Background Briefing:
China-Vietnam Establish
Defence Hot Line – What Next?
Carlyle A. Thayer
October 20, 2014
When the China-Vietnam oilrig crisis broke out in May regional analysts opined that
bilateral relations had been set back several decades as a result of the worst crisis
since the 1979 border war. This assessment was premature. There are now signs
that Beijing and Hanoi are moving to reset their relations and pick up where they
were prior to the oil rig crisis.
The oil rig crisis witnessed physical confrontations by Chinese and Vietnamese
civilian law enforcement vessels, an upsurge in anti-China sentiment in Vietnam
including violent anti-China riots, the evacuation of Chinese workers from Vietnam, a
drop in Chinese tourism to Vietnam, and Vietnamese threats to take international
legal action against China. There were even calls by Vietnam’s political elite “to exit
China’s orbit.”
Initially China played diplomatic hardball and rebuffed all Vietnamese efforts to send
special envoys and to open up bilateral channels of communications between
government ministries and agencies most directly affected. Vietnamese leaders held
two main concerns. First, they could not appear to be buckling under pressure from
Beijing, especially given the intensity of domestic anti-China sentiment. Second,
Vietnamese leaders wanted to contain the fallout from the oilrig crisis and prevent it
from damaging the broader bilateral relationship.
Chinese leaders also had a re-think. On June 18 State Councilor Yang Jiechi travelled
to Hanoi to attend the annual meeting of the Joint Steering Committee that oversees
the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Media and
academic commentary focused almost exclusively on Yang’s remarks on territorial
disputes in the South China Sea.
The significance of Yang’s visit was that he came at all. It signalled that China wanted
to prevent South China Sea disputes from rupturing the broader bilateral
relationship.
Yang’s visit resulted in confidential behind-the-scenes discussions by external
relations specialists from the Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties. In July,
China withdrew its oil rig HD 981 from disputes waters. In late August, China
received Le Hong Anh, special envoy of the Secretary General of the Vietnam
Communist Party, thus ending Beijing’s diplomatic stonewalling of Vietnamese
efforts to open a dialogue.
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
China-Vietnam relations took a major step forward with the unexpected three-day
visit to Beijing by a thirteen-member high-level Vietnamese military delegation led
by its Minister of National Defence General Phung Quang Thanh. General Thanh was
invited by his Chinese counterpart General Chang Wanquan. The delegation arrived
on October 16 and departed two days later.
China laid out the red carpet for General Thanh. On the morning of October 17
Thanh inspected a People’s Liberation Army honor guard at the Ministry of Defense.
Immediately after the two sides held formal discussions. General Thanh was received
later in the day by Vice President Le Yuanchao. On the following morning, General
Thanh met with Lt. Gen. Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission and member of the CCP Politburo. No joint statement was issued.
Chinese and Vietnamese media reporting of General Thanh’s three bilateral
meetings varied in their coverage. The Chinese media provided only sparse accounts,
while the Vietnamese media provided greater details on the substance of the
exchanges.
What is clear from media accounts is that the atmospherics of these bilateral
meetings were cordial and positive. Both sides used past diplomatic formulations in
an effort to overcome relations strained by the oilrig crisis. For example, General
Chang stressed China has always valued friendly and cooperative relations with
Vietnam and that General Thanh’s visit would contribute to the comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership in general and defense relations in particular.
General Thanh opened his remarks by congratulating the Chinese people for their
accomplishments over the past sixty-five years . Thanh expressed his appreciation
for the positive development of China-Vietnam relations in recent years. He
reaffirmed Vietnam’s basic policy of highly valuing good neighborly relations and
comprehensive cooperation with China.
General Thanh also noted that overall relations between China and Vietnam were
developing well and that disputes over maritime sovereignty were the only
stumbling block in bilateral relations.
Pleasantries aside, General Thanh tabled five proposals to rebuild confidence and
trust and to provide both sides with reassurance that force would not be used.
According to Vietnamese media accounts, General Thanh proposed that both
militaries should remain calm, patient, show restraint and strictly control activities at
sea to avoid misunderstandings, prevent conflict, and not use force or the threat of
force to settle maritime disputes.
