with intensive efforts at fertility control.
(These figures assume, that sufficient food could be produced and distributed
to avoid limitation through famines.)
Adequacy of World
Food Supplies
Food Supplies
5. Growing populations will have a serious
impact on the need for food especially in the poorest, fastest growing LDCs.
While under normal weather conditions and assuming food production growth in
line with recent trends, total world agricultural production could expand
faster than population, there will nevertheless be serious problems in food
distribution and financing, making shortages, even at today's poor nutrition
levels, probable in many of the larger more populous LDC regions. Even today 10
to 20 million people die each year due, directly or indirectly, to
malnutrition. Even more serious is the consequence of major crop failures which
are likely to occur from time to time.
impact on the need for food especially in the poorest, fastest growing LDCs.
While under normal weather conditions and assuming food production growth in
line with recent trends, total world agricultural production could expand
faster than population, there will nevertheless be serious problems in food
distribution and financing, making shortages, even at today's poor nutrition
levels, probable in many of the larger more populous LDC regions. Even today 10
to 20 million people die each year due, directly or indirectly, to
malnutrition. Even more serious is the consequence of major crop failures which
are likely to occur from time to time.
6. The most serious consequence for the
short and middle term is the possibility of massive famines in certain parts of
the world, especially the poorest regions. World needs for food rise by 2-1/2
percent or more per year (making a modest allowance for improved diets and
nutrition) at a time when readily available fertilizer and well-watered land is
already largely being utilized. Therefore, additions to food production must
come mainly from higher yields. Countries with large population growth cannot
afford constantly growing imports, but for them to raise food output steadily
by 2 to 4 percent over the next generation or two is a formidable challenge.
Capital and foreign exchange requirements for intensive agriculture are heavy,
and are aggravated by energy cost increases and fertilizer scarcities and price
rises. The institutional, technical, and economic problems of transforming
traditional agriculture are also very difficult to overcome.
short and middle term is the possibility of massive famines in certain parts of
the world, especially the poorest regions. World needs for food rise by 2-1/2
percent or more per year (making a modest allowance for improved diets and
nutrition) at a time when readily available fertilizer and well-watered land is
already largely being utilized. Therefore, additions to food production must
come mainly from higher yields. Countries with large population growth cannot
afford constantly growing imports, but for them to raise food output steadily
by 2 to 4 percent over the next generation or two is a formidable challenge.
Capital and foreign exchange requirements for intensive agriculture are heavy,
and are aggravated by energy cost increases and fertilizer scarcities and price
rises. The institutional, technical, and economic problems of transforming
traditional agriculture are also very difficult to overcome.
7. In addition, in some overpopulated
regions, rapid population growth presses on a fragile environment in ways that
threaten longer-term food production: through cultivation of marginal lands,
overgrazing, desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, with consequent
destruction of land and pollution of water, rapid siltation of reservoirs, and
impairment of inland and coastal fisheries.
regions, rapid population growth presses on a fragile environment in ways that
threaten longer-term food production: through cultivation of marginal lands,
overgrazing, desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, with consequent
destruction of land and pollution of water, rapid siltation of reservoirs, and
impairment of inland and coastal fisheries.
Minerals and Fuel
8. Rapid population growth is not in itself
a major factor in pressure on depletable resources (fossil fuels and other
minerals), since demand for them depends more on levels of industrial output
than on numbers of people. On the other hand, the world is increasingly
dependent on mineral supplies from developing countries, and if rapid
population frustrates their prospects for economic development and social progress,
the resulting instability may undermine the conditions for expanded output and
sustained flows of such resources.
a major factor in pressure on depletable resources (fossil fuels and other
minerals), since demand for them depends more on levels of industrial output
than on numbers of people. On the other hand, the world is increasingly
dependent on mineral supplies from developing countries, and if rapid
population frustrates their prospects for economic development and social progress,
the resulting instability may undermine the conditions for expanded output and
sustained flows of such resources.
9. There will be serious problems for some
of the poorest LDCs with rapid population growth. They will increasingly find
it difficult to pay for needed raw materials and energy. Fertilizer, vital for
their own agricultural production, will be difficult to obtain for the next few
years. Imports for fuel and other materials will cause grave problems which
could impinge on the U.S.,
both through the need to supply greater financial support and in LDC efforts to
obtain better terms of trade through higher prices for exports.
of the poorest LDCs with rapid population growth. They will increasingly find
it difficult to pay for needed raw materials and energy. Fertilizer, vital for
their own agricultural production, will be difficult to obtain for the next few
years. Imports for fuel and other materials will cause grave problems which
could impinge on the U.S.,
both through the need to supply greater financial support and in LDC efforts to
obtain better terms of trade through higher prices for exports.
Economic
Development and Population Growth
Development and Population Growth
10. Rapid population growth creates a
severe drag on rates of economic development otherwise attainable, sometimes to
the point of preventing any increase in per capita incomes. In addition to the
overall impact on per capita incomes, rapid population growth seriously affects
a vast range of other aspects of the quality of life important to social and
economic progress in the LDCs.
severe drag on rates of economic development otherwise attainable, sometimes to
the point of preventing any increase in per capita incomes. In addition to the
overall impact on per capita incomes, rapid population growth seriously affects
a vast range of other aspects of the quality of life important to social and
economic progress in the LDCs.
11. Adverse economic factors which
generally result from rapid population growth include:
generally result from rapid population growth include:
reduced family
savings and domestic investment;
savings and domestic investment;
increased need for
large amounts of foreign exchange for food imports;
large amounts of foreign exchange for food imports;
intensification of
severe unemployment and underemployment;
severe unemployment and underemployment;
the need for large
expenditures for services such as dependency support, education, and health
which would be used for more productive investment;
expenditures for services such as dependency support, education, and health
which would be used for more productive investment;
the concentration
of developmental resources on increasing food production to ensure survival for
a larger population, rather than on improving living conditions for smaller
total numbers.
of developmental resources on increasing food production to ensure survival for
a larger population, rather than on improving living conditions for smaller
total numbers.
12. While GNP increased per annum at an
average rate of 5 percent in LDCs over the last decade, the population increase
of 2.5 percent reduced the average annual per capita growth rate to only 2.5
percent. In many heavily populated areas this rate was 2 percent or less. In
the LDCs hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an aggregate population of 800 million,
GNP increases may be reduced to less than 1 percent per capita per year for the
remainder of the 1970's. For the poorest half of the populations of these
countries, with average incomes of less than $100, the prospect is for no
growth or retrogression for this period.
average rate of 5 percent in LDCs over the last decade, the population increase
of 2.5 percent reduced the average annual per capita growth rate to only 2.5
percent. In many heavily populated areas this rate was 2 percent or less. In
the LDCs hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an aggregate population of 800 million,
GNP increases may be reduced to less than 1 percent per capita per year for the
remainder of the 1970's. For the poorest half of the populations of these
countries, with average incomes of less than $100, the prospect is for no
growth or retrogression for this period.
13. If significant progress can be made in
slowing population growth, the positive impact on growth of GNP and per capita
income will be significant. Moreover, economic and social progress will
probably contribute further to the decline in fertility rates.
slowing population growth, the positive impact on growth of GNP and per capita
income will be significant. Moreover, economic and social progress will
probably contribute further to the decline in fertility rates.
14. High birth rates appear to stem
primarily from:
primarily from:
a. inadequate
information about and availability of means of fertility control;
information about and availability of means of fertility control;
b. inadequate
motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with motivation for many children
resulting from still high infant and child mortality and need for support in
old age; and
motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with motivation for many children
resulting from still high infant and child mortality and need for support in
old age; and
c. the slowness of
change in family preferences in response to changes in environment.
change in family preferences in response to changes in environment.
15. The universal objective of increasing
the world's standard of living dictates that economic growth outpace population
growth. In many high population growth areas of the world, the largest
proportion of GNP is consumed, with only a small amount saved. Thus, a small
proportion of GNP is available for investment -- the "engine" of
economic growth. Most experts agree that, with fairly constant costs per
acceptor, expenditures on effective family planning services are generally one
of the most cost effective investments for an LDC country seeking to improve overall
welfare and per capita economic growth. We cannot wait for overall
modernization and development to produce lower fertility rates naturally since
this will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing countries, during
which time rapid population growth will tend to slow development and widen even
more the gap between rich and poor.
the world's standard of living dictates that economic growth outpace population
growth. In many high population growth areas of the world, the largest
proportion of GNP is consumed, with only a small amount saved. Thus, a small
proportion of GNP is available for investment -- the "engine" of
economic growth. Most experts agree that, with fairly constant costs per
acceptor, expenditures on effective family planning services are generally one
of the most cost effective investments for an LDC country seeking to improve overall
welfare and per capita economic growth. We cannot wait for overall
modernization and development to produce lower fertility rates naturally since
this will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing countries, during
which time rapid population growth will tend to slow development and widen even
more the gap between rich and poor.
16. The interrelationships between
development and population growth are complex and not wholly understood.
Certain aspects of economic development and modernization appear to be more
directly related to lower birth rates than others. Thus certain development
programs may bring a faster demographic transition to lower fertility rates
than other aspects of development. The World Population Plan of Action adopted
at the World Population Conference recommends that countries working to affect
fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and
education strategies which have a decisive effect on fertility. International
cooperation should give priority to assisting such national efforts. These
programs include: (a) improved health care and nutrition to reduce child
mortality, (b) education and improved social status for women; (c) increased
female employment; (d) improved old-age security; and (e) assistance for the
rural poor, who generally have the highest fertility, with actions to
redistribute income and resources including providing privately owned farms.
However, one cannot proceed simply from identification of relationships to
specific large-scale operational programs. For example, we do not yet know of
cost-effective ways to encourage increased female employment, particularly if
we are concerned about not adding to male unemployment. We do not yet know what
specific packages of programs will be most cost effective in many situations.
development and population growth are complex and not wholly understood.
Certain aspects of economic development and modernization appear to be more
directly related to lower birth rates than others. Thus certain development
programs may bring a faster demographic transition to lower fertility rates
than other aspects of development. The World Population Plan of Action adopted
at the World Population Conference recommends that countries working to affect
fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and
education strategies which have a decisive effect on fertility. International
cooperation should give priority to assisting such national efforts. These
programs include: (a) improved health care and nutrition to reduce child
mortality, (b) education and improved social status for women; (c) increased
female employment; (d) improved old-age security; and (e) assistance for the
rural poor, who generally have the highest fertility, with actions to
redistribute income and resources including providing privately owned farms.
However, one cannot proceed simply from identification of relationships to
specific large-scale operational programs. For example, we do not yet know of
cost-effective ways to encourage increased female employment, particularly if
we are concerned about not adding to male unemployment. We do not yet know what
specific packages of programs will be most cost effective in many situations.
17. There is need for more information on
cost effectiveness of different approaches on both the "supply" and
the "demand" side of the picture. On the supply side, intense efforts
are required to assure full availability by 1980 of birth control information
and means to all fertile individuals, especially in rural areas. Improvement is
also needed in methods of birth control most acceptable and useable by the
rural poor. On the demand side, further experimentation and implementation
action projects and programs are needed. In particular, more research is needed
on the motivation of the poorest who often have the highest fertility rates.
Assistance programs must be more precisely targeted to this group than in the
past.
cost effectiveness of different approaches on both the "supply" and
the "demand" side of the picture. On the supply side, intense efforts
are required to assure full availability by 1980 of birth control information
and means to all fertile individuals, especially in rural areas. Improvement is
also needed in methods of birth control most acceptable and useable by the
rural poor. On the demand side, further experimentation and implementation
action projects and programs are needed. In particular, more research is needed
on the motivation of the poorest who often have the highest fertility rates.
Assistance programs must be more precisely targeted to this group than in the
past.
18. It may well be that desired family size
will not decline to near replacement levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor
improves to the extent that the benefits of reducing family size appear to them
to outweigh the costs. For urban people, a rapidly growing element in the LDCs,
the liabilities of having too many children are already becoming apparent. Aid
recipients and donors must also emphasize development and improvements in the
quality of life of the poor, if significant progress is to be made in
controlling population growth. Although it was adopted primarily for other
reasons, the new emphasis of AID's legislation on problems of the poor (which
is echoed in comparable changes in policy emphasis by other donors and by an
increasing number of LDC's) is directly relevant to the conditions required for
fertility reduction.
will not decline to near replacement levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor
improves to the extent that the benefits of reducing family size appear to them
to outweigh the costs. For urban people, a rapidly growing element in the LDCs,
the liabilities of having too many children are already becoming apparent. Aid
recipients and donors must also emphasize development and improvements in the
quality of life of the poor, if significant progress is to be made in
controlling population growth. Although it was adopted primarily for other
reasons, the new emphasis of AID's legislation on problems of the poor (which
is echoed in comparable changes in policy emphasis by other donors and by an
increasing number of LDC's) is directly relevant to the conditions required for
fertility reduction.
Political Effects
of Population Factors
of Population Factors
19. The political consequences of current
population factors in the LDCs -- rapid growth, internal migration, high
percentages of young people, slow improvement in living standards, urban
concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration -- are damaging to the
internal stability and international relations of countries in whose
advancement the U.S. is interested, thus creating political or even national
security problems for the U.S. In a broader sense, there is a major risk of
severe damage to world economic, political, and ecological systems and, as
these systems begin to fail, to our humanitarian values.
population factors in the LDCs -- rapid growth, internal migration, high
percentages of young people, slow improvement in living standards, urban
concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration -- are damaging to the
internal stability and international relations of countries in whose
advancement the U.S. is interested, thus creating political or even national
security problems for the U.S. In a broader sense, there is a major risk of
severe damage to world economic, political, and ecological systems and, as
these systems begin to fail, to our humanitarian values.
20. The pace of internal migration from
countryside to over-swollen cities is greatly intensified by rapid population
growth. Enormous burdens are placed on LDC governments for public
administration, sanitation, education, police, and other services, and urban
slum dwellers (though apparently not recent migrants) may serve as a volatile,
violent force which threatens political stability.
countryside to over-swollen cities is greatly intensified by rapid population
growth. Enormous burdens are placed on LDC governments for public
administration, sanitation, education, police, and other services, and urban
slum dwellers (though apparently not recent migrants) may serve as a volatile,
violent force which threatens political stability.
21. Adverse socio-economic conditions
generated by these and related factors may contribute to high and increasing
levels of child abandonment, juvenile delinquency, chronic and growing
underemployment and unemployment, petty thievery, organized brigandry, food
riots, separatist movements, communal massacres, revolutionary actions and
counter-revolutionary coups. Such conditions also detract from the environment
needed to attract the foreign capital vital to increasing levels of economic
growth in these areas. If these conditions result in expropriation of foreign
interests, such action, from an economic viewpoint, is not in the best interests
of either the investing country or the host government.
generated by these and related factors may contribute to high and increasing
levels of child abandonment, juvenile delinquency, chronic and growing
underemployment and unemployment, petty thievery, organized brigandry, food
riots, separatist movements, communal massacres, revolutionary actions and
counter-revolutionary coups. Such conditions also detract from the environment
needed to attract the foreign capital vital to increasing levels of economic
growth in these areas. If these conditions result in expropriation of foreign
interests, such action, from an economic viewpoint, is not in the best interests
of either the investing country or the host government.
22. In international relations, population
factors are crucial in, and often determinants of, violent conflicts in
developing areas. Conflicts that are regarded in primarily political terms often
have demographic roots. Recognition of these relationships appears crucial to
any understanding or prevention of such hostilities.
factors are crucial in, and often determinants of, violent conflicts in
developing areas. Conflicts that are regarded in primarily political terms often
have demographic roots. Recognition of these relationships appears crucial to
any understanding or prevention of such hostilities.
General Goals and
Requirements for Dealing With Rapid Population Growth
Requirements for Dealing With Rapid Population Growth
23. The central question for world population
policy in the year 1974, is whether mankind is to remain on a track toward an
ultimate population of 12 to 15 billion -- implying a five to seven-fold
increase in almost all the underdeveloped world outside of China -- or whether
(despite the momentum of population growth) it can be switched over to the
course of earliest feasible population stability -- implying ultimate totals of
8 to 9 billions and not more than a three or four-fold increase in any major
region.
policy in the year 1974, is whether mankind is to remain on a track toward an
ultimate population of 12 to 15 billion -- implying a five to seven-fold
increase in almost all the underdeveloped world outside of China -- or whether
(despite the momentum of population growth) it can be switched over to the
course of earliest feasible population stability -- implying ultimate totals of
8 to 9 billions and not more than a three or four-fold increase in any major
region.
24. What are the stakes? We do not know
whether technological developments will make it possible to feed over 8 much
less 12 billion people in the 21st century. We cannot be entirely certain that
climatic changes in the coming decade will not create great difficulties in
feeding a growing population, especially people in the LDCs who live under
increasingly marginal and more vulnerable conditions. There exists at least the
possibility that present developments point toward Malthusian conditions for
many regions of the world.
whether technological developments will make it possible to feed over 8 much
less 12 billion people in the 21st century. We cannot be entirely certain that
climatic changes in the coming decade will not create great difficulties in
feeding a growing population, especially people in the LDCs who live under
increasingly marginal and more vulnerable conditions. There exists at least the
possibility that present developments point toward Malthusian conditions for
many regions of the world.
25. But even if survival for these much
larger numbers is possible, it will in all likelihood be bare survival, with
all efforts going in the good years to provide minimum nutrition and utter
dependence in the bad years on emergency rescue efforts from the less populated
and richer countries of the world. In the shorter run -- between now and the
year 2000 -- the difference between the two courses can be some perceptible
material gain in the crowded poor regions, and some improvement in the relative
distribution of intra-country per capita income between rich and poor, as
against permanent poverty and the widening of income gaps. A much more vigorous
effort to slow population growth can also mean a very great difference between
enormous tragedies of malnutrition and starvation as against only serious
chronic conditions.
larger numbers is possible, it will in all likelihood be bare survival, with
all efforts going in the good years to provide minimum nutrition and utter
dependence in the bad years on emergency rescue efforts from the less populated
and richer countries of the world. In the shorter run -- between now and the
year 2000 -- the difference between the two courses can be some perceptible
material gain in the crowded poor regions, and some improvement in the relative
distribution of intra-country per capita income between rich and poor, as
against permanent poverty and the widening of income gaps. A much more vigorous
effort to slow population growth can also mean a very great difference between
enormous tragedies of malnutrition and starvation as against only serious
chronic conditions.
Policy
Recommendations
Recommendations
26. There is no single approach which will
"solve" the population problem. The complex social and economic
factors involved call for a comprehensive strategy with both bilateral and
multilateral elements. At the same time actions and programs must be tailored
to specific countries and groups. Above all, LDCs themselves must play the most
important role to achieve success.
"solve" the population problem. The complex social and economic
factors involved call for a comprehensive strategy with both bilateral and
multilateral elements. At the same time actions and programs must be tailored
to specific countries and groups. Above all, LDCs themselves must play the most
important role to achieve success.
27. Coordination among the bilateral donors
and multilateral organizations is vital to any effort to moderate population
growth. Each kind of effort will be needed for worldwide results.
and multilateral organizations is vital to any effort to moderate population
growth. Each kind of effort will be needed for worldwide results.
28. World policy and programs in the
population field should incorporate two major objectives:
population field should incorporate two major objectives:
(a) actions to accommodate
continued population growth up to 6 billions by the mid-21st century without
massive starvation or total frustration of developmental hopes; and
continued population growth up to 6 billions by the mid-21st century without
massive starvation or total frustration of developmental hopes; and
(b) actions to keep
the ultimate level as close as possible to 8 billions rather than permitting it
to reach 10 billions, 13 billions, or more.
the ultimate level as close as possible to 8 billions rather than permitting it
to reach 10 billions, 13 billions, or more.
29. While specific goals in this area are
difficult to state, our aim should be for the world to achieve a replacement
level of fertility, (a two-child family on the average), by about the year
2000. This will require the present 2 percent growth rate to decline to 1.7
percent within a decade and to 1.1 percent by 2000. Compared to the U.N medium
projection, this goal would result in 500 million fewer people in 2000 and
about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment of this goal will require greatly
intensified population programs. A basis for developing national population
growth control targets to achieve this world target is contained in the World
Population Plan of Action.
difficult to state, our aim should be for the world to achieve a replacement
level of fertility, (a two-child family on the average), by about the year
2000. This will require the present 2 percent growth rate to decline to 1.7
percent within a decade and to 1.1 percent by 2000. Compared to the U.N medium
projection, this goal would result in 500 million fewer people in 2000 and
about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment of this goal will require greatly
intensified population programs. A basis for developing national population
growth control targets to achieve this world target is contained in the World
Population Plan of Action.
30. The World Population Plan of Action is
not self-enforcing and will require vigorous efforts by interested countries,
U.N. agencies and other international bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership
is essential. The strategy must include the following elements and actions:
not self-enforcing and will require vigorous efforts by interested countries,
U.N. agencies and other international bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership
is essential. The strategy must include the following elements and actions:
(a) Concentration
on key countries. Assistance for population moderation should give primary
emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries where there is
special U.S.
political and strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico,
Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey,
Ethiopia and Colombia.
Together, they account for 47 percent of the world's current population
increase. (It should be recognized that at present AID bilateral assistance to some
of these countries may not be acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent
that funds are available, will be given to other countries, considering such
factors as population growth, need for external assistance, long-term U.S.
interests and willingness to engage in self-help. Multilateral programs must
necessarily have a wider coverage and the bilateral programs of other national
donors will be shaped to their particular interests. At the same time, the U.S. will look to the multilateral agencies --
especially the U.N. Fund for Population Activities which already has projects
in over 80 countries -- to increase population assistance on a broader basis
with increased U.S.
contributions. This is desirable in terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political
terms in the United Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key
13 and our limited resources should give major emphasis to them. (b)
Integration of population factors and population programs into country
development planning. As called for by the world Population Plan of Action,
developing countries and those aiding them should specifically take population
factors into account in national planning and include population programs in
such plans. (c) Increased assistance for family planning services, information
and technology. This is a vital aspect of any world population program. (1)
Family planning information and materials based on present technology should be
made fully available as rapidly as possible to the 85% of the populations in
key LDCs not now reached, essentially rural poor who have the highest
fertility. (2) Fundamental and developmental research should be expanded, aimed
at simple, low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable methods of
fertility control. Support by all federal agencies for biomedical research in
this field should be increased by $60 million annually. (d) Creating conditions
conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits and consistent with the
recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action, priority should be
given in the general aid program to selective development policies in sectors
offering the greatest promise of increased motivation for smaller family size.
In many cases pilot programs and experimental research will be needed as
guidance for later efforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors include:
on key countries. Assistance for population moderation should give primary
emphasis to the largest and fastest growing developing countries where there is
special U.S.
political and strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico,
Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey,
Ethiopia and Colombia.
Together, they account for 47 percent of the world's current population
increase. (It should be recognized that at present AID bilateral assistance to some
of these countries may not be acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent
that funds are available, will be given to other countries, considering such
factors as population growth, need for external assistance, long-term U.S.
interests and willingness to engage in self-help. Multilateral programs must
necessarily have a wider coverage and the bilateral programs of other national
donors will be shaped to their particular interests. At the same time, the U.S. will look to the multilateral agencies --
especially the U.N. Fund for Population Activities which already has projects
in over 80 countries -- to increase population assistance on a broader basis
with increased U.S.
contributions. This is desirable in terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political
terms in the United Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key
13 and our limited resources should give major emphasis to them. (b)
Integration of population factors and population programs into country
development planning. As called for by the world Population Plan of Action,
developing countries and those aiding them should specifically take population
factors into account in national planning and include population programs in
such plans. (c) Increased assistance for family planning services, information
and technology. This is a vital aspect of any world population program. (1)
Family planning information and materials based on present technology should be
made fully available as rapidly as possible to the 85% of the populations in
key LDCs not now reached, essentially rural poor who have the highest
fertility. (2) Fundamental and developmental research should be expanded, aimed
at simple, low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable methods of
fertility control. Support by all federal agencies for biomedical research in
this field should be increased by $60 million annually. (d) Creating conditions
conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits and consistent with the
recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action, priority should be
given in the general aid program to selective development policies in sectors
offering the greatest promise of increased motivation for smaller family size.
In many cases pilot programs and experimental research will be needed as
guidance for later efforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors include:
Providing minimal
levels of education, especially for women;
levels of education, especially for women;
Reducing infant
mortality, including through simple low-cost health care networks;
mortality, including through simple low-cost health care networks;
Expanding wage
employment, especially for women;
employment, especially for women;
Developing
alternatives to children as a source of old age security;
alternatives to children as a source of old age security;
Increasing income
of the poorest, especially in rural areas, including providing privately owned
farms;
of the poorest, especially in rural areas, including providing privately owned
farms;
Education of new
generations on the desirability of smaller families.
generations on the desirability of smaller families.
While AID has
information on the relative importance of the new major socio-economic factors
that lead to lower birth rates, much more research and experimentation need to
be done to determine what cost effective programs and policy will lead to lower
birth rates.
information on the relative importance of the new major socio-economic factors
that lead to lower birth rates, much more research and experimentation need to
be done to determine what cost effective programs and policy will lead to lower
birth rates.
(e) Food and
agricultural assistance is vital for any population sensitive development
strategy. The provision of adequate food stocks for a growing population in
times of shortage is crucial. Without such a program for the LDCs there is considerable
chance that such shortage will lead to conflict and adversely affect population
goals and developmental efforts. Specific recommendations are included in
Section IV(c) of this study. (f) Development of a worldwide political and
popular commitment to population stabilization is fundamental to any effective
strategy. This requires the support and commitment of key LDC leaders. This
will only take place if they clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted
population growth and believe it is possible to deal with this question through
governmental action. The U.S.
should encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in advancing family planning and
population stabilization both within multilateral organizations and through
bilateral contacts with other LDCs. This will require that the President and
the Secretary of State treat the subject of population growth control as a
matter of paramount importance and address it specifically in their regular
contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly LDCs.
agricultural assistance is vital for any population sensitive development
strategy. The provision of adequate food stocks for a growing population in
times of shortage is crucial. Without such a program for the LDCs there is considerable
chance that such shortage will lead to conflict and adversely affect population
goals and developmental efforts. Specific recommendations are included in
Section IV(c) of this study. (f) Development of a worldwide political and
popular commitment to population stabilization is fundamental to any effective
strategy. This requires the support and commitment of key LDC leaders. This
will only take place if they clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted
population growth and believe it is possible to deal with this question through
governmental action. The U.S.
should encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in advancing family planning and
population stabilization both within multilateral organizations and through
bilateral contacts with other LDCs. This will require that the President and
the Secretary of State treat the subject of population growth control as a
matter of paramount importance and address it specifically in their regular
contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly LDCs.
31. The World Population Plan of Action and
the resolutions adopted by consensus by 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N.
World Population Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent framework
for developing a worldwide system of population/family planning programs. We
should use them to generate U.N. agency and national leadership for an all-out
effort to lower growth rates. Constructive action by the U.S. will
further our objectives. To this end we should:
the resolutions adopted by consensus by 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N.
World Population Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent framework
for developing a worldwide system of population/family planning programs. We
should use them to generate U.N. agency and national leadership for an all-out
effort to lower growth rates. Constructive action by the U.S. will
further our objectives. To this end we should:
(a) Strongly
support the World Population Plan of Action and the adoption of its appropriate
provisions in national and other programs. (b) Urge the adoption by national
programs of specific population goals including replacement levels of fertility
for DCs and LDCs by 2000. (c) After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal to maintain our present
national average fertility no higher than replacement level and attain near
stability by 2000. (d) Initiate an international cooperative strategy of
national research programs on human reproduction and fertility control covering
biomedical and socio-economic factors, as proposed by the U.S. Delegation at Bucharest. (e) Act on our offer at Bucharest to collaborate
with other interested donors and U.N. agencies to aid selected countries to
develop low cost preventive health and family planning services. (f) Work
directly with donor countries and through the U.N. Fund for Population
Activities and the OECD/DAC to increase bilateral and multilateral assistance
for population programs.
support the World Population Plan of Action and the adoption of its appropriate
provisions in national and other programs. (b) Urge the adoption by national
programs of specific population goals including replacement levels of fertility
for DCs and LDCs by 2000. (c) After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal to maintain our present
national average fertility no higher than replacement level and attain near
stability by 2000. (d) Initiate an international cooperative strategy of
national research programs on human reproduction and fertility control covering
biomedical and socio-economic factors, as proposed by the U.S. Delegation at Bucharest. (e) Act on our offer at Bucharest to collaborate
with other interested donors and U.N. agencies to aid selected countries to
develop low cost preventive health and family planning services. (f) Work
directly with donor countries and through the U.N. Fund for Population
Activities and the OECD/DAC to increase bilateral and multilateral assistance
for population programs.
32. As measures to increase understanding
of population factors by LDC leaders and to strengthen population planning in
national development plans, we should carry out the recommendations in Part II,
Section VI, including:
of population factors by LDC leaders and to strengthen population planning in
national development plans, we should carry out the recommendations in Part II,
Section VI, including:
(a) Consideration
of population factors and population policies in all Country Assistance
Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development Assistance Program (DAP) multi-year
strategy papers.
of population factors and population policies in all Country Assistance
Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development Assistance Program (DAP) multi-year
strategy papers.
(b) Prepare
projections of population growth individualized for countries with analyses of
development of each country and discuss them with national leaders.
projections of population growth individualized for countries with analyses of
development of each country and discuss them with national leaders.
(c) Provide for
greatly increased training programs for senior officials of LDCs in the
elements of demographic economics.
greatly increased training programs for senior officials of LDCs in the
elements of demographic economics.
(d) Arrange for
familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for ministers of governments,
senior policy level officials and comparably influential leaders from private
life.
familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for ministers of governments,
senior policy level officials and comparably influential leaders from private
life.
(e) Assure
assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population factors in national plans,
particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural
resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income and
social stability.
assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population factors in national plans,
particularly as they relate to health services, education, agricultural
resources and development, employment, equitable distribution of income and
social stability.
(f) Also assure
assistance to LDC leaders in relating population policies and family planning
programs to major sectors of development: health, nutrition, agriculture,
education, social services, organized labor, women's activities, and community
development.
assistance to LDC leaders in relating population policies and family planning
programs to major sectors of development: health, nutrition, agriculture,
education, social services, organized labor, women's activities, and community
development.
(g) Undertake
initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment regarding improvement in the
status of women.
initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment regarding improvement in the
status of women.
(h) Give emphasis
in assistance to programs on development of rural areas.
in assistance to programs on development of rural areas.
Beyond these
activities which are essentially directed at national interests, we must assure
that a broader educational concept is developed to convey an acute
understanding to national leaders of the interrelation of national interests
and world population growth.
activities which are essentially directed at national interests, we must assure
that a broader educational concept is developed to convey an acute
understanding to national leaders of the interrelation of national interests
and world population growth.
33. We must take care that our activities
should not give the appearance to the LDCs of an industrialized country policy
directed against the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this
field we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within this country.
"Third World" leaders should be in
the forefront and obtain the credit for successful programs. In this context it
is important to demonstrate to LDC leaders that such family planning programs
have worked and can work within a reasonable period of time.
should not give the appearance to the LDCs of an industrialized country policy
directed against the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this
field we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within this country.
"Third World" leaders should be in
the forefront and obtain the credit for successful programs. In this context it
is important to demonstrate to LDC leaders that such family planning programs
have worked and can work within a reasonable period of time.
34. To help assure others of our intentions
we should indicate our emphasis on the right of individuals and couples to
determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and
to have information, education and means to do so, and our continued interest
in improving the overall general welfare. We should use the authority provided
by the World Population Plan of Action to advance the principles that 1) responsibility
in parenthood includes responsibility to the children and the community and 2)
that nations in exercising their sovereignty to set population policies should
take into account the welfare of their neighbors and the world. To strengthen
the worldwide approach, family planning programs should be supported by
multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the most efficient means.
we should indicate our emphasis on the right of individuals and couples to
determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and
to have information, education and means to do so, and our continued interest
in improving the overall general welfare. We should use the authority provided
by the World Population Plan of Action to advance the principles that 1) responsibility
in parenthood includes responsibility to the children and the community and 2)
that nations in exercising their sovereignty to set population policies should
take into account the welfare of their neighbors and the world. To strengthen
the worldwide approach, family planning programs should be supported by
multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the most efficient means.
35. To support such family planning and
related development assistance efforts there is need to increase public and
leadership information in this field. We recommend increased emphasis on mass
media, newer communications technology and other population education and
motivation programs by the UN and USIA. Higher priority should be given to
these information programs in this field worldwide.
related development assistance efforts there is need to increase public and
leadership information in this field. We recommend increased emphasis on mass
media, newer communications technology and other population education and
motivation programs by the UN and USIA. Higher priority should be given to
these information programs in this field worldwide.
36. In order to provide the necessary
resources and leadership, support by the U.S. public and Congress will be
necessary. A significant amount of funds will be required for a number of
years. High level personal contact by the Secretary of State and other
officials on the subject at an early date with Congressional counterparts is
needed. A program for this purpose should be developed by OES with H and AID.
resources and leadership, support by the U.S. public and Congress will be
necessary. A significant amount of funds will be required for a number of
years. High level personal contact by the Secretary of State and other
officials on the subject at an early date with Congressional counterparts is
needed. A program for this purpose should be developed by OES with H and AID.
37. There is an alternate view which holds
that a growing number of experts believe that the population situation is
already more serious and less amenable to solution through voluntary measures
than is generally accepted. It holds that, to prevent even more widespread food
shortage and other demographic catastrophes than are generally anticipated,
even stronger measures are required and some fundamental, very difficult moral
issues need to be addressed. These include, for example, our own consumption
patterns, mandatory programs, tight control of our food resources. In view of
the seriousness of these issues, explicit consideration of them should begin in
the Executive Branch, the Congress and the U.N. soon. (See the end of Section I
for this viewpoint.)
that a growing number of experts believe that the population situation is
already more serious and less amenable to solution through voluntary measures
than is generally accepted. It holds that, to prevent even more widespread food
shortage and other demographic catastrophes than are generally anticipated,
even stronger measures are required and some fundamental, very difficult moral
issues need to be addressed. These include, for example, our own consumption
patterns, mandatory programs, tight control of our food resources. In view of
the seriousness of these issues, explicit consideration of them should begin in
the Executive Branch, the Congress and the U.N. soon. (See the end of Section I
for this viewpoint.)
38. Implementing the actions discussed
above (in paragraphs 1-36), will require a significant expansion in AID funds
for population/family planning. A number of major actions in the area of
creating conditions for fertility decline can be funded from resources
available to the sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture). Other
actions, including family planning services, research and experimental
activities on factors affecting fertility, come under population funds. We
recommend increases in AID budget requests to the Congress on the order of
$35-50 million annually through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million requested for
FY 1975). This funding would cover both bilateral programs and contributions to
multilateral organizations. However, the level of funds needed in the future
could change significantly, depending on such factors as major breakthroughs in
fertility control technologies and LDC receptivities to population assistance.
To help develop, monitor, and evaluate the expanded actions discussed above,
AID is likely to need additional direct hire personnel in the population/family
planning area. As a corollary to expanded AID funding levels for population,
efforts must be made to encourage increased contributions by other donors and
recipient countries to help reduce rapid population growth.
above (in paragraphs 1-36), will require a significant expansion in AID funds
for population/family planning. A number of major actions in the area of
creating conditions for fertility decline can be funded from resources
available to the sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture). Other
actions, including family planning services, research and experimental
activities on factors affecting fertility, come under population funds. We
recommend increases in AID budget requests to the Congress on the order of
$35-50 million annually through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million requested for
FY 1975). This funding would cover both bilateral programs and contributions to
multilateral organizations. However, the level of funds needed in the future
could change significantly, depending on such factors as major breakthroughs in
fertility control technologies and LDC receptivities to population assistance.
To help develop, monitor, and evaluate the expanded actions discussed above,
AID is likely to need additional direct hire personnel in the population/family
planning area. As a corollary to expanded AID funding levels for population,
efforts must be made to encourage increased contributions by other donors and
recipient countries to help reduce rapid population growth.
Policy Follow-up
and Coordination
and Coordination
39. This world wide population strategy
involves very complex and difficult questions. Its implementation will require
very careful coordination and specific application in individual circumstances.
Further work is greatly needed in examining the mix of our assistance strategy
and its most efficient application. A number of agencies are interested and
involved. Given this, there appears to be a need for a better and higher level
mechanism to refine and develop policy in this field and to coordinate its
implementation beyond this NSSM. The following options are suggested for
consideration: (a) That the NSC Under Secretaries Committee be given
responsibility for policy and executive review of this subject:
involves very complex and difficult questions. Its implementation will require
very careful coordination and specific application in individual circumstances.