General Thanh proposed that the military should act in a humane manner towards
fishermen and not confiscate equipment used to earn their livelihood. In addition,
the military should assist fishermen in distress and create conditions for them to go
about their business, thus contributing to the common interests of both sides.
General Thanh reiterated Vietnam’s long-standing policy on the peaceful settlement
of South China Sea territorial disputes on the basis of international law and the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Se and the full implementation of the
Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Thanh urged China to reach
3
a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.
Genera Thanh requested China to lift its travel advisory so that economic exchanges
and tourism could be restored to normal.
Finally, General Thanh invited General Chang to visit Vietnam.
Both defense ministers agreed that military-to-military cooperation formed an
important part of China-Vietnam relations. Under the terms of a defence
cooperation agreement reached in 2003 the two sides exchanged visits, held a
strategic dialogue at deputy minister level, conducted personnel training, held
discussions on party and political work in the military, coordinated the work of
border guard units, and conducted joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both ministers
agreed that the 2003 protocol had led to positive outcomes and both sides should
continue to step up these activities in the future.
At the conclusion of their meeting, both defense ministers witnessed the signing of a
technical memorandum of understanding on the establishment of direct
communication lines between their respective ministries. No further details were
released.
According to Xinhua, the two ministers “reached consensus on developing bilateral
military relations… pledging to properly handle their maritime disputes.” The two
ministers further “decided to gradually resume and promote the healthy and stable
development of bilateral military ties.”
Xinhua also quoted from “a statement” that read, “both sides’ armed forces should
enhance solidarity and provide a strong guarantee for the governing status of the
communist parties of the two countries and the cause of socialist construction.”
Finally, the two ministers agreed “to abide by the consensus reached by both leaders
and play a positive role in dealing with maritime disputes and safeguarding a
peaceful and stable situation.”
General Thanh’s meeting with Vice President Le was equally cordial. Le opened the
conversation by notnig that General Thanh’s visit “would contribute to boosting
bilateral relations, strengthen understanding, trust and mutually beneficial
cooperation between the two parties, states and militaries. Le also emphasized that
China attached great importance to cooperation and friendship with Vietnam and
stressed the importance of traditional friendly cooperation by senior leaders.
Xinhua reported that Vice President Le called on both sides “to intensify strategic
communication, enhance political trust, manage maritime disputes, promote joint
development, and strengthen tangible cooperation so as to forge ahead bilateral
relations.”
General Thanh passed on the greetings of Vietnam’s party and state leaders. Thanh
informed Vice President Le that the purpose of his visit was to promote the
understanding reached by their leaders previously and to promote healthy, longterm
and stable relations between the two parties, states and armed forces.
Xinhua paraphrased General Thanh as stating, “Vietnam and China have maintained
close contacts and enjoyed broad common interests… the Vietnamese military is
4
willing to contribute to the development of bilateral military and state relations as
well as the peace and stability of the region.”
General Thanh met with General Fan Changlong on the morning of his departure.
According to Chinese media accounts Genera Fan told his visitor, “a neighboring
country cannot be moved away. It is in the common interest of China and Vietnam to
live in amity, handle disputes properly and promote common development.”
Fan also noted that the armed forces of both countries had significant responsibility
to safeguard and sustain bilateral ties and should contribute “positive energy”
towards this end. “We should make our troops well-behaved,” he said, “and not
make remarks harming the feelings of both people or do things undermining the
overall bilateral relations.”
Vietnamese media reported that General Thanh affirmed that Vietnam attached
special importance to good neighbourliness and comprehensive cooperation with
China and both sides should fully implement the common understanding reached by
their leaders. General Thanh reiterated in details Vietnam’s long-standing policy to
resolve maritime disputes by peaceful means, under international law, and to reach
a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
On October 16, in a positive upturn in Chia-Vietnam relations, Premier Li Keqiang
met with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe
Summit Meeting in Milan. News reports quoted Premier Li as saying China and
Vietnam should “properly address and control maritime differences… Thanks to the
efforts from both sides, China-Vietnam relations have ridden out the recent rough
patch and gradually recovered.”
Prime Minister Dung was quoted as in agreement and endorsed stepping up
“cooperation in infrastructure, finance and maritime exploration” three areas that
had been agreed to during Li’s visit to Hanoi in October 2013.
China and Vietnam have begun to repair bilateral relations by utilizing trusted partyto-
party and military-to-military links, by-passing their respective foreign ministries.
These developments need to be treated with a degree of caution. All professions of
mutual respect, traditional good neighborly relations, and perceptions of high-level
leaders has been said before.
It is important to note the size and composition of the two defense delegations.
Military commanders on either side of the border and at sea have met their
respective counterparts. More importantly, these commanders have all witnessed
the verbal agreement sreached by their respective ministers and can be expected to
carry out their duties accordingly. Chinese and Vietnamese military commanders are
now committed to stepping up existing defense cooperation activities in a number of
areas. Analysts will have to “watch this space” to determine if words are followed by
deeds.
When will Defense Minister Chang take up the invitation to visit Hanoi? It would be a
sign of progress if General Change attended the seventieth anniversary celebrations
marking the Vietnam People’s Army on December 22.
5
The most important outcome of the talks between the two defense ministers was
agreement on a protocol establishing direct communication links between their
respective ministries. This is a positive indication that both sides realize how quickly
an incident could spiral out of control and lead to deadly force.
From Vietnam’s point of view, it was important to demonstrate unity by bringing
such a large delegation to Beijing.
Another indication of the state of China-Vietnam relations will come at the APEC
Summit hosted by China and the East Asia Summit hosted by Myanmar. Will Chinese
and Vietnamese leaders meet on the sidelines and agree to make progress on
settling their differences?
China’s recent extension of the runway on Woody Island in the Paracels and the visit
to land reclamation sites in the Spratly archipelago by China’s Navy Commander
clearly demonstrate that territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea
remain the main irritant in bilateral relations.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China-Vietnam Establish Defence Hot Line –
What Next?,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October 20, 2014. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
China-Vietnam Establish
Defence Hot Line – What Next?
Carlyle A. Thayer
October 20, 2014
When the China-Vietnam oilrig crisis broke out in May regional analysts opined that
bilateral relations had been set back several decades as a result of the worst crisis
since the 1979 border war. This assessment was premature. There are now signs
that Beijing and Hanoi are moving to reset their relations and pick up where they
were prior to the oil rig crisis.
The oil rig crisis witnessed physical confrontations by Chinese and Vietnamese
civilian law enforcement vessels, an upsurge in anti-China sentiment in Vietnam
including violent anti-China riots, the evacuation of Chinese workers from Vietnam, a
drop in Chinese tourism to Vietnam, and Vietnamese threats to take international
legal action against China. There were even calls by Vietnam’s political elite “to exit
China’s orbit.”
Initially China played diplomatic hardball and rebuffed all Vietnamese efforts to send
special envoys and to open up bilateral channels of communications between
government ministries and agencies most directly affected. Vietnamese leaders held
two main concerns. First, they could not appear to be buckling under pressure from
Beijing, especially given the intensity of domestic anti-China sentiment. Second,
Vietnamese leaders wanted to contain the fallout from the oilrig crisis and prevent it
from damaging the broader bilateral relationship.
Chinese leaders also had a re-think. On June 18 State Councilor Yang Jiechi travelled
to Hanoi to attend the annual meeting of the Joint Steering Committee that oversees
the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Media and
academic commentary focused almost exclusively on Yang’s remarks on territorial
disputes in the South China Sea.
The significance of Yang’s visit was that he came at all. It signalled that China wanted
to prevent South China Sea disputes from rupturing the broader bilateral
relationship.
Yang’s visit resulted in confidential behind-the-scenes discussions by external
relations specialists from the Chinese and Vietnamese communist parties. In July,
China withdrew its oil rig HD 981 from disputes waters. In late August, China
received Le Hong Anh, special envoy of the Secretary General of the Vietnam
Communist Party, thus ending Beijing’s diplomatic stonewalling of Vietnamese
efforts to open a dialogue.
Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123
2
China-Vietnam relations took a major step forward with the unexpected three-day
visit to Beijing by a thirteen-member high-level Vietnamese military delegation led
by its Minister of National Defence General Phung Quang Thanh. General Thanh was
invited by his Chinese counterpart General Chang Wanquan. The delegation arrived
on October 16 and departed two days later.
China laid out the red carpet for General Thanh. On the morning of October 17
Thanh inspected a People’s Liberation Army honor guard at the Ministry of Defense.
Immediately after the two sides held formal discussions. General Thanh was received
later in the day by Vice President Le Yuanchao. On the following morning, General
Thanh met with Lt. Gen. Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission and member of the CCP Politburo. No joint statement was issued.
Chinese and Vietnamese media reporting of General Thanh’s three bilateral
meetings varied in their coverage. The Chinese media provided only sparse accounts,
while the Vietnamese media provided greater details on the substance of the
exchanges.
What is clear from media accounts is that the atmospherics of these bilateral
meetings were cordial and positive. Both sides used past diplomatic formulations in
an effort to overcome relations strained by the oilrig crisis. For example, General
Chang stressed China has always valued friendly and cooperative relations with
Vietnam and that General Thanh’s visit would contribute to the comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership in general and defense relations in particular.
General Thanh opened his remarks by congratulating the Chinese people for their
accomplishments over the past sixty-five years . Thanh expressed his appreciation
for the positive development of China-Vietnam relations in recent years. He
reaffirmed Vietnam’s basic policy of highly valuing good neighborly relations and
comprehensive cooperation with China.
General Thanh also noted that overall relations between China and Vietnam were
developing well and that disputes over maritime sovereignty were the only
stumbling block in bilateral relations.
Pleasantries aside, General Thanh tabled five proposals to rebuild confidence and
trust and to provide both sides with reassurance that force would not be used.
According to Vietnamese media accounts, General Thanh proposed that both
militaries should remain calm, patient, show restraint and strictly control activities at
sea to avoid misunderstandings, prevent conflict, and not use force or the threat of
force to settle maritime disputes.
General Thanh proposed that the military should act in a humane manner towards
fishermen and not confiscate equipment used to earn their livelihood. In addition,
the military should assist fishermen in distress and create conditions for them to go
about their business, thus contributing to the common interests of both sides.
General Thanh reiterated Vietnam’s long-standing policy on the peaceful settlement
of South China Sea territorial disputes on the basis of international law and the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Se and the full implementation of the
Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Thanh urged China to reach
3
a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations.
Genera Thanh requested China to lift its travel advisory so that economic exchanges
and tourism could be restored to normal.
Finally, General Thanh invited General Chang to visit Vietnam.
Both defense ministers agreed that military-to-military cooperation formed an
important part of China-Vietnam relations. Under the terms of a defence
cooperation agreement reached in 2003 the two sides exchanged visits, held a
strategic dialogue at deputy minister level, conducted personnel training, held
discussions on party and political work in the military, coordinated the work of
border guard units, and conducted joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both ministers
agreed that the 2003 protocol had led to positive outcomes and both sides should
continue to step up these activities in the future.
At the conclusion of their meeting, both defense ministers witnessed the signing of a
technical memorandum of understanding on the establishment of direct
communication lines between their respective ministries. No further details were
released.
According to Xinhua, the two ministers “reached consensus on developing bilateral
military relations… pledging to properly handle their maritime disputes.” The two
ministers further “decided to gradually resume and promote the healthy and stable
development of bilateral military ties.”
Xinhua also quoted from “a statement” that read, “both sides’ armed forces should
enhance solidarity and provide a strong guarantee for the governing status of the
communist parties of the two countries and the cause of socialist construction.”
Finally, the two ministers agreed “to abide by the consensus reached by both leaders
and play a positive role in dealing with maritime disputes and safeguarding a
peaceful and stable situation.”