Further work is greatly needed in examining the mix of our assistance strategy
and its most efficient application. A number of agencies are interested and
involved. Given this, there appears to be a need for a better and higher level
mechanism to refine and develop policy in this field and to coordinate its
implementation beyond this NSSM. The following options are suggested for
consideration: (a) That the NSC Under Secretaries Committee be given
responsibility for policy and executive review of this subject:
Pros:
Because of the
major foreign policy implications of the recommended population strategy a high
level focus on policy is required for the success of such a major effort.
major foreign policy implications of the recommended population strategy a high
level focus on policy is required for the success of such a major effort.
With the very wide
agency interests in this topic there is need for an accepted and normal
interagency process for effective analysis and disinterested policy development
and implementation within the N.S.C. system.
agency interests in this topic there is need for an accepted and normal
interagency process for effective analysis and disinterested policy development
and implementation within the N.S.C. system.
Staffing support
for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on exists within the USC framework
including utilization of the Office of Population of the Department of State as
well as other.
for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on exists within the USC framework
including utilization of the Office of Population of the Department of State as
well as other.
USC has provided
coordination and follow-up in major foreign policy areas involving a number of
agencies as is the case in this study.
coordination and follow-up in major foreign policy areas involving a number of
agencies as is the case in this study.
Cons:
The USC would not
be within the normal policy-making framework for development policy as would be
in the case with the DCC.
be within the normal policy-making framework for development policy as would be
in the case with the DCC.
The USC is further
removed from the process of budget development and review of the AID Population
Assistance program.
removed from the process of budget development and review of the AID Population
Assistance program.
(b) That when its
establishment is authorized by the President, the Development Coordination
Committee, headed by the AID Administrator be given overall
responsibility:(note 1)
establishment is authorized by the President, the Development Coordination
Committee, headed by the AID Administrator be given overall
responsibility:(note 1)
Pros: (Provided by
AID)
AID)
It is precisely for
coordination of this type of development issue involving a variety of U.S. policies
toward LDCs that the Congress directed the establishment of the DCC.
coordination of this type of development issue involving a variety of U.S. policies
toward LDCs that the Congress directed the establishment of the DCC.
The DCC is also the
body best able to relate population issues to other development issues, with
which they are intimately related.
body best able to relate population issues to other development issues, with
which they are intimately related.
The DCC has the
advantage of stressing technical and financial aspects of U.S. population
policies, thereby minimizing political complications frequently inherent in
population programs.
advantage of stressing technical and financial aspects of U.S. population
policies, thereby minimizing political complications frequently inherent in
population programs.
It is, in AID's
view, the coordinating body best located to take an overview of all the
population activities now taking place under bilateral and multilateral auspices.
view, the coordinating body best located to take an overview of all the
population activities now taking place under bilateral and multilateral auspices.
Cons:
While the DCC will
doubtless have substantial technical competence, the entire range of political
and other factors bearing on our global population strategy might be more
effectively considered by a group having a broader focus than the DCC.
doubtless have substantial technical competence, the entire range of political
and other factors bearing on our global population strategy might be more
effectively considered by a group having a broader focus than the DCC.
The DCC is not
within the N.S.C. system which provides a more direct access to both the
President and the principal foreign policy decision-making mechanism.
within the N.S.C. system which provides a more direct access to both the
President and the principal foreign policy decision-making mechanism.
The DCC might
overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of population and under emphasize
other important elements.
overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of population and under emphasize
other important elements.
(c) That the
NSC/CIEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group for this subject to insure
follow-up interagency coordination, and further policy development. (No
participating Agency supports this option, therefore it is only included to
present a full range of possibilities). Option (a) is supported by State,
Treasury,
NSC/CIEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group for this subject to insure
follow-up interagency coordination, and further policy development. (No
participating Agency supports this option, therefore it is only included to
present a full range of possibilities). Option (a) is supported by State,
Treasury,
Defense (ISA and
JCS), Agriculture, HEW,
JCS), Agriculture, HEW,
Commerce NSC and
CIA.(note 2)
CIA.(note 2)
Option (b) is
supported by AID.
supported by AID.
Under any of the
above options, there should be an annual review of our population policy to
examine progress, insure our programs are in keeping with the latest
information in this field, identify possible deficiencies, and recommend
additional action at the appropriate level.(note 3)
above options, there should be an annual review of our population policy to
examine progress, insure our programs are in keeping with the latest
information in this field, identify possible deficiencies, and recommend
additional action at the appropriate level.(note 3)
* NOTE: AID expects
the DCC will have the following composition: The Administrator of AID as
Chairman; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Under
Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs; the Under Secretaries of Commerce,
Agriculture and Labor; an Associate Director of OMB; the Executive Director of
CIEP, STR; a representative of the NSC; the Presidents of the EX-IM Bank and
OPIC; and any other agency when items of interest to them are under
discussion.)
the DCC will have the following composition: The Administrator of AID as
Chairman; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Under
Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs; the Under Secretaries of Commerce,
Agriculture and Labor; an Associate Director of OMB; the Executive Director of
CIEP, STR; a representative of the NSC; the Presidents of the EX-IM Bank and
OPIC; and any other agency when items of interest to them are under
discussion.)
** Department of
Commerce supports the option of placing the population policy formulation
mechanism under the auspices of the USC but believes that any detailed economic
questions resulting from proposed population policies be explored through
existing domestic and international economic policy channels.
Commerce supports the option of placing the population policy formulation
mechanism under the auspices of the USC but believes that any detailed economic
questions resulting from proposed population policies be explored through
existing domestic and international economic policy channels.
*** AID believes
these reviews undertaken only periodically might look at selected areas or at
the entire range of population policy depending on problems and needs which
arise.
these reviews undertaken only periodically might look at selected areas or at
the entire range of population policy depending on problems and needs which
arise.
CHAPTER I - WORLD
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS
Introduction
The present world population growth is
unique. Rates of increase are much higher than in earlier centuries, they are
more widespread, and have a greater effect on economic life, social justice,
and -- quite likely -- on public order and political stability. The significance
of population growth is enhanced because it comes at a time when the absolute
size and rate of increase of the global economy, need for agricultural land,
demand for and consumption of resources including water, production of wastes
and pollution have also escalated to historically unique levels. Factors that
only a short time ago were considered separately now have interlocking
relationships, inter-dependence in a literal sense. The changes are not only
quantitatively greater than in the past but qualitatively different. The
growing burden is not only on resources but on administrative and social
institutions as well.
unique. Rates of increase are much higher than in earlier centuries, they are
more widespread, and have a greater effect on economic life, social justice,
and -- quite likely -- on public order and political stability. The significance
of population growth is enhanced because it comes at a time when the absolute
size and rate of increase of the global economy, need for agricultural land,
demand for and consumption of resources including water, production of wastes
and pollution have also escalated to historically unique levels. Factors that
only a short time ago were considered separately now have interlocking
relationships, inter-dependence in a literal sense. The changes are not only
quantitatively greater than in the past but qualitatively different. The
growing burden is not only on resources but on administrative and social
institutions as well.
Population growth is, of course, only one
of the important factors in this new, highly integrated tangle of
relationships. However, it differs from the others because it is a determinant
of the demand sector while others relate to output and supply. (Population
growth also contributes to supply through provision of manpower; in most
developing countries, however, the problem is not a lack of but a surfeit of
hands.) It is, therefore, most pervasive, affecting what needs to be done in
regard to other factors. Whether other problems can be solved depends, in
varying degrees, on the extent to which rapid population growth and other
population variables can be brought under control. Highlights of Current
Demographic Trends Since 1950, world
population has been undergoing unprecedented growth. This growth has four
prominent features:
of the important factors in this new, highly integrated tangle of
relationships. However, it differs from the others because it is a determinant
of the demand sector while others relate to output and supply. (Population
growth also contributes to supply through provision of manpower; in most
developing countries, however, the problem is not a lack of but a surfeit of
hands.) It is, therefore, most pervasive, affecting what needs to be done in
regard to other factors. Whether other problems can be solved depends, in
varying degrees, on the extent to which rapid population growth and other
population variables can be brought under control. Highlights of Current
Demographic Trends Since 1950, world
population has been undergoing unprecedented growth. This growth has four
prominent features:
1. It is unique, far more rapid than ever
in history.
in history.
2. It is much more rapid in less developed
than in developed regions.
than in developed regions.
3. Concentration in towns and cities is
increasing much more rapidly than overall population growth and is far more
rapid in LDCs than in developed countries.
4. It has a tremendous built-in momentum that will inexorably double
populations of most less developed countries by 2000 and will treble or
quadruple their populations before leveling off -- unless far greater efforts
at fertility control are made than are being made.
increasing much more rapidly than overall population growth and is far more
rapid in LDCs than in developed countries.
4. It has a tremendous built-in momentum that will inexorably double
populations of most less developed countries by 2000 and will treble or
quadruple their populations before leveling off -- unless far greater efforts
at fertility control are made than are being made.
Therefore, if a country wants to influence
its total numbers through population policy, it must act in the immediate
future in order to make a substantial difference in the long run.
its total numbers through population policy, it must act in the immediate
future in order to make a substantial difference in the long run.
For most of man's history, world population
grew very slowly. At the rate of growth estimated for the first 18 centuries
A.D., it required more than 1,000 years for world population to double in size.
With the beginnings of the industrial revolution and of modern medicine and
sanitation over two hundred years ago, population growth rates began to
accelerate. At the current growth rate (1.9 percent) world population will
double in 37 years.
grew very slowly. At the rate of growth estimated for the first 18 centuries
A.D., it required more than 1,000 years for world population to double in size.
With the beginnings of the industrial revolution and of modern medicine and
sanitation over two hundred years ago, population growth rates began to
accelerate. At the current growth rate (1.9 percent) world population will
double in 37 years.
By about 1830,
world population reached 1 billion. The second billion was added in about 100
years by 1930. The third billion in 30 years by 1960. The fourth will be
reached in 1975.
world population reached 1 billion. The second billion was added in about 100
years by 1930. The third billion in 30 years by 1960. The fourth will be
reached in 1975.
Between 1750-1800
less than 4 million were being added, on the average, to the earth's population
each year. Between 1850-1900, it was close to 8 million. By 1950 it had grown
to 40 million. By 1975 it will be about 80 million.
less than 4 million were being added, on the average, to the earth's population
each year. Between 1850-1900, it was close to 8 million. By 1950 it had grown
to 40 million. By 1975 it will be about 80 million.
In the developed countries of Europe, growth rates in the last century rarely exceeded
1.0-1.2 percent per year, almost never 1.5 percent. Death rates were much
higher than in most LDCs today. In North America
where growth rates were higher, immigration made a significant contribution. In
nearly every country of Europe, growth rates
are now below 1 percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The natural growth rate
(births minus deaths) in the United
States is less than 0.6 percent. Including
immigration (the world's highest) it is less than 0.7 percent.
1.0-1.2 percent per year, almost never 1.5 percent. Death rates were much
higher than in most LDCs today. In North America
where growth rates were higher, immigration made a significant contribution. In
nearly every country of Europe, growth rates
are now below 1 percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The natural growth rate
(births minus deaths) in the United
States is less than 0.6 percent. Including
immigration (the world's highest) it is less than 0.7 percent.
In less developed countries growth rates
average about 2.4 percent. For the People's Republic of China, with a
massive, enforced birth control program, the growth rate is estimated at under
2 percent. India's is variously estimated from 2.2 percent, Brazil at 2.8
percent, Mexico at 3.4 percent, and Latin America
at about 2.9 percent. African countries, with high birth as well as high death
rates, average 2.6 percent; this growth rate will increase as death rates go
down.
average about 2.4 percent. For the People's Republic of China, with a
massive, enforced birth control program, the growth rate is estimated at under
2 percent. India's is variously estimated from 2.2 percent, Brazil at 2.8
percent, Mexico at 3.4 percent, and Latin America
at about 2.9 percent. African countries, with high birth as well as high death
rates, average 2.6 percent; this growth rate will increase as death rates go
down.
The world's population is now about 3.9
billion; 1.1 billion in the developed countries (30 percent) and 2.8 billion in
the less developed countries (70 percent).
billion; 1.1 billion in the developed countries (30 percent) and 2.8 billion in
the less developed countries (70 percent).
In 1950, only 28 percent of the world's
population or 692 million, lived in urban localities. Between 1950 and 1970,
urban population expanded at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth of
total population. In 1970, urban population increased to 36 percent of world
total and numbered 1.3 billion. By 2000, according to the UN's medium variant
projection, 3.2 billion (about half of the total) of world inhabitants will
live in cities and towns.
population or 692 million, lived in urban localities. Between 1950 and 1970,
urban population expanded at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth of
total population. In 1970, urban population increased to 36 percent of world
total and numbered 1.3 billion. By 2000, according to the UN's medium variant
projection, 3.2 billion (about half of the total) of world inhabitants will
live in cities and towns.
In developed countries, the urban
population varies from 45 to 85 percent; in LDCs, it varies from close to zero
in some African states to nearly 100 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore.
population varies from 45 to 85 percent; in LDCs, it varies from close to zero
in some African states to nearly 100 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore.
In LDCs, urban population is projected to
more than triple in the remainder of this century, from 622 million in 1970 to
2,087 in 2000. Its proportion in total LDC population will thus increase from
25 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 2000. This implies that by the end of this
century LDCs will reach half the level of urbanization projected for DCs (82
percent) (See Table I).
more than triple in the remainder of this century, from 622 million in 1970 to
2,087 in 2000. Its proportion in total LDC population will thus increase from
25 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 2000. This implies that by the end of this
century LDCs will reach half the level of urbanization projected for DCs (82
percent) (See Table I).
The enormous built-in momentum of
population growth in the less developed countries (and to a degree in the
developed countries) is, if possible, even more important and ominous than
current population size and rates of growth. Unlike a conventional explosion,
population growth provides a continuing chain reaction. This momentum springs
from (1) high fertility levels of LDC populations and (2) the very high
percentage of maturing young people in populations. The typical developed
country, Sweden
for example, may have 25% of the population under 15 years of age. The typical
developing country has 41% to 45% or its population under 15. This means that a
tremendous number of future parents, compared to existing parents, are already
born. Even if they have fewer children per family than their parents, the
increase in population will be very great.
population growth in the less developed countries (and to a degree in the
developed countries) is, if possible, even more important and ominous than
current population size and rates of growth. Unlike a conventional explosion,
population growth provides a continuing chain reaction. This momentum springs
from (1) high fertility levels of LDC populations and (2) the very high
percentage of maturing young people in populations. The typical developed
country, Sweden
for example, may have 25% of the population under 15 years of age. The typical
developing country has 41% to 45% or its population under 15. This means that a
tremendous number of future parents, compared to existing parents, are already
born. Even if they have fewer children per family than their parents, the
increase in population will be very great.
Three projections (not predictions), based
on three different assumptions concerning fertility, will illustrate the
generative effect of this building momentum.
on three different assumptions concerning fertility, will illustrate the
generative effect of this building momentum.
a. Present fertility continued: If present
fertility rates were to remain constant, the 1974 population 3.9 billion would
increase to 7.8 billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103 billion
by 2075.
fertility rates were to remain constant, the 1974 population 3.9 billion would
increase to 7.8 billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103 billion
by 2075.
b. U.N. "Medium Variant": If
present birth rates in the developing countries, averaging about 38/1000 were
further reduced to 29/1000 by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 6.4
billion, with over 100 million being added each year. At the time stability
(non-growth) is reached in about 2100, world population would exceed 12.0
billion.
present birth rates in the developing countries, averaging about 38/1000 were
further reduced to 29/1000 by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 6.4
billion, with over 100 million being added each year. At the time stability
(non-growth) is reached in about 2100, world population would exceed 12.0
billion.
c. Replacement Fertility by 2000: If
replacement levels of fertility were reached by 2000, the world's population in
2000 would be 5.9 billion and at the time of stability, about 2075, would be
8.4 billion. ("Replacement level" of fertility is not zero population
growth. It is the level of fertility when couples are limiting their families
to an average of about two children. For most countries, where there are high
percentages of young people, even the attainment of replacement levels of
fertility means that the population will continue to grow for additional 50-60
years to much higher numbers before leveling off.)
replacement levels of fertility were reached by 2000, the world's population in
2000 would be 5.9 billion and at the time of stability, about 2075, would be
8.4 billion. ("Replacement level" of fertility is not zero population
growth. It is the level of fertility when couples are limiting their families
to an average of about two children. For most countries, where there are high
percentages of young people, even the attainment of replacement levels of
fertility means that the population will continue to grow for additional 50-60
years to much higher numbers before leveling off.)
It is reasonable to assume that projection
(a) is unreal since significant efforts are already being made to slow
population growth and because even the most extreme pro-natalists do not argue
that the earth could or should support 103 billion people. Famine, pestilence,
war, or birth control will stop population growth far short of this figure.
(a) is unreal since significant efforts are already being made to slow
population growth and because even the most extreme pro-natalists do not argue
that the earth could or should support 103 billion people. Famine, pestilence,
war, or birth control will stop population growth far short of this figure.
The U.N. medium
variant (projection (b) has been described in a publication of the U.N.
Population Division as "a synthesis of the results of efforts by
demographers of the various countries and the U.N. Secretariat to formulate
realistic assumptions with regard to future trends, in view of information
about present conditions and past experiences." Although by no means
infallible, these projections provide plausible working numbers and are used by
U.N. agencies (e.g., FAO, ILO) for their specialized analyses. One major
shortcoming of most projections, however, is that "information about
present conditions" quoted above is not quite up-to-date. Even in the United States,
refined fertility and mortality rates become available only after a delay of
several years.
variant (projection (b) has been described in a publication of the U.N.
Population Division as "a synthesis of the results of efforts by
demographers of the various countries and the U.N. Secretariat to formulate
realistic assumptions with regard to future trends, in view of information
about present conditions and past experiences." Although by no means
infallible, these projections provide plausible working numbers and are used by
U.N. agencies (e.g., FAO, ILO) for their specialized analyses. One major
shortcoming of most projections, however, is that "information about
present conditions" quoted above is not quite up-to-date. Even in the United States,
refined fertility and mortality rates become available only after a delay of
several years.
Thus, it is possible that the rate of
world population growth has actually fallen below (or for that matter increased
from) that assumed under the U.N. medium variant. A number of less developed
countries with rising living levels (particularly with increasing equality of
income) and efficient family planning programs have experienced marked declines
in fertility. Where access to family planning services has been restricted,
fertility levels can be expected to show little change.
world population growth has actually fallen below (or for that matter increased
from) that assumed under the U.N. medium variant. A number of less developed
countries with rising living levels (particularly with increasing equality of
income) and efficient family planning programs have experienced marked declines
in fertility. Where access to family planning services has been restricted,
fertility levels can be expected to show little change.
It is certain that fertility rates have
already fallen significantly in Hong King, Singapore, Taiwan, Fiji, South
Korea, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius (See
Table 1). Moderate declines have also been registered in West Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. Steady increases in the
number of acceptors at family planning facilities indicate a likelihood of some
fertility reduction in Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Colombia, and other countries which
have family planning programs. On the other hand, there is little concrete
evidence of significant fertility reduction in the populous countries of India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan,
etc.1
already fallen significantly in Hong King, Singapore, Taiwan, Fiji, South
Korea, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius (See
Table 1). Moderate declines have also been registered in West Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. Steady increases in the
number of acceptors at family planning facilities indicate a likelihood of some
fertility reduction in Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Colombia, and other countries which
have family planning programs. On the other hand, there is little concrete
evidence of significant fertility reduction in the populous countries of India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan,
etc.1
Projection (c) is attainable if countries
recognize the gravity of their population situation and make a serious effort
to do something about it.
recognize the gravity of their population situation and make a serious effort
to do something about it.
The differences in the size of total
population projected under the three variants become substantial in a
relatively short time.
population projected under the three variants become substantial in a
relatively short time.
By 1985, the medium variant projects some
342 million fewer people than the constant fertility variant and the
replacement variant is 75 million lower than the medium variant.
342 million fewer people than the constant fertility variant and the
replacement variant is 75 million lower than the medium variant.
By the year 2000 the difference between
constant and medium fertility variants rises to 1.4 billion and between the
medium and replacement variants, close to 500 million. By the year 2000, the
span between the high and low series -- some 1.9 billion -- would amount to
almost half the present world population.
constant and medium fertility variants rises to 1.4 billion and between the
medium and replacement variants, close to 500 million. By the year 2000, the
span between the high and low series -- some 1.9 billion -- would amount to
almost half the present world population.
Most importantly, perhaps, by 2075 the
constant variant would have swamped the earth and the difference between the
medium and replacement variants would amount to 3.7 billion. (Table 2.) The
significance of the alternative variants is that they reflect the difference
between a manageable situation and potential chaos with widespread starvation,
disease, and disintegration for many countries.
constant variant would have swamped the earth and the difference between the
medium and replacement variants would amount to 3.7 billion. (Table 2.) The
significance of the alternative variants is that they reflect the difference
between a manageable situation and potential chaos with widespread starvation,
disease, and disintegration for many countries.
Furthermore, after replacement level
fertility is reached, family size need not remain at an average of two children
per family. Once this level is attained, it is possible that fertility will
continue to decline below replacement level. This would hasten the time when a
stationary population is reached and would increase the difference between the
projection variants. The great momentum of population growth can be seen even
more clearly in the case of a single country -- for example, Mexico. Its
1970 population was 50 million. If its 1965-1970 fertility were to continue, Mexico's
population in 2070 would theoretically number 2.2 billion. If its present
average of 6.1 children per family could be reduced to an average of about 2
(replacement level fertility) by 1980-85, its population would continue to grow
for about sixty years to 110 million. If the two-child average could be reached
by 1990-95, the population would stabilize in sixty more years at about 22
percent higher -- 134 million. If the two-child average cannot be reached for
30 years (by 2000-05), the population at stabilization would grow by an
additional 24 percent to 167 million.
fertility is reached, family size need not remain at an average of two children
per family. Once this level is attained, it is possible that fertility will
continue to decline below replacement level. This would hasten the time when a
stationary population is reached and would increase the difference between the
projection variants. The great momentum of population growth can be seen even
more clearly in the case of a single country -- for example, Mexico. Its
1970 population was 50 million. If its 1965-1970 fertility were to continue, Mexico's
population in 2070 would theoretically number 2.2 billion. If its present
average of 6.1 children per family could be reduced to an average of about 2
(replacement level fertility) by 1980-85, its population would continue to grow
for about sixty years to 110 million. If the two-child average could be reached
by 1990-95, the population would stabilize in sixty more years at about 22
percent higher -- 134 million. If the two-child average cannot be reached for
30 years (by 2000-05), the population at stabilization would grow by an
additional 24 percent to 167 million.
Similar illustrations for other countries
are given below.
are given below.
As Table 3. indicates, alternative rates
of fertility decline would have significant impact on the size of a country's
population by 2000. They would make enormous differences in the sizes of the
stabilized populations, attained some 60 to 70 years after replacement level
fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of the utmost urgency that governments
now recognize the facts and implications of population growth determining the
ultimate population sizes that make sense for their countries and start
vigorous programs at once to achieve their desired goals.
of fertility decline would have significant impact on the size of a country's
population by 2000. They would make enormous differences in the sizes of the
stabilized populations, attained some 60 to 70 years after replacement level
fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of the utmost urgency that governments
now recognize the facts and implications of population growth determining the
ultimate population sizes that make sense for their countries and start
vigorous programs at once to achieve their desired goals.
FUTURE GROWTH IN
MAJOR REGIONS AND COUNTRIES
MAJOR REGIONS AND COUNTRIES
Throughout the projected period 1970 to
2000, less developed regions will grow more rapidly than developed regions. The
rate of growth in LDCs will primarily depend upon the rapidity with which
family planning practices are adopted.
2000, less developed regions will grow more rapidly than developed regions. The
rate of growth in LDCs will primarily depend upon the rapidity with which
family planning practices are adopted.
Differences in the growth rates of DCs and
LDCs will further aggravate the striking demographic imbalances between
developed and less developed countries. Under the U.N. medium projection
variant, by the year 2000 the population of less developed countries would
double, rising from 2.5 billion in 1970 to 5.0 billion (Table 4). In contrast,
the overall growth of the population of the developed world during the same
period would amount to about 26 percent, increasing from 1.08 to 1.37 billion.
Thus, by the year 2000 almost 80 percent of world population would reside in
regions now considered less developed and over 90 percent of the annual
increment to world population would occur there.
LDCs will further aggravate the striking demographic imbalances between
developed and less developed countries. Under the U.N. medium projection
variant, by the year 2000 the population of less developed countries would
double, rising from 2.5 billion in 1970 to 5.0 billion (Table 4). In contrast,
the overall growth of the population of the developed world during the same
period would amount to about 26 percent, increasing from 1.08 to 1.37 billion.
Thus, by the year 2000 almost 80 percent of world population would reside in
regions now considered less developed and over 90 percent of the annual
increment to world population would occur there.
The paucity of reliable information on all
Asian communist countries and the highly optimistic assumptions concerning China's
fertility trends implicit in U.N. medium projections2 argue for disaggregating
the less developed countries into centrally planned economies and countries
with market economies. Such disaggregation reflects more accurately the burden
of rapidly growing populations in most LDCs.
Asian communist countries and the highly optimistic assumptions concerning China's
fertility trends implicit in U.N. medium projections2 argue for disaggregating
the less developed countries into centrally planned economies and countries
with market economies. Such disaggregation reflects more accurately the burden
of rapidly growing populations in most LDCs.
As Table 4. shows, the population of
countries with centrally planned economies, comprising about 1/3 of the 1970
LDC total, is projected to grow between 1970 and 2000 at a rate well below the
LDC average of 2.3 percent. Over the entire thirty-year period, their growth
rate averages 1.4 percent, in comparison with 2.7 percent for other LDCs.
Between 1970 and 1985, the annual rate of growth in Asian communist LDCs is
expected to average 1.6 percent and subsequently to decline to an average of
1.2 percent between 1985 and 2000. The growth rate of LDCs with market
economies, on the other hand, remains practically the same, at 2.7 and 2.6
percent, respectively. Thus, barring both large-scale birth control efforts
(greater than implied by the medium variant) or economic or political
upheavals, the next twenty-five years offer non-communist LDCs little respite
from the burdens of rapidly increasing humanity. Of course, some LDCs will be
able to accommodate this increase with less difficulty than others.
countries with centrally planned economies, comprising about 1/3 of the 1970
LDC total, is projected to grow between 1970 and 2000 at a rate well below the
LDC average of 2.3 percent. Over the entire thirty-year period, their growth
rate averages 1.4 percent, in comparison with 2.7 percent for other LDCs.
Between 1970 and 1985, the annual rate of growth in Asian communist LDCs is
expected to average 1.6 percent and subsequently to decline to an average of
1.2 percent between 1985 and 2000. The growth rate of LDCs with market
economies, on the other hand, remains practically the same, at 2.7 and 2.6
percent, respectively. Thus, barring both large-scale birth control efforts
(greater than implied by the medium variant) or economic or political
upheavals, the next twenty-five years offer non-communist LDCs little respite
from the burdens of rapidly increasing humanity. Of course, some LDCs will be
able to accommodate this increase with less difficulty than others.
Moreover, short of Draconian measures
there is no possibility that any LDC can stabilize its population at less than
double its present size. For many, stabilization will not be short of three
times their present size.
there is no possibility that any LDC can stabilize its population at less than
double its present size. For many, stabilization will not be short of three
times their present size.
NATO and Eastern
Europe. In the west, only France
and Greece
have a policy of increasing population growth -- which the people are
successfully disregarding. (In a recent and significant change from traditional
positions, however, the French Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a law not only
authorizing general availability of contraceptives but also providing that
their cost be borne by the social security system.) Other western NATO members
have no policies.3 Most provide some or substantial family planning services.
All appear headed toward lower growth rates. In two NATO member countries (West Germany and Luxembourg), annual numbers of
deaths already exceed births, yielding a negative natural growth rate.
Europe. In the west, only France
and Greece
have a policy of increasing population growth -- which the people are
successfully disregarding. (In a recent and significant change from traditional
positions, however, the French Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a law not only
authorizing general availability of contraceptives but also providing that
their cost be borne by the social security system.) Other western NATO members
have no policies.3 Most provide some or substantial family planning services.
All appear headed toward lower growth rates. In two NATO member countries (West Germany and Luxembourg), annual numbers of
deaths already exceed births, yielding a negative natural growth rate.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia
have active policies to increase their population growth rates -- despite the
reluctance of their people to have larger families. Within the USSR, fertility rates in RSFSR and the republics
of Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia are below replacement
level. This situation has prevailed at least since 1969-1970 and, if continued,
will eventually lead to negative population growth in these republics. In the United States,
average fertility also fell below replacement level in the past two years (1972
and 1973). There is a striking difference, however, in the attitudes toward
this demographic development in the two countries. While in the United States the possibility of a stabilized
(non-growing) population is generally viewed with favor, in the USSR there is
perceptible concern over the low fertility of Slavs and Balts (mostly by Slavs
and Balts). The Soviet government, by all indications, is studying the
feasibility of increasing their sagging birth rates. The entire matter of
fertility-bolstering policies is circumscribed by the relatively high costs of
increasing fertility (mainly through increased outlays for consumption goods
and services) and the need to avoid the appearance of ethnic discrimination
between rapidly and slowly growing nationalities.
have active policies to increase their population growth rates -- despite the
reluctance of their people to have larger families. Within the USSR, fertility rates in RSFSR and the republics
of Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia are below replacement
level. This situation has prevailed at least since 1969-1970 and, if continued,
will eventually lead to negative population growth in these republics. In the United States,
average fertility also fell below replacement level in the past two years (1972
and 1973). There is a striking difference, however, in the attitudes toward
this demographic development in the two countries. While in the United States the possibility of a stabilized
(non-growing) population is generally viewed with favor, in the USSR there is
perceptible concern over the low fertility of Slavs and Balts (mostly by Slavs
and Balts). The Soviet government, by all indications, is studying the
feasibility of increasing their sagging birth rates. The entire matter of
fertility-bolstering policies is circumscribed by the relatively high costs of
increasing fertility (mainly through increased outlays for consumption goods
and services) and the need to avoid the appearance of ethnic discrimination
between rapidly and slowly growing nationalities.
U.N. medium projections to the year 2000
show no significant changes in the relative demographic position of the western
alliance countries as against eastern Europe and the USSR. The population of the Warsaw Pact countries
will remain at 65 percent of the populations of NATO member states. If Turkey is excluded, the Warsaw Pact proportion rises somewhat from 70
percent in 1970 to 73 percent by 2000. This change is not of an order of
magnitude that in itself will have important implications for east-west power
relations. (Future growth of manpower in NATO and Warsaw Pact nations has not been examined in
this Memorandum.)
show no significant changes in the relative demographic position of the western
alliance countries as against eastern Europe and the USSR. The population of the Warsaw Pact countries
will remain at 65 percent of the populations of NATO member states. If Turkey is excluded, the Warsaw Pact proportion rises somewhat from 70
percent in 1970 to 73 percent by 2000. This change is not of an order of
magnitude that in itself will have important implications for east-west power
relations. (Future growth of manpower in NATO and Warsaw Pact nations has not been examined in
this Memorandum.)
Of greater potential political and
strategic significance are prospective changes in the populations of less
developed regions both among themselves and in relation to developed countries.
strategic significance are prospective changes in the populations of less
developed regions both among themselves and in relation to developed countries.
Africa.
Assessment of future demographic trends in Africa
is severely impeded by lack of reliable base data on the size, composition,
fertility and mortality, and migration of much of the continent's population.
With this important limitation in mind, the population of Africa is projected
to increase from 352 million in 1970 to 834 million in 2000, an increase of
almost 2.5 times. In most African countries, population growth rates are likely
to increase appreciably before they begin to decline. Rapid population
expansion may be particularly burdensome to the "least developed"
among Africa's LDCs including -- according to the U.N. classification --
Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Burundi,
Guinea, Chad, Rwanda, Somalia, Dahomey, Lesotho, and Botswana. As a group, they
numbered 104 million in 1970 and are projected to grow at an average rate of
3.0 percent a year, to some 250 million in 2000. This rate of growth is based
on the assumption of significant reductions in mortality. It is questionable,
however, whether economic and social conditions in the foreseeable future will
permit reductions in mortality required to produce a 3 percent growth rate.
Consequently, the population of the "least developed" of Africa's LDCs may fall short of the 250 million figure in
2000.
Assessment of future demographic trends in Africa
is severely impeded by lack of reliable base data on the size, composition,
fertility and mortality, and migration of much of the continent's population.
With this important limitation in mind, the population of Africa is projected
to increase from 352 million in 1970 to 834 million in 2000, an increase of
almost 2.5 times. In most African countries, population growth rates are likely
to increase appreciably before they begin to decline. Rapid population
expansion may be particularly burdensome to the "least developed"
among Africa's LDCs including -- according to the U.N. classification --
Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Burundi,
Guinea, Chad, Rwanda, Somalia, Dahomey, Lesotho, and Botswana. As a group, they
numbered 104 million in 1970 and are projected to grow at an average rate of
3.0 percent a year, to some 250 million in 2000. This rate of growth is based
on the assumption of significant reductions in mortality. It is questionable,
however, whether economic and social conditions in the foreseeable future will
permit reductions in mortality required to produce a 3 percent growth rate.
Consequently, the population of the "least developed" of Africa's LDCs may fall short of the 250 million figure in
2000.
African countries endowed with rich oil and
other natural resources may be in a better economic position to cope with
population expansion. Nigeria
falls into this category. Already the most populous country on the continent,
with an estimated 55 million people in 1970 (see footnote to Table 4), Nigeria's
population by the end of this century is projected to number 135 million. This
suggests a growing political and strategic role for Nigeria,
at least in Africa south of the Sahara.
other natural resources may be in a better economic position to cope with
population expansion. Nigeria
falls into this category. Already the most populous country on the continent,
with an estimated 55 million people in 1970 (see footnote to Table 4), Nigeria's
population by the end of this century is projected to number 135 million. This
suggests a growing political and strategic role for Nigeria,
at least in Africa south of the Sahara.
In North
Africa, Egypt's
population of 33 million in 1970 is projected to double by 2000. The large and
increasing size of Egypt's
population is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration in
the formulation of many foreign and domestic policies not only of Egypt but also
of neighboring countries.
Africa, Egypt's
population of 33 million in 1970 is projected to double by 2000. The large and
increasing size of Egypt's
population is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration in
the formulation of many foreign and domestic policies not only of Egypt but also
of neighboring countries.
Latin America.
Rapid population growth is projected for tropical South American which includes
Brazil, Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Brazil, with a current
population of over 100 million, clearly dominates the continent
demographically; by the end of this century, its population is projected to
reach the 1974 U.S.
level of about 212 million people. Rapid economic growth prospects -- if they
are not diminished by demographic overgrowth -- portend a growing power status
for Brazil in Latin America and on the world scene over the next 25
years.
Rapid population growth is projected for tropical South American which includes
Brazil, Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Brazil, with a current
population of over 100 million, clearly dominates the continent
demographically; by the end of this century, its population is projected to
reach the 1974 U.S.
level of about 212 million people. Rapid economic growth prospects -- if they
are not diminished by demographic overgrowth -- portend a growing power status
for Brazil in Latin America and on the world scene over the next 25
years.
The Caribbean which includes a number of
countries with promising family planning programs (Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Cuba, Barbados and also Puerto Rico) is projected to grow at 2.2
percent a year between 1970 and 2000, a rate below the Latin American average
of 2.8 percent.
countries with promising family planning programs (Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Cuba, Barbados and also Puerto Rico) is projected to grow at 2.2
percent a year between 1970 and 2000, a rate below the Latin American average
of 2.8 percent.
Perhaps the most significant population
trend from the viewpoint of the United States
is the prospect that Mexico's
population will increase from 50 million in 1970 to over 130 million by the
year 2000. Even under most optimistic conditions, in which the country's
average fertility falls to replacement level by 2000, Mexico's
population is likely to exceed 100 million by the end of this century.
trend from the viewpoint of the United States
is the prospect that Mexico's
population will increase from 50 million in 1970 to over 130 million by the
year 2000. Even under most optimistic conditions, in which the country's
average fertility falls to replacement level by 2000, Mexico's
population is likely to exceed 100 million by the end of this century.
South Asia.
Somewhat slower rates are expected for Eastern and Middle South
Asia whose combined population of 1.03 billion in 1970 is
projected to more than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. In the face of continued
rapid population growth (2.5 percent), the prospects for the populous Indian
subregion, which already faces staggering economic problems, are particularly
bleak. South and Southeast Asia's population will substantially increase
relative to mainland China;
it appears doubtful, however, that this will do much to enhance their relative
power position and political influence in Asia.
On the contrary, preoccupation with the growing internal economic and social
problems resulting from huge population increases may progressively reduce the
ability of the region, especially India, to play an effective
regional and world power role.
Somewhat slower rates are expected for Eastern and Middle South
Asia whose combined population of 1.03 billion in 1970 is
projected to more than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. In the face of continued
rapid population growth (2.5 percent), the prospects for the populous Indian
subregion, which already faces staggering economic problems, are particularly
bleak. South and Southeast Asia's population will substantially increase
relative to mainland China;
it appears doubtful, however, that this will do much to enhance their relative
power position and political influence in Asia.
On the contrary, preoccupation with the growing internal economic and social
problems resulting from huge population increases may progressively reduce the
ability of the region, especially India, to play an effective
regional and world power role.
Western South Asia, demographically
dominated by Turkey and
seven oil-rich states (including Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, and Kuwait) is
projected to be one of the fastest growing LDC regions, with an annual average
growth rate of 2.9 percent between 1970 and 2000. Part of this growth will be
due to immigration, as for example, into Kuwait.
dominated by Turkey and
seven oil-rich states (including Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, and Kuwait) is
projected to be one of the fastest growing LDC regions, with an annual average
growth rate of 2.9 percent between 1970 and 2000. Part of this growth will be
due to immigration, as for example, into Kuwait.
The relatively low growth rate of 1.8
percent projected for East Asian LDCs with market economics reflects highly
successful family planning programs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.
percent projected for East Asian LDCs with market economics reflects highly
successful family planning programs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.
The People's Republic of China (PRC).
The People's Republic of China
has by far the world's largest population and, potentially, severe problems of
population pressure, given its low standard of living and quite intensive
utilization of available farm land resources. Its last census in 1953 recorded
a population of 583 million, and PRC officials have cited a figure as high as
830 million for 1970. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis
projects a slightly higher population, reaching 920 million by 1974. The
present population growth rate is about two percent. Conclusion Rapid population growth in less developed
countries has been mounting in a social milieu of poverty, unemployment and
underemployment, low educational attainment, widespread malnutrition, and
increasing costs of food production. These countries have accumulated a
formidable "backlog" of unfinished tasks. They include economic
assimilation of some 40 percent of their people who are pressing at, but
largely remain outside the periphery of the developing economy; the
amelioration of generally low levels of living; and in addition, accommodation
of annually larger increments to the population. The accomplishment of these
tasks could be intolerably slow if the average annual growth rate in the
remainder of this century does not slow down to well below the 2.7 percent
projected, under the medium variant, for LDCs with market economics. How rapid
population growth impedes social and economic progress is discussed in
subsequent chapters.
The People's Republic of China
has by far the world's largest population and, potentially, severe problems of
population pressure, given its low standard of living and quite intensive
utilization of available farm land resources. Its last census in 1953 recorded
a population of 583 million, and PRC officials have cited a figure as high as
830 million for 1970. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis
projects a slightly higher population, reaching 920 million by 1974. The
present population growth rate is about two percent. Conclusion Rapid population growth in less developed
countries has been mounting in a social milieu of poverty, unemployment and
underemployment, low educational attainment, widespread malnutrition, and
increasing costs of food production. These countries have accumulated a
formidable "backlog" of unfinished tasks. They include economic
assimilation of some 40 percent of their people who are pressing at, but
largely remain outside the periphery of the developing economy; the
amelioration of generally low levels of living; and in addition, accommodation
of annually larger increments to the population. The accomplishment of these
tasks could be intolerably slow if the average annual growth rate in the
remainder of this century does not slow down to well below the 2.7 percent
projected, under the medium variant, for LDCs with market economics. How rapid
population growth impedes social and economic progress is discussed in
subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER II.
POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES
POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES
Rapid population growth and lagging food
production in developing countries, together with the sharp deterioration in
the global food situation in 1972 and 1973, have raised serious concerns about
the ability of the world to feed itself adequately over the next quarter
century and beyond.
production in developing countries, together with the sharp deterioration in
the global food situation in 1972 and 1973, have raised serious concerns about
the ability of the world to feed itself adequately over the next quarter
century and beyond.
As a result of population growth, and to
some extent also of increasing affluence, world food demand has been growing at
unprecedented rates. In 1900, the annual increase in world demand for cereals
was about 4 million tons. By 1950, it had risen to about 12 million tons per
year. By 1970, the annual increase in demand was 30 million tons (on a base of
over 1,200 million tons). This is roughly equivalent to the annual wheat crop
of Canada, Australia, and Argentina combined. This annual
increase in food demand is made up of a 2% annual increase in population and a
0.5% increased demand per capita. Part of the rising per capita demand reflects
improvement in diets of some of the peoples of the developing countries. In the
less developed countries about 400 pounds of grain is available per person per
year and is mostly eaten as cereal. The average North American, however, uses
nearly a ton of grain a year, only 200 pounds directly and the rest in the form
of meat, milk, and eggs for which several pounds of cereal are required to
produce one pound of the animal product (e.g., five pounds of grain to produce
one pound of beef).
some extent also of increasing affluence, world food demand has been growing at
unprecedented rates. In 1900, the annual increase in world demand for cereals
was about 4 million tons. By 1950, it had risen to about 12 million tons per
year. By 1970, the annual increase in demand was 30 million tons (on a base of
over 1,200 million tons). This is roughly equivalent to the annual wheat crop
of Canada, Australia, and Argentina combined. This annual
increase in food demand is made up of a 2% annual increase in population and a
0.5% increased demand per capita. Part of the rising per capita demand reflects
improvement in diets of some of the peoples of the developing countries. In the
less developed countries about 400 pounds of grain is available per person per
year and is mostly eaten as cereal. The average North American, however, uses
nearly a ton of grain a year, only 200 pounds directly and the rest in the form
of meat, milk, and eggs for which several pounds of cereal are required to
produce one pound of the animal product (e.g., five pounds of grain to produce
one pound of beef).
During the past two decades, LDCs have
been able to keep food production ahead of population, notwithstanding the
unprecedentedly high rates of population growth. The basic figures are
summarized in the following table: [calculated from data in USDA, The World
Agricultural Situation, March 1974]:
been able to keep food production ahead of population, notwithstanding the
unprecedentedly high rates of population growth. The basic figures are
summarized in the following table: [calculated from data in USDA, The World
Agricultural Situation, March 1974]:
INDICES OF WORLD POPULATION AND FOOD
PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION
(excluding Peoples
Republic of China)
Republic of China)
1954=100
+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
|
WORLD | DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES|LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES|
WORLD | DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES|LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES|
|
Food | Food |
Food |
Food | Food |
Food |
|
production | production |
production |
production | production |
production |
| | | |
| Popu- Per
| Popu- Per | Popu- Per |
| Popu- Per | Popu- Per |
|lation Total Capita|lation Total Capita|lation Total Capita
|
|
+------+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
| 1954 | 100
100 100 | 100
100 100 | 100
100 100 |
100 100 | 100
100 100 | 100
100 100 |
| 1973 | 144
170 119 | 124 170
138 | 159 171
107 |
170 119 | 124 170
138 | 159 171
107 |
| |
|
|
| Compound Annual
Increase (%): |
Increase (%): |
| |
1.9 2.8 0.9 |
1.1 2.8 1.7 |
2.5 2.9 0.4
|
1.9 2.8 0.9 |
1.1 2.8 1.7 |
2.5 2.9 0.4
|
+------+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
It will be noted that the relative gain in
LDC total food production was just as great as for advanced countries, but was
far less on a per capita basis because of the sharp difference in population
growth rates. Moreover, within the LDC group were 24 countries (including
Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Zaire, Algeria, Guyana, Iraq, and Chile)
in which the rate of increase of population growth exceeded the rate of
increase in food production; and a much more populous group (including India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh) in which the rate of increase in production barely
exceeded population growth but did not keep up with the increase in domestic
demand. [World Food Conference, Preliminary Assessment, 8 May 1974; U.N.
Document E/CONF. 65/ PREP/6, p. 33.]
LDC total food production was just as great as for advanced countries, but was
far less on a per capita basis because of the sharp difference in population
growth rates. Moreover, within the LDC group were 24 countries (including
Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Zaire, Algeria, Guyana, Iraq, and Chile)
in which the rate of increase of population growth exceeded the rate of
increase in food production; and a much more populous group (including India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh) in which the rate of increase in production barely
exceeded population growth but did not keep up with the increase in domestic
demand. [World Food Conference, Preliminary Assessment, 8 May 1974; U.N.
Document E/CONF. 65/ PREP/6, p. 33.]
General requirements have been projected
for the years 1985 and 2000, based on the UN Medium Variant population
estimates and allowing for a very small improvement in diets in the LDCs.
for the years 1985 and 2000, based on the UN Medium Variant population
estimates and allowing for a very small improvement in diets in the LDCs.
A recent projection made by the Department
of Agriculture indicates a potential productive capacity more than adequate to
meet world cereal requirements (the staple food of the world) of a population
of 6.4 billion in the year 2000 (medium fertility variant) at roughly current
relative prices.
of Agriculture indicates a potential productive capacity more than adequate to
meet world cereal requirements (the staple food of the world) of a population
of 6.4 billion in the year 2000 (medium fertility variant) at roughly current
relative prices.
This overall picture offers little cause
for complacency when broken down by geographic regions. To support only a very
modest improvement in current cereal consumption levels (from 177 kilograms per
capita in 1970 to 200-206 kilograms in 2000) the projections show an alarming
increase in LDC dependency on imports. Such imports are projected to rise from
21.4 million tons in 1970 to 102-122 million tons by the end of the century. Cereal
imports would increase to 13-15 percent of total developing country consumption
as against 8 percent in 1970. As a group, the advanced countries cannot only
meet their own needs but will also generate a substantial surplus. For the
LDCs, analyses of food production capacity foresee the physical possibility of
meeting their needs, provided that (a) weather conditions are normal, (b)
yields per unit of area continue to improve at the rates of the last decade,
bringing the average by 1985 close to present yields in the advanced countries,
and (c) a substantially larger annual transfer of grains can be arranged from
the surplus countries (mainly North America), either through commercial sales
or through continuous and growing food aid. The estimates of production
capacity do not rely on major new technical breakthroughs in food production
methods, but they do require the availability and application of greatly
increased quantities of fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation water, and other
inputs to modernized agriculture, together with continued technological
advances at past rates and the institutional and administrative reforms
(including vastly expanded research and extension services) essential to the
successful application of these inputs. They also assume normal weather
conditions. Substantial political will is required in the LDCs to give the
necessary priority to food production.
for complacency when broken down by geographic regions. To support only a very
modest improvement in current cereal consumption levels (from 177 kilograms per
capita in 1970 to 200-206 kilograms in 2000) the projections show an alarming
increase in LDC dependency on imports. Such imports are projected to rise from
21.4 million tons in 1970 to 102-122 million tons by the end of the century. Cereal
imports would increase to 13-15 percent of total developing country consumption
as against 8 percent in 1970. As a group, the advanced countries cannot only
meet their own needs but will also generate a substantial surplus. For the
LDCs, analyses of food production capacity foresee the physical possibility of
meeting their needs, provided that (a) weather conditions are normal, (b)
yields per unit of area continue to improve at the rates of the last decade,
bringing the average by 1985 close to present yields in the advanced countries,
and (c) a substantially larger annual transfer of grains can be arranged from
the surplus countries (mainly North America), either through commercial sales
or through continuous and growing food aid. The estimates of production
capacity do not rely on major new technical breakthroughs in food production
methods, but they do require the availability and application of greatly
increased quantities of fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation water, and other
inputs to modernized agriculture, together with continued technological
advances at past rates and the institutional and administrative reforms
(including vastly expanded research and extension services) essential to the
successful application of these inputs. They also assume normal weather
conditions. Substantial political will is required in the LDCs to give the
necessary priority to food production.
There is great uncertainty whether the
conditions for achieving food balance in the LDCs can in fact be realized.
Climatic changes are poorly understood, but a persistent atmospheric cooling
trend since 1940 has been established. One respectable body of scientific
opinion believes that this portends a period of much wider annual frosts, and
possibly a long-term lowering of rainfall in the monsoon areas of Asia and Africa. Nitrogen fertilizer will be in world short supply
into the late 1970s, at least; because of higher energy prices, it may also be
more costly in real terms than in the 1960s. Capital investments for irrigation
and infrastructure and the organizational requirements for securing continuous
improvements in agricultural yields may well be beyond the financial and
administrative capacity of many LDCs. For some of the areas under heaviest
population pressure, there is little or no prospect for foreign exchange
earnings to cover constantly increasing imports of food.
conditions for achieving food balance in the LDCs can in fact be realized.
Climatic changes are poorly understood, but a persistent atmospheric cooling
trend since 1940 has been established. One respectable body of scientific
opinion believes that this portends a period of much wider annual frosts, and
possibly a long-term lowering of rainfall in the monsoon areas of Asia and Africa. Nitrogen fertilizer will be in world short supply
into the late 1970s, at least; because of higher energy prices, it may also be
more costly in real terms than in the 1960s. Capital investments for irrigation
and infrastructure and the organizational requirements for securing continuous
improvements in agricultural yields may well be beyond the financial and
administrative capacity of many LDCs. For some of the areas under heaviest
population pressure, there is little or no prospect for foreign exchange
earnings to cover constantly increasing imports of food.
While it is always unwise to project the
recent past into the long-term future, the experience of 1972-73 is very
sobering. The coincidence of adverse weather in many regions in 1972 brought
per capita production in the LDCs back to the level of the early 1960s. At the
same time, world food reserves (mainly American) were almost exhausted, and
they were not rebuilt during the high production year of 1973. A repetition
under these conditions of 1972 weather patterns would result in large-scale
famine of a kind not experienced for several decades -- a kind the world
thought had been permanently banished.
recent past into the long-term future, the experience of 1972-73 is very
sobering. The coincidence of adverse weather in many regions in 1972 brought
per capita production in the LDCs back to the level of the early 1960s. At the
same time, world food reserves (mainly American) were almost exhausted, and
they were not rebuilt during the high production year of 1973. A repetition
under these conditions of 1972 weather patterns would result in large-scale
famine of a kind not experienced for several decades -- a kind the world
thought had been permanently banished.
Even if massive famine can be averted, the
most optimistic forecasts of food production potential in the more populous
LDCs show little improvement in the presently inadequate levels and quality of
nutrition. As long as annual population growth continues at 2 to 3 percent or
more, LDCs must make expanded food production the top development priority,
even though it may absorb a large fraction of available capital and foreign
exchange.
most optimistic forecasts of food production potential in the more populous
LDCs show little improvement in the presently inadequate levels and quality of
nutrition. As long as annual population growth continues at 2 to 3 percent or
more, LDCs must make expanded food production the top development priority,
even though it may absorb a large fraction of available capital and foreign
exchange.
Moderation of population growth rates in
the LDCs could make some difference to food requirements by 1985, a substantial
difference by 2000, and a vast difference in the early part of the next
century. From the viewpoint of U.S.
interests, such reductions in LDC food needs would be clearly advantageous.
They would not reduce American commercial markets for food since the reduction
in LDC food requirements that would result from slowing population growth would
affect only requests for concessional or grant food assistance, not commercial
sales. They would improve the prospects for maintaining adequate world food reserves
against climatic emergencies. They would reduce the likelihood of periodic
famines in region after region, accompanied by food riots and chronic social
and political instability. They would improve the possibilities for long-term
development and integration into a peaceful world order.
the LDCs could make some difference to food requirements by 1985, a substantial
difference by 2000, and a vast difference in the early part of the next
century. From the viewpoint of U.S.
interests, such reductions in LDC food needs would be clearly advantageous.
They would not reduce American commercial markets for food since the reduction
in LDC food requirements that would result from slowing population growth would
affect only requests for concessional or grant food assistance, not commercial
sales. They would improve the prospects for maintaining adequate world food reserves
against climatic emergencies. They would reduce the likelihood of periodic
famines in region after region, accompanied by food riots and chronic social
and political instability. They would improve the possibilities for long-term
development and integration into a peaceful world order.
Even taking the most optimistic view of
the theoretical possibilities of producing enough foods in the developed
countries to meet the requirements of the developing countries, the problem of
increased costs to the LDCs is already extremely serious and in its future may
be insurmountable. At current prices the anticipated import requirements of
102-122 million tons by 2000 would raise the cost of developing countries'
imports of cereals to $16-204 billion by that year compared with $2.5 billion
in 1970. Large as they may seem even these estimates of import requirements
could be on the low side if the developing countries are unable to achieve the
Department of Agriculture's assumed increase in the rate of growth of production.
the theoretical possibilities of producing enough foods in the developed
countries to meet the requirements of the developing countries, the problem of
increased costs to the LDCs is already extremely serious and in its future may
be insurmountable. At current prices the anticipated import requirements of
102-122 million tons by 2000 would raise the cost of developing countries'
imports of cereals to $16-204 billion by that year compared with $2.5 billion
in 1970. Large as they may seem even these estimates of import requirements
could be on the low side if the developing countries are unable to achieve the
Department of Agriculture's assumed increase in the rate of growth of production.
The FAO in its recent "Preliminary
Assessment of the World Food Situation Present and Future" has reached a
similar conclusion:
Assessment of the World Food Situation Present and Future" has reached a
similar conclusion:
What is certain is the enormity of the
food import bill which might face the developing countries . . . In addition
[to cereals] the developing countries . . . would be importing substantial
amounts of other foodstuffs. clearly the financing of international food trade
on this scale would raise very grave problems.
food import bill which might face the developing countries . . . In addition
[to cereals] the developing countries . . . would be importing substantial
amounts of other foodstuffs. clearly the financing of international food trade
on this scale would raise very grave problems.
At least three-quarters of the projected
increase in cereal imports of developing countries would fall in the poorer
countries of South Asia and North and Central Africa.
The situation in Latin America which is
projected to shift from a modest surplus to a modest deficit area is quite
different. Most of this deficit will be in Mexico and Central America, with
relatively high income and easily exploitable transportation links to the U.S.
increase in cereal imports of developing countries would fall in the poorer
countries of South Asia and North and Central Africa.
The situation in Latin America which is
projected to shift from a modest surplus to a modest deficit area is quite
different. Most of this deficit will be in Mexico and Central America, with
relatively high income and easily exploitable transportation links to the U.S.
The problem in Latin
America, therefore, appears relatively more manageable.
America, therefore, appears relatively more manageable.
It seems highly unlikely, however, that
the poorer countries of Asia and Africa will
be able to finance nearly like the level of import requirements projected by
the USDA. Few of them have dynamic export-oriented industrial sectors like Taiwan or South Korea or rich raw material
resources that will generate export earnings fast enough to keep pace with food
import needs. Accordingly, those countries where large-scale hunger and
malnutrition are already present face the bleak prospect of little, if any,
improvement in the food intake in the years ahead barring a major foreign
financial food aid program, more rapid expansion of domestic food production,
reduced population growth or some combination of all three. Worse yet, a series
of crop disasters could transform some of them into classic Malthusian cases
with famines involving millions of people.
the poorer countries of Asia and Africa will
be able to finance nearly like the level of import requirements projected by
the USDA. Few of them have dynamic export-oriented industrial sectors like Taiwan or South Korea or rich raw material
resources that will generate export earnings fast enough to keep pace with food
import needs. Accordingly, those countries where large-scale hunger and
malnutrition are already present face the bleak prospect of little, if any,
improvement in the food intake in the years ahead barring a major foreign
financial food aid program, more rapid expansion of domestic food production,
reduced population growth or some combination of all three. Worse yet, a series
of crop disasters could transform some of them into classic Malthusian cases
with famines involving millions of people.
While foreign assistance probably will
continue to be forthcoming to meet short-term emergency situations like the
threat of mass starvation, it is more questionable whether aid donor countries
will be prepared to provide the sort of massive food aid called for by the
import projections on a long-term continuing basis.
continue to be forthcoming to meet short-term emergency situations like the
threat of mass starvation, it is more questionable whether aid donor countries
will be prepared to provide the sort of massive food aid called for by the
import projections on a long-term continuing basis.
Reduced population growth rates clearly
could bring significant relief over the longer term. Some analysts maintain
that for the post-1985 period a rapid decline in fertility will be crucial to
adequate diets worldwide. If, as noted before, fertility in the developing
countries could be made to decline to the replacement level by the year 2000,
the world's population in that year would be 5.9 billion or 500 million below
the level that would be attained if the UN medium projection were followed.
Nearly all of the decline would be in the LDCs. With such a reduction the
projected import gap of 102-122 million tons per year could be eliminated while
still permitting a modest improvement in per capita consumption. While such a
rapid reduction in fertility rates in the next 30 years is an optimistic
target, it is thought by some experts that it could be obtained by intensified
efforts if its necessity were understood by world and national leaders. Even
more modest reductions could have significant implications by 2000 and even
more over time.
could bring significant relief over the longer term. Some analysts maintain
that for the post-1985 period a rapid decline in fertility will be crucial to
adequate diets worldwide. If, as noted before, fertility in the developing
countries could be made to decline to the replacement level by the year 2000,
the world's population in that year would be 5.9 billion or 500 million below
the level that would be attained if the UN medium projection were followed.
Nearly all of the decline would be in the LDCs. With such a reduction the
projected import gap of 102-122 million tons per year could be eliminated while
still permitting a modest improvement in per capita consumption. While such a
rapid reduction in fertility rates in the next 30 years is an optimistic
target, it is thought by some experts that it could be obtained by intensified
efforts if its necessity were understood by world and national leaders. Even
more modest reductions could have significant implications by 2000 and even
more over time.
Intensive programs to increase food
production in developing countries beyond the levels assumed in the U.S.D.A.
projections probably offer the best prospect for some reasonably early relief,
although this poses major technical and organizational difficulties and will
involve substantial costs. It must be realized, however, that this will be
difficult in all countries and probably impossible in some -- or many. Even
with the introduction of new inputs and techniques it has not been possible to
increase agricultural output by as much as 3 percent per annum in many of the
poorer developing countries. Population growth in a number of these countries
exceeds that rate.
production in developing countries beyond the levels assumed in the U.S.D.A.
projections probably offer the best prospect for some reasonably early relief,
although this poses major technical and organizational difficulties and will
involve substantial costs. It must be realized, however, that this will be
difficult in all countries and probably impossible in some -- or many. Even
with the introduction of new inputs and techniques it has not been possible to
increase agricultural output by as much as 3 percent per annum in many of the
poorer developing countries. Population growth in a number of these countries
exceeds that rate.
Such a program of increased food
production would require the widespread use of improved seed varieties,
increased applications of chemical fertilizers and pesticides over vast areas
and better farm management along with bringing new land under cultivation. It
has been estimated, for example, that with better varieties, pest control, and
the application of fertilizer on the Japanese scale, Indian rice yields could
theoretically at least, be raised two and one-half times current levels. Here
again very substantial foreign assistance for imported materials may be
required for at least the early years before the program begins to take hold.
production would require the widespread use of improved seed varieties,
increased applications of chemical fertilizers and pesticides over vast areas
and better farm management along with bringing new land under cultivation. It
has been estimated, for example, that with better varieties, pest control, and
the application of fertilizer on the Japanese scale, Indian rice yields could
theoretically at least, be raised two and one-half times current levels. Here
again very substantial foreign assistance for imported materials may be
required for at least the early years before the program begins to take hold.
The problem is clear. The solutions, or at
least the directions we must travel to reach them are also generally agreed.
What will be required is a genuine commitment to a set of policies that will
lead the international community, both developed and developing countries, to the
achievement of the objectives spelled out above.
least the directions we must travel to reach them are also generally agreed.
What will be required is a genuine commitment to a set of policies that will
lead the international community, both developed and developing countries, to the
achievement of the objectives spelled out above.
CHAPTER III -
MINERALS AND FUEL
MINERALS AND FUEL
Population growth per se is not likely to
impose serious constraints on the global physical availability of fuel and
non-fuel minerals to the end of the century and beyond.
impose serious constraints on the global physical availability of fuel and
non-fuel minerals to the end of the century and beyond.
This favorable outlook on reserves does
not rule out shortage situations for specific minerals at particular times and
places. Careful planning with continued scientific and technological progress
(including the development of substitutes) should keep the problems of physical
availability within manageable proportions.
not rule out shortage situations for specific minerals at particular times and
places. Careful planning with continued scientific and technological progress
(including the development of substitutes) should keep the problems of physical
availability within manageable proportions.
The major factor influencing the demand
for non-agricultural raw materials is the level of industrial activity,
regional and global. For example, the U.S., with 6% of the world's
population, consumes about a third of its resources. The demand for raw
materials, unlike food, is not a direct function of population growth. The
current scarcities and high prices for most such materials result mainly from
the boom conditions in all industrialized regions in the years 1972-73.
for non-agricultural raw materials is the level of industrial activity,
regional and global. For example, the U.S., with 6% of the world's
population, consumes about a third of its resources. The demand for raw
materials, unlike food, is not a direct function of population growth. The
current scarcities and high prices for most such materials result mainly from
the boom conditions in all industrialized regions in the years 1972-73.
The important potential linkage between
rapid population growth and minerals availability is indirect rather than
direct. It flows from the negative effects of excessive population growth in
economic development and social progress, and therefore on internal stability,
in overcrowded under-developed countries. The United States has become
increasingly dependent on mineral imports from developing countries in recent
decades, and this trend is likely to continue. The location of known reserves
of higher-grade ores of most minerals favors increasing dependence of all
industrialized regions on imports from less developed countries. The real
problems of mineral supplies lie, not in basic physical sufficiency, but in the
politico-economic issues of access, terms for exploration and exploitation, and
division of the benefits among producers, consumers, and host country
governments.
rapid population growth and minerals availability is indirect rather than
direct. It flows from the negative effects of excessive population growth in
economic development and social progress, and therefore on internal stability,
in overcrowded under-developed countries. The United States has become
increasingly dependent on mineral imports from developing countries in recent
decades, and this trend is likely to continue. The location of known reserves
of higher-grade ores of most minerals favors increasing dependence of all
industrialized regions on imports from less developed countries. The real
problems of mineral supplies lie, not in basic physical sufficiency, but in the
politico-economic issues of access, terms for exploration and exploitation, and
division of the benefits among producers, consumers, and host country
governments.
In the extreme cases where population
pressures lead to endemic famine, food riots, and breakdown of social order,
those conditions are scarcely conducive to systematic exploration for mineral
deposits or the long-term investments required for their exploitation. Short of
famine, unless some minimum of popular aspirations for material improvement can
be satisfied, and unless the terms of access and exploitation persuade
governments and peoples that this aspect of the international economic order
has "something in it for them," concessions to foreign companies are
likely to be expropriated or subjected to arbitrary intervention. Whether
through government action, labor conflicts, sabotage, or civil disturbance, the
smooth flow of needed materials will be jeopardized. Although population
pressure is obviously not the only factor involved, these types of frustrations
are much less likely under conditions of slow or zero population growth.
pressures lead to endemic famine, food riots, and breakdown of social order,
those conditions are scarcely conducive to systematic exploration for mineral
deposits or the long-term investments required for their exploitation. Short of
famine, unless some minimum of popular aspirations for material improvement can
be satisfied, and unless the terms of access and exploitation persuade
governments and peoples that this aspect of the international economic order
has "something in it for them," concessions to foreign companies are
likely to be expropriated or subjected to arbitrary intervention. Whether
through government action, labor conflicts, sabotage, or civil disturbance, the
smooth flow of needed materials will be jeopardized. Although population
pressure is obviously not the only factor involved, these types of frustrations
are much less likely under conditions of slow or zero population growth.
Reserves.
Projections made by the Department of
Interior through the year 2000 for those fuel and non-fuel minerals on which
the U.S.
depends heavily for imports5 support these conclusions on physical resources
(see Annex). Proven reserves of many of these minerals appear to be more than
adequate to meet the estimated accumulated world demand at 1972 relative prices
at least to the end of the century. While petroleum (including natural gas),
copper, zinc, and tin are probable exceptions, the extension of economically
exploitable reserves as a result of higher prices, as well as substitution and
secondary recovery for metals, should avoid long-term supply restrictions. In
many cases, the price increases that have taken place since 1972 should be more
than sufficient to bring about the necessary extension of reserves.
Interior through the year 2000 for those fuel and non-fuel minerals on which
the U.S.
depends heavily for imports5 support these conclusions on physical resources
(see Annex). Proven reserves of many of these minerals appear to be more than
adequate to meet the estimated accumulated world demand at 1972 relative prices
at least to the end of the century. While petroleum (including natural gas),
copper, zinc, and tin are probable exceptions, the extension of economically
exploitable reserves as a result of higher prices, as well as substitution and
secondary recovery for metals, should avoid long-term supply restrictions. In
many cases, the price increases that have taken place since 1972 should be more
than sufficient to bring about the necessary extension of reserves.
These conclusions are consistent with a
much more extensive study made in 1972 for the Commission on Population Growth
and the American Future.6
much more extensive study made in 1972 for the Commission on Population Growth
and the American Future.6
As regards fossil fuels, that study
foresees adequate world reserves for at least the next quarter to half century
even without major technological breakthroughs. U.S. reserves of coal and oil shale
are adequate well into the next century, although their full exploitation may
be limited by environmental and water supply factors. Estimates of the U.S.
Geological Survey suggest recoverable oil and gas reserves (assuming sufficiently
high prices) to meet domestic demand for another two or three decades, but
there is also respectable expert opinion supporting much lower estimates;
present oil production is below the peak of 1970 and meets only 70 percent of
current demands.7 Nevertheless, the U.S. is in a relatively strong position on
fossil fuels compared with the rest of the industrialized world, provided that
it takes the time and makes the heavy investments needed to develop domestic
alternatives to foreign sources.
foresees adequate world reserves for at least the next quarter to half century
even without major technological breakthroughs. U.S. reserves of coal and oil shale
are adequate well into the next century, although their full exploitation may
be limited by environmental and water supply factors. Estimates of the U.S.
Geological Survey suggest recoverable oil and gas reserves (assuming sufficiently
high prices) to meet domestic demand for another two or three decades, but
there is also respectable expert opinion supporting much lower estimates;
present oil production is below the peak of 1970 and meets only 70 percent of
current demands.7 Nevertheless, the U.S. is in a relatively strong position on
fossil fuels compared with the rest of the industrialized world, provided that
it takes the time and makes the heavy investments needed to develop domestic
alternatives to foreign sources.
In the case of the 19 non-fuel minerals
studied by the Commission it was concluded there were sufficient proven
reserves of nine to meet cumulative world needs at current relative prices
through the year 2020.8 For the ten others9 world proven reserves were considered
inadequate. However, it was judged that moderate price increases, recycling and
substitution could bridge the estimated gap between supply and requirements.
studied by the Commission it was concluded there were sufficient proven
reserves of nine to meet cumulative world needs at current relative prices
through the year 2020.8 For the ten others9 world proven reserves were considered
inadequate. However, it was judged that moderate price increases, recycling and
substitution could bridge the estimated gap between supply and requirements.
The above projections probably understate
the estimates of global resources. "Proved Reserves," that is known
supplies that will be available at present or slightly higher relative costs 10
to 25 years from now, rarely exceed 25 years' cumulative requirements, because
industry generally is reluctant to undertake costly exploration to meet demands
which may or may not materialize in the more distant future. Experience has
shown that additional reserves are discovered as required, at least in the case
of non-fuel minerals, and "proved reserves" have generally remained
constant in relation to consumption.
the estimates of global resources. "Proved Reserves," that is known
supplies that will be available at present or slightly higher relative costs 10
to 25 years from now, rarely exceed 25 years' cumulative requirements, because
industry generally is reluctant to undertake costly exploration to meet demands
which may or may not materialize in the more distant future. Experience has
shown that additional reserves are discovered as required, at least in the case
of non-fuel minerals, and "proved reserves" have generally remained
constant in relation to consumption.
The adequacy of reserves does not of
course assure that supplies will be forthcoming in a steady stream as required.
Intermediate problems may develop as a result of business miscalculations
regarding the timing of expansion to meet requirements. With the considerable
lead time required for expanding capacity, this can result in periods of
serious shortage for certain materials and rising prices as in the recent past.
Similarly, from time to time there will be periods of overcapacity and falling
prices. Necessary technical adjustments required for the shift to substitutes
or increased recycling also may be delayed by the required lead time or by lack
of information.
course assure that supplies will be forthcoming in a steady stream as required.
Intermediate problems may develop as a result of business miscalculations
regarding the timing of expansion to meet requirements. With the considerable
lead time required for expanding capacity, this can result in periods of
serious shortage for certain materials and rising prices as in the recent past.
Similarly, from time to time there will be periods of overcapacity and falling
prices. Necessary technical adjustments required for the shift to substitutes
or increased recycling also may be delayed by the required lead time or by lack
of information.
An early warning system designed to flag
impending surpluses and shortages, could be very helpful in anticipating these
problems. Such a mechanism might take the form of groups of experts working
with the UN Division of Resources. Alternatively, intergovernmental commodity
study groups might be set up for the purpose of monitoring those commodities
identified as potential problem areas.
impending surpluses and shortages, could be very helpful in anticipating these
problems. Such a mechanism might take the form of groups of experts working
with the UN Division of Resources. Alternatively, intergovernmental commodity
study groups might be set up for the purpose of monitoring those commodities
identified as potential problem areas.
Adequate global availability of fuel and
non-fuel minerals is not of much benefit to countries who cannot afford to pay
for them. Oil supplies currently are adequate to cover world needs, but the
quadrupling of prices in the past year has created grave financial and payment
problems for developed and developing countries alike. If similar action to
raise prices were undertaken by supplies of other important minerals, an
already bad situation would be intensified. Success in such efforts is
questionable, however; there is no case in which the quantities involved are
remotely comparable to the cases of energy; and the scope for successful
price-gouging or cartel tactics is much smaller.
non-fuel minerals is not of much benefit to countries who cannot afford to pay
for them. Oil supplies currently are adequate to cover world needs, but the
quadrupling of prices in the past year has created grave financial and payment
problems for developed and developing countries alike. If similar action to
raise prices were undertaken by supplies of other important minerals, an
already bad situation would be intensified. Success in such efforts is
questionable, however; there is no case in which the quantities involved are
remotely comparable to the cases of energy; and the scope for successful
price-gouging or cartel tactics is much smaller.
Although the U.S. is relatively well off in this
regard, it nonetheless depends heavily on mineral imports from a number of
sources which are not completely safe or stable. It may therefore be necessary,
especially in the light of our recent oil experience, to keep this dependence
within bounds, in some cases by developing additional domestic resources and
more generally by acquiring stock-piles for economic as well as national
defense emergencies. There are also possible dangers of unreasonable prices promoted
by producer cartels and broader policy questions of U.S. support for commodity
agreements involving both producers and consumers. Such matters, however, are
in the domain of commodity policy rather than population policy.
regard, it nonetheless depends heavily on mineral imports from a number of
sources which are not completely safe or stable. It may therefore be necessary,
especially in the light of our recent oil experience, to keep this dependence
within bounds, in some cases by developing additional domestic resources and
more generally by acquiring stock-piles for economic as well as national
defense emergencies. There are also possible dangers of unreasonable prices promoted
by producer cartels and broader policy questions of U.S. support for commodity
agreements involving both producers and consumers. Such matters, however, are
in the domain of commodity policy rather than population policy.
At least through the end of this century,
changes in population growth trends will make little difference to total levels
of requirements for fuel and other minerals. Those requirements are related
much more closely to levels of income and industrial output, leaving the demand
for minerals substantially unaffected. In the longer run, a lower ultimate
world population (say 8 to 9 billion rather than 12 to 16 billion) would
require a lower annual input of depletable resources directly affected by
population size as well as a much lower volume of food, forest products,
textiles, and other renewable resources.
changes in population growth trends will make little difference to total levels
of requirements for fuel and other minerals. Those requirements are related
much more closely to levels of income and industrial output, leaving the demand
for minerals substantially unaffected. In the longer run, a lower ultimate
world population (say 8 to 9 billion rather than 12 to 16 billion) would
require a lower annual input of depletable resources directly affected by
population size as well as a much lower volume of food, forest products,
textiles, and other renewable resources.
Whatever may be done to guard against
interruptions of supply and to develop domestic alternatives, the U.S. economy
will require large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially
from less developed countries.10 That fact gives the U.S. enhanced interest in
the political, economic, and social stability of the supplying countries.
Wherever a lessening of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase
the prospects for such stability, population policy becomes relevant to
resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States.
interruptions of supply and to develop domestic alternatives, the U.S. economy
will require large and increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially
from less developed countries.10 That fact gives the U.S. enhanced interest in
the political, economic, and social stability of the supplying countries.
Wherever a lessening of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase
the prospects for such stability, population policy becomes relevant to
resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States.