General Thanh’s meeting with Vice President Le was equally cordial. Le opened the
conversation by notnig that General Thanh’s visit “would contribute to boosting
bilateral relations, strengthen understanding, trust and mutually beneficial
cooperation between the two parties, states and militaries. Le also emphasized that
China attached great importance to cooperation and friendship with Vietnam and
stressed the importance of traditional friendly cooperation by senior leaders.
Xinhua reported that Vice President Le called on both sides “to intensify strategic
communication, enhance political trust, manage maritime disputes, promote joint
development, and strengthen tangible cooperation so as to forge ahead bilateral
relations.”
General Thanh passed on the greetings of Vietnam’s party and state leaders. Thanh
informed Vice President Le that the purpose of his visit was to promote the
understanding reached by their leaders previously and to promote healthy, longterm
and stable relations between the two parties, states and armed forces.
Xinhua paraphrased General Thanh as stating, “Vietnam and China have maintained
close contacts and enjoyed broad common interests… the Vietnamese military is
4
willing to contribute to the development of bilateral military and state relations as
well as the peace and stability of the region.”
General Thanh met with General Fan Changlong on the morning of his departure.
According to Chinese media accounts Genera Fan told his visitor, “a neighboring
country cannot be moved away. It is in the common interest of China and Vietnam to
live in amity, handle disputes properly and promote common development.”
Fan also noted that the armed forces of both countries had significant responsibility
to safeguard and sustain bilateral ties and should contribute “positive energy”
towards this end. “We should make our troops well-behaved,” he said, “and not
make remarks harming the feelings of both people or do things undermining the
overall bilateral relations.”
Vietnamese media reported that General Thanh affirmed that Vietnam attached
special importance to good neighbourliness and comprehensive cooperation with
China and both sides should fully implement the common understanding reached by
their leaders. General Thanh reiterated in details Vietnam’s long-standing policy to
resolve maritime disputes by peaceful means, under international law, and to reach
a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
On October 16, in a positive upturn in Chia-Vietnam relations, Premier Li Keqiang
met with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe
Summit Meeting in Milan. News reports quoted Premier Li as saying China and
Vietnam should “properly address and control maritime differences… Thanks to the
efforts from both sides, China-Vietnam relations have ridden out the recent rough
patch and gradually recovered.”
Prime Minister Dung was quoted as in agreement and endorsed stepping up
“cooperation in infrastructure, finance and maritime exploration” three areas that
had been agreed to during Li’s visit to Hanoi in October 2013.
China and Vietnam have begun to repair bilateral relations by utilizing trusted partyto-
party and military-to-military links, by-passing their respective foreign ministries.
These developments need to be treated with a degree of caution. All professions of
mutual respect, traditional good neighborly relations, and perceptions of high-level
leaders has been said before.
It is important to note the size and composition of the two defense delegations.
Military commanders on either side of the border and at sea have met their
respective counterparts. More importantly, these commanders have all witnessed
the verbal agreement sreached by their respective ministers and can be expected to
carry out their duties accordingly. Chinese and Vietnamese military commanders are
now committed to stepping up existing defense cooperation activities in a number of
areas. Analysts will have to “watch this space” to determine if words are followed by
deeds.
When will Defense Minister Chang take up the invitation to visit Hanoi? It would be a
sign of progress if General Change attended the seventieth anniversary celebrations
marking the Vietnam People’s Army on December 22.
5
The most important outcome of the talks between the two defense ministers was
agreement on a protocol establishing direct communication links between their
respective ministries. This is a positive indication that both sides realize how quickly
an incident could spiral out of control and lead to deadly force.
From Vietnam’s point of view, it was important to demonstrate unity by bringing
such a large delegation to Beijing.
Another indication of the state of China-Vietnam relations will come at the APEC
Summit hosted by China and the East Asia Summit hosted by Myanmar. Will Chinese
and Vietnamese leaders meet on the sidelines and agree to make progress on
settling their differences?
China’s recent extension of the runway on Woody Island in the Paracels and the visit
to land reclamation sites in the Spratly archipelago by China’s Navy Commander
clearly demonstrate that territorial and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea
remain the main irritant in bilateral relations.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China-Vietnam Establish Defence Hot Line –
What Next?,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October 20, 2014. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.
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