ANNEX
OUTLOOK FOR RAW
MATERIALS
MATERIALS
I. Factors
Affecting Raw Material Demand and Supply
Affecting Raw Material Demand and Supply
Some of the key factors that must be
considered in evaluating the future raw materials situation are the stage of a
country's economic development and the responsiveness of the market to changes
in the relative prices of the raw materials.
considered in evaluating the future raw materials situation are the stage of a
country's economic development and the responsiveness of the market to changes
in the relative prices of the raw materials.
Economic theory indicates that the pattern
of consumption of raw materials varies with the level of economic activity.
Examination of the intensity-of-use of raw materials (incremental quantity of
raw material needed to support an additional unit of GNP) show that after a
particular level of GNP is reached, the intensity of use of raw materials
starts to decline. Possible explanations for this decline are:
of consumption of raw materials varies with the level of economic activity.
Examination of the intensity-of-use of raw materials (incremental quantity of
raw material needed to support an additional unit of GNP) show that after a
particular level of GNP is reached, the intensity of use of raw materials
starts to decline. Possible explanations for this decline are:
1. In industrialized countries, the
services component of GNP expands relative to the non-services components as
economic growth occurs.
services component of GNP expands relative to the non-services components as
economic growth occurs.
2. Technological progress, on the whole,
tends to lower the intensity-of-use through greater efficiency in the use of
raw materials and development of alloys.
tends to lower the intensity-of-use through greater efficiency in the use of
raw materials and development of alloys.
3. Economic growth continues to be
characterized by substitution of one material by another and substitution of
synthetics for natural materials.11
characterized by substitution of one material by another and substitution of
synthetics for natural materials.11
Most developed countries have reached this
point of declining intensity-of-use.12 For other countries that have not
reached this stage of economic development, their population usually goes
through a stage of rapid growth prior to industrialization. This is due to the
relative ease in the application of improved health care policies and the
resulting decline in their death rates, while birth rates remain high. Then the
country's economy does begin to industrialize and grow more rapidly, the
initial rapid rise in industrial production results in an increasing
intensity-of-use of raw materials, until industrial production reached the
level where the intensity-of-use begins to decline.
point of declining intensity-of-use.12 For other countries that have not
reached this stage of economic development, their population usually goes
through a stage of rapid growth prior to industrialization. This is due to the
relative ease in the application of improved health care policies and the
resulting decline in their death rates, while birth rates remain high. Then the
country's economy does begin to industrialize and grow more rapidly, the
initial rapid rise in industrial production results in an increasing
intensity-of-use of raw materials, until industrial production reached the
level where the intensity-of-use begins to decline.
As was discussed above, changes in the
relative prices of raw materials change the amount of economically recoverable
reserves. Thus, the relative price level, smoothness of the adjustment process,
and availability of capital for needed investment can also be expected to
significantly influence raw materials' market conditions. In addition,
technological improvement in mining and metallurgy permits lower grade ores to
be exploited without corresponding increases in costs.
relative prices of raw materials change the amount of economically recoverable
reserves. Thus, the relative price level, smoothness of the adjustment process,
and availability of capital for needed investment can also be expected to
significantly influence raw materials' market conditions. In addition,
technological improvement in mining and metallurgy permits lower grade ores to
be exploited without corresponding increases in costs.
The following table presents the 1972 net
imports and the ratio of imports to total demand for nine commodities. The net
imports of these nine commodities represented 99 percent of the total trade
deficit in minerals.
imports and the ratio of imports to total demand for nine commodities. The net
imports of these nine commodities represented 99 percent of the total trade
deficit in minerals.
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
| | 1972
| Ratio of Imports |
| Ratio of Imports |
|
Commodity | Net
Imports | to Total Demand |
Commodity | Net
Imports | to Total Demand |
| | ($Millions)* | |
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
| Aluminum | 48.38
| .286 |
| .286 |
| Copper | 206.4
| .160 |
| .160 |
| Iron | 424.5
| .049 |
| .049 |
| Lead | 102.9
| .239 |
| .239 |
| Nickel | 477.1
| .704 |
| .704 |
| Tin | 220.2
| .943 |
| .943 |
| Titanium | 256.5
| .469 |
| .469 |
| Zinc | 294.8
| .517 |
| .517 |
| Petroleum | 5,494.5
| .246 |
| .246 |
| (including natural gas) |
| |
| |
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
The primary sources
of these US
imports during the period 1969-1972 were:
of these US
imports during the period 1969-1972 were:
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Commodity Source & % |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aluminum
- Canada 76% |
- Canada 76% |
| Copper - Canada
31%, Peru 27%, Chile 22% |
31%, Peru 27%, Chile 22% |
| Iron - Canada
50%, Venezuela
31% |
50%, Venezuela
31% |
| Lead - Canada
29%, Peru 21%, Australia
21% |
29%, Peru 21%, Australia
21% |
| Nickel - Canada
82%, Norway
8% |
82%, Norway
8% |
| Tin - Malaysia
64%, Thailand
27% |
64%, Thailand
27% |
| Titanium - Japan
73%, USSR
19% |
73%, USSR
19% |
| Zinc (Ore) - Canada
60%, Mexico
24% |
60%, Mexico
24% |
| Zinc
(Metal) - Canada 48%, Australia 10% |
(Metal) - Canada 48%, Australia 10% |
| Pertroleum (crude) - Canada 42% |
| Petroleum (crude) - Venezuela 17% |
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
II. World Reserves
The following table shows estimates of the
world reserve position for these commodities. As mentioned earlier, the
quantity of economically recoverable reserves increases with higher prices. The
following tables, based on Bureau of Mines information, provide estimates of
reserves at various prices. (All prices are in constant 1972 dollars.)
world reserve position for these commodities. As mentioned earlier, the
quantity of economically recoverable reserves increases with higher prices. The
following tables, based on Bureau of Mines information, provide estimates of
reserves at various prices. (All prices are in constant 1972 dollars.)
Aluminum (Bauxite)
Price (per pound primary aluminum)
Price A Price B
Price C Price D
Price C Price D
.23
.29 .33 .36
.29 .33 .36
Reserves (billion short tons, aluminum
content)
content)
World 3.58
3.76 4.15 5.21
3.76 4.15 5.21
U.S. .01
.02 .04 .09
.02 .04 .09
Copper
Price (per pound refined copper)
.51 .60 .75
Reserves (million short tons)
World 370
418 507
418 507
U.S. 83
93 115
93 115
Gold
Price (per troy ounce)
58.60 90 100 150
Reserves (million troy ounce)
World 1,000
1,221 1,588 1,850
1,221 1,588 1,850
U.S. 82
120 200 240
120 200 240
Iron
Price (per short ton of primary iron
contained in ore)
contained in ore)
17.80 20.80
23.80
23.80
Reserves (billion short tons iron
content)
content)
World 96.7
129.0 206.0
129.0 206.0
U.S. 2.0
2.7 18.0
2.7 18.0
Lead
Price (per pound primary lead metal)
.15 .18 .20
Reserves (million short tons, lead
content)
content)
World 96.0
129.0 144.0
129.0 144.0
U.S. 36.0
51.0 56.0
51.0 56.0
Nickel
Price (per pound of primary metal)
1.53 1.75 2.00 2.25
Reserves (millions short tons)
World 46.2
60.5 78.0 99.5
60.5 78.0 99.5
U.S. .2
.2 .5 .5
.2 .5 .5
Tin
Price (per pound primary tin metal)
1.77 2.00 2.50 3.00
Reserves (thousands of long tons - tin
content)
content)
World 4,180
5,500 7,530 9,290
5,500 7,530 9,290
U.S. 5 9 100 200
Titanium
Price (per pound titanium in pigment)
.45 .55 .60
Reserves (thousands short tons
titanium content)
titanium content)
World 158,000 222,000
327,000
327,000
U.S. 32,400
45,000 60,000
45,000 60,000
Zinc
Price (per pound, prime western zinc
delivered)
delivered)
.18 .25 .30
Reserves (million short tons, zinc
content)
content)
World 131
193 260
193 260
U.S. 30
40 50
40 50
Petroleum:
Data necessary to
quantify reserve-price relationships are not available. For planning purposes,
however, the Bureau of Mines used the rough assumption that a 100% increase in
price would increase reserves by 10%. The average 1972 U.S. price was
$3.39/bbl. with proven world reserves of 666.9 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves
of 36.3 billion barrels. Using the Bureau of Mines assumption, therefore, a
doubling in world price (a U.S.
price of $6.78/bbl.) would imply world reserves of 733.5 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves
of 39.9 billion barrels.
quantify reserve-price relationships are not available. For planning purposes,
however, the Bureau of Mines used the rough assumption that a 100% increase in
price would increase reserves by 10%. The average 1972 U.S. price was
$3.39/bbl. with proven world reserves of 666.9 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves
of 36.3 billion barrels. Using the Bureau of Mines assumption, therefore, a
doubling in world price (a U.S.
price of $6.78/bbl.) would imply world reserves of 733.5 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves
of 39.9 billion barrels.
Natural Gas:
Price (wellhead price per thousand
cubic feet)
cubic feet)
.186 .34 .44 .55
Reserves (trillion cubic feet)
World 1,156
6,130 10,240 15,599
6,130 10,240 15,599
U.S. 266
580 900 2,349
580 900 2,349
It should be noted
that these statistics represent a shift in 1972 relative prices and assume
constant 1972 technology. The development of new technology or a more dramatic
shift in relative prices can have a significant impact on the supply of
economically recoverable reserves. Aluminum is a case in point. It is the most
abundant metallic element in the earth's crust and the supply of this resource
is almost entirely determined by the price. Current demand and technology limit
economically recoverable reserves to bauxite sources. Alternate sources of
aluminum exist (e.g., alunite) and if improved technology is developed making
these alternate sources commercially viable, supply constraints will not likely
be encountered.
that these statistics represent a shift in 1972 relative prices and assume
constant 1972 technology. The development of new technology or a more dramatic
shift in relative prices can have a significant impact on the supply of
economically recoverable reserves. Aluminum is a case in point. It is the most
abundant metallic element in the earth's crust and the supply of this resource
is almost entirely determined by the price. Current demand and technology limit
economically recoverable reserves to bauxite sources. Alternate sources of
aluminum exist (e.g., alunite) and if improved technology is developed making
these alternate sources commercially viable, supply constraints will not likely
be encountered.
The above estimated
reserve figures, while representing approximate orders of magnitude, are
adequate to meet projected accumulated world demand (also very rough orders of
magnitude) through the year 2000. In some cases, modest price increases above
the 1972 level may be required to attract the necessary capital investment.
reserve figures, while representing approximate orders of magnitude, are
adequate to meet projected accumulated world demand (also very rough orders of
magnitude) through the year 2000. In some cases, modest price increases above
the 1972 level may be required to attract the necessary capital investment.
Chapter IV -
Economic Development and Population Growth
Economic Development and Population Growth
Rapid population growth adversely affects every
aspect of economic and social progress in developing countries. It absorbs
large amounts of resources needed for more productive investment in
development. It requires greater expenditures for health, education and other
social services, particularly in urban areas. It increases the dependency load
per worker so that a high fraction of the output of the productive age group is
needed to support dependents. It reduces family savings and domestic
investment. It increases existing severe pressures on limited agricultural land
in countries where the world's "poverty problem" is concentrated. It
creates a need for use of large amounts of scarce foreign exchange for food
imports (or the loss of food surpluses for export). Finally, it intensifies the
already severe unemployment and underemployment problems of many developing
countries where not enough productive jobs are created to absorb the annual
increments to the labor force.
aspect of economic and social progress in developing countries. It absorbs
large amounts of resources needed for more productive investment in
development. It requires greater expenditures for health, education and other
social services, particularly in urban areas. It increases the dependency load
per worker so that a high fraction of the output of the productive age group is
needed to support dependents. It reduces family savings and domestic
investment. It increases existing severe pressures on limited agricultural land
in countries where the world's "poverty problem" is concentrated. It
creates a need for use of large amounts of scarce foreign exchange for food
imports (or the loss of food surpluses for export). Finally, it intensifies the
already severe unemployment and underemployment problems of many developing
countries where not enough productive jobs are created to absorb the annual
increments to the labor force.
Even in countries with good
resource/population ratios, rapid population growth causes problems for several
reasons: First, large capital investments generally are required to exploit
unused resources. Second, some countries already have high and growing
unemployment and lack the means to train new entrants to their labor force. Third,
there are long delays between starting effective family planning programs and
reducing fertility, and even longer delays between reductions in fertility and
population stabilization. Hence there is substantial danger of vastly
overshooting population targets if population growth is not moderated in the
near future.
resource/population ratios, rapid population growth causes problems for several
reasons: First, large capital investments generally are required to exploit
unused resources. Second, some countries already have high and growing
unemployment and lack the means to train new entrants to their labor force. Third,
there are long delays between starting effective family planning programs and
reducing fertility, and even longer delays between reductions in fertility and
population stabilization. Hence there is substantial danger of vastly
overshooting population targets if population growth is not moderated in the
near future.
During the past decade, the developing
countries have raised their GNP at a rate of 5 percent per annum as against 4.8
percent in developed countries. But at the same time the LDCs experienced an
average annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Thus their per capita
income growth rate was only 2.5 percent and in some of the more highly
populated areas the increase in per capita incomes was less than 2 percent.
This stands in stark contrast to 3.6 percent in the rich countries. Moreover,
the low rate means that there is very little change in those countries whose
per capita incomes are $200 or less per annum. The problem has been further
exacerbated in recent months by the dramatic increases in oil and fertilizer
prices. The World Bank has estimated that the incomes of the 800 million
inhabitants of the countries hardest hit by the oil crisis will grow at less
than 1% per capita per year of the remainder of the 1970s. Taking account of
inequalities in income distribution, there will be well over 500 million
people, with average incomes of less than $100 per capita, who will experience
either no growth or negative growth in that period.
countries have raised their GNP at a rate of 5 percent per annum as against 4.8
percent in developed countries. But at the same time the LDCs experienced an
average annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Thus their per capita
income growth rate was only 2.5 percent and in some of the more highly
populated areas the increase in per capita incomes was less than 2 percent.
This stands in stark contrast to 3.6 percent in the rich countries. Moreover,
the low rate means that there is very little change in those countries whose
per capita incomes are $200 or less per annum. The problem has been further
exacerbated in recent months by the dramatic increases in oil and fertilizer
prices. The World Bank has estimated that the incomes of the 800 million
inhabitants of the countries hardest hit by the oil crisis will grow at less
than 1% per capita per year of the remainder of the 1970s. Taking account of
inequalities in income distribution, there will be well over 500 million
people, with average incomes of less than $100 per capita, who will experience
either no growth or negative growth in that period.
Moderation of population growth offers benefits
in terms of resources saved for investment and/or higher per capita
consumption. If resource requirements to support fewer children are reduced and
the funds now allocated for construction of schools, houses, hospitals and
other essential facilities are invested in productive activities, the impact on
the growth of GNP and per capita income may be significant. In addition,
economic and social progress resulting from population control will further
contribute to the decline in fertility rates. The relationship is reciprocal,
and can take the form of either a vicious or a virtuous circle.
in terms of resources saved for investment and/or higher per capita
consumption. If resource requirements to support fewer children are reduced and
the funds now allocated for construction of schools, houses, hospitals and
other essential facilities are invested in productive activities, the impact on
the growth of GNP and per capita income may be significant. In addition,
economic and social progress resulting from population control will further
contribute to the decline in fertility rates. The relationship is reciprocal,
and can take the form of either a vicious or a virtuous circle.
This raises the question of how much more
efficient expenditures for population control might be than in raising
production through direct investments in additional irrigation and power
projects and factories. While most economists today do not agree with the
assumptions that went into early overly optimistic estimates of returns to
population expenditures, there is general agreement that up to the point when
cost per acceptor rises rapidly, family planning expenditures are generally
considered the best investment a country can make in its own future.
efficient expenditures for population control might be than in raising
production through direct investments in additional irrigation and power
projects and factories. While most economists today do not agree with the
assumptions that went into early overly optimistic estimates of returns to
population expenditures, there is general agreement that up to the point when
cost per acceptor rises rapidly, family planning expenditures are generally
considered the best investment a country can make in its own future.
II. Impact of
Population Growth on Economic Development
Population Growth on Economic Development
In most, if not all, developing countries
high fertility rates impose substantial economic costs and restrain economic
growth. The main adverse macroeconomic effects may be analyzed in three general
categories: (1) the saving effect, (2) "child quality" versus
"child quantity", and (3) "capital deepening" versus
"capital widening." These three categories are not mutually
exclusive, but they highlight different familial and social perspectives. In
addition, there are often longer-run adverse effects on agricultural output and
the balance of payments.
high fertility rates impose substantial economic costs and restrain economic
growth. The main adverse macroeconomic effects may be analyzed in three general
categories: (1) the saving effect, (2) "child quality" versus
"child quantity", and (3) "capital deepening" versus
"capital widening." These three categories are not mutually
exclusive, but they highlight different familial and social perspectives. In
addition, there are often longer-run adverse effects on agricultural output and
the balance of payments.
(1) The saving effect. A high fertility
economy has perforce a larger "burden of dependency" than a low
fertility economy, because a larger proportion of the population consists of
children too young to work. There are more non-working people to feed, house and
rear, and there is a smaller surplus above minimum consumption available for
savings and investment. It follows that a lower fertility rate can free
resources from consumption; if saved and invested, these resources could
contribute to economic growth. (There is much controversy on this; empirical
studies of the savings effect have produced varying results.)
economy has perforce a larger "burden of dependency" than a low
fertility economy, because a larger proportion of the population consists of
children too young to work. There are more non-working people to feed, house and
rear, and there is a smaller surplus above minimum consumption available for
savings and investment. It follows that a lower fertility rate can free
resources from consumption; if saved and invested, these resources could
contribute to economic growth. (There is much controversy on this; empirical
studies of the savings effect have produced varying results.)
(2) Child quality versus quantity. Parents
make investment decisions, in a sense, about their children. Healthier and
better-educated children tend to be economically more productive, both as
children and later as adults. In addition to the more-or-less conscious
trade-offs parents can make about more education and better health per child,
there are certain biologic adverse effects suffered by high birth order
children such as higher mortality and limited brain growth due to higher
incidence of malnutrition. It must be emphasized, however, that discussion of
trade-offs between child quality and child quantity will probably remain
academic with regard to countries where child mortality remains high. When
parents cannot expect most children to survive to old age, they probably will
continue to "over-compensate", using high fertility as a form of
hedge to insure that they will have some living offspring able to support the
parents in the distant future.
make investment decisions, in a sense, about their children. Healthier and
better-educated children tend to be economically more productive, both as
children and later as adults. In addition to the more-or-less conscious
trade-offs parents can make about more education and better health per child,
there are certain biologic adverse effects suffered by high birth order
children such as higher mortality and limited brain growth due to higher
incidence of malnutrition. It must be emphasized, however, that discussion of
trade-offs between child quality and child quantity will probably remain
academic with regard to countries where child mortality remains high. When
parents cannot expect most children to survive to old age, they probably will
continue to "over-compensate", using high fertility as a form of
hedge to insure that they will have some living offspring able to support the
parents in the distant future.
(3) Capital deepening versus widening.
From the family's viewpoint high fertility is likely to reduce welfare per
child; for the economy one may view high fertility as too rapid a growth in
labor force relative to capital stock. Society's capital stock includes
facilities such as schools and other educational inputs in addition to capital
investments that raise workers' outputs in agriculture and manufacturing. For
any given rate of capital accumulation, a lower population growth rate can help
increase the amount of capital and education per worker, helping thereby to
increase output and income per capita. The problem of migration to cities and
the derived demand for urban infrastructure can also be analyzed as problems of
capital widening, which draw resources away from growth-generating investments.
From the family's viewpoint high fertility is likely to reduce welfare per
child; for the economy one may view high fertility as too rapid a growth in
labor force relative to capital stock. Society's capital stock includes
facilities such as schools and other educational inputs in addition to capital
investments that raise workers' outputs in agriculture and manufacturing. For
any given rate of capital accumulation, a lower population growth rate can help
increase the amount of capital and education per worker, helping thereby to
increase output and income per capita. The problem of migration to cities and
the derived demand for urban infrastructure can also be analyzed as problems of
capital widening, which draw resources away from growth-generating investments.
In a number of the more populous countries
a fourth aspect of rapid growth in numbers has emerged in recent years which
has profound long-run consequences. Agricultural output was able to keep pace
or exceed population growth over the many decades of population rise prior to
the middle of this century, primarily through steady expansion of acreage under
cultivation. More recently, only marginal unused land has been available in India, Thailand,
Java, Bangladesh, and other areas. As a
result (a) land holdings have declined in size, and (b) land shortage has led
to deforestation and overgrazing, with consequent soil erosion and severe water
pollution and increased urban migration. Areas that once earned foreign
exchange through the export of food surpluses are now in deficit or face early
transition to dependence on food imports. Although the scope for raising
agricultural productivity is very great in many of these areas, the available
technologies for doing so require much higher capital costs per acre and much
larger foreign exchange outlays for "modern" inputs (chemical
fertilizer, pesticides, petroleum fuels, etc.) than was the case with the traditional
technologies. Thus the population growth problem can be seen as an important
long-run, or structural, contributor to current LDC balance of payments
problems and to deterioration of their basic ecological infrastructure.
a fourth aspect of rapid growth in numbers has emerged in recent years which
has profound long-run consequences. Agricultural output was able to keep pace
or exceed population growth over the many decades of population rise prior to
the middle of this century, primarily through steady expansion of acreage under
cultivation. More recently, only marginal unused land has been available in India, Thailand,
Java, Bangladesh, and other areas. As a
result (a) land holdings have declined in size, and (b) land shortage has led
to deforestation and overgrazing, with consequent soil erosion and severe water
pollution and increased urban migration. Areas that once earned foreign
exchange through the export of food surpluses are now in deficit or face early
transition to dependence on food imports. Although the scope for raising
agricultural productivity is very great in many of these areas, the available
technologies for doing so require much higher capital costs per acre and much
larger foreign exchange outlays for "modern" inputs (chemical
fertilizer, pesticides, petroleum fuels, etc.) than was the case with the traditional
technologies. Thus the population growth problem can be seen as an important
long-run, or structural, contributor to current LDC balance of payments
problems and to deterioration of their basic ecological infrastructure.
Finally, high fertility appears to
exacerbate the maldistribution of income which is a fundamental economic and
social problem in much of the developing world. Higher income families tend to
have fewer children, spend more on the health and education of these children,
have more wealth to pass on to these children in contrast to the several
disadvantages that face the children of the poor. The latter tend to be more
numerous, receiving less of an investment per child in their "human
capital", leaving the children with economic, educational and social
constraints similar to those which restrict the opportunities of the parents.
In short, high fertility contributes to the intergenerational continuity of
maldistributions of income and related social and political problems.
exacerbate the maldistribution of income which is a fundamental economic and
social problem in much of the developing world. Higher income families tend to
have fewer children, spend more on the health and education of these children,
have more wealth to pass on to these children in contrast to the several
disadvantages that face the children of the poor. The latter tend to be more
numerous, receiving less of an investment per child in their "human
capital", leaving the children with economic, educational and social
constraints similar to those which restrict the opportunities of the parents.
In short, high fertility contributes to the intergenerational continuity of
maldistributions of income and related social and political problems.
III. The Effect of
Development on Population Growth
Development on Population Growth
The determinants of population growth are
not well understood, especially for low income societies. Historical data show
that declining fertility in Europe and North America
has been associated with declining mortality and increasing urbanization, and
generally with "modernization." Fertility declined substantially in
the West without the benefit of sophisticated contraceptives. This movement
from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality is
known as the "demographic transition". In many low income countries
mortality has declined markedly since World War II (in large part from
reduction in epidemic illness and famine), but fertility has remained high.
Apart from a few pockets of low fertility in East Asia and the Caribbean, a significant demographic transition has not
occurred in the third world. (The Chinese, however, make remarkable claims
about their success in reducing birth rates, and qualified observers are
persuaded that they have had unusual success even though specific demographic
information is lacking.)
not well understood, especially for low income societies. Historical data show
that declining fertility in Europe and North America
has been associated with declining mortality and increasing urbanization, and
generally with "modernization." Fertility declined substantially in
the West without the benefit of sophisticated contraceptives. This movement
from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality is
known as the "demographic transition". In many low income countries
mortality has declined markedly since World War II (in large part from
reduction in epidemic illness and famine), but fertility has remained high.
Apart from a few pockets of low fertility in East Asia and the Caribbean, a significant demographic transition has not
occurred in the third world. (The Chinese, however, make remarkable claims
about their success in reducing birth rates, and qualified observers are
persuaded that they have had unusual success even though specific demographic
information is lacking.)
There is considerable, incontestable
evidence in many developing countries that a larger (though not fully known)
number of couples would like to have fewer children than possible generally
there -- and that there is a large unsatisfied demand by these couples for
family planning services. It is also now widely believed that something more
that family planning services will be needed to motivate other couples to want
smaller families and all couples to want replacement levels essential to the
progress and growth of their countries.
evidence in many developing countries that a larger (though not fully known)
number of couples would like to have fewer children than possible generally
there -- and that there is a large unsatisfied demand by these couples for
family planning services. It is also now widely believed that something more
that family planning services will be needed to motivate other couples to want
smaller families and all couples to want replacement levels essential to the
progress and growth of their countries.
There is also evidence, although it is not
conclusive, that certain aspects of economic development and modernization are
more directly related to lowered birth rates than others, and that selective
developmental policies may bring about a demographic transition at
substantially lower per capita income levels than in Europe, North America, and
Japan.13 Such selective policies would focus on improved health care and
nutrition directed toward reduced infant and child mortality; universal
schooling and adult literacy, especially for women; increasing the legal age of
marriage; greater opportunities for female employment in the money economy;
improved old-age social security arrangements; and agricultural modernization
focussed on small farmers. It is important that this focus be made in
development programs because, given today's high population densities, high
birth rates, and low income levels in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
if the demographic transition has to await overall development and
modernization, the vicious circle of poverty, people, and unemployment may
never be broken.
conclusive, that certain aspects of economic development and modernization are
more directly related to lowered birth rates than others, and that selective
developmental policies may bring about a demographic transition at
substantially lower per capita income levels than in Europe, North America, and
Japan.13 Such selective policies would focus on improved health care and
nutrition directed toward reduced infant and child mortality; universal
schooling and adult literacy, especially for women; increasing the legal age of
marriage; greater opportunities for female employment in the money economy;
improved old-age social security arrangements; and agricultural modernization
focussed on small farmers. It is important that this focus be made in
development programs because, given today's high population densities, high
birth rates, and low income levels in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
if the demographic transition has to await overall development and
modernization, the vicious circle of poverty, people, and unemployment may
never be broken.
The causes of high birth rates in low
income societies are generally explained in terms of three factors:
income societies are generally explained in terms of three factors:
a. Inadequacy of information and means.
Actual family size in many societies is higher than desired family size owing
to ignorance of acceptable birth control methods or unavailability of birth
control devices and services. The importance of this factor is evidenced by
many sociological investigations on "desired family size" versus
actual size, and by the substantial rates of acceptance for contraceptives when
systematic family planning services are introduced. This factor has been a
basic assumption in the family planning programs of official bilateral and
multilateral programs in many countries over the past decade. Whatever the
actual weight of this factor, which clearly varies from country to country and
which shifts with changes in economic and social conditions, there remains
without question a significant demand for family planning services.
Actual family size in many societies is higher than desired family size owing
to ignorance of acceptable birth control methods or unavailability of birth
control devices and services. The importance of this factor is evidenced by
many sociological investigations on "desired family size" versus
actual size, and by the substantial rates of acceptance for contraceptives when
systematic family planning services are introduced. This factor has been a
basic assumption in the family planning programs of official bilateral and
multilateral programs in many countries over the past decade. Whatever the
actual weight of this factor, which clearly varies from country to country and
which shifts with changes in economic and social conditions, there remains
without question a significant demand for family planning services.
b. Inadequacy of motivation for reduced
numbers of children. Especially in the rural areas of underdeveloped countries,
which account for the major share of today's population growth, parents often
want large numbers of children (especially boys) (i) to ensure that some will
survive against the odds of high child mortality, (ii) to provide support for
the parents in their old age, and (iii) to provide low cost farm labor. While
these elements are present among rural populace, continued urbanization may
reduce the need for sons in the longer term. The absence of educational and
employment opportunities for young women intensifies these same motivations by
encouraging early marriage and early and frequent maternity. This factor
suggests the crucial importance of selective development policies as a means of
accelerating the reduction of fertility.
numbers of children. Especially in the rural areas of underdeveloped countries,
which account for the major share of today's population growth, parents often
want large numbers of children (especially boys) (i) to ensure that some will
survive against the odds of high child mortality, (ii) to provide support for
the parents in their old age, and (iii) to provide low cost farm labor. While
these elements are present among rural populace, continued urbanization may
reduce the need for sons in the longer term. The absence of educational and
employment opportunities for young women intensifies these same motivations by
encouraging early marriage and early and frequent maternity. This factor
suggests the crucial importance of selective development policies as a means of
accelerating the reduction of fertility.
c. The "time lag". Family
preferences and social institutions that favor high fertility change slowly.
Even though mortality and economic conditions have improved significantly since
World War II in LDCs, family expectations, social norms, and parental practice
are slow to respond to these altered conditions. This factor leads to the need
for large scale programs of information, education, and persuasion directed at
lower fertility.
preferences and social institutions that favor high fertility change slowly.
Even though mortality and economic conditions have improved significantly since
World War II in LDCs, family expectations, social norms, and parental practice
are slow to respond to these altered conditions. This factor leads to the need
for large scale programs of information, education, and persuasion directed at
lower fertility.
The three elements are undoubtedly
intermixed in varying proportions in all underdeveloped countries with high
birth rates. In most LDCs, many couples would reduce their completed family
size if appropriate birth control methods were more easily available. The
extent of this reduction, however, may still leave their completed family size
at higher than mere replacement levels -- i.e., at levels implying continued
but less rapid population growth. Many other couples would not reduce their
desired family size merely if better contraceptives were available, either because
they see large families as economically beneficial, or because of cultural
factors, or because they misread their own economic interests.
intermixed in varying proportions in all underdeveloped countries with high
birth rates. In most LDCs, many couples would reduce their completed family
size if appropriate birth control methods were more easily available. The
extent of this reduction, however, may still leave their completed family size
at higher than mere replacement levels -- i.e., at levels implying continued
but less rapid population growth. Many other couples would not reduce their
desired family size merely if better contraceptives were available, either because
they see large families as economically beneficial, or because of cultural
factors, or because they misread their own economic interests.
Therefore, family planning supply
(contraceptive technology and delivery systems) and demand (the motivation for
reduced fertility) would not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives; they
are complementary and may be mutually reinforcing. The selected point of focus
mentioned earlier -- old age security programs, maternal and child health
programs, increased female education, increasing the legal age of marriage,
financial incentives to "acceptors", personnel, -- are important, yet
better information is required as to which measures are most cost-effective and
feasible in a given situation and how their cost-effectiveness compares to
supply programs.
(contraceptive technology and delivery systems) and demand (the motivation for
reduced fertility) would not be viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives; they
are complementary and may be mutually reinforcing. The selected point of focus
mentioned earlier -- old age security programs, maternal and child health
programs, increased female education, increasing the legal age of marriage,
financial incentives to "acceptors", personnel, -- are important, yet
better information is required as to which measures are most cost-effective and
feasible in a given situation and how their cost-effectiveness compares to
supply programs.
One additional interesting area is
receiving increasing attention: the distribution of the benefits of
development. Experience in several countries suggests that the extent to which
the poor, with the highest fertility rates, reduce their fertility will depend
on the extent to which they participate in development. In this view the
average level of economic development and the average amount of modernization
are less important determinants of population growth than is the specific
structure of development. This line of investigation suggests that social
development activities need to be more precisely targeted than in the past to
reach the lowest income people, to counteract their desire for high fertility as
a means of alleviating certain adverse conditions.
receiving increasing attention: the distribution of the benefits of
development. Experience in several countries suggests that the extent to which
the poor, with the highest fertility rates, reduce their fertility will depend
on the extent to which they participate in development. In this view the
average level of economic development and the average amount of modernization
are less important determinants of population growth than is the specific
structure of development. This line of investigation suggests that social
development activities need to be more precisely targeted than in the past to
reach the lowest income people, to counteract their desire for high fertility as
a means of alleviating certain adverse conditions.
IV. Employment and Social Problems
Employment, aside from its role in
production of goods and services, is an important source of income and of
status or recognition to workers and their families. The inability of large
segments of the economically active population in developing countries to find
jobs offering a minimum acceptable standard of living is reflected in a
widening of income disparities and a deepening sense of economic, political and
social frustration.
production of goods and services, is an important source of income and of
status or recognition to workers and their families. The inability of large
segments of the economically active population in developing countries to find
jobs offering a minimum acceptable standard of living is reflected in a
widening of income disparities and a deepening sense of economic, political and
social frustration.
The most economically significant
employment problems in LDCs contributed to by excessive population growth are
low worker productivity in production of traditional goods and services
produced, the changing aspirations of the work force, the existing distribution
of income, wealth and power, and the natural resource endowment of a country.
employment problems in LDCs contributed to by excessive population growth are
low worker productivity in production of traditional goods and services
produced, the changing aspirations of the work force, the existing distribution
of income, wealth and power, and the natural resource endowment of a country.
The political and social problems of urban
overcrowding are directly related to population growth. In addition to the
still-high fertility in urban areas of many LDC's, population pressures on the
land, which increases migration to the cities, adds to the pressures on urban
job markets and political stability, and strains, the capacity to provide
schools, health facilities, and water supplies.
overcrowding are directly related to population growth. In addition to the
still-high fertility in urban areas of many LDC's, population pressures on the
land, which increases migration to the cities, adds to the pressures on urban
job markets and political stability, and strains, the capacity to provide
schools, health facilities, and water supplies.
It should be recognized that lower
fertility will relieve only a portion of these strains and that its most
beneficial effects will be felt only over a period of decades. Most of the
potential migrants from countryside to city over the coming 15 to 20 years have
already been born. Lower birth rates do provide some immediate relief to health
and sanitation and welfare services, and medium-term relief to pressures on
educational systems. The largest effects on employment, migration, and living
standards, however, will be felt only after 25 or 30 years. The time lags
inherent in all aspects of population dynamics only reinforce the urgency of
adopting effective policies in the years immediately ahead if the formidable
problems of the present decade are not to become utterly unmanageable in the
1990s and beyond the year 2000.
fertility will relieve only a portion of these strains and that its most
beneficial effects will be felt only over a period of decades. Most of the
potential migrants from countryside to city over the coming 15 to 20 years have
already been born. Lower birth rates do provide some immediate relief to health
and sanitation and welfare services, and medium-term relief to pressures on
educational systems. The largest effects on employment, migration, and living
standards, however, will be felt only after 25 or 30 years. The time lags
inherent in all aspects of population dynamics only reinforce the urgency of
adopting effective policies in the years immediately ahead if the formidable
problems of the present decade are not to become utterly unmanageable in the
1990s and beyond the year 2000.
Chapter V --
Implications of Population Pressures for National Security
Implications of Population Pressures for National Security
It seems well understood that the impact
of population factors on the subjects already considered -- development, food
requirements, resources, environment -- adversely affects the welfare and
progress of countries in which we have a friendly interest and thus indirectly
adversely affects broad U.S. interests as well.
of population factors on the subjects already considered -- development, food
requirements, resources, environment -- adversely affects the welfare and
progress of countries in which we have a friendly interest and thus indirectly
adversely affects broad U.S. interests as well.
The effects of population factors on the
political stability of these countries and their implications for internal and
international order or disorder, destructive social unrest, violence and
disruptive foreign activities are less well understood and need more analysis.
Nevertheless, some strategists and experts believe that these effects may
ultimately be the most important of those arising from population factors, most
harmful to the countries where they occur and seriously affecting U.S. interests.
Other experts within the U.S.
Government disagree with this conclusion.
political stability of these countries and their implications for internal and
international order or disorder, destructive social unrest, violence and
disruptive foreign activities are less well understood and need more analysis.
Nevertheless, some strategists and experts believe that these effects may
ultimately be the most important of those arising from population factors, most
harmful to the countries where they occur and seriously affecting U.S. interests.
Other experts within the U.S.
Government disagree with this conclusion.
A recent study14 of forty-five local
conflicts involving Third World countries
examined the ways in which population factors affect the initiation and course
of a conflict in different situations. The study reached two major conclusions:
conflicts involving Third World countries
examined the ways in which population factors affect the initiation and course
of a conflict in different situations. The study reached two major conclusions:
1. ". . . population factors are
indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent conflict in developing
areas. Segmental (religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid
population growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban
differences, population pressure and the spacial location of population in
relation to resources -- in this rough order of importance -- all appear to be
important contributions to conflict and violence...
indeed critical in, and often determinants of, violent conflict in developing
areas. Segmental (religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid
population growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban
differences, population pressure and the spacial location of population in
relation to resources -- in this rough order of importance -- all appear to be
important contributions to conflict and violence...
2. Clearly, conflicts which are regarded
in primarily political terms often have demographic roots: Recognition of these
relationships appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of such
hostilities."
in primarily political terms often have demographic roots: Recognition of these
relationships appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of such
hostilities."
It does not appear that the population
factors act alone or, often, directly to cause the disruptive effects. They act
through intervening elements -- variables. They also add to other causative
factors turning what might have been only a difficult situation into one with
disruptive results.
factors act alone or, often, directly to cause the disruptive effects. They act
through intervening elements -- variables. They also add to other causative
factors turning what might have been only a difficult situation into one with
disruptive results.
This action is seldom simple. Professor
Philip Hauser of the University of Chicago has suggested the concept of
"population complosion" to describe the situation in many developing
countries when (a) more and more people are born into or move into and are
compressed in the same living space under (b) conditions and irritations of
different races, colors, religions, languages, or cultural backgrounds, often
with differential rates of population growth among these groups, and (c) with
the frustrations of failure to achieve their aspirations for better standards
of living for themselves or their children. To these may be added pressures for
and actual international migration. These population factors appear to have a
multiplying effect on other factors involved in situations of incipient
violence. Population density, the "overpopulation" most often thought
of in this connection, is much less important.
Philip Hauser of the University of Chicago has suggested the concept of
"population complosion" to describe the situation in many developing
countries when (a) more and more people are born into or move into and are
compressed in the same living space under (b) conditions and irritations of
different races, colors, religions, languages, or cultural backgrounds, often
with differential rates of population growth among these groups, and (c) with
the frustrations of failure to achieve their aspirations for better standards
of living for themselves or their children. To these may be added pressures for
and actual international migration. These population factors appear to have a
multiplying effect on other factors involved in situations of incipient
violence. Population density, the "overpopulation" most often thought
of in this connection, is much less important.
These population factors contribute to
socio-economic variables including breakdowns in social structures, underemployment
and unemployment, poverty, deprived people in city slums, lowered opportunities
for education for the masses, few job opportunities for those who do obtain
education, interracial, religious, and regional rivalries, and sharply
increased financial, planning, and administrative burdens on governmental
systems at all levels.
socio-economic variables including breakdowns in social structures, underemployment
and unemployment, poverty, deprived people in city slums, lowered opportunities
for education for the masses, few job opportunities for those who do obtain
education, interracial, religious, and regional rivalries, and sharply
increased financial, planning, and administrative burdens on governmental
systems at all levels.
These adverse conditions appear to
contribute frequently to harmful developments of a political nature: Juvenile
delinquency, thievery and other crimes, organized brigandry, kidnapping and
terrorism, food riots, other outbreaks of violence; guerilla warfare, communal
violence, separatist movements, revolutionary movements and
counter-revolutionary coups. All of these bear upon the weakening or collapse
of local, state, or national government functions.
contribute frequently to harmful developments of a political nature: Juvenile
delinquency, thievery and other crimes, organized brigandry, kidnapping and
terrorism, food riots, other outbreaks of violence; guerilla warfare, communal
violence, separatist movements, revolutionary movements and
counter-revolutionary coups. All of these bear upon the weakening or collapse
of local, state, or national government functions.
Beyond national boundaries, population
factors appear to have had operative roles in some past politically disturbing
legal or illegal mass migrations, border incidents, and wars. If current
increased population pressures continue they may have greater potential for
future disruption in foreign relations.
factors appear to have had operative roles in some past politically disturbing
legal or illegal mass migrations, border incidents, and wars. If current
increased population pressures continue they may have greater potential for
future disruption in foreign relations.
Perhaps most important, in the last decade
population factors have impacted more severely than before on availabilities of
agricultural land and resources, industrialization, pollution and the
environment. All this is occurring at a time when international communications
have created rising expectations which are being frustrated by slow development
and inequalities of distribution.
population factors have impacted more severely than before on availabilities of
agricultural land and resources, industrialization, pollution and the
environment. All this is occurring at a time when international communications
have created rising expectations which are being frustrated by slow development
and inequalities of distribution.
Since population factors work with other
factors and act through intervening linkages, research as to their effects of a
political nature is difficult and "proof" even more so. This does not
mean, however, that the causality does not exist. It means only that U.S. policy
decisions must take into account the less precise and programmatic character of
our knowledge of these linkages.
factors and act through intervening linkages, research as to their effects of a
political nature is difficult and "proof" even more so. This does not
mean, however, that the causality does not exist. It means only that U.S. policy
decisions must take into account the less precise and programmatic character of
our knowledge of these linkages.
Although general hypotheses are hard to
draw, some seem reasonably sustainable:
draw, some seem reasonably sustainable:
1. Population growth and inadequate
resources. Where population size is greater than available resources, or is
expanding more rapidly than the available resources, there is a tendency toward
internal disorders and violence and, sometimes, disruptive international
policies or violence. The higher the rate of growth, the more salient a factor
population increase appears to be. A sense of increasing crowding, real or
perceived, seems to generate such tendencies, especially if it seems to thwart
obtaining desired personal or national goals.
resources. Where population size is greater than available resources, or is
expanding more rapidly than the available resources, there is a tendency toward
internal disorders and violence and, sometimes, disruptive international
policies or violence. The higher the rate of growth, the more salient a factor
population increase appears to be. A sense of increasing crowding, real or
perceived, seems to generate such tendencies, especially if it seems to thwart
obtaining desired personal or national goals.
2. Populations with a high proportion of
growth. The young people, who are in much higher proportions in many LDCs, are
likely to be more volatile, unstable, prone to extremes, alienation and
violence than an older population. These young people can more readily be
persuaded to attack the legal institutions of the government or real property
of the "establishment," "imperialists," multinational
corporations, or other -- often foreign -- influences blamed for their
troubles.
growth. The young people, who are in much higher proportions in many LDCs, are
likely to be more volatile, unstable, prone to extremes, alienation and
violence than an older population. These young people can more readily be
persuaded to attack the legal institutions of the government or real property
of the "establishment," "imperialists," multinational
corporations, or other -- often foreign -- influences blamed for their
troubles.
3. Population factors with social
cleavages. When adverse population factors of growth, movement, density,
excess, or pressure coincide with racial, religious, color, linguistic,
cultural, or other social cleavages, there will develop the most potentially
explosive situations for internal disorder, perhaps with external effects. When
such factors exist together with the reality or sense of relative deprivation
among different groups within the same country or in relation to other
countries or peoples, the probability of violence increases significantly.
cleavages. When adverse population factors of growth, movement, density,
excess, or pressure coincide with racial, religious, color, linguistic,
cultural, or other social cleavages, there will develop the most potentially
explosive situations for internal disorder, perhaps with external effects. When
such factors exist together with the reality or sense of relative deprivation
among different groups within the same country or in relation to other
countries or peoples, the probability of violence increases significantly.
4. Population movements and international
migrations. Population movements within countries appear to have a large role
in disorders. Migrations into neighboring countries (especially those richer or
more sparsely settled), whether legal or illegal, can provoke negative
political reactions or force.
migrations. Population movements within countries appear to have a large role
in disorders. Migrations into neighboring countries (especially those richer or
more sparsely settled), whether legal or illegal, can provoke negative
political reactions or force.
There may be increased propensities for
violence arising simply from technological developments making it easier --
e.g., international proliferation and more ready accessibility to sub-national
groups of nuclear and other lethal weaponry. These possibilities make the
disruptive population factors discussed above even more dangerous.
violence arising simply from technological developments making it easier --
e.g., international proliferation and more ready accessibility to sub-national
groups of nuclear and other lethal weaponry. These possibilities make the
disruptive population factors discussed above even more dangerous.
Some Effects of
Current Population Pressures
Current Population Pressures
In the 1960s and 1970s, there have been a
series of episodes in which population factors have apparently had a role --
directly or indirectly -- affecting countries in which we have an interest.
series of episodes in which population factors have apparently had a role --
directly or indirectly -- affecting countries in which we have an interest.
El Salvador-Honduras War. An example was
the 1969 war between El Salvador
and Honduras.
Dubbed the "Soccer War", it was sparked by a riot during a soccer
match, its underlying cause was tension resulting from the large scale
migration of Salvadorans from their rapidly growing, densely populated country
to relatively uninhabited areas of Honduras. The Hondurans resented
the presence of migrants and in 1969 began to enforce an already extant land
tenancy law to expel them. El
Salvador was angered by the treatment given
its citizens. Flaring tempers on both sides over this issue created a situation
which ultimately led to a military clash.
the 1969 war between El Salvador
and Honduras.
Dubbed the "Soccer War", it was sparked by a riot during a soccer
match, its underlying cause was tension resulting from the large scale
migration of Salvadorans from their rapidly growing, densely populated country
to relatively uninhabited areas of Honduras. The Hondurans resented
the presence of migrants and in 1969 began to enforce an already extant land
tenancy law to expel them. El
Salvador was angered by the treatment given
its citizens. Flaring tempers on both sides over this issue created a situation
which ultimately led to a military clash.
Nigeria. The Nigerian civil war
seriously retarded the progress of Africa's most populous nations and caused
political repercussions and pressures in the United States. It was fundamentally
a matter of tribal relationships. Irritations among the tribes caused in part
by rapidly increasing numbers of people, in a situation of inadequate
opportunity for most of them, magnified the tribal issues and may have helped
precipitate the war. The migration of the Ibos from Eastern
Nigeria, looking for employment, led to competition with local
peoples of other tribes and contributed to tribal rioting. This unstable
situation was intensified by the fact that in the 1963 population census
returns were falsified to inflate the Western region's population and hence its
representation in the Federal Government. The Ibos of the Eastern region, with
the oil resources of the country, felt their resources would be unjustly drawn
on and attempted to establish their independence.
seriously retarded the progress of Africa's most populous nations and caused
political repercussions and pressures in the United States. It was fundamentally
a matter of tribal relationships. Irritations among the tribes caused in part
by rapidly increasing numbers of people, in a situation of inadequate
opportunity for most of them, magnified the tribal issues and may have helped
precipitate the war. The migration of the Ibos from Eastern
Nigeria, looking for employment, led to competition with local
peoples of other tribes and contributed to tribal rioting. This unstable
situation was intensified by the fact that in the 1963 population census
returns were falsified to inflate the Western region's population and hence its
representation in the Federal Government. The Ibos of the Eastern region, with
the oil resources of the country, felt their resources would be unjustly drawn
on and attempted to establish their independence.
Pakistan-India-Bangladesh 1970-71. This
religious and nationalistic conflict contains several points where a population
factor at a crucial time may have had a causal effect in turning events away
from peaceful solutions to violence. The Central Government in West Pakistan
resorted to military suppression of the East Wing after the election in which
the Awami League had an overwhelming victory in East
Pakistan. This election had followed two sets of circumstances.
The first was a growing discontent in East Pakistan at the slow rate of economic
and social progress being made and the Bengali feeling that West Pakistan was
dealing unequally and unfairly with East Pakistan
in the distribution of national revenues. The first population factor was the
75 million Bengalis whom the 45 million West Pakistanis sought to continue to
dominate. Some observers believe that as a recent population factor the rapid
rate of population growth in East Pakistan
seriously diminished the per capita improvement from the revenues made
available and contributed significantly to the discontent. A special aspect of
the population explosion in East Pakistan
(second population factor) was the fact that the dense occupation of all good
agricultural land forced hundreds of thousands of people to move into the
obviously unsafe lowlands along the southern coast. They became victims of the
hurricane in 1970. An estimated 300,000 died. The Government was unable to deal
with a disaster affecting so many people. The leaders and people of East Pakistan reacted vigorously to this failure of the
Government to bring help.
religious and nationalistic conflict contains several points where a population
factor at a crucial time may have had a causal effect in turning events away
from peaceful solutions to violence. The Central Government in West Pakistan
resorted to military suppression of the East Wing after the election in which
the Awami League had an overwhelming victory in East
Pakistan. This election had followed two sets of circumstances.
The first was a growing discontent in East Pakistan at the slow rate of economic
and social progress being made and the Bengali feeling that West Pakistan was
dealing unequally and unfairly with East Pakistan
in the distribution of national revenues. The first population factor was the
75 million Bengalis whom the 45 million West Pakistanis sought to continue to
dominate. Some observers believe that as a recent population factor the rapid
rate of population growth in East Pakistan
seriously diminished the per capita improvement from the revenues made
available and contributed significantly to the discontent. A special aspect of
the population explosion in East Pakistan
(second population factor) was the fact that the dense occupation of all good
agricultural land forced hundreds of thousands of people to move into the
obviously unsafe lowlands along the southern coast. They became victims of the
hurricane in 1970. An estimated 300,000 died. The Government was unable to deal
with a disaster affecting so many people. The leaders and people of East Pakistan reacted vigorously to this failure of the
Government to bring help.
It seems quite likely that these
situations in which population factors played an important role led to the
overwhelming victory of the Awami League that led the Government to resort to
force in East Pakistan with the massacres and
rapes that followed. Other experts believe the effects of the latter two
factors were of marginal influence in the Awami League's victory.
situations in which population factors played an important role led to the
overwhelming victory of the Awami League that led the Government to resort to
force in East Pakistan with the massacres and
rapes that followed. Other experts believe the effects of the latter two
factors were of marginal influence in the Awami League's victory.
It further seems possible that much of the
violence was stimulated or magnified by population pressures. Two groups of
Moslems had been competing for jobs and land in East
Bengal since the 1947 partition. "Biharis" are a small
minority of non-Bengali Moslems who chose to resettle in East
Pakistan at that time. Their integration into Bengali society was
undoubtedly inhibited by the deteriorating living conditions of the majority
Bengalis. With the Pakistan
army crackdown in March, 1971, the Biharis cooperated with the authorities, and
reportedly were able thereby to improve their economic conditions at the
expense of the persecuted Bengalis. When the tables were turned after
independence, it was the Biharis who were persecuted and whose property and
jobs were seized. It seems likely that both these outbursts of violence were
induced or enlarged by the population "complosion" factor.
violence was stimulated or magnified by population pressures. Two groups of
Moslems had been competing for jobs and land in East
Bengal since the 1947 partition. "Biharis" are a small
minority of non-Bengali Moslems who chose to resettle in East
Pakistan at that time. Their integration into Bengali society was
undoubtedly inhibited by the deteriorating living conditions of the majority
Bengalis. With the Pakistan
army crackdown in March, 1971, the Biharis cooperated with the authorities, and
reportedly were able thereby to improve their economic conditions at the
expense of the persecuted Bengalis. When the tables were turned after
independence, it was the Biharis who were persecuted and whose property and
jobs were seized. It seems likely that both these outbursts of violence were
induced or enlarged by the population "complosion" factor.
The violence in East Pakistan against the
Bengalis and particularly the Hindu minority who bore the brunt of Army
repression led to the next population factor, the mass migration during one
year of nine or ten million refugees into West Bengal in India. This
placed a tremendous burden on the already weak Indian economy. As one Indian
leader in the India
Family Planning Program said, "The influx of nine million people wiped out
the savings of some nine million births which had been averted over a period of
eight years of the family planning program."
Bengalis and particularly the Hindu minority who bore the brunt of Army
repression led to the next population factor, the mass migration during one
year of nine or ten million refugees into West Bengal in India. This
placed a tremendous burden on the already weak Indian economy. As one Indian
leader in the India
Family Planning Program said, "The influx of nine million people wiped out
the savings of some nine million births which had been averted over a period of
eight years of the family planning program."
There were other factors in India's
invasion of East Bengal, but it is possible that the necessity of returning
these nine or ten million refugees to east Bengal -- getting them out of India
-- may have played a part in the Indian decision to invade. Certainly, in a
broader sense, the threat posed by this serious, spreading instability on India's eastern
frontier -- an instability in which population factors were a major underlying
cause -- a key reason for the Indian decision.
invasion of East Bengal, but it is possible that the necessity of returning
these nine or ten million refugees to east Bengal -- getting them out of India
-- may have played a part in the Indian decision to invade. Certainly, in a
broader sense, the threat posed by this serious, spreading instability on India's eastern
frontier -- an instability in which population factors were a major underlying
cause -- a key reason for the Indian decision.
The political arrangements in the
Subcontinent have changed, but all of the underlying population factors which
influenced the dramatic acts of violence that took place in 1970-71 still
exist, in worsening dimensions, to influence future events.
Subcontinent have changed, but all of the underlying population factors which
influenced the dramatic acts of violence that took place in 1970-71 still
exist, in worsening dimensions, to influence future events.
Additional illustrations. Population
factors also appear to have had indirect causal relations, in varying degrees,
on the killings in Indonesia
in 1965-6, the communal slaughter in Rwanda
in 1961-2 and 1963-4 and in Burundi
in 1972, the coup in Uganda
in 1972, and the insurrection in Sri Lanka in 1971.
factors also appear to have had indirect causal relations, in varying degrees,
on the killings in Indonesia
in 1965-6, the communal slaughter in Rwanda
in 1961-2 and 1963-4 and in Burundi
in 1972, the coup in Uganda
in 1972, and the insurrection in Sri Lanka in 1971.
Some Potential
Effects of Future Population Pressures
Effects of Future Population Pressures
Between the end of World War II and 1975
the world's population will have increased about one and a half billion --
nearly one billion of that from 1960 to the present. The rate of growth is
increasing and between two and a half and three and a half billion will be
added by the year 2000, depending partly on the effectiveness of population
growth control programs. This increase of the next 25 years will, of course,
pyramid on the great number added with such rapidity in the last 25. The
population factors which contributed to the political pressures and
instabilities of the last decades will be multiplied.
the world's population will have increased about one and a half billion --
nearly one billion of that from 1960 to the present. The rate of growth is
increasing and between two and a half and three and a half billion will be
added by the year 2000, depending partly on the effectiveness of population
growth control programs. This increase of the next 25 years will, of course,
pyramid on the great number added with such rapidity in the last 25. The
population factors which contributed to the political pressures and
instabilities of the last decades will be multiplied.
PRC - The demographic factors of the PRC
are referred to on page 79 above. The Government of the PRC has made a major
effort to feed its growing population.
are referred to on page 79 above. The Government of the PRC has made a major
effort to feed its growing population.
Cultivated farm land, at 107 million
hectares, has not increased significantly over the past 25 years, although farm
output has substantially kept pace with population growth through improved
yields secured by land improvement, irrigation extension, intensified cropping,
and rapid expansion in the supply of fertilizers.
hectares, has not increased significantly over the past 25 years, although farm
output has substantially kept pace with population growth through improved
yields secured by land improvement, irrigation extension, intensified cropping,
and rapid expansion in the supply of fertilizers.
In 1973 the PRC adopted new, forceful
population control measures. In the urban areas Peking
claimed its birth control measures had secured a two-child family and a one
percent annual population growth, and it proposes to extend this development
throughout the rural areas by 1980.
population control measures. In the urban areas Peking
claimed its birth control measures had secured a two-child family and a one
percent annual population growth, and it proposes to extend this development
throughout the rural areas by 1980.
The political implications of China's future
population growth are obviously important but are not dealt with here.
population growth are obviously important but are not dealt with here.
Israel
and the Arab States. If a peace settlement can be
reached, the central issue will be how to make it last. Egypt with
about 37 million today is growing at 2.8% per year. It will approximate 48
million by 1985, 75 million by 1995, and more than 85 million by 2000. It is
doubtful that Egypt's
economic progress can greatly exceed its population growth. With Israel starting
at today's population of 3.3 million, the disparity between its population and
those of the Arab States will rapidly increase. Inside Israel, unless
Jewish immigration continues, the gap between the size of the Arab and Jewish
populations will diminish. Together with the traditional animosities -- which
will remain the prime determinants of Arab-Israeli conflict -- these population
factors make the potential for peace and for U.S. interests in the area ominous.
and the Arab States. If a peace settlement can be
reached, the central issue will be how to make it last. Egypt with
about 37 million today is growing at 2.8% per year. It will approximate 48
million by 1985, 75 million by 1995, and more than 85 million by 2000. It is
doubtful that Egypt's
economic progress can greatly exceed its population growth. With Israel starting
at today's population of 3.3 million, the disparity between its population and
those of the Arab States will rapidly increase. Inside Israel, unless
Jewish immigration continues, the gap between the size of the Arab and Jewish
populations will diminish. Together with the traditional animosities -- which
will remain the prime determinants of Arab-Israeli conflict -- these population
factors make the potential for peace and for U.S. interests in the area ominous.
India-Bangladesh. The Subcontinent will be
for years the major focus of world concern over population growth. India's
population is now approximately 580 million, adding a million by each full
moon. Embassy New Delhi
(New Delhi 2115, June 17, 1974) reports:
for years the major focus of world concern over population growth. India's
population is now approximately 580 million, adding a million by each full
moon. Embassy New Delhi
(New Delhi 2115, June 17, 1974) reports:
"There seems
no way of turning off the faucet this side of 1 billion Indians, which means
India must continue to court economic and social disaster. It is not clear how
the shaky and slow-growing Indian economy can bear the enormous expenditures on
health, housing, employment, and education, which must be made if the society
is even to maintain its current low levels."
no way of turning off the faucet this side of 1 billion Indians, which means
India must continue to court economic and social disaster. It is not clear how
the shaky and slow-growing Indian economy can bear the enormous expenditures on
health, housing, employment, and education, which must be made if the society
is even to maintain its current low levels."
Death rates have recently increased in
parts of India and episodes
like the recent smallpox epidemic have led Embassy New Delhi to add:
parts of India and episodes
like the recent smallpox epidemic have led Embassy New Delhi to add:
"A future
failure of the India
food crop could cause widespread death and suffering which could not be
overcome by the GOI or foreign assistance. The rise in the death rate in
several rural areas suggests that Malthusian pressures are already being
felt."
failure of the India
food crop could cause widespread death and suffering which could not be
overcome by the GOI or foreign assistance. The rise in the death rate in
several rural areas suggests that Malthusian pressures are already being
felt."
And
further:
further:
"Increasing
political disturbances should be expected in the future, fed by the pressures
of rising population in urban areas, food shortages, and growing scarcities in
household commodities. The GOI has not been very successful in alleviating
unemployment in the cities. The recent disturbances in Gujarat and Bihar seem
to be only the beginning of chronic and serious political disorders occurring
throughout India."
political disturbances should be expected in the future, fed by the pressures
of rising population in urban areas, food shortages, and growing scarcities in
household commodities. The GOI has not been very successful in alleviating
unemployment in the cities. The recent disturbances in Gujarat and Bihar seem
to be only the beginning of chronic and serious political disorders occurring
throughout India."
There will probably be a weakening,
possibly a breakdown, of the control of the central government over some of the
states and local areas. The democratic system will be taxed and may be in
danger of giving way to a form of dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. The
existence of India as a
democratic buttress in Asia will be threatened.
possibly a breakdown, of the control of the central government over some of the
states and local areas. The democratic system will be taxed and may be in
danger of giving way to a form of dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. The
existence of India as a
democratic buttress in Asia will be threatened.
Bangladesh, with appalling population
density, rapid population growth, and extensive poverty will suffer even more.
Its population has increased 40% since the census 13 years ago and is growing
at least 3% per year. The present 75 million, or so, unless slowed by famine,
disease, or massive birth control, will double in 23 years and exceed 170
million by 2000.
density, rapid population growth, and extensive poverty will suffer even more.
Its population has increased 40% since the census 13 years ago and is growing
at least 3% per year. The present 75 million, or so, unless slowed by famine,
disease, or massive birth control, will double in 23 years and exceed 170
million by 2000.
Requirements for food and other basic
necessities of life are growing at a faster rate than existing resources and
administrative systems are providing them. In the rural areas, the size of the
average farm is being reduced and there is increasing landlessness. More and
more people are migrating to urban areas. The government admits a 30% rate of
unemployment and underemployment. Already, Embassy Dacca reports (Dacca 3424, June 19, 1974)
there are important economic-population causes for the landlessness that is
rapidly increasing and contributing to violent crimes of murder and armed
robbery that terrorize the ordinary citizen.
necessities of life are growing at a faster rate than existing resources and
administrative systems are providing them. In the rural areas, the size of the
average farm is being reduced and there is increasing landlessness. More and
more people are migrating to urban areas. The government admits a 30% rate of
unemployment and underemployment. Already, Embassy Dacca reports (Dacca 3424, June 19, 1974)
there are important economic-population causes for the landlessness that is
rapidly increasing and contributing to violent crimes of murder and armed
robbery that terrorize the ordinary citizen.
"Some of the
vast army of unemployed and landless, and those strapped by the escalating cost
of basic commodities, have doubtless turned to crime."
vast army of unemployed and landless, and those strapped by the escalating cost
of basic commodities, have doubtless turned to crime."
Three paragraphs of Embassy Dacca's report sharply outline the effect on U.S. political interests we may anticipate from
population factors in Bangladesh
and other countries that, if present trends are not changed, will be in
conditions similar to Bangladesh
in only a few years.
population factors in Bangladesh
and other countries that, if present trends are not changed, will be in
conditions similar to Bangladesh
in only a few years.
"Of concern to
the U.S.
are several probable outcomes as the basic political, economic and social
situation worsens over the coming decades. Already afflicted with a crisis
mentality by which they look to wealthy foreign countries to shore up their
faltering economy, the BDG will continue to escalate its demands on the U.S.
both bilaterally and internationally to enlarge its assistance, both of
commodities and financing. Bangladesh is now a fairly solid supporter of third
world positions, advocating better distribution of the world's wealth and
extensive trade concessions to poor nations. As its problems grow and its
ability to gain assistance fails to keep pace, Bangladesh's
positions on international issues likely will become radicalized, inevitably in
opposition to U.S.
interests on major issues as it seeks to align itself with others to force
adequate aid.
the U.S.
are several probable outcomes as the basic political, economic and social
situation worsens over the coming decades. Already afflicted with a crisis
mentality by which they look to wealthy foreign countries to shore up their
faltering economy, the BDG will continue to escalate its demands on the U.S.
both bilaterally and internationally to enlarge its assistance, both of
commodities and financing. Bangladesh is now a fairly solid supporter of third
world positions, advocating better distribution of the world's wealth and
extensive trade concessions to poor nations. As its problems grow and its
ability to gain assistance fails to keep pace, Bangladesh's
positions on international issues likely will become radicalized, inevitably in
opposition to U.S.
interests on major issues as it seeks to align itself with others to force
adequate aid.
"U.S. interests in Bangladesh center on the
development of an economically and politically stable country which will not
threaten the stability of its neighbors in the Subcontinent nor invite the
intrusion of outside powers. Surrounded on three sides by India and sharing a short border with Burma, Bangladesh, if it descends into
chaos, will threaten the stability of these nations as well. Already Bengalis
are illegally migrating into the frontier provinces of Assam and Tripura, politically sensitive areas
of India, and into adjacent Burma. Should
expanded out-migration and socio-political collapse in Bangladesh threaten its own stability, India may be
forced to consider intervention, although it is difficult to see in what way
the Indians could cope with the situation.
development of an economically and politically stable country which will not
threaten the stability of its neighbors in the Subcontinent nor invite the
intrusion of outside powers. Surrounded on three sides by India and sharing a short border with Burma, Bangladesh, if it descends into
chaos, will threaten the stability of these nations as well. Already Bengalis
are illegally migrating into the frontier provinces of Assam and Tripura, politically sensitive areas
of India, and into adjacent Burma. Should
expanded out-migration and socio-political collapse in Bangladesh threaten its own stability, India may be
forced to consider intervention, although it is difficult to see in what way
the Indians could cope with the situation.
"Bangladesh is a
case study of the effects of few resources and burgeoning population not only
on national and regional stability but also on the future world order. In a
sense, if we and other richer elements of the world community do not meet the
test of formulating a policy to help Bangladesh awaken from its economic and
demographic nightmare, we will not be prepared in future decades to deal with
the consequences of similar problems in other countries which have far more
political and economic consequences to U.S. interests."
case study of the effects of few resources and burgeoning population not only
on national and regional stability but also on the future world order. In a
sense, if we and other richer elements of the world community do not meet the
test of formulating a policy to help Bangladesh awaken from its economic and
demographic nightmare, we will not be prepared in future decades to deal with
the consequences of similar problems in other countries which have far more
political and economic consequences to U.S. interests."
Africa -- Sahel
Countries. The current tragedy of the Sahel countries, to which U.S. aid in
past years has been minimal, has suddenly cost us an immense effort in food
supplies at a time when we are already hard pressed to supply other countries,
and domestic food prices are causing strong political repercussions in the U.S.
The costs to us and other donor countries for aid to help restore the
devastated land will run into hundreds of millions. Yet little attention is
given to the fact that even before the adverse effect of the continued drought,
it was population growth and added migration of herdsmen to the edge of the
desert that led to cutting the trees and cropping the grass, inviting the
desert to sweep forward. Control of population growth and migration must be a
part of any program for improvement of lasting value.
Countries. The current tragedy of the Sahel countries, to which U.S. aid in
past years has been minimal, has suddenly cost us an immense effort in food
supplies at a time when we are already hard pressed to supply other countries,
and domestic food prices are causing strong political repercussions in the U.S.
The costs to us and other donor countries for aid to help restore the
devastated land will run into hundreds of millions. Yet little attention is
given to the fact that even before the adverse effect of the continued drought,
it was population growth and added migration of herdsmen to the edge of the
desert that led to cutting the trees and cropping the grass, inviting the
desert to sweep forward. Control of population growth and migration must be a
part of any program for improvement of lasting value.
Panama. The troublesome problem of
jurisdiction over the Canal Zone is primarily
due to Panamanian feelings of national pride and a desire to achieve
sovereignty over its entire territory. One Panamanian agreement in pursuing its
treaty goals is that U.S.
control over the Canal Zone prevents the natural expansion of Panama City, an expansion needed as a result
of demographic pressures. In 1908, at the time of the construction of the
Canal, the population of the Zone was about 40,000. Today it is close to the
same figure, 45,000. On the other hand, Panama
City, which had some 20,000 people in 1908, has
received growing migration from rural areas and now has over 500,000. A new
treaty which would give Panama
jurisdiction over land now in the Zone would help alleviate the problems caused
by this growth of Panama City.
jurisdiction over the Canal Zone is primarily
due to Panamanian feelings of national pride and a desire to achieve
sovereignty over its entire territory. One Panamanian agreement in pursuing its
treaty goals is that U.S.
control over the Canal Zone prevents the natural expansion of Panama City, an expansion needed as a result
of demographic pressures. In 1908, at the time of the construction of the
Canal, the population of the Zone was about 40,000. Today it is close to the
same figure, 45,000. On the other hand, Panama
City, which had some 20,000 people in 1908, has
received growing migration from rural areas and now has over 500,000. A new
treaty which would give Panama
jurisdiction over land now in the Zone would help alleviate the problems caused
by this growth of Panama City.
Mexico and the U.S. Closest to home, the
combined population growth of Mexico
and the U.S.
Southwest presages major difficulties for the future. Mexico's population is
growing at some 3.5% per year and will double in 20 years with concomitant
increases in demands for food, housing, education, and employment. By 1995, the
present 57 million will have increased to some 115 million and, unless their
recently established family planning program has great success, by 2000 will
exceed 130 million. More important, the numbers of young people entering the
job market each year will expand even more quickly. These growing numbers will
increase the pressure of illegal emigration to the U.S.,
and make the issue an even more serious source of friction in our political
relations with Mexico.
combined population growth of Mexico
and the U.S.
Southwest presages major difficulties for the future. Mexico's population is
growing at some 3.5% per year and will double in 20 years with concomitant
increases in demands for food, housing, education, and employment. By 1995, the
present 57 million will have increased to some 115 million and, unless their
recently established family planning program has great success, by 2000 will
exceed 130 million. More important, the numbers of young people entering the
job market each year will expand even more quickly. These growing numbers will
increase the pressure of illegal emigration to the U.S.,
and make the issue an even more serious source of friction in our political
relations with Mexico.
On our side, the Bureau of the Census
estimates that as more and more Americans move to the Southwestern States the
present 40,000,000 population may approximate 61,000,000 by 1995. The domestic
use of Colorado River water may again have increased the salinity level in Mexico and
reopened that political issue.
estimates that as more and more Americans move to the Southwestern States the
present 40,000,000 population may approximate 61,000,000 by 1995. The domestic
use of Colorado River water may again have increased the salinity level in Mexico and
reopened that political issue.
Amembassy Mexico City
(Mexico 4953, June 14, 1974) summarized the influences of population factors on
U.S.
interests as follows:
(Mexico 4953, June 14, 1974) summarized the influences of population factors on
U.S.
interests as follows:
"An indefinite
continuation of Mexico's
high population growth rate would increasingly act as a brake on economic (and
social) improvement. The consequences would be noted in various ways. Mexico could
well take more radical positions in the international scene. Illegal migration
to the U.S.
would increase. In a country where unemployment and under-employment is already
high, the entry of increasing numbers into the work force would only intensify
the pressure to seek employment in the U.S. by whatever means. Yet another
consequence would be increased demand for food imports from the U.S., especially
if the rate of growth of agricultural production continues to lag behind the
population growth rate. Finally, one cannot dismiss the spectre of future
domestic instability as a long term consequence, should the economy, now
strong, falter."
continuation of Mexico's
high population growth rate would increasingly act as a brake on economic (and
social) improvement. The consequences would be noted in various ways. Mexico could
well take more radical positions in the international scene. Illegal migration
to the U.S.
would increase. In a country where unemployment and under-employment is already
high, the entry of increasing numbers into the work force would only intensify
the pressure to seek employment in the U.S. by whatever means. Yet another
consequence would be increased demand for food imports from the U.S., especially
if the rate of growth of agricultural production continues to lag behind the
population growth rate. Finally, one cannot dismiss the spectre of future
domestic instability as a long term consequence, should the economy, now
strong, falter."
UNCTAD, the Special UNGA, and the UN. The
developing countries, after several years of unorganized maneuvering and
erratic attacks have now formed tight groupings in the Special Committee for
Latin American Coordination, the Organization of African States, and the
Seventy-Seven. As illustrated in the Declaration of Santiago
and the recent Special General Assembly, these groupings at times appear to
reflect a common desire to launch economic attacks against the United States
and, to a lesser degree, the European developed countries. A factor which is
common to all of them, which retards their development, burdens their foreign
exchange, subjects them to world prices for food, fertilizer, and necessities
of life and pushes them into disadvantageous trade relations is their
excessively rapid population growth. Until they are able to overcome this
problem, it is likely that their manifestations of antagonism toward the United States
in international bodies will increase. Global Factors
developing countries, after several years of unorganized maneuvering and
erratic attacks have now formed tight groupings in the Special Committee for
Latin American Coordination, the Organization of African States, and the
Seventy-Seven. As illustrated in the Declaration of Santiago
and the recent Special General Assembly, these groupings at times appear to
reflect a common desire to launch economic attacks against the United States
and, to a lesser degree, the European developed countries. A factor which is
common to all of them, which retards their development, burdens their foreign
exchange, subjects them to world prices for food, fertilizer, and necessities
of life and pushes them into disadvantageous trade relations is their
excessively rapid population growth. Until they are able to overcome this
problem, it is likely that their manifestations of antagonism toward the United States
in international bodies will increase. Global Factors
In industrial nations, population growth
increases demand for industrial output. This over time tends to deplete
national raw materials resources and calls increasingly on sources of marginal
profitability and foreign supplies. To obtain raw materials, industrial nations
seek to locate and develop external sources of supply. The potential for
collisions of interest among the developing countries is obvious and has
already begun. It is visible and vexing in claims for territorial waters and
national sovereignty over mineral resources. It may become intense in rivalries
over exploring and exploiting the resources of the ocean floor.
increases demand for industrial output. This over time tends to deplete
national raw materials resources and calls increasingly on sources of marginal
profitability and foreign supplies. To obtain raw materials, industrial nations
seek to locate and develop external sources of supply. The potential for
collisions of interest among the developing countries is obvious and has
already begun. It is visible and vexing in claims for territorial waters and
national sovereignty over mineral resources. It may become intense in rivalries
over exploring and exploiting the resources of the ocean floor.
In developing countries, the burden of
population factors, added to others, will weaken unstable governments, often
only marginally effective in good times, and open the way for extremist
regimes. Countries suffering under such burdens will be more susceptible to
radicalization. Their vulnerability also might invite foreign intervention by
stronger nations bent on acquiring political and economic advantage. The
tensions within the Have-not nations are likely to intensify, and the conflicts
between them and the Haves may escalate.
population factors, added to others, will weaken unstable governments, often
only marginally effective in good times, and open the way for extremist
regimes. Countries suffering under such burdens will be more susceptible to
radicalization. Their vulnerability also might invite foreign intervention by
stronger nations bent on acquiring political and economic advantage. The
tensions within the Have-not nations are likely to intensify, and the conflicts
between them and the Haves may escalate.
Past experience gives little assistance to
predicting the course of these developments because the speed of today's population
growth, migrations, and urbanization far exceeds anything the world has seen
before. Moreover, the consequences of such population factors can no longer be
evaded by moving to new hunting or grazing lands, by conquering new territory,
by discovering or colonizing new continents, or by emigration in large numbers.
predicting the course of these developments because the speed of today's population
growth, migrations, and urbanization far exceeds anything the world has seen
before. Moreover, the consequences of such population factors can no longer be
evaded by moving to new hunting or grazing lands, by conquering new territory,
by discovering or colonizing new continents, or by emigration in large numbers.
The world has ample warning that we all
must make more rapid efforts at social and economic development to avoid or
mitigate these gloomy prospects. We should be warned also that we all must move
as rapidly as possible toward stabilizing national and world population growth.
must make more rapid efforts at social and economic development to avoid or
mitigate these gloomy prospects. We should be warned also that we all must move
as rapidly as possible toward stabilizing national and world population growth.
CHAPTER VI - WORLD
POPULATION CONFERENCE
POPULATION CONFERENCE
From the standpoint of policy and program,
the focal point of the World Population Conference (WPC) at Bucharest, Romania,
in August 1974, was the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA). The U.S. had
contributed many substantive points to the draft Plan. We had particularly
emphasized the incorporation of population factors in national planning of
developing countries' population programs for assuring the availability of
means of family planning to persons of reproductive age, voluntary but specific
goals for the reduction of population growth and time frames for action.
the focal point of the World Population Conference (WPC) at Bucharest, Romania,
in August 1974, was the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA). The U.S. had
contributed many substantive points to the draft Plan. We had particularly
emphasized the incorporation of population factors in national planning of
developing countries' population programs for assuring the availability of
means of family planning to persons of reproductive age, voluntary but specific
goals for the reduction of population growth and time frames for action.
As the WPPA reached the WPC it was organized
as a demographic document. It also related population factors to family
welfare, social and economic development, and fertility reduction. Population
policies and programs were recognized as an essential element, but only one
element of economic and social development programs. The sovereignty of nations
in determining their own population policies and programs was repeatedly
recognized. The general impression after five regional consultative meetings on
the Plan was that it had general support.
as a demographic document. It also related population factors to family
welfare, social and economic development, and fertility reduction. Population
policies and programs were recognized as an essential element, but only one
element of economic and social development programs. The sovereignty of nations
in determining their own population policies and programs was repeatedly
recognized. The general impression after five regional consultative meetings on
the Plan was that it had general support.
There was general consternation,
therefore, when at the beginning of the conference the Plan was subjected to a
slashing, five-pronged attack led by Algeria, with the backing of several
African countries; Argentina, supported by Uruguay, Brazil, Peru and, more
limitedly, some other Latin American countries; the Eastern European group
(less Romania); the PRC and the Holy See. Although the attacks were not
identical, they embraced three central elements relevant to U.S. policy and
action in this field:
therefore, when at the beginning of the conference the Plan was subjected to a
slashing, five-pronged attack led by Algeria, with the backing of several
African countries; Argentina, supported by Uruguay, Brazil, Peru and, more
limitedly, some other Latin American countries; the Eastern European group
(less Romania); the PRC and the Holy See. Although the attacks were not
identical, they embraced three central elements relevant to U.S. policy and
action in this field:
1.Repeated references to the importance
(or as some said, the pre-condition) of economic and social development for the
reduction of high fertility. Led by Algeria
and Argentina,
many emphasized the "new international economic order" as central to
economic and social development.
(or as some said, the pre-condition) of economic and social development for the
reduction of high fertility. Led by Algeria
and Argentina,
many emphasized the "new international economic order" as central to
economic and social development.
2.Efforts to reduce the references to
population programs, minimize their importance and delete all references to
quantitative or time goals.
population programs, minimize their importance and delete all references to
quantitative or time goals.
3.Additional references to national
sovereignty in setting population policies and programs.
sovereignty in setting population policies and programs.
The Plan of Action
Despite the initial attack and continuing
efforts to change the conceptual basis of the world Population Plan of Action,
the Conference adopted by acclamation (only the Holy See stating a general
reservation) a complete World Population Plan of Action. It is less urgent in
tone than the draft submitted by the U.N. Secretariat but in several ways more
complete and with greater potential than that draft. The final action followed
a vigorous debate with hotly contested positions and forty-seven votes.
Nevertheless, there was general satisfaction among the participants at the
success of their efforts.
efforts to change the conceptual basis of the world Population Plan of Action,
the Conference adopted by acclamation (only the Holy See stating a general
reservation) a complete World Population Plan of Action. It is less urgent in
tone than the draft submitted by the U.N. Secretariat but in several ways more
complete and with greater potential than that draft. The final action followed
a vigorous debate with hotly contested positions and forty-seven votes.
Nevertheless, there was general satisfaction among the participants at the
success of their efforts.
a. Principles and
Aims
Aims
The Plan of Action lays down several
important principles, some for the first time in a U.N. document.
important principles, some for the first time in a U.N. document.
1. Among the first-time statements is the
assertion that the sovereign right of each nation to set its own population
policies is "to be exercised ... taking into account universal solidarity
in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world." (Para 13) This new provision opens the way toward
increasing responsibility by nations toward other nations in establishing their
national population policies.
assertion that the sovereign right of each nation to set its own population
policies is "to be exercised ... taking into account universal solidarity
in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world." (Para 13) This new provision opens the way toward
increasing responsibility by nations toward other nations in establishing their
national population policies.
2. The conceptual relationship between
population and development is stated in Para
13(c):
population and development is stated in Para
13(c):
Population and
development are interrelated: population variables influence development
variables and are also influenced by them; the formulation of a World
Population Plan of Action reflects the international community's awareness of
the importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the
socio-economic nature of the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action
reflects its awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting
population trends.
development are interrelated: population variables influence development
variables and are also influenced by them; the formulation of a World
Population Plan of Action reflects the international community's awareness of
the importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the
socio-economic nature of the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action
reflects its awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting
population trends.
3. A
basic right of couples and individuals is recognized by Para 13(f), for the
first time in a single declarative sentence:
basic right of couples and individuals is recognized by Para 13(f), for the
first time in a single declarative sentence:
All couples and
individuals have the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly the
number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and
means to do so;
individuals have the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly the
number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and
means to do so;
4. Also for the first time, a U.N.
document links the responsibility of child-bearers to the community [Para 13(f) continued]:
document links the responsibility of child-bearers to the community [Para 13(f) continued]:
The responsibility
of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the
needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards
the community.
of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the
needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards
the community.
It is now possible
to build on this newly-stated principle as the right of couples first
recognized in the Tehran
Human Rights Declaration of 1968 has been built on.
to build on this newly-stated principle as the right of couples first
recognized in the Tehran
Human Rights Declaration of 1968 has been built on.
5. A flat declaration of the right of
women is included in Para 13(h):
women is included in Para 13(h):
Women have the
right to complete integration in the development process particularly by means
of an equal participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and
political life. In addition, the necessary measures should be taken to
facilitate this integration with family responsibilities which should be fully
shared by both partners.
right to complete integration in the development process particularly by means
of an equal participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and
political life. In addition, the necessary measures should be taken to
facilitate this integration with family responsibilities which should be fully
shared by both partners.
6. The need for international action is
accepted in Para 13(k):
accepted in Para 13(k):
The growing
interdependence of countries makes the adoption of measures at the
international level increasingly important for the solution of problems of
development and population problems.
interdependence of countries makes the adoption of measures at the
international level increasingly important for the solution of problems of
development and population problems.
7. The "primary aim" of the Plan
of Action is asserted to be "to expand and deepen the capacities of
countries to deal effectively with their national and subnational population
problems and to promote an appropriate international response to their needs by
increasing international activity in research, the exchange of information, and
the provision of assistance on request."
of Action is asserted to be "to expand and deepen the capacities of
countries to deal effectively with their national and subnational population
problems and to promote an appropriate international response to their needs by
increasing international activity in research, the exchange of information, and
the provision of assistance on request."
b. Recommendations
The Plan of Action includes
recommendations for: population goals and policies; population growth;
mortality and morbidity; reproduction; family formation and the status of
women; population distribution and internal migration; international migration;
population structure; socio-economic policies; data collection and analysis;
research; development and evolution of population policies; the role of national
governments and of international cooperation; and monitoring, review and
appraisal.
recommendations for: population goals and policies; population growth;
mortality and morbidity; reproduction; family formation and the status of
women; population distribution and internal migration; international migration;
population structure; socio-economic policies; data collection and analysis;
research; development and evolution of population policies; the role of national
governments and of international cooperation; and monitoring, review and
appraisal.
A score of these recommendations are the
most important:
most important:
1. Governments should integrate population
measures and programs into comprehensive social and economic plans and programs
and their integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and
organizations for planning within the countries. A unit dealing with population
aspects should be created and placed at a high level of the national administrative
structure. (Para 94)
measures and programs into comprehensive social and economic plans and programs
and their integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and
organizations for planning within the countries. A unit dealing with population
aspects should be created and placed at a high level of the national administrative
structure. (Para 94)
2. Countries which consider their
population growth hampers attainment of their goals should consider adopting
population policies -- through a low level of birth and death rates. (Para 17, 18)
population growth hampers attainment of their goals should consider adopting
population policies -- through a low level of birth and death rates. (Para 17, 18)
3. Highest priority should be given to
reduction in mortality and morbidity and increase of life expectancy and
programs for this purpose should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups.
(Para 20-25)
reduction in mortality and morbidity and increase of life expectancy and
programs for this purpose should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups.
(Para 20-25)
4. Countries are urged to encourage
appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to
persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it. [Para
29(b)]
appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to
persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it. [Para
29(b)]
5. Family planning and related services
should aim at prevention of unwanted pregnancies and also at elimination of
involuntary sterility or subfecundity to enable couples to achieve their
desired number of children. [Para 29 (c)]
should aim at prevention of unwanted pregnancies and also at elimination of
involuntary sterility or subfecundity to enable couples to achieve their
desired number of children. [Para 29 (c)]
6. Adequately trained auxiliary personnel,
social workers and non-government channels should be used to help provide
family planning services. [Para 29(e)]
social workers and non-government channels should be used to help provide
family planning services. [Para 29(e)]
7. Governments with family planning
programs should consider coordinating them with health and other services
designed to raise the quality of life.
programs should consider coordinating them with health and other services
designed to raise the quality of life.
8. Countries wishing to affect fertility
levels should give priority to development programs and health and education
strategies which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including
fertility. [Para 31] International cooperation
should give priority to assisting such national efforts. Such programs may
include reduction in infant and child mortality, increased education,
particularly for females, improvement in the status of women, land reform and
support in old age. [Para 32]
levels should give priority to development programs and health and education
strategies which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including
fertility. [Para 31] International cooperation
should give priority to assisting such national efforts. Such programs may
include reduction in infant and child mortality, increased education,
particularly for females, improvement in the status of women, land reform and
support in old age. [Para 32]
9. Countries which consider their birth
rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to set quantitative
goals and implement policies to achieve them by 1985. [Para
37]
rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to set quantitative
goals and implement policies to achieve them by 1985. [Para
37]
10. Developed countries are urged to
develop appropriate policies in population, consumption and investment, bearing
in mind the need for fundamental improvement in international equity.
develop appropriate policies in population, consumption and investment, bearing
in mind the need for fundamental improvement in international equity.
11. Because the family is the basic unit
of society, governments should assist families as far as possible through
legislation and services. [Para 39]
of society, governments should assist families as far as possible through
legislation and services. [Para 39]
12. Governments should ensure full
participation of women in the educational, economic, social and political life
of their countries on an equal basis with men. [Para
40] (A new provision, added at Bucharest.)
participation of women in the educational, economic, social and political life
of their countries on an equal basis with men. [Para
40] (A new provision, added at Bucharest.)
13. A series of recommendations are made
to stabilize migration within countries, particularly policies to reduce the
undesirable consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop
opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of
individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. [Para
44-50]
to stabilize migration within countries, particularly policies to reduce the
undesirable consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop
opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of
individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. [Para
44-50]
14. Agreements should be concluded to
regulate the international migration of workers and to assure
non-discriminatory treatment and social services for these workers and their
families; also other measures to decrease the brain drain from developing
countries. [Para 51-62]
regulate the international migration of workers and to assure
non-discriminatory treatment and social services for these workers and their
families; also other measures to decrease the brain drain from developing
countries. [Para 51-62]
15. To assure needed information
concerning population trends, population censuses should be taken at regular
intervals and information concerning births and deaths be made available at
least annually. [Para 72-77]
concerning population trends, population censuses should be taken at regular
intervals and information concerning births and deaths be made available at
least annually. [Para 72-77]
16. Research should be intensified to
develop knowledge concerning the social, economic and political
interrelationships with population trends; effective means of reducing infant
and childhood mortality; methods for integrating population goals into national
plans, means of improving the motivation of people, analysis of population
policies in relation to socio-economic development, laws and institution;
methods of fertility regulation to meet the varied requirement of individuals
and communities, including methods requiring no medical supervision; the
interrelations of health, nutrition and reproductive biology; and utilization
of social services, including family planning services. [Para
78-80]
develop knowledge concerning the social, economic and political
interrelationships with population trends; effective means of reducing infant
and childhood mortality; methods for integrating population goals into national
plans, means of improving the motivation of people, analysis of population
policies in relation to socio-economic development, laws and institution;
methods of fertility regulation to meet the varied requirement of individuals
and communities, including methods requiring no medical supervision; the
interrelations of health, nutrition and reproductive biology; and utilization
of social services, including family planning services. [Para
78-80]
17. Training of management on population
dynamics and administration, on an interdisciplinary basis, should be provided
for medical, paramedical, traditional health personnel, program administrators,
senior government officials, labor, community and social leaders. Education and
information programs should be undertaken to bring population information to all
areas of countries. [Paras 81-92]
dynamics and administration, on an interdisciplinary basis, should be provided
for medical, paramedical, traditional health personnel, program administrators,
senior government officials, labor, community and social leaders. Education and
information programs should be undertaken to bring population information to all
areas of countries. [Paras 81-92]
18. An important role of governments is to
determine and assess the population problems and needs of their countries in
the light of their political, social, cultural, religious and economic
conditions; such an undertaking should be carried out systematically and
periodically so as to provide informed, rational and dynamic decision-making in
matters of population and development. [Para 97]
determine and assess the population problems and needs of their countries in
the light of their political, social, cultural, religious and economic
conditions; such an undertaking should be carried out systematically and
periodically so as to provide informed, rational and dynamic decision-making in
matters of population and development. [Para 97]
20. The Plan of Action should be closely
coordinated with the International Development Strategy for the Second United
Nations Development Decade, reviewed in depth at five year intervals, and
modified as appropriate. [Paras 106-108]
coordinated with the International Development Strategy for the Second United
Nations Development Decade, reviewed in depth at five year intervals, and
modified as appropriate. [Paras 106-108]
The Plan of Action hedges in presenting
specific statements of quantitative goals or a time frame for the reduction of
fertility. These concepts are included, however, in the combination of Paras 16
and 36, together with goals [Para 37] and the review [Para
106]. Para 16 states that, according to the U.N low variant projections, it is
estimated that as a result of social and economic development and population
policies as reported by countries in the Second United Nations Inquiry on
Population and Development, population growth rates in the developing countries
as a whole may decline from the present level of 2.4% per annum to about 2% by
1985; and below 0.7% per annum in the developed countries. In this case the
worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 2% to about 1.7%. Para
36 says that these projections and those for mortality decline are consistent
with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries as a whole from the
present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985. Para 36 goes on to
say that "To achieve by 1985 these levels of fertility would require substantial
national efforts, by those countries concerned, in the field of socio-economic
development and population policies, supported, upon request, by adequate
international assistance." Para 37 then follows with the statement that
countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national
purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing
policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Para 106
recommends a comprehensive review and appraisal of population trends and
policies discussed in the Plan of Action should be undertaken every five years
and modified, wherever needed, by ECOSOC.
specific statements of quantitative goals or a time frame for the reduction of
fertility. These concepts are included, however, in the combination of Paras 16
and 36, together with goals [Para 37] and the review [Para
106]. Para 16 states that, according to the U.N low variant projections, it is
estimated that as a result of social and economic development and population
policies as reported by countries in the Second United Nations Inquiry on
Population and Development, population growth rates in the developing countries
as a whole may decline from the present level of 2.4% per annum to about 2% by
1985; and below 0.7% per annum in the developed countries. In this case the
worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 2% to about 1.7%. Para
36 says that these projections and those for mortality decline are consistent
with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries as a whole from the
present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985. Para 36 goes on to
say that "To achieve by 1985 these levels of fertility would require substantial
national efforts, by those countries concerned, in the field of socio-economic
development and population policies, supported, upon request, by adequate
international assistance." Para 37 then follows with the statement that
countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national
purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing
policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Para 106
recommends a comprehensive review and appraisal of population trends and
policies discussed in the Plan of Action should be undertaken every five years
and modified, wherever needed, by ECOSOC.
Usefulness of the
Plan of Action
Plan of Action
The World Population Plan of Action,
despite its wordiness and often hesitant tone, contains all the necessary
provisions for effective population growth control programs at national and
international levels. It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with
time frames for their accomplishment. These will have to be added by individual
national action and development as rapidly as possible in further U.N.
documents. The basis for suitable goals exists in paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and
106, referred to above. The U.N. low variant projection used in these
paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the United States and other ECAFE
nations:
despite its wordiness and often hesitant tone, contains all the necessary
provisions for effective population growth control programs at national and
international levels. It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with
time frames for their accomplishment. These will have to be added by individual
national action and development as rapidly as possible in further U.N.
documents. The basis for suitable goals exists in paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and
106, referred to above. The U.N. low variant projection used in these
paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the United States and other ECAFE
nations:
For developed
countries -
countries -
replacement levels
of fertility by 1985;
of fertility by 1985;
stationary
populations as soon as practicable.
populations as soon as practicable.
For developing
countries -
countries -
replacement levels
in two or three decades.
in two or three decades.
For the world -
a 1.7% population
growth rate by 1985 with 2% average for the developing countries and 0.7%
average for developed countries;
growth rate by 1985 with 2% average for the developing countries and 0.7%
average for developed countries;
replacement level
of fertility for all countries by 2000.
of fertility for all countries by 2000.
The dangerous situation evidenced by the
current food situation and projections for the future make it essential to
press for the realization of these goals. The beliefs, ideologies and
misconceptions displayed by many nations at Bucharest
indicate more forcefully than ever the need for extensive education of the
leaders of many governments, especially in Africa and some in Latin
America. Approaches leaders of individual countries must be
designed in the light of their current beliefs and to meet their special
concerns. These might include:
current food situation and projections for the future make it essential to
press for the realization of these goals. The beliefs, ideologies and
misconceptions displayed by many nations at Bucharest
indicate more forcefully than ever the need for extensive education of the
leaders of many governments, especially in Africa and some in Latin
America. Approaches leaders of individual countries must be
designed in the light of their current beliefs and to meet their special
concerns. These might include:
1. Projections of population growth
individualized for countries and with analyses of relations of population
factors to social and economic development of each country.
individualized for countries and with analyses of relations of population
factors to social and economic development of each country.
2. Familiarization programs at U.N.
Headquarters in New York for ministers of governments, senior policy level
officials and comparably influential leaders from private life.
Headquarters in New York for ministers of governments, senior policy level
officials and comparably influential leaders from private life.
3. Greatly increased training programs for
senior officials in the elements of demographic economics.
senior officials in the elements of demographic economics.
4. Assistance in integrating population
factors in national plans, particularly as they relate to health services,
education, agricultural resources and development, employment, equitable
distribution of income and social stability.
factors in national plans, particularly as they relate to health services,
education, agricultural resources and development, employment, equitable
distribution of income and social stability.
5. Assistance in relating population
policies and family planning programs to major sectors of development: health,
nutrition, agriculture, education, social services, organized labor, women's
activities, community development.
policies and family planning programs to major sectors of development: health,
nutrition, agriculture, education, social services, organized labor, women's
activities, community development.
6. Initiatives to implement the Percy
amendment regarding improvement in the status of women.
amendment regarding improvement in the status of women.
7. Emphasis in assistance and development
programs on development of rural areas.
programs on development of rural areas.
All these activities and others
particularly productive are consistent with the Plan of Action and may be based
upon it.
particularly productive are consistent with the Plan of Action and may be based
upon it.
Beyond these activities, essentially directed
at national interests, a broader educational concept is needed to convey an
acute understanding of the interrelation of national interests and world
population growth.
at national interests, a broader educational concept is needed to convey an
acute understanding of the interrelation of national interests and world
population growth.
P A R T T W O
Policy
Recommendations
Recommendations
I. Introduction - A
U.S.
Global Population Strategy
U.S.
Global Population Strategy
There is no simple single approach to the
population problem which will provide a "technological fix." As the
previous analysis makes clear the problem of population growth has social,
economic and technological aspects all of which must be understood and dealt
with for a world population policy to succeed. With this in mind, the following
broad recommended strategy provides a framework for the development of specific
individual programs which must be tailored to the needs and particularities of
each country and of different sectors of the population within a country.
Essentially all its recommendations made below are supported by the World
Population Plan of action drafted at the World Population Conference.
population problem which will provide a "technological fix." As the
previous analysis makes clear the problem of population growth has social,
economic and technological aspects all of which must be understood and dealt
with for a world population policy to succeed. With this in mind, the following
broad recommended strategy provides a framework for the development of specific
individual programs which must be tailored to the needs and particularities of
each country and of different sectors of the population within a country.
Essentially all its recommendations made below are supported by the World
Population Plan of action drafted at the World Population Conference.
A. Basic Global
Strategy
Strategy
The following basic elements are necessary
parts of a comprehensive approach to the population problem which must include
both bilateral and multilateral components to achieve success. Thus, USG
population assistance programs will need to be coordinated with those of the
major multilateral institutions, voluntary organizations, and other bilateral
donors.
parts of a comprehensive approach to the population problem which must include
both bilateral and multilateral components to achieve success. Thus, USG
population assistance programs will need to be coordinated with those of the
major multilateral institutions, voluntary organizations, and other bilateral
donors.
The common strategy for dealing with rapid
population growth should encourage constructive actions to lower fertility
since population growth over the years will seriously negate reasonable
prospects for the sound social and economic development of the peoples
involved.
population growth should encourage constructive actions to lower fertility
since population growth over the years will seriously negate reasonable
prospects for the sound social and economic development of the peoples
involved.
While the time horizon in this NSSM is the
year 2000 we must recognize that in most countries, especially the LDCs, population
stability cannot be achieved until the next century. There are too many
powerful socio-economic factors operating on family size decisions and too much
momentum built into the dynamics of population growth to permit a quick and
dramatic reversal of current trends. There is also even less cause for optimism
on the rapidity of socio-economic progress that would generate rapid fertility
reduction in the poor LDCs than on the feasibility of extending family planning
services to those in their populations who may wish to take advantage of them.
Thus, at this point we cannot know with certainty when world population can
feasibly be stabilized, nor can we state with assurance the limits of the
world's ecological "carrying capability". But we can be certain of
the desirable direction of change and can state as a plausible objective the
target of achieving replacement fertility rates by the year 2000.
year 2000 we must recognize that in most countries, especially the LDCs, population
stability cannot be achieved until the next century. There are too many
powerful socio-economic factors operating on family size decisions and too much
momentum built into the dynamics of population growth to permit a quick and
dramatic reversal of current trends. There is also even less cause for optimism
on the rapidity of socio-economic progress that would generate rapid fertility
reduction in the poor LDCs than on the feasibility of extending family planning
services to those in their populations who may wish to take advantage of them.
Thus, at this point we cannot know with certainty when world population can
feasibly be stabilized, nor can we state with assurance the limits of the
world's ecological "carrying capability". But we can be certain of
the desirable direction of change and can state as a plausible objective the
target of achieving replacement fertility rates by the year 2000.
Over the past few years, U.S.
government-funded population programs have played a major role in arousing
interest in family planning in many countries, and in launching and
accelerating the growth of national family planning programs. In most
countries, there has been an initial rapid growth in contraceptive
"acceptors" up to perhaps 10% of fertile couples in a few LDCs. The
acceleration of previous trends of fertility decline is attributable, at least
in part, to family planning programs.
government-funded population programs have played a major role in arousing
interest in family planning in many countries, and in launching and
accelerating the growth of national family planning programs. In most
countries, there has been an initial rapid growth in contraceptive
"acceptors" up to perhaps 10% of fertile couples in a few LDCs. The
acceleration of previous trends of fertility decline is attributable, at least
in part, to family planning programs.
However, there is growing appreciation
that the problem is more long term and complex than first appeared and that a
short term burst of activity or moral fervor will not solve it. The danger in
this realization is that the U.S.
might abandon its commitment to assisting in the world's population problem,
rather than facing up to it for the long-run difficult problem that it is.
that the problem is more long term and complex than first appeared and that a
short term burst of activity or moral fervor will not solve it. The danger in
this realization is that the U.S.
might abandon its commitment to assisting in the world's population problem,
rather than facing up to it for the long-run difficult problem that it is.
From year to year we are learning more
about what kind of fertility reduction is feasible in differing LDC situations.
Given the laws of compound growth, even comparatively small reductions in
fertility over the next decade will make a significant difference in total
numbers by the year 2000, and a far more significant one by the year 2050.
about what kind of fertility reduction is feasible in differing LDC situations.
Given the laws of compound growth, even comparatively small reductions in
fertility over the next decade will make a significant difference in total
numbers by the year 2000, and a far more significant one by the year 2050.
The proposed strategy calls for a
coordinated approach to respond to the important U.S. foreign policy interest in the
influence of population growth on the world's political, economic and
ecological systems. What is unusual about population is that this foreign
policy interest must have a time horizon far beyond that of most other
objectives. While there are strong short-run reasons for population programs,
because of such factors as food supply, pressures on social service budgets,
urban migration and social and political instability, the major impact of the
benefits - or avoidance of catastrophe - that could be accomplished by a
strengthened U.S. commitment in the population area will be felt less by those
of us in the U.S. and other countries today than by our children and
grandchildren.
coordinated approach to respond to the important U.S. foreign policy interest in the
influence of population growth on the world's political, economic and
ecological systems. What is unusual about population is that this foreign
policy interest must have a time horizon far beyond that of most other
objectives. While there are strong short-run reasons for population programs,
because of such factors as food supply, pressures on social service budgets,
urban migration and social and political instability, the major impact of the
benefits - or avoidance of catastrophe - that could be accomplished by a
strengthened U.S. commitment in the population area will be felt less by those
of us in the U.S. and other countries today than by our children and
grandchildren.
B. Ppriorities in U.S. and
Multilateral Population Assistance
Multilateral Population Assistance
One issue in any global population strategy
is the degree of emphasis in allocation of program resources among countries.
The options available range from heavy concentration on a few vital large
countries to a geographically diverse program essentially involving all
countries willing to accept such assistance. All agencies believe the following
policy provides the proper overall balance.
is the degree of emphasis in allocation of program resources among countries.
The options available range from heavy concentration on a few vital large
countries to a geographically diverse program essentially involving all
countries willing to accept such assistance. All agencies believe the following
policy provides the proper overall balance.
In order to assist the development of
major countries and to maximize progress toward population stability, primary
emphasis would be placed on the largest and fastest growing developing
countries where the imbalance between growing numbers and development potential
most seriously risks instability, unrest, and international tensions. These
countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia,
Brazil, The Philippines, Thailand,
Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia,
and Colombia.
Out of a total 73.3 million worldwide average increase in population from
1970-75 these countries contributed 34.3 million or 47%. This group of priority
countries includes some with virtually no government interest in family
planning and others with active government family planning programs which
require and would welcome enlarged technical and financial assistance. These
countries should be given the highest priority within AID's population program
in terms of resource allocations and/or leadership efforts to encourage action
by other donors and organizations.
major countries and to maximize progress toward population stability, primary
emphasis would be placed on the largest and fastest growing developing
countries where the imbalance between growing numbers and development potential
most seriously risks instability, unrest, and international tensions. These
countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia,
Brazil, The Philippines, Thailand,
Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia,
and Colombia.
Out of a total 73.3 million worldwide average increase in population from
1970-75 these countries contributed 34.3 million or 47%. This group of priority
countries includes some with virtually no government interest in family
planning and others with active government family planning programs which
require and would welcome enlarged technical and financial assistance. These
countries should be given the highest priority within AID's population program
in terms of resource allocations and/or leadership efforts to encourage action
by other donors and organizations.
However, other countries would not be
ignored. AID would provide population assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts
with respect to other, lower priority countries to the extent that the
availability of funds and staff permits, taking into account of such factors as
: long run U.S. political interests; impact of rapid population growth on its
development potential; the country's relative contribution to world population
growth; its financial capacity to cope with the problem; potential impact on
domestic unrest and international frictions (which can apply to small as well
as large countries); its significance as a test or demonstration case; and
opportunities for expenditures that appear particularly cost-effective (e.g. it
has been suggested that there may be particularly cost-effective opportunities
for supporting family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and
fertility declines in countries where death rates are still declining rapidly);
national commitment to an effective program.
ignored. AID would provide population assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts
with respect to other, lower priority countries to the extent that the
availability of funds and staff permits, taking into account of such factors as
: long run U.S. political interests; impact of rapid population growth on its
development potential; the country's relative contribution to world population
growth; its financial capacity to cope with the problem; potential impact on
domestic unrest and international frictions (which can apply to small as well
as large countries); its significance as a test or demonstration case; and
opportunities for expenditures that appear particularly cost-effective (e.g. it
has been suggested that there may be particularly cost-effective opportunities
for supporting family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and
fertility declines in countries where death rates are still declining rapidly);
national commitment to an effective program.
For both the high priority countries and
the lower priority ones to which funds and staff permit aid, the form and content
of our assistance or leadership efforts would vary from country to country,
depending on each nation's particular interests, needs, and receptivity to
various forms of assistance. For example, if these countries are receptive to U.S. assistance
through bilateral or central AID funding, we should provide such assistance at
levels commensurate with the recipient's capability to finance needed actions
with its own funds, the contributions of other donors and organizations, and
the effectiveness with which funds can be used.
the lower priority ones to which funds and staff permit aid, the form and content
of our assistance or leadership efforts would vary from country to country,
depending on each nation's particular interests, needs, and receptivity to
various forms of assistance. For example, if these countries are receptive to U.S. assistance
through bilateral or central AID funding, we should provide such assistance at
levels commensurate with the recipient's capability to finance needed actions
with its own funds, the contributions of other donors and organizations, and
the effectiveness with which funds can be used.
In countries where U.S. assistance
is limited either by the nature of political or diplomatic relations with those
countries or by lack of strong government desire. In population reduction
programs, external technical and financial assistance (if desired by the
countries) would have to come from other donors and/or from private and
international organizations, many of which receive contributions from AID. The
USG would, however, maintain an interest (e.g. through Embassies) in such
countries' population problems and programs (if any) to reduce population
growth rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high priority countries, we
should be alert to opportunities for expanding our assistance efforts and for
demonstrating to their leaders the consequences of rapid population growth and
the benefits of actions to reduce fertility.
is limited either by the nature of political or diplomatic relations with those
countries or by lack of strong government desire. In population reduction
programs, external technical and financial assistance (if desired by the
countries) would have to come from other donors and/or from private and
international organizations, many of which receive contributions from AID. The
USG would, however, maintain an interest (e.g. through Embassies) in such
countries' population problems and programs (if any) to reduce population
growth rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high priority countries, we
should be alert to opportunities for expanding our assistance efforts and for
demonstrating to their leaders the consequences of rapid population growth and
the benefits of actions to reduce fertility.
In countries to which other forms of U.S.
assistance are provided but not population assistance, AID will monitor
progress toward achievement of development objectives, taking into account the
extent to which these are hindered by rapid population growth, and will look
for opportunities to encourage initiation of or improvement in population
policies and programs.
assistance are provided but not population assistance, AID will monitor
progress toward achievement of development objectives, taking into account the
extent to which these are hindered by rapid population growth, and will look
for opportunities to encourage initiation of or improvement in population
policies and programs.
In addition, the U.S. strategy should
support in these LDC countries general activities (e.g. bio-medical research or
fertility control methods) capable of achieving major breakthroughs in key
problems which hinder reductions in population growth.
support in these LDC countries general activities (e.g. bio-medical research or
fertility control methods) capable of achieving major breakthroughs in key
problems which hinder reductions in population growth.
C. Instruments and
Modalities for Population Assistance
Modalities for Population Assistance
Bilateral population assistance is the
largest and most invisible "instrument" for carrying out U.S. policy in
this area. Other instruments include: support for and coordination with
population programs of multilateral organizations and voluntary agencies;
encouragement of multilateral country consortia and consultative groups to
emphasize family planning in reviews of overall recipient progress and aid
requests; and formal and informal presentation of views at international gatherings,
such as food and population conferences. Specific country strategies must be
worked out for each of the highest priority countries, and for the lower
priority ones. These strategies will take account of such factors as: national
attitudes and sensitivities on family planning; which "instruments"
will be most acceptable, opportunities for effective use of assistance; and
need of external capital or operating assistance.
largest and most invisible "instrument" for carrying out U.S. policy in
this area. Other instruments include: support for and coordination with
population programs of multilateral organizations and voluntary agencies;
encouragement of multilateral country consortia and consultative groups to
emphasize family planning in reviews of overall recipient progress and aid
requests; and formal and informal presentation of views at international gatherings,
such as food and population conferences. Specific country strategies must be
worked out for each of the highest priority countries, and for the lower
priority ones. These strategies will take account of such factors as: national
attitudes and sensitivities on family planning; which "instruments"
will be most acceptable, opportunities for effective use of assistance; and
need of external capital or operating assistance.
For example, in Mexico our strategy would
focus on working primarily through private agencies and multilateral
organizations to encourage more government attention to the need for control of
population growth; in Bangladesh we might provide large-scale technical and
financial assistance, depending on the soundness of specific program requests;
in Indonesia we would respond to assistance requests but would seek to have
Indonesia meet as much of program costs from its own resources (i.e. surplus
oil earnings) as possible. In general we would not provide large-scale
bilateral assistance in the more developed LDCs, such as Brazil or Mexico. Although these countries
are in the top priority list our approach must take account of the fact that
their problems relate often to government policies and decisions and not to
larger scale need for concessional assistance.
focus on working primarily through private agencies and multilateral
organizations to encourage more government attention to the need for control of
population growth; in Bangladesh we might provide large-scale technical and
financial assistance, depending on the soundness of specific program requests;
in Indonesia we would respond to assistance requests but would seek to have
Indonesia meet as much of program costs from its own resources (i.e. surplus
oil earnings) as possible. In general we would not provide large-scale
bilateral assistance in the more developed LDCs, such as Brazil or Mexico. Although these countries
are in the top priority list our approach must take account of the fact that
their problems relate often to government policies and decisions and not to
larger scale need for concessional assistance.
Within the overall array of U.S. foreign
assistance programs, preferential treatment in allocation of funds and manpower
should be given to cost-effective programs to reduce population growth;
including both family planning activities and supportive activities in other
sectors.
assistance programs, preferential treatment in allocation of funds and manpower
should be given to cost-effective programs to reduce population growth;
including both family planning activities and supportive activities in other
sectors.
While some have argued for use of explicit
"leverage" to "force" better population programs on LDC
governments, there are several practical constraints on our efforts to achieve
program improvements. Attempts to use "leverage" for far less
sensitive issues have generally caused political frictions and often backfired.
Successful family planning requires strong local dedication and commitment that
cannot over the long run be enforced from the outside. There is also the danger
that some LDC leaders will see developed country pressures for family planning
as a form of economic or racial imperialism; this could well create a serious
backlash.
"leverage" to "force" better population programs on LDC
governments, there are several practical constraints on our efforts to achieve
program improvements. Attempts to use "leverage" for far less
sensitive issues have generally caused political frictions and often backfired.
Successful family planning requires strong local dedication and commitment that
cannot over the long run be enforced from the outside. There is also the danger
that some LDC leaders will see developed country pressures for family planning
as a form of economic or racial imperialism; this could well create a serious
backlash.
Short of "leverage", there are
many opportunities, bilaterally and multilaterally, for U.S.
representations to discuss and urge the need for stronger family planning
programs. There is also some established precedent for taking account of family
planning performance in appraisal of assistance requirements by AID and
consultative groups. Since population growth is a major determinant of
increases in food demand, allocation of scarce PL 480 resources should take
account of what steps a country is taking in population control as well as food
production. In these sensitive relationships, however, it is important in style
as well as substance to avoid the appearance of coercion.
many opportunities, bilaterally and multilaterally, for U.S.
representations to discuss and urge the need for stronger family planning
programs. There is also some established precedent for taking account of family
planning performance in appraisal of assistance requirements by AID and
consultative groups. Since population growth is a major determinant of
increases in food demand, allocation of scarce PL 480 resources should take
account of what steps a country is taking in population control as well as food
production. In these sensitive relationships, however, it is important in style
as well as substance to avoid the appearance of coercion.
D. Provision and
Development of Family Planning Services, Information and Technology
Development of Family Planning Services, Information and Technology
Past experience suggests that easily
available family planning services are a vital and effective element in
reducing fertility rates in the LDCs.
available family planning services are a vital and effective element in
reducing fertility rates in the LDCs.
Two main advances are required for
providing safe and effective fertility control techniques in the developing
countries:
providing safe and effective fertility control techniques in the developing
countries:
1. Expansion and further development of
efficient low-cost systems to assure the full availability of existing family
planning services, materials and information to the 85% of LDC populations not
now effectively reached. In developing countries willing to create special
delivery systems for family planning services this may be the most effective
method. In others the most efficient and acceptable method is to combine family
planning with health or nutrition in multi-purpose delivery systems.
efficient low-cost systems to assure the full availability of existing family
planning services, materials and information to the 85% of LDC populations not
now effectively reached. In developing countries willing to create special
delivery systems for family planning services this may be the most effective
method. In others the most efficient and acceptable method is to combine family
planning with health or nutrition in multi-purpose delivery systems.
2. Improving the effectiveness of present
means of fertility control, and developing new technologies which are simple,
low cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable to potential users. This
involves both basic developmental research and operations research to judge the
utility of new or modified approaches under LDC conditions.
means of fertility control, and developing new technologies which are simple,
low cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable to potential users. This
involves both basic developmental research and operations research to judge the
utility of new or modified approaches under LDC conditions.
Both of these goals should be given very
high priority with necessary additional funding consistent with current or
adjusted divisions of labor among other donors and organizations involved in
these areas of population assistance.
high priority with necessary additional funding consistent with current or
adjusted divisions of labor among other donors and organizations involved in
these areas of population assistance.
E. Creating
Conditions Conducive to Fertility Decline
Conditions Conducive to Fertility Decline
It is clear that the availability of
contraceptive services and information is not a complete answer to the
population problem. In view of the importance of socio-economic factors in
determining desired family size, overall assistance strategy should
increasingly concentrate on selective policies which will contribute to
population decline as well as other goals. This strategy reflects the
complementarity between population control and other U.S. development objectives,
particularly those relating to AID's Congressional mandate to focus on problems
of the "poor majority" in LDC's.
contraceptive services and information is not a complete answer to the
population problem. In view of the importance of socio-economic factors in
determining desired family size, overall assistance strategy should
increasingly concentrate on selective policies which will contribute to
population decline as well as other goals. This strategy reflects the
complementarity between population control and other U.S. development objectives,
particularly those relating to AID's Congressional mandate to focus on problems
of the "poor majority" in LDC's.
We know that certain kinds of development
policies -- e.g., those which provide the poor with a major share in
development benefits -- both promote fertility reductions and accomplish other
major development objectives. There are other policies which appear to also
promote fertility reduction but which may conflict with non-population objectives
(e.g., consider the effect of bringing a large number of women into the labor
force in countries and occupations where unemployment is already high and
rising).
policies -- e.g., those which provide the poor with a major share in
development benefits -- both promote fertility reductions and accomplish other
major development objectives. There are other policies which appear to also
promote fertility reduction but which may conflict with non-population objectives
(e.g., consider the effect of bringing a large number of women into the labor
force in countries and occupations where unemployment is already high and
rising).
However, AID knows only approximately the
relative priorities among the factors that affect fertility and is even further
away from knowing what specific cost-effective steps governments can take to
affect these factors.
relative priorities among the factors that affect fertility and is even further
away from knowing what specific cost-effective steps governments can take to
affect these factors.
Nevertheless, with what limited
information we have, the urgency of moving forward toward lower fertility rates,
even without complete knowledge of the socio-economic forces involved, suggests
a three-pronged strategy:
information we have, the urgency of moving forward toward lower fertility rates,
even without complete knowledge of the socio-economic forces involved, suggests
a three-pronged strategy:
1. High priority to large-scale
implementation of programs affecting the determinants of fertility in those
cases where there is probable cost-effectiveness, taking account of potential
impact on population growth rates; other development benefits to be gained;
ethical considerations; feasibility in light of LDC bureaucratic and political
concerns and problems; and timeframe for accomplishing objectives.
implementation of programs affecting the determinants of fertility in those
cases where there is probable cost-effectiveness, taking account of potential
impact on population growth rates; other development benefits to be gained;
ethical considerations; feasibility in light of LDC bureaucratic and political
concerns and problems; and timeframe for accomplishing objectives.
2. High priority to experimentation and
pilot projects in areas where there is evidence of a close relationship to
fertility reduction but where there are serious questions about
cost-effectiveness relating either to other development impact (e.g., the
female employment example cited above) or to program design (e.g., what
cost-effective steps can be taken to promote female employment or literacy).
pilot projects in areas where there is evidence of a close relationship to
fertility reduction but where there are serious questions about
cost-effectiveness relating either to other development impact (e.g., the
female employment example cited above) or to program design (e.g., what
cost-effective steps can be taken to promote female employment or literacy).
3. High priority to comparative research
and evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size of the
socio-economic determinants of fertility in general and on what policy scope
exists for affecting these determinants.
and evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size of the
socio-economic determinants of fertility in general and on what policy scope
exists for affecting these determinants.
In all three cases emphasis should be
given to moving action as much as possible to LDC institutions and individuals
rather than to involving U.S. researchers on a large scale.
given to moving action as much as possible to LDC institutions and individuals
rather than to involving U.S. researchers on a large scale.
Activities in all three categories would
receive very high priority in allocation of AID funds. The largest amounts
required should be in the first category and would generally not come from
population funds. However, since such activities (e.g., in rural development
and basic education) coincide with other AID sectoral priorities, sound project
requests from LDC's will be placed close to the top in AID's funding priorities
(assuming that they do not conflict with other major development and other
foreign policy objectives).
receive very high priority in allocation of AID funds. The largest amounts
required should be in the first category and would generally not come from
population funds. However, since such activities (e.g., in rural development
and basic education) coincide with other AID sectoral priorities, sound project
requests from LDC's will be placed close to the top in AID's funding priorities
(assuming that they do not conflict with other major development and other
foreign policy objectives).
The following areas appear to contain
significant promise in effecting fertility declines, and are discussed in
subsequent sections.
significant promise in effecting fertility declines, and are discussed in
subsequent sections.
providing minimal
levels of education especially for women;
levels of education especially for women;
reducing infant and
child mortality;
child mortality;
expanding
opportunities for wage employment especially for women;
opportunities for wage employment especially for women;
developing
alternatives to "social security" support provided by children to
aging parents;
alternatives to "social security" support provided by children to
aging parents;
pursuing
development strategies that skew income growth toward the poor, especially
rural development focusing on rural poverty;
development strategies that skew income growth toward the poor, especially
rural development focusing on rural poverty;
concentrating on
the education and indoctrination of the rising generation of children regarding
the desirability of smaller family size.
the education and indoctrination of the rising generation of children regarding
the desirability of smaller family size.
The World Population Plan of Action
includes a provision (paragraph 31) that countries trying for effective
fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and
education strategies which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including
fertility. It calls for international information to give priority to assisting
such national efforts. Programs suggested (paragraph 32) are essentially the
same as those listed above.
includes a provision (paragraph 31) that countries trying for effective
fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and
education strategies which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including
fertility. It calls for international information to give priority to assisting
such national efforts. Programs suggested (paragraph 32) are essentially the
same as those listed above.
Food is another of special concern in any
population strategy. Adequate food stocks need to be created to provide for
periods of severe shortages and LDC food production efforts must be reenforced
to meet increased demand resulting from population and income growth. U.S.
agricultural production goals should take account of the normal import
requirements of LDC's (as well as developed countries) and of likely occasional
crop failures in major parts of the LDC world. Without improved food security,
there will be pressure leading to possible conflict and the desire for large
families for "insurance" purposes, thus undermining other development
and population control efforts.
population strategy. Adequate food stocks need to be created to provide for
periods of severe shortages and LDC food production efforts must be reenforced
to meet increased demand resulting from population and income growth. U.S.
agricultural production goals should take account of the normal import
requirements of LDC's (as well as developed countries) and of likely occasional
crop failures in major parts of the LDC world. Without improved food security,
there will be pressure leading to possible conflict and the desire for large
families for "insurance" purposes, thus undermining other development
and population control efforts.
F. Development of
World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment to Population Stabilization and Its
Associated Improvement of Individual Quality of Life.
World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment to Population Stabilization and Its
Associated Improvement of Individual Quality of Life.
A fundamental element in any overall
strategy to deal with the population problem is obtaining the support and
commitment of key leaders in the developing countries. This is only possible if
they can clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted population growth in
their countries and the benefits of reducing birth rates - and if they believe
it is possible to cope with the population problem through instruments of
public policy. Since most high officials are in office for relatively short periods,
they have to see early benefits or the value of longer term statesmanship. In
each specific case, individual leaders will have to approach their population
problems within the context of their country's values, resources, and existing
priorities.
strategy to deal with the population problem is obtaining the support and
commitment of key leaders in the developing countries. This is only possible if
they can clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted population growth in
their countries and the benefits of reducing birth rates - and if they believe
it is possible to cope with the population problem through instruments of
public policy. Since most high officials are in office for relatively short periods,
they have to see early benefits or the value of longer term statesmanship. In
each specific case, individual leaders will have to approach their population
problems within the context of their country's values, resources, and existing
priorities.
Therefore, it is vital that leaders of
major LDCs themselves take the lead in advancing family planning and population
stabilization, not only within the U.N. and other international organizations
but also through bilateral contacts with leaders of other LDCs. Reducing
population growth in LDCs should not be advocated exclusively by the developed
countries. The U.S.
should encourage such a role as opportunities appear in its high level contact
with LDC leaders.
major LDCs themselves take the lead in advancing family planning and population
stabilization, not only within the U.N. and other international organizations
but also through bilateral contacts with leaders of other LDCs. Reducing
population growth in LDCs should not be advocated exclusively by the developed
countries. The U.S.
should encourage such a role as opportunities appear in its high level contact
with LDC leaders.
The most recent forum for such an effort
was the August 1974 U.N. World Population Conference. It was an ideal context
to focus concerted world attention on the problem. The debate views and
highlights of the World Population Plan of action are reviewed in Chapter VI.
was the August 1974 U.N. World Population Conference. It was an ideal context
to focus concerted world attention on the problem. The debate views and
highlights of the World Population Plan of action are reviewed in Chapter VI.
The U.S. strengthened its credibility as
an advocate of lower population growth rates by explaining that, while it did
not have a single written action population policy, it did have legislation,
Executive Branch policies and court decisions that amounted to a national policy
and that our national fertility level was already below replacement and seemed
likely to attain a stable population by 2000.
an advocate of lower population growth rates by explaining that, while it did
not have a single written action population policy, it did have legislation,
Executive Branch policies and court decisions that amounted to a national policy
and that our national fertility level was already below replacement and seemed
likely to attain a stable population by 2000.
The U.S. also proposed to join with
other developed countries in an international collaborative effort of research
in human reproduction and fertility control covering bio-medical and
socio-economic factors.
other developed countries in an international collaborative effort of research
in human reproduction and fertility control covering bio-medical and
socio-economic factors.
The U.S. further offered to collaborate
with other interested donor countries and organizations (e.g., WHO, UNFPA,
World Bank, UNICEF) to encourage further action by LDC governments and other
institutions to provide low-cost, basic preventive health services, including
maternal and child health and family planning services, reaching out into the
remote rural areas.
with other interested donor countries and organizations (e.g., WHO, UNFPA,
World Bank, UNICEF) to encourage further action by LDC governments and other
institutions to provide low-cost, basic preventive health services, including
maternal and child health and family planning services, reaching out into the
remote rural areas.
The U.S.
delegation also said the U.S.
would request from the Congress increased U.S. bilateral assistance to
population-family planning programs, and additional amounts for essential
functional activities and our contribution to the UNFPA if countries showed an
interest in such assistance.
delegation also said the U.S.
would request from the Congress increased U.S. bilateral assistance to
population-family planning programs, and additional amounts for essential
functional activities and our contribution to the UNFPA if countries showed an
interest in such assistance.
Each of these commitments is important and
should be pursued by the U.S.
Government.
should be pursued by the U.S.
Government.
It is vital that the effort to develop and
strengthen a commitment on the part of the LDC leaders not be seen by them as
an industrialized country policy to keep their strength down or to reserve
resources for use by the "rich" countries. Development of such a
perception could create a serious backlash adverse to the cause of population
stability. Thus the U.S.
and other "rich" countries should take care that policies they
advocate for the LDC's would be acceptable within their own countries. (This
may require public debate and affirmation of our intended policies.) The
"political" leadership role in developing countries should, of
course, be taken whenever possible by their own leaders.
strengthen a commitment on the part of the LDC leaders not be seen by them as
an industrialized country policy to keep their strength down or to reserve
resources for use by the "rich" countries. Development of such a
perception could create a serious backlash adverse to the cause of population
stability. Thus the U.S.
and other "rich" countries should take care that policies they
advocate for the LDC's would be acceptable within their own countries. (This
may require public debate and affirmation of our intended policies.) The
"political" leadership role in developing countries should, of
course, be taken whenever possible by their own leaders.
The U.S. can help to minimize charges
of an imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by
repeatedly asserting that such support derives from a concern with:
of an imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by
repeatedly asserting that such support derives from a concern with:
(a) the right of
the individual couple to determine freely and responsibly their number and
spacing of children and to have information, education, and 1means to do so;
and
the individual couple to determine freely and responsibly their number and
spacing of children and to have information, education, and 1means to do so;
and
(b) the fundamental
social and economic development of poor countries in which rapid population
growth is both a contributing cause and a consequence of widespread poverty.
social and economic development of poor countries in which rapid population
growth is both a contributing cause and a consequence of widespread poverty.
Furthermore, the U.S. should
also take steps to convey the message that the control of world population
growth is in the mutual interest of the developed and developing countries
alike.
also take steps to convey the message that the control of world population
growth is in the mutual interest of the developed and developing countries
alike.
Family planning programs should be
supported by multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the most
efficient and acceptable means. Where U.S. bilateral assistance is
necessary or preferred, it should be provided in collaboration with host
country institutions -- as is the case now. Credit should go to local leaders
for the success of projects. The success and acceptability of family planning
assistance will depend in large measure on the degree to which it contributes
to the ability of the host government to serve and obtain the support of its
people.
supported by multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the most
efficient and acceptable means. Where U.S. bilateral assistance is
necessary or preferred, it should be provided in collaboration with host
country institutions -- as is the case now. Credit should go to local leaders
for the success of projects. The success and acceptability of family planning
assistance will depend in large measure on the degree to which it contributes
to the ability of the host government to serve and obtain the support of its
people.
In many countries today, decision-makers
are wary of instituting population programs, not because they are unconcerned
about rapid population growth, but because they lack confidence that such
programs will succeed. By actively working to demonstrate to such leaders that
national population and family planning programs have achieved progress in a
wide variety of poor countries, the U.S. could help persuade the leaders of
many countries that the investment of funds in national family planning
programs is likely to yield high returns even in the short and medium term.
Several examples of success exist already, although regrettably they tend to
come from LDCs that are untypically well off in terms of income growth and/or
social services or are islands or city states.
are wary of instituting population programs, not because they are unconcerned
about rapid population growth, but because they lack confidence that such
programs will succeed. By actively working to demonstrate to such leaders that
national population and family planning programs have achieved progress in a
wide variety of poor countries, the U.S. could help persuade the leaders of
many countries that the investment of funds in national family planning
programs is likely to yield high returns even in the short and medium term.
Several examples of success exist already, although regrettably they tend to
come from LDCs that are untypically well off in terms of income growth and/or
social services or are islands or city states.
We should also appeal to potential leaders
among the younger generations in developing countries, focusing on the
implications of continued rapid population growth for their countries in the
next 10-20 years, when they may assume national leadership roles.
among the younger generations in developing countries, focusing on the
implications of continued rapid population growth for their countries in the
next 10-20 years, when they may assume national leadership roles.
Beyond seeking to reach and influence
national leaders, improved world-wide support for population-related efforts
should be sought through increased emphasis on mass media and other population
education and motivation programs by the U.N., USIA, and USAID. We should give
higher priorities in our information programs world-wide for this area and
consider expansion of collaborative arrangements with multilateral institutions
in population education programs.
national leaders, improved world-wide support for population-related efforts
should be sought through increased emphasis on mass media and other population
education and motivation programs by the U.N., USIA, and USAID. We should give
higher priorities in our information programs world-wide for this area and
consider expansion of collaborative arrangements with multilateral institutions
in population education programs.
Another challenge will be in obtaining the
further understanding and support of the U.S. public and Congress for the
necessary added funds for such an effort, given the competing demands for
resources. If an effective program is to be mounted by the U.S., we will
need to contribute significant new amounts of funds. Thus there is need to
reinforce the positive attitudes of those in Congress who presently support U.S. activity
in the population field and to enlist their support in persuading others.
Public debate is needed now.
further understanding and support of the U.S. public and Congress for the
necessary added funds for such an effort, given the competing demands for
resources. If an effective program is to be mounted by the U.S., we will
need to contribute significant new amounts of funds. Thus there is need to
reinforce the positive attitudes of those in Congress who presently support U.S. activity
in the population field and to enlist their support in persuading others.
Public debate is needed now.
Personal approaches by the President, the
Secretary of State, other members of the Cabinet, and their principal deputies
would be helpful in this effort. Congress and the public must be clearly
informed that the Executive Branch is seriously worried about the problem and
that it deserves their further attention. Congressional representatives at the
World Population Conference can help.
Secretary of State, other members of the Cabinet, and their principal deputies
would be helpful in this effort. Congress and the public must be clearly
informed that the Executive Branch is seriously worried about the problem and
that it deserves their further attention. Congressional representatives at the
World Population Conference can help.
An Alternative View
The above basic strategy assumes that the
current forms of assistance programs in both population and economic and social
development areas will be able to solve the problem. There is however, another
view, which is shared by a growing number of experts. It believes that the
outlook is much harsher and far less tractable than commonly perceived. This
holds that the severity of the population problem in this century which is
already claiming the lives of more than 10 million people yearly, is such as to
make likely continued widespread food shortage and other demographic
catastrophes, and, in the words of C.P. Snow, we shall be watching people
starve on television.
current forms of assistance programs in both population and economic and social
development areas will be able to solve the problem. There is however, another
view, which is shared by a growing number of experts. It believes that the
outlook is much harsher and far less tractable than commonly perceived. This
holds that the severity of the population problem in this century which is
already claiming the lives of more than 10 million people yearly, is such as to
make likely continued widespread food shortage and other demographic
catastrophes, and, in the words of C.P. Snow, we shall be watching people
starve on television.
The conclusion of this view is that
mandatory programs may be needed and that we should be considering these
possibilities now.
mandatory programs may be needed and that we should be considering these
possibilities now.
This school of thought believes the
following types of questions need to be addressed:
following types of questions need to be addressed:
Should the U.S. make an
all out commitment to major limitation of world population with all the
financial and international as well as domestic political costs that would
entail?
all out commitment to major limitation of world population with all the
financial and international as well as domestic political costs that would
entail?
Should the U.S. set even
higher agricultural production goals which would enable it to provide
additional major food resources to other countries? Should they be nationally
or internationally controlled?
higher agricultural production goals which would enable it to provide
additional major food resources to other countries? Should they be nationally
or internationally controlled?
On what basis
should such food resources then be provided? Would food be considered an
instrument of national power? Will we be forced to make choices as to whom we
can reasonably assist, and if so, should population efforts be a criterion for
such assistance?
should such food resources then be provided? Would food be considered an
instrument of national power? Will we be forced to make choices as to whom we
can reasonably assist, and if so, should population efforts be a criterion for
such assistance?
Is the U.S. prepared
to accept food rationing to help people who can't/won't control their
population growth?
to accept food rationing to help people who can't/won't control their
population growth?
Should the U.S. seek to
change its own food consumption patterns toward more efficient uses of protein?
change its own food consumption patterns toward more efficient uses of protein?
Are mandatory
population control measures appropriate for the U.S. and/or for others?
population control measures appropriate for the U.S. and/or for others?
Should the U.S. initiate a
major research effort to address the growing problems of fresh water supply,
ecological damage, and adverse climate?
major research effort to address the growing problems of fresh water supply,
ecological damage, and adverse climate?
While definitive answers to those
questions are not possible in this study given its time limitations and its
implications for domestic policy, nevertheless they are needed if one accepts
the drastic and persistent character of the population growth problem. Should
the choice be made that the recommendations and the options given below are not
adequate to meet this problem, consideration should be given to a further study
and additional action in this field as outlined above.
questions are not possible in this study given its time limitations and its
implications for domestic policy, nevertheless they are needed if one accepts
the drastic and persistent character of the population growth problem. Should
the choice be made that the recommendations and the options given below are not
adequate to meet this problem, consideration should be given to a further study
and additional action in this field as outlined above.
Conclusion
The overall strategy above provides a
general approach through which the difficulties and dangers of population
growth and related problems can be approached in a balanced and comprehensive
basis. No single effort will do the job. Only a concerted and major effort in a
number of carefully selected directions can provide the hope of success in
reducing population growth and its unwanted dangers to world economic
will-being and political stability. There are no "quick-fixes" in
this field.
general approach through which the difficulties and dangers of population
growth and related problems can be approached in a balanced and comprehensive
basis. No single effort will do the job. Only a concerted and major effort in a
number of carefully selected directions can provide the hope of success in
reducing population growth and its unwanted dangers to world economic
will-being and political stability. There are no "quick-fixes" in
this field.
Below are specific program recommendations
which are designed to implement this strategy. Some will require few new
resources; many call for major efforts and significant new resources. We cannot
simply buy population growth moderation for nearly 4 billion people "on
the cheap."
which are designed to implement this strategy. Some will require few new
resources; many call for major efforts and significant new resources. We cannot
simply buy population growth moderation for nearly 4 billion people "on
the cheap."
II. Action to
Create Conditions for Fertility Decline: Population and a Development
Assistance Strategy
Create Conditions for Fertility Decline: Population and a Development
Assistance Strategy
II. A. General
Strategy and Resource Allocations for AID Assistance
Strategy and Resource Allocations for AID Assistance
Discussion:
1. Past Program
Actions
Actions
Since inception of the program in 1965,
AID has obligated nearly $625 million for population activities. These funds
have been used primarily to (1) draw attention to the population problem, (2)
encourage multilateral and other donor support for the worldwide population
effort, and (3) help create and maintain the means for attacking the problem,
including the development of LDC capabilities to do so.
AID has obligated nearly $625 million for population activities. These funds
have been used primarily to (1) draw attention to the population problem, (2)
encourage multilateral and other donor support for the worldwide population
effort, and (3) help create and maintain the means for attacking the problem,
including the development of LDC capabilities to do so.
In pursuing these objectives, AID's
population resources were focussed on areas of need where action was feasible
and likely to be effective. AID has provided assistance to population programs
in some 70 LDCs, on a bilateral basis and/or indirectly through private
organizations and other channels. AID currently provides bilateral assistance
to 36 of these countries. State and AID played an important role in
establishing the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to
spearhead multilateral effort in population as a complement to the bilateral
actions of AID and other donor countries. Since the Fund's establishment, AID
has been the largest single contributor. Moreover, with assistance from AID a
number of private family planning organizations (e.g., Pathfinder Fund,
International Planned Parenthood Foundation, Population Council) have
significantly expanded their worldwide population programs. Such organizations
are still the main supporters of family planning action in many developing countries.
population resources were focussed on areas of need where action was feasible
and likely to be effective. AID has provided assistance to population programs
in some 70 LDCs, on a bilateral basis and/or indirectly through private
organizations and other channels. AID currently provides bilateral assistance
to 36 of these countries. State and AID played an important role in
establishing the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to
spearhead multilateral effort in population as a complement to the bilateral
actions of AID and other donor countries. Since the Fund's establishment, AID
has been the largest single contributor. Moreover, with assistance from AID a
number of private family planning organizations (e.g., Pathfinder Fund,
International Planned Parenthood Foundation, Population Council) have
significantly expanded their worldwide population programs. Such organizations
are still the main supporters of family planning action in many developing countries.
AID actions have been a major catalyst in
stimulating the flow of funds into LDC population programs - from almost
nothing ten years ago, the amounts being spent from all sources in 1974 for
programs in the developing countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia
(excluding China) will total between $400 and $500 million. About half of this
will be contributed by the developed countries bilaterally or through
multilateral agencies, and the balance will come from the budgets of the
developing countries themselves. AID's contribution is about one-quarter of the
total - AID obligated $112.4 million for population programs in FY 1974 and
plans for FY 1975 program of $137.5 million.
stimulating the flow of funds into LDC population programs - from almost
nothing ten years ago, the amounts being spent from all sources in 1974 for
programs in the developing countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia
(excluding China) will total between $400 and $500 million. About half of this
will be contributed by the developed countries bilaterally or through
multilateral agencies, and the balance will come from the budgets of the
developing countries themselves. AID's contribution is about one-quarter of the
total - AID obligated $112.4 million for population programs in FY 1974 and
plans for FY 1975 program of $137.5 million.
While world resources for population
activities will continue to grow, they are unlikely to expand as rapidly as
needed. (One rough estimate is that five times the current amount, or about
$2.5 billion in constant dollars, will be required annually by 1985 to provide
the 2.5 billion people in the developing world, excluding China, with
full-scale family planning programs). In view of these limited resources AID's
efforts (in both fiscal and manpower terms) and through its leadership the
efforts of others, must be focussed to the extent possible on high priority
needs in countries where the population problem is the most acute. Accordingly,
AID last year began a process of developing geographic and functional program
priorities for use in allocating funds and staff, and in arranging and
adjusting divisions of labor with other donors and organizations active in the
worldwide population effort. Although this study has not yet been completed, a
general outline of a U.S.
population assistance strategy can be developed from the results of the
priorities studied to date. The geographic and functional parameters of the
strategy are discussed under 2. and 3. below. The implications for population
resource allocations are presented under 4.
activities will continue to grow, they are unlikely to expand as rapidly as
needed. (One rough estimate is that five times the current amount, or about
$2.5 billion in constant dollars, will be required annually by 1985 to provide
the 2.5 billion people in the developing world, excluding China, with
full-scale family planning programs). In view of these limited resources AID's
efforts (in both fiscal and manpower terms) and through its leadership the
efforts of others, must be focussed to the extent possible on high priority
needs in countries where the population problem is the most acute. Accordingly,
AID last year began a process of developing geographic and functional program
priorities for use in allocating funds and staff, and in arranging and
adjusting divisions of labor with other donors and organizations active in the
worldwide population effort. Although this study has not yet been completed, a
general outline of a U.S.
population assistance strategy can be developed from the results of the
priorities studied to date. The geographic and functional parameters of the
strategy are discussed under 2. and 3. below. The implications for population
resource allocations are presented under 4.
2. Geographic
Priorities in U.S.
Population Assistance
Priorities in U.S.
Population Assistance
The U.S. strategy should be to
encourage and support, through bilateral, multilateral and other channels,
constructive actions to lower fertility rates in selected developing countries.
Within this overall strategy and in view of funding and manpower limitations,
the U.S.
should emphasize assistance to those countries where the population problem is
the most serious.
encourage and support, through bilateral, multilateral and other channels,
constructive actions to lower fertility rates in selected developing countries.
Within this overall strategy and in view of funding and manpower limitations,
the U.S.
should emphasize assistance to those countries where the population problem is
the most serious.
There are three major factors to consider
in judging the seriousness of the problem:
in judging the seriousness of the problem:
The first is the
country's contribution to the world's population problem, which is determined
by the size of its population, its population growth rate, and its progress in
the "demographic transition" from high birth and high death rates to
low ones.
country's contribution to the world's population problem, which is determined
by the size of its population, its population growth rate, and its progress in
the "demographic transition" from high birth and high death rates to
low ones.
The second is the
extent to which population growth impinges on the country's economic
development and its financial capacity to cope with its population problem.
extent to which population growth impinges on the country's economic
development and its financial capacity to cope with its population problem.
The third factor is
the extent to which an imbalance between growing numbers of people and a
country's capability to handle the problem could lead to serious instability,
international tensions, or conflicts. Although many countries may experience
adverse consequences from such imbalances, the troublemaking regional or
international conditions might not be as serious in some places as they are in
others.
the extent to which an imbalance between growing numbers of people and a
country's capability to handle the problem could lead to serious instability,
international tensions, or conflicts. Although many countries may experience
adverse consequences from such imbalances, the troublemaking regional or
international conditions might not be as serious in some places as they are in
others.
Based on the first two criteria, AID has
developed a preliminary rank ordering of nearly 100 developing countries which,
after review and refinement, will be used as a guide in AID's own funding and
manpower resource allocations and in encouraging action through AID leadership
efforts on the part of other population assistance instrumentalities. Applying
these three criteria to this rank ordering, there are 13 countries where we
currently judge the problem and risks to be the most serious. They are: Bangladesh, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil,
Mexico, and Colombia. Out
of a total 67 million worldwide increase in population in 1972 these countries
contributed about 45%. These countries range from those with virtually no
government interest in family planning to those with active government family
planning programs which require and would welcome enlarged technical and
financial assistance.
developed a preliminary rank ordering of nearly 100 developing countries which,
after review and refinement, will be used as a guide in AID's own funding and
manpower resource allocations and in encouraging action through AID leadership
efforts on the part of other population assistance instrumentalities. Applying
these three criteria to this rank ordering, there are 13 countries where we
currently judge the problem and risks to be the most serious. They are: Bangladesh, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil,
Mexico, and Colombia. Out
of a total 67 million worldwide increase in population in 1972 these countries
contributed about 45%. These countries range from those with virtually no
government interest in family planning to those with active government family
planning programs which require and would welcome enlarged technical and
financial assistance.
These countries should be given the
highest priority within AID's population program in terms of resource
allocations and/or leadership efforts to encourage action by other donors and
organizations. The form and content of our assistance or leadership efforts
would vary from country-to-country (as discussed in 3. below), depending on
each country's needs, its receptivity to various forms of assistance, its
capability to finance needed actions, the effectiveness with which funds can be
used, and current or adjusted divisions of labor among the other donors and
organizations providing population assistance to the country. AID's population
actions would also need to be consistent with the overall U.S.
development policy toward each country.
highest priority within AID's population program in terms of resource
allocations and/or leadership efforts to encourage action by other donors and
organizations. The form and content of our assistance or leadership efforts
would vary from country-to-country (as discussed in 3. below), depending on
each country's needs, its receptivity to various forms of assistance, its
capability to finance needed actions, the effectiveness with which funds can be
used, and current or adjusted divisions of labor among the other donors and
organizations providing population assistance to the country. AID's population
actions would also need to be consistent with the overall U.S.
development policy toward each country.
While the countries cited above would be
given highest priority, other countries would not be ignored. AID would provide
population assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts with respect to other
countries to the extent that the availability of funds and staff permits,
taking account of such factors as: a country's placement in AID's priority
listing of LDCs; its potential impact on domestic unrest and international
frictions (which can apply to small as well as large countries); its
significance as a test or demonstration case; and opportunities for
expenditures that appear particularly cost-effective (e.g. its has been
suggested that there may be particularly cost-effective opportunities for
supporting family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility
declines in countries where death rates are still declining rapidly).
given highest priority, other countries would not be ignored. AID would provide
population assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts with respect to other
countries to the extent that the availability of funds and staff permits,
taking account of such factors as: a country's placement in AID's priority
listing of LDCs; its potential impact on domestic unrest and international
frictions (which can apply to small as well as large countries); its
significance as a test or demonstration case; and opportunities for
expenditures that appear particularly cost-effective (e.g. its has been
suggested that there may be particularly cost-effective opportunities for
supporting family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility
declines in countries where death rates are still declining rapidly).
3. Mode and Content
of U.S.
Population Assistance
of U.S.
Population Assistance
In moving from geographic emphases to
strategies for the mode and functional content of population assistance to both
the higher and lower priority countries which are to be assisted, various
factors need to be considered: (1) the extent of a country's understanding of
its population problem and interest in responding to it; (2) the specific
actions needed to cope with the problem; (3) the country's need for external
financial assistance to deal with the problem; and (4) its receptivity to
various forms of assistance.
strategies for the mode and functional content of population assistance to both
the higher and lower priority countries which are to be assisted, various
factors need to be considered: (1) the extent of a country's understanding of
its population problem and interest in responding to it; (2) the specific
actions needed to cope with the problem; (3) the country's need for external
financial assistance to deal with the problem; and (4) its receptivity to
various forms of assistance.
Some of the countries in the high priority
group cited above (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand)
and some lower priority countries have recognized that rapid population growth
is a problem, are taking actions of their own to deal with it, and are
receptive to assistance from the U.S. (through bilateral or central AID
funding) and other donors, as well as to multilateral support for their
efforts. In these cases AID should continue to provide such assistance based on
each country's functional needs, the effectiveness with which funds can be used
in these areas, and current or adjusted divisions of labor among other donors
and organizations providing assistance to the country. Furthermore, our
assistance strategies for these countries should consider their capabilities to
finance needed population actions. Countries which have relatively large
surpluses of export earning and foreign exchange reserves are unlikely to
require large-scale external financial assistance and should be encouraged to
finance their own commodity imports as well as local costs. In such cases our
strategy should be to concentrate on needed technical assistance and on
attempting to play a catalytic role in encouraging better programs and
additional host country financing for dealing with the population problem.
group cited above (e.g. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand)
and some lower priority countries have recognized that rapid population growth
is a problem, are taking actions of their own to deal with it, and are
receptive to assistance from the U.S. (through bilateral or central AID
funding) and other donors, as well as to multilateral support for their
efforts. In these cases AID should continue to provide such assistance based on
each country's functional needs, the effectiveness with which funds can be used
in these areas, and current or adjusted divisions of labor among other donors
and organizations providing assistance to the country. Furthermore, our
assistance strategies for these countries should consider their capabilities to
finance needed population actions. Countries which have relatively large
surpluses of export earning and foreign exchange reserves are unlikely to
require large-scale external financial assistance and should be encouraged to
finance their own commodity imports as well as local costs. In such cases our
strategy should be to concentrate on needed technical assistance and on
attempting to play a catalytic role in encouraging better programs and
additional host country financing for dealing with the population problem.
In other high and lower priority countries
U.S. assistance is limited either by the nature of political or diplomatic
relations with those countries (e.g. India, Egypt), or by the lack of strong
government interest in population reduction programs (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Mexico, Brazil). In such cases, external technical and financial assistance, if
desired by the countries, would have to come from other donors and/or from
private and international organizations (many of which receive contributions
from AID). The USG would, however, maintain an interest (e.g. through
Embassies) in such countries' population problems and programs (if any) to
reduce population growth rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high
priority countries to which U.S. population assistance is now limited for one
reason or another, we should be alert to opportunities for expanding our
assistance efforts and for demonstrating to their leaders the consequences of
rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to reduce fertility.
U.S. assistance is limited either by the nature of political or diplomatic
relations with those countries (e.g. India, Egypt), or by the lack of strong
government interest in population reduction programs (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Mexico, Brazil). In such cases, external technical and financial assistance, if
desired by the countries, would have to come from other donors and/or from
private and international organizations (many of which receive contributions
from AID). The USG would, however, maintain an interest (e.g. through
Embassies) in such countries' population problems and programs (if any) to
reduce population growth rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high
priority countries to which U.S. population assistance is now limited for one
reason or another, we should be alert to opportunities for expanding our
assistance efforts and for demonstrating to their leaders the consequences of
rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to reduce fertility.
In countries to which other forms of U.S.
assistance are provided but not population assistance, AID will monitor progress
toward achievement of development objectives, taking into account the extent to
which these are hindered by rapid population growth, and will look for
opportunities to encourage initiation of or improvement in population policies
and programs.
assistance are provided but not population assistance, AID will monitor progress
toward achievement of development objectives, taking into account the extent to
which these are hindered by rapid population growth, and will look for
opportunities to encourage initiation of or improvement in population policies
and programs.
In addition, the U.S. strategy
should support general activities capable of achieving major breakthroughs in
key problems which hinder attainment of fertility control objectives. For
example, the development of more effective, simpler contraceptive methods through
bio-medical research will benefit all countries which face the problem of rapid
population growth; improvements in methods for measuring demographic changes
will assist a number of LDCs in determining current population growth rates and
evaluating the impact over time of population/family planning activities.
should support general activities capable of achieving major breakthroughs in
key problems which hinder attainment of fertility control objectives. For
example, the development of more effective, simpler contraceptive methods through
bio-medical research will benefit all countries which face the problem of rapid
population growth; improvements in methods for measuring demographic changes
will assist a number of LDCs in determining current population growth rates and
evaluating the impact over time of population/family planning activities.
4. Resource
Allocations for U.S.
Population Assistance
Allocations for U.S.
Population Assistance
AID funds obligated for population/family
planning assistance rose steadily since inception of the program ($10 million
in the FY 1965-67 period) to nearly $125 million in FY 1972. In FY 1973,
however, funds available for population remained at the $125 million level; in
FY 1974 they actually declined slightly, to $112.5 million because of a ceiling
on population obligations inserted in the legislation by the House
Appropriations Committee. With this plateau in AID population obligations,
worldwide resources have not been adequate to meet all identified, sensible
funding needs, and we therefore see opportunities for significant expansion of
the program.
planning assistance rose steadily since inception of the program ($10 million
in the FY 1965-67 period) to nearly $125 million in FY 1972. In FY 1973,
however, funds available for population remained at the $125 million level; in
FY 1974 they actually declined slightly, to $112.5 million because of a ceiling
on population obligations inserted in the legislation by the House
Appropriations Committee. With this plateau in AID population obligations,
worldwide resources have not been adequate to meet all identified, sensible
funding needs, and we therefore see opportunities for significant expansion of
the program.
Some major actions in the area of creating
conditions for fertility decline, as described in Section IIB, can be funded
from AID resources available for the sectors in question (e.g., education,
agriculture). Other actions come under the purview of population ("Title
X") funds. In this latter category, increases in projected budget requests
to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 --
above the $137.5 million requested by FY 1975 -- appear appropriate at this
time. Such increases must be accompanied by expanding contributions to the
worldwide population effort from other donors and organizations and from the
LDCs themselves, if significant progress is to be made. The USG should take
advantage of appropriate opportunities to stimulate such contributions from
others.
conditions for fertility decline, as described in Section IIB, can be funded
from AID resources available for the sectors in question (e.g., education,
agriculture). Other actions come under the purview of population ("Title
X") funds. In this latter category, increases in projected budget requests
to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 --
above the $137.5 million requested by FY 1975 -- appear appropriate at this
time. Such increases must be accompanied by expanding contributions to the
worldwide population effort from other donors and organizations and from the
LDCs themselves, if significant progress is to be made. The USG should take
advantage of appropriate opportunities to stimulate such contributions from
others.
Title X Funding for Population
+----------------------------------------------------+
|
Year
Amount ($ million) |
Year
Amount ($ million) |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| FY 1972
- Actual Obligations
123.3 |
- Actual Obligations
123.3 |
| FY 1973
- Actual Obligations
125.6 |
- Actual Obligations
125.6 |
| FY 1974
- Actual Obligations
112.4 |
- Actual Obligations
112.4 |
| FY 1975
- Request to Congress
137.5 |
- Request to Congress
137.5 |
| FY 1976
- Projection
170 |
- Projection
170 |
| FY 1977
- Projection
210 |
- Projection
210 |
| FY 1978
- Projection
250 |
- Projection
250 |
| FY 1979
- Projection 300 |
- Projection 300 |
| FY 1980
- Projection
350 |
- Projection
350 |
+----------------------------------------------------+
These Title X funding projections for FY
1976-80 are general magnitudes based on preliminary estimates of expansion or
initiation of population programs in developing countries and growing
requirements for outside assistance as discussed in greater detail in other
sections of this paper. These estimates contemplated very substantial increases
in self-help and assistance from other donor countries.
1976-80 are general magnitudes based on preliminary estimates of expansion or
initiation of population programs in developing countries and growing
requirements for outside assistance as discussed in greater detail in other
sections of this paper. These estimates contemplated very substantial increases
in self-help and assistance from other donor countries.
Our objective should be to assure that
developing countries make family planning information, educational and means
available to all their peoples by 1980. Our efforts should include:
developing countries make family planning information, educational and means
available to all their peoples by 1980. Our efforts should include:
Increased A.I.D.
bilateral and centrally-funded programs, consistent with the geographic
priorities cited above.
bilateral and centrally-funded programs, consistent with the geographic
priorities cited above.
Expanded
contributions to multilateral and private organizations that can work
effectively in the population area.
contributions to multilateral and private organizations that can work
effectively in the population area.
Further research on
the relative impact of various socio-economic factors on desired family size,
and experimental efforts to test the feasibility of larger-scale efforts to
affect some of these factors.
the relative impact of various socio-economic factors on desired family size,
and experimental efforts to test the feasibility of larger-scale efforts to
affect some of these factors.
Additional
bio-medical research to improve the existing means of fertility control and to
develop new ones which are safe, effective, inexpensive, and attractive to both
men and women.
bio-medical research to improve the existing means of fertility control and to
develop new ones which are safe, effective, inexpensive, and attractive to both
men and women.
Innovative
approaches to providing family planning services, such as the utilization of
commercial channels for distribution of contraceptives, and the development of
low-cost systems for delivering effective health and family planning services
to the 85% of LDC populations not now reached by such services.
approaches to providing family planning services, such as the utilization of
commercial channels for distribution of contraceptives, and the development of
low-cost systems for delivering effective health and family planning services
to the 85% of LDC populations not now reached by such services.
Expanded efforts to
increase the awareness of LDC leaders and publics regarding the consequences of
rapid population growth and to stimulate further LDC commitment to actions to
reduce fertility.
increase the awareness of LDC leaders and publics regarding the consequences of
rapid population growth and to stimulate further LDC commitment to actions to
reduce fertility.
We believe expansions in the range of
35-50 million annually over the next five years are realistic, in light of
potential LDC needs and prospects for increased contributions from other population
assistance instrumentalities, as well as constraints on the speed with which
AID (and other donors) population funds can be expanded and effectively
utilized. These include negative or ambivalent host government attitudes toward
population reduction programs; the need for complementary financial and
manpower inputs by recipient governments, which must come at the expense of
other programs they consider to be high priority; and the need to assure that
new projects involve sensible, effective actions that are likely to reduce
fertility. We must avoid inadequately planned or implemented programs that lead
to extremely high costs per acceptor. In effect, we are closer to
"absorptive capacity" in terms of year-to-year increases in
population programs than we are, for example, in annual expansions in food,
fertilizer or generalized resource transfers.
35-50 million annually over the next five years are realistic, in light of
potential LDC needs and prospects for increased contributions from other population
assistance instrumentalities, as well as constraints on the speed with which
AID (and other donors) population funds can be expanded and effectively
utilized. These include negative or ambivalent host government attitudes toward
population reduction programs; the need for complementary financial and
manpower inputs by recipient governments, which must come at the expense of
other programs they consider to be high priority; and the need to assure that
new projects involve sensible, effective actions that are likely to reduce
fertility. We must avoid inadequately planned or implemented programs that lead
to extremely high costs per acceptor. In effect, we are closer to
"absorptive capacity" in terms of year-to-year increases in
population programs than we are, for example, in annual expansions in food,
fertilizer or generalized resource transfers.
It would be premature to make detailed
funding recommendations by countries and functional categories in light of our
inability to predict what changes -- such as in host country attitudes to U.S.
population assistance and in fertility control technologies -- may occur which
would significantly alter funding needs in particular geographic or functional
areas. For example, AID is currently precluded from providing bilateral
assistance to India and Egypt, two significant countries in the highest
priority group, due to the nature of U.S. political and diplomatic
relations with these countries. However, if these relationships were to change
and bilateral aid could be provided, we would want to consider providing
appropriate population assistance to these countries. In other cases, changing
U.S.-LDC relationships might preclude further aid to some countries. Factors
such as these could both change the mix and affect overall magnitudes of funds
needed for population assistance. Therefore, proposed program mixes and funding
levels by geographic and functional categories should continue to be examined
on an annual basis during the regular USG program and budget review processes
which lead to the presentation of funding requests to the Congress.
funding recommendations by countries and functional categories in light of our
inability to predict what changes -- such as in host country attitudes to U.S.
population assistance and in fertility control technologies -- may occur which
would significantly alter funding needs in particular geographic or functional
areas. For example, AID is currently precluded from providing bilateral
assistance to India and Egypt, two significant countries in the highest
priority group, due to the nature of U.S. political and diplomatic
relations with these countries. However, if these relationships were to change
and bilateral aid could be provided, we would want to consider providing
appropriate population assistance to these countries. In other cases, changing
U.S.-LDC relationships might preclude further aid to some countries. Factors
such as these could both change the mix and affect overall magnitudes of funds
needed for population assistance. Therefore, proposed program mixes and funding
levels by geographic and functional categories should continue to be examined
on an annual basis during the regular USG program and budget review processes
which lead to the presentation of funding requests to the Congress.
Recognizing that changing opportunities
for action could substantially affect AID's resource requirements for
population assistance, we anticipate that, if funds are provided by the
Congress at the levels projected, we would be able to cover necessary actions
related to the highest priority countries and also those related to lower
priority countries, moving reasonably far down the list. At this point,
however, AID believes it would not be desirable to make priority judgments on
which activities would not be funded if Congress did not provide the levels
projected. If cuts were made in these levels we would have to make judgments
based on such factors as the priority rankings of countries, then-existing LDC
needs, and divisions of labor with other actors in the population assistance
area.
for action could substantially affect AID's resource requirements for
population assistance, we anticipate that, if funds are provided by the
Congress at the levels projected, we would be able to cover necessary actions
related to the highest priority countries and also those related to lower
priority countries, moving reasonably far down the list. At this point,
however, AID believes it would not be desirable to make priority judgments on
which activities would not be funded if Congress did not provide the levels
projected. If cuts were made in these levels we would have to make judgments
based on such factors as the priority rankings of countries, then-existing LDC
needs, and divisions of labor with other actors in the population assistance
area.
If AID's population assistance program is
to expand at the general magnitudes cited above, additional direct hire staff
will likely be needed. While the expansion in program action would be primarily
through grants and contracts with LDC or U.S. institutions, or through
contributions to international organizations, increases in direct hire staff
would be necessary to review project proposals, monitor their implementation
through such instrumentalities, and evaluate their progress against
pre-established goals. Specific direct hire manpower requirements should
continue to be considered during the annual program and budget reviews, along
with details of program mix and funding levels by country and functional
category, in order to correlate staffing needs with projected program actions
for a particular year.
to expand at the general magnitudes cited above, additional direct hire staff
will likely be needed. While the expansion in program action would be primarily
through grants and contracts with LDC or U.S. institutions, or through
contributions to international organizations, increases in direct hire staff
would be necessary to review project proposals, monitor their implementation
through such instrumentalities, and evaluate their progress against
pre-established goals. Specific direct hire manpower requirements should
continue to be considered during the annual program and budget reviews, along
with details of program mix and funding levels by country and functional
category, in order to correlate staffing needs with projected program actions
for a particular year.
Recommendations
1. The U.S. strategy should be to
encourage and support, through bilateral, multilateral and other channels,
constructive action to lower fertility rates in selected developing countries.
The U.S.
should apply each of the relevant provisions of its World Population Plan of
Action and use it to influence and support actions by developing countries.
encourage and support, through bilateral, multilateral and other channels,
constructive action to lower fertility rates in selected developing countries.
The U.S.
should apply each of the relevant provisions of its World Population Plan of
Action and use it to influence and support actions by developing countries.
2. Within this overall strategy, the U.S.
should give highest priority, in terms of resource allocation (along with
donors) to efforts to encourage assistance from others to those countries cited
above where the population problem is most serious, and provide assistance to
other countries as funds and staff permit.
should give highest priority, in terms of resource allocation (along with
donors) to efforts to encourage assistance from others to those countries cited
above where the population problem is most serious, and provide assistance to
other countries as funds and staff permit.
3. AID's further development of population
program priorities, both geographic and functional, should be consistent with
the general strategy discussed above, with the other recommendations of this
paper and with the World Population Plan of Action. The strategies should be
coordinated with the population activities of other donors countries and
agencies using the WPPA as leverage to obtain suitable action.
program priorities, both geographic and functional, should be consistent with
the general strategy discussed above, with the other recommendations of this
paper and with the World Population Plan of Action. The strategies should be
coordinated with the population activities of other donors countries and
agencies using the WPPA as leverage to obtain suitable action.
4. AID's budget requests over the next
five years should include a major expansion of bilateral population and family
planning programs (as appropriate for each country or region), of functional
activities as necessary, and of contributions through multilateral channels,
consistent with the general funding magnitudes discussed above. The proposed
budgets should emphasize the country and functional priorities outlined in the
recommendations of this study and as detailed in AID's geographic and functional
strategy papers.
five years should include a major expansion of bilateral population and family
planning programs (as appropriate for each country or region), of functional
activities as necessary, and of contributions through multilateral channels,
consistent with the general funding magnitudes discussed above. The proposed
budgets should emphasize the country and functional priorities outlined in the
recommendations of this study and as detailed in AID's geographic and functional
strategy papers.
II. B. Functional
Assistance Programs to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline
Assistance Programs to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline
Introduction
Discussion
It is clear that the availability of
contraceptive services and information, important as that is, is not the only
element required to address the population problems of the LDCs. Substantial
evidence shows that many families in LDCs (especially the poor) consciously
prefer to have numerous children for a variety of economic and social reasons.
For example, small children can make economic contributions on family farms,
children can be important sources of support for old parents where no
alternative form of social security exists, and children may be a source of
status for women who have few alternatives in male-dominated societies.
contraceptive services and information, important as that is, is not the only
element required to address the population problems of the LDCs. Substantial
evidence shows that many families in LDCs (especially the poor) consciously
prefer to have numerous children for a variety of economic and social reasons.
For example, small children can make economic contributions on family farms,
children can be important sources of support for old parents where no
alternative form of social security exists, and children may be a source of
status for women who have few alternatives in male-dominated societies.
The desire for large families diminishes
as income rises. Developed countries and the more developed areas in LDCs have
lower fertility than less developed areas. Similarly, family planning programs
produce more acceptors and have a greater impact on fertility in developed
areas than they do in less developed areas. Thus, investments in development
are important in lowering fertility rates. We know that the major
socio-economic determinants of fertility are strongly interrelated. A change in
any one of them is likely to produce a change in the others as well. Clearly
development per se is a powerful determinant of fertility. However, since it is
unlikely that most LDCs will develop sufficiently during the next 25-30 years,
it is crucial to identify those sectors that most directly and powerfully
affect fertility.
as income rises. Developed countries and the more developed areas in LDCs have
lower fertility than less developed areas. Similarly, family planning programs
produce more acceptors and have a greater impact on fertility in developed
areas than they do in less developed areas. Thus, investments in development
are important in lowering fertility rates. We know that the major
socio-economic determinants of fertility are strongly interrelated. A change in
any one of them is likely to produce a change in the others as well. Clearly
development per se is a powerful determinant of fertility. However, since it is
unlikely that most LDCs will develop sufficiently during the next 25-30 years,
it is crucial to identify those sectors that most directly and powerfully
affect fertility.
In this context, population should be
viewed as a variable which interacts, to differing degrees, with a wide range
of development programs, and the U.S. strategy should continue to stress the
importance of taking population into account in "non-family planning"
activities. This is particularly important with the increasing focus in the
U.S. development program on food and nutrition, health and population, and education
and human resources; assistance programs have less chance of success as long as
the numbers to be fed, educated, and employed are increasing rapidly.
viewed as a variable which interacts, to differing degrees, with a wide range
of development programs, and the U.S. strategy should continue to stress the
importance of taking population into account in "non-family planning"
activities. This is particularly important with the increasing focus in the
U.S. development program on food and nutrition, health and population, and education
and human resources; assistance programs have less chance of success as long as
the numbers to be fed, educated, and employed are increasing rapidly.
Thus, to assist in achieving LDC fertility
reduction, not only should family planning be high up on the priority list for
U.S. foreign assistance, but high priority in allocation of funds should be
given to programs in other sectors that contribute in a cost-effective manner
in reduction in population growth.
reduction, not only should family planning be high up on the priority list for
U.S. foreign assistance, but high priority in allocation of funds should be
given to programs in other sectors that contribute in a cost-effective manner
in reduction in population growth.
There is a growing, but still quite small,
body of research to determine the socio-economic aspects of development that
most directly and powerfully affect fertility. Although the limited analysis to
date cannot be considered definitive, there is general agreement that the five
following factors (in addition to increases in per capita income) tend to be
strongly associated with fertility declines: education, especially the
education of women; reductions in infant mortality; wage employment
opportunities for women; social security and other substitutes for the economic
value of children; and relative equality in income distribution and rural
development. There are a number of other factors identified from research,
historical analysis, and experimentation that also affect fertility, including
delaying the average age of marriage, and direct payments (financial incentive)
to family planning acceptors.
body of research to determine the socio-economic aspects of development that
most directly and powerfully affect fertility. Although the limited analysis to
date cannot be considered definitive, there is general agreement that the five
following factors (in addition to increases in per capita income) tend to be
strongly associated with fertility declines: education, especially the
education of women; reductions in infant mortality; wage employment
opportunities for women; social security and other substitutes for the economic
value of children; and relative equality in income distribution and rural
development. There are a number of other factors identified from research,
historical analysis, and experimentation that also affect fertility, including
delaying the average age of marriage, and direct payments (financial incentive)
to family planning acceptors.
There are, however, a number of questions
which must be addressed before one can move from identification of factors
associated with fertility decline to large-scale programs that will induce
fertility decline in a cost-effective manner. For example, in the case of
female education, we need to consider such questions as: did the female
education cause fertility to decline or did the development process in some
situations cause parents both to see less economic need for large families and
to indulge in the "luxury" of educating their daughters? If more
female education does in fact cause fertility declines, will poor
high-fertility parents see much advantage in sending their daughters to school?
If so, how much does it cost to educate a girl to the point where her fertility
will be reduced (which occurs at about the fourth-grade level)? What specific
programs in female education are most cost-effective (e.g., primary school,
non-formal literacy training, or vocational or pre-vocational training)? What,
in rough quantitative terms, are the non-population benefits of an additional
dollar spent on female education in a given situation in comparison to other non-population
investment alternatives? What are the population benefits of a dollar spent on
female education in comparison with other population-related investments, such
as in contraceptive supplies or in maternal and child health care systems? And
finally, what is the total population plus non-population benefit of investment
in a given specific program in female education in comparison with the total
population plus non-population benefits of alternate feasible investment
opportunities?
which must be addressed before one can move from identification of factors
associated with fertility decline to large-scale programs that will induce
fertility decline in a cost-effective manner. For example, in the case of
female education, we need to consider such questions as: did the female
education cause fertility to decline or did the development process in some
situations cause parents both to see less economic need for large families and
to indulge in the "luxury" of educating their daughters? If more
female education does in fact cause fertility declines, will poor
high-fertility parents see much advantage in sending their daughters to school?
If so, how much does it cost to educate a girl to the point where her fertility
will be reduced (which occurs at about the fourth-grade level)? What specific
programs in female education are most cost-effective (e.g., primary school,
non-formal literacy training, or vocational or pre-vocational training)? What,
in rough quantitative terms, are the non-population benefits of an additional
dollar spent on female education in a given situation in comparison to other non-population
investment alternatives? What are the population benefits of a dollar spent on
female education in comparison with other population-related investments, such
as in contraceptive supplies or in maternal and child health care systems? And
finally, what is the total population plus non-population benefit of investment
in a given specific program in female education in comparison with the total
population plus non-population benefits of alternate feasible investment
opportunities?
As a recent research proposal from
Harvard's Department of Population Studies puts this problem: "Recent
studies have identified more specific factors underlying fertility declines,
especially, the spread of educational attainment and the broadening of non-traditional
roles for women. In situations of rapid population growth, however, these run
counter to powerful market forces. Even when efforts are made to provide
educational opportunities for most of the school age population, low levels of
development and restricted employment opportunities for academically educated
youth lead to high dropout rates and non-attendance..."
Harvard's Department of Population Studies puts this problem: "Recent
studies have identified more specific factors underlying fertility declines,
especially, the spread of educational attainment and the broadening of non-traditional
roles for women. In situations of rapid population growth, however, these run
counter to powerful market forces. Even when efforts are made to provide
educational opportunities for most of the school age population, low levels of
development and restricted employment opportunities for academically educated
youth lead to high dropout rates and non-attendance..."
Fortunately, the situation is by no means
as ambiguous for all of the likely factors affecting fertility. For example,
laws that raise the minimum marriage age, where politically feasible and at
least partially enforceable, can over time have a modest effect on fertility at
negligible cost. Similarly, there have been some controversial, but remarkably
successful, experiments in India
in which financial incentives, along with other motivational devices, were used
to get large numbers of men to accept vasectomies. In addition, there appear to
be some major activities, such as programs aimed to improve the productive
capacity of the rural poor, which can be well justified even without reference
to population benefits, but which appear to have major population benefits as
well.
as ambiguous for all of the likely factors affecting fertility. For example,
laws that raise the minimum marriage age, where politically feasible and at
least partially enforceable, can over time have a modest effect on fertility at
negligible cost. Similarly, there have been some controversial, but remarkably
successful, experiments in India
in which financial incentives, along with other motivational devices, were used
to get large numbers of men to accept vasectomies. In addition, there appear to
be some major activities, such as programs aimed to improve the productive
capacity of the rural poor, which can be well justified even without reference
to population benefits, but which appear to have major population benefits as
well.
The strategy suggested by the above
considerations is that the volume and type of programs aimed at the
"determinants of fertility" should be directly related to our
estimate of the total benefits (including non-population benefits) of a dollar
invested in a given proposed program and to our confidence in the reliability
of that estimate. There is room for honest disagreement among researchers and
policy-makers about the benefits, or feasibility, of a given program.
Hopefully, over time, with more research, experimentation and evaluation, areas
of disagreement and ambiguity will be clarified, and donors and recipients will
have better information both on what policies and programs tend to work under
what circumstances and how to go about analyzing a given country situation to
find the best feasible steps that should be taken.
considerations is that the volume and type of programs aimed at the
"determinants of fertility" should be directly related to our
estimate of the total benefits (including non-population benefits) of a dollar
invested in a given proposed program and to our confidence in the reliability
of that estimate. There is room for honest disagreement among researchers and
policy-makers about the benefits, or feasibility, of a given program.
Hopefully, over time, with more research, experimentation and evaluation, areas
of disagreement and ambiguity will be clarified, and donors and recipients will
have better information both on what policies and programs tend to work under
what circumstances and how to go about analyzing a given country situation to
find the best feasible steps that should be taken.
Recommendations:
1. AID should implement the strategy set
out in the World Population Plan of Action, especially paragraphs 31 and 32 and
Section I ("Introduction - a U.S. Global Population
Strategy") above, which calls for high priority in funding to three
categories of programs in areas affecting fertility (family-size) decisions:
out in the World Population Plan of Action, especially paragraphs 31 and 32 and
Section I ("Introduction - a U.S. Global Population
Strategy") above, which calls for high priority in funding to three
categories of programs in areas affecting fertility (family-size) decisions:
a. Operational
programs where there is proven cost-effectiveness, generally where there are
also significant benefits for non-population objectives;
programs where there is proven cost-effectiveness, generally where there are
also significant benefits for non-population objectives;
b. Experimental
programs where research indicates close relationships to fertility reduction
but cost-effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated in terms of specific steps
to be taken (i.e., program design); and
programs where research indicates close relationships to fertility reduction
but cost-effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated in terms of specific steps
to be taken (i.e., program design); and
c. Research and
evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size of the socio-economic
determinants of fertility, and on what policy scope exists for affecting these
determinants.
evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size of the socio-economic
determinants of fertility, and on what policy scope exists for affecting these
determinants.
2. Research, experimentation and
evaluation of ongoing programs should focus on answering the questions (such as
those raised above, relating to female education) that determine what steps can
and should be taken in other sectors that will in a cost-effective manner speed
up the rate of fertility decline. In addition to the five areas discussed in
Section II. B 1-5 below, the research should also cover the full range of factors
affecting fertility, such as laws and norms respecting age of marriage, and
financial incentives. Work of this sort should be undertaken in individual key
countries to determine the motivational factors required there to develop a
preference for small family size. High priority must be given to testing
feasibility and replicability on a wide scale.
evaluation of ongoing programs should focus on answering the questions (such as
those raised above, relating to female education) that determine what steps can
and should be taken in other sectors that will in a cost-effective manner speed
up the rate of fertility decline. In addition to the five areas discussed in
Section II. B 1-5 below, the research should also cover the full range of factors
affecting fertility, such as laws and norms respecting age of marriage, and
financial incentives. Work of this sort should be undertaken in individual key
countries to determine the motivational factors required there to develop a
preference for small family size. High priority must be given to testing
feasibility and replicability on a wide scale.
3. AID should encourage other donors in
LDC governments to carry out parallel strategies of research, experimentation,
and (cost-effective well-evaluated) large-scale operations programs on factors
affecting fertility. Work in this area should be coordinated, and results
shared.
LDC governments to carry out parallel strategies of research, experimentation,
and (cost-effective well-evaluated) large-scale operations programs on factors
affecting fertility. Work in this area should be coordinated, and results
shared.
4. AID should help develop capacity in a
few existing U.S.
and LDC institutions to serve as major centers for research and policy
development in the areas of fertility-affecting social or economic measures,
direct incentives, household behavior research, and evaluation techniques for
motivational approaches. The centers should provide technical assistance, serve
as a forum for discussion, and generally provide the "critical mass"
of effort and visibility which has been lacking in this area to date. Emphasis
should be given to maximum involvement of LDC institutions and individuals.
few existing U.S.
and LDC institutions to serve as major centers for research and policy
development in the areas of fertility-affecting social or economic measures,
direct incentives, household behavior research, and evaluation techniques for
motivational approaches. The centers should provide technical assistance, serve
as a forum for discussion, and generally provide the "critical mass"
of effort and visibility which has been lacking in this area to date. Emphasis
should be given to maximum involvement of LDC institutions and individuals.
The following sections discuss research
experimental and operational programs to be undertaken in the five promising
areas mentioned above.
experimental and operational programs to be undertaken in the five promising
areas mentioned above.
II. B. 1. Providing
Minimal Levels of Education, Especially for Women
Minimal Levels of Education, Especially for Women
Discussion
There is fairly convincing evidence that
female education especially of 4th grade and above correlates strongly with
reduced desired family size, although it is unclear the extent to which the
female education causes reductions in desired family size or whether it is a
faster pace of development which leads both to increased demand for female
education and to reduction in desired family size. There is also a relatively
widely held theory -- though not statistically validated -- that improved
levels of literacy contribute to reduction in desired family size both through greater
knowledge of family planning information and increasing motivational factors
related to reductions in family size. Unfortunately, AID's experience with mass
literacy programs over the past 15 years has yielded the sobering conclusion
that such programs generally failed (i.e. were not cost-effective) unless the
population sees practical benefits to themselves from learning how to read --
e.g., a requirement for literacy to acquire easier access to information about
new agricultural technologies or to jobs that require literacy.
female education especially of 4th grade and above correlates strongly with
reduced desired family size, although it is unclear the extent to which the
female education causes reductions in desired family size or whether it is a
faster pace of development which leads both to increased demand for female
education and to reduction in desired family size. There is also a relatively
widely held theory -- though not statistically validated -- that improved
levels of literacy contribute to reduction in desired family size both through greater
knowledge of family planning information and increasing motivational factors
related to reductions in family size. Unfortunately, AID's experience with mass
literacy programs over the past 15 years has yielded the sobering conclusion
that such programs generally failed (i.e. were not cost-effective) unless the
population sees practical benefits to themselves from learning how to read --
e.g., a requirement for literacy to acquire easier access to information about
new agricultural technologies or to jobs that require literacy.
Now, however, AID has recently revised its
education strategy, in line with the mandate of its legislation, to place
emphasis on the spread of education to poor people, particularly in rural
areas, and relatively less on higher levels of education. This approach is
focused on use of formal and "non-formal" education (i.e., organized
education outside the schoolroom setting) to assist in meeting the human
resource requirements of the development process, including such things as
rural literacy programs aimed at agriculture, family planning, or other
development goals.
education strategy, in line with the mandate of its legislation, to place
emphasis on the spread of education to poor people, particularly in rural
areas, and relatively less on higher levels of education. This approach is
focused on use of formal and "non-formal" education (i.e., organized
education outside the schoolroom setting) to assist in meeting the human
resource requirements of the development process, including such things as
rural literacy programs aimed at agriculture, family planning, or other
development goals.
Recommendations
1. Integrated basic education (including
applied literacy) and family planning programs should be developed whenever
they appear to be effective, of high priority, and acceptable to the individual
country. AID should continue its emphasis on basic education, for women as well
as men.
applied literacy) and family planning programs should be developed whenever
they appear to be effective, of high priority, and acceptable to the individual
country. AID should continue its emphasis on basic education, for women as well
as men.
2. A major effort should be made in LDCs
seeking to reduce birth rates to assure at least an elementary school education
for virtually all children, girls as well as boys, as soon as the country can
afford it (which would be quite soon for all but the poorest countries).
Simplified, practical education programs should be developed. These programs
should, where feasible, include specific curricula to motivate the next
generation toward a two-child family average to assure that level of fertility
in two or three decades. AID should encourage and respond to requests for
assistance in extending basic education and in introducing family planning into
curricula. Expenditures for such emphasis on increased practical education
should come from general AID funds, not population funds.
seeking to reduce birth rates to assure at least an elementary school education
for virtually all children, girls as well as boys, as soon as the country can
afford it (which would be quite soon for all but the poorest countries).
Simplified, practical education programs should be developed. These programs
should, where feasible, include specific curricula to motivate the next
generation toward a two-child family average to assure that level of fertility
in two or three decades. AID should encourage and respond to requests for
assistance in extending basic education and in introducing family planning into
curricula. Expenditures for such emphasis on increased practical education
should come from general AID funds, not population funds.
II. B. 2. Reducing
Infant and Child Mortality
Infant and Child Mortality
Discussion:
High infant and child mortality rates,
evident in many developing countries, lead parents to be concerned about the
number of their children who are likely to survive. Parents may overcompensate
for possible child losses by having additional children. Research to date clearly
indicates not only that high fertility and high birth rates are closely
correlated but that in most circumstances low net population growth rates can
only be achieved when child mortality is low as well. Policies and programs
which significantly reduce infant and child mortality below present levels will
lead couples to have fewer children. However, we must recognize that there is a
lag of at least several years before parents (and cultures and subcultures)
become confident that their children are more likely to survive and to adjust
their fertility behavior accordingly.
evident in many developing countries, lead parents to be concerned about the
number of their children who are likely to survive. Parents may overcompensate
for possible child losses by having additional children. Research to date clearly
indicates not only that high fertility and high birth rates are closely
correlated but that in most circumstances low net population growth rates can
only be achieved when child mortality is low as well. Policies and programs
which significantly reduce infant and child mortality below present levels will
lead couples to have fewer children. However, we must recognize that there is a
lag of at least several years before parents (and cultures and subcultures)
become confident that their children are more likely to survive and to adjust
their fertility behavior accordingly.
Considerable reduction in infant and child
mortality is possible through improvement in nutrition, inoculations against
diseases, and other public health measures if means can be devised for
extending such services to neglected LDC populations on a low-cost basis. It
often makes sense to combine such activities with family planning services in
integrated delivery systems in order to maximize the use of scarce LDC
financial and health manpowder (sic.) resources (See Section IV). In addition,
providing selected health care for both mothers and their children can enhance
the acceptability of family planning by showing concern for the whole condition
of the mother and her children and not just for the single factor of fertility.
mortality is possible through improvement in nutrition, inoculations against
diseases, and other public health measures if means can be devised for
extending such services to neglected LDC populations on a low-cost basis. It
often makes sense to combine such activities with family planning services in
integrated delivery systems in order to maximize the use of scarce LDC
financial and health manpowder (sic.) resources (See Section IV). In addition,
providing selected health care for both mothers and their children can enhance
the acceptability of family planning by showing concern for the whole condition
of the mother and her children and not just for the single factor of fertility.
The two major cost-effective problems in
maternal-child health care are that clinical health care delivery systems have
not in the past accounted for much of the reduction in infant mortality and
that, as in the U.S., local medical communities tend to favor relatively
expensive quality health care, even at the cost of leaving large numbers of
people (in the LDC's generally over two-thirds of the people) virtually
uncovered by modern health services.
maternal-child health care are that clinical health care delivery systems have
not in the past accounted for much of the reduction in infant mortality and
that, as in the U.S., local medical communities tend to favor relatively
expensive quality health care, even at the cost of leaving large numbers of
people (in the LDC's generally over two-thirds of the people) virtually
uncovered by modern health services.
Although we do not have all the answers on
how to develop inexpensive, integrated delivery systems, we need to proceed
with operational programs to respond to ODC requests if they are likely to be
cost-effective based on experience to date, and to experiment on a large scale
with innovative ways of tackling the outstanding problems. Evaluation
mechanisms for measuring the impact of various courses of action are an
essential part of this effort in order to provide feedback for current and
future projects and to improve the state of the art in this field.
how to develop inexpensive, integrated delivery systems, we need to proceed
with operational programs to respond to ODC requests if they are likely to be
cost-effective based on experience to date, and to experiment on a large scale
with innovative ways of tackling the outstanding problems. Evaluation
mechanisms for measuring the impact of various courses of action are an
essential part of this effort in order to provide feedback for current and
future projects and to improve the state of the art in this field.
Currently, efforts to develop low-cost
health and family planning services for neglected populations in the LDC's are
impeded because of the lack of international commitment and resources to the
health side. For example:
health and family planning services for neglected populations in the LDC's are
impeded because of the lack of international commitment and resources to the
health side. For example:
A. The World Bank could supply
low-interest credits to LDCs for the development of low-cost health-related
services to neglected populations but has not yet made a policy decision to do
so. The Bank has a population and health program and the program's leaders have
been quite sympathetic with the above objective. The Bank's staff has prepared
a policy paper on this subject for the Board but prospects for it are not good.
Currently, the paper will be discussed by the Bank Board at its November 1974
meeting. Apparently there is some reticence within the Bank's Board and in
parts of the staff about making a strong initiative in this area. In part, the
Bank argues that there are not proven models of effective, low-cost health
systems in which the Bank can invest. The Bank also argues that other sectors
such as agriculture, should receive higher priority in the competition for
scarce resources. In addition, arguments are made in some quarters of the Bank
that the Bank ought to restrict itself to "hard loan projects" and
not get into the "soft" area.
low-interest credits to LDCs for the development of low-cost health-related
services to neglected populations but has not yet made a policy decision to do
so. The Bank has a population and health program and the program's leaders have
been quite sympathetic with the above objective. The Bank's staff has prepared
a policy paper on this subject for the Board but prospects for it are not good.
Currently, the paper will be discussed by the Bank Board at its November 1974
meeting. Apparently there is some reticence within the Bank's Board and in
parts of the staff about making a strong initiative in this area. In part, the
Bank argues that there are not proven models of effective, low-cost health
systems in which the Bank can invest. The Bank also argues that other sectors
such as agriculture, should receive higher priority in the competition for
scarce resources. In addition, arguments are made in some quarters of the Bank
that the Bank ought to restrict itself to "hard loan projects" and
not get into the "soft" area.
A current reading from the Bank's staff
suggests that unless there is some change in the thinking of the Bank Board,
the Bank's policy will be simply to keep trying to help in the population and
health areas but not to take any large initiative in the low-cost delivery
system area.
suggests that unless there is some change in the thinking of the Bank Board,
the Bank's policy will be simply to keep trying to help in the population and
health areas but not to take any large initiative in the low-cost delivery
system area.
The Bank stance is regrettable because the
Bank could play a very useful role in this area helping to fund low-cost
physical structures and other elements of low-cost health systems, including
rural health clinics where needed. It could also help in providing low-cost
loans for training, and in seeking and testing new approaches to reaching those
who do not now have access to health and family planning services. This would
not be at all inconsistent with our and the Bank's frankly admitting that we do
not have all the "answer" or cost-effective models for low-cost
health delivery systems. Rather they, we and other donors could work together
on experimentally oriented, operational programs to develop models for the wide
variety of situations faced by LDCs.
Bank could play a very useful role in this area helping to fund low-cost
physical structures and other elements of low-cost health systems, including
rural health clinics where needed. It could also help in providing low-cost
loans for training, and in seeking and testing new approaches to reaching those
who do not now have access to health and family planning services. This would
not be at all inconsistent with our and the Bank's frankly admitting that we do
not have all the "answer" or cost-effective models for low-cost
health delivery systems. Rather they, we and other donors could work together
on experimentally oriented, operational programs to develop models for the wide
variety of situations faced by LDCs.
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