RSIS presents the following commentary China’s Xinjiang Predicament: Time to Look Out of the Box by Nodirbek Soliyev. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg
No. 233/2013 dated 19 December 2013
China’s Xinjiang Predicament:
Time to Look Out of the Box
By Nodirbek Soliyev
Time to Look Out of the Box
By Nodirbek Soliyev
Synopsis
In
spite of China’s sustained law enforcement response, its Xinjiang
province continues to experience sporadic outbreaks of violence. The
recent attacks in Xinjiang and Beijing question whether China’s current
approach is the most effective one to bring lasting peace to the
province.
Commentary
THE
BLOODY clash between ethnic Uighurs and the Chinese police that took
place on 15 December 2013 in Xinjiang reflects a reality that rising
China faces today. It was the fourth outbreak of such violence that has
flared in Xinjiang since April 2013 in which at least 84 people have
been killed and 25 others injured.
The
Chinese government’s reaction to the incident was as usual: Beijing
called it a “terrorist” attack blaming a “violent terrorist gang” in
Xinjiang for it, and scaled up security measures to stabilise the
region. However, enhanced security measures alone cannot realistically
be expected to curb violence in the region, especially when social and
economic discontent of its Uighur minority remains unresolved.
Uighur militancy in a new phase?
China
often claims the attacks in Xinjiang, its Muslim-dominated western
province, to be the work of terrorists and tends to associate such
violence, with few exceptions, with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement
(ETIM). However, it has not shown any conclusive evidence to
substantiate these claims. A number of factors challenge the official
Chinese claim on this significant development.
There
are reports that numbers of Uighur radicals have travelled to Syria to
participate in anti-Assad “jihad” since 2012. However, any fighting
experience alongside some of the most battle-hardened groups has not
been reflected in the recent attacks in Xinjiang. There were no
sophisticated explosives used in the attacks, and the assailants did not
even possess guns. The attacks were carried out with knives, axes and
other primitive weapons. Tactics used by assailants include mainly
stabbing with knives and arson. The attacks have targeted police,
government installations, and local Han workers that symbolise Beijing’s
authority. Target assessment shows that Uighurs have specific
grievances against Beijing’s policies.
Social and economic grievances of the Uighurs
Xinjiang’s
crisis is a result of growing discontent among Uighur people that was
fuelled by China’s domestic policy in the region. Many of the Uighurs have grievances that are driven by ethnic, religious and cultural factors.
Over decades, government-sponsored immigration of Hans into the province has been a central part of China’s policy in Xinjiang. Beijing portrays this policy as intended to stimulate economic development and forge social cohesion but it has also been found to be counter-productive. The policy has altered the demographic make-up of the province reducing the Uighurs into a
minority in Xinjiang. In 1940 Uighurs comprised over 80 percent of the
population, while today, there are around nine million ethnic Uighurs
who make up about 46 percent of the province’s population; the rest are
mainly Han Chinese who constitute about 39 percent.
To
improve its infrastructure and entice Uighurs with the opportunity of
economic prosperity, the Chinese authority announced a new ambitious
plan in 2010. This was portrayed by China as a “balanced approach
policy” towards Xinjiang, giving priority to economic development to
modernise the region by 2015. It has funded enormous economic
development projects in Xinjiang, including the building of schools,
hospitals and the construction of earthquake-proof houses.
However,
economic development without a comprehensive political and social
approach to allay the fears of the Uighurs proved to be equally counter-productive.
The local Han population has benefited from these economic projects but
the Uighurs feel left out. Private employers in Xinjiang are more
inclined to hire Han Chinese workers than local Uighurs who are
disadvantaged by language and technical skills. These measures have
increased socio-economic imbalance between Uighurs and Hans and aggravated the discontent among local Uighurs.
Uighur
leaders exiled in the West blame the Chinese authority for lack of
religious freedom. For example public personnel are said to be
prohibited from fasting during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Uighurs
regard their religion as a key foundation of their distinct cultural
identity.
Terrorists exploiting the local grievances?
That
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) poses a significant threat
to China’s stability is incontestable. The ETIM, based in Pakistan’s
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), has managed to survive even
during the US-led coalition
forces antiterrorism campaign in Afghanistan since October 2001.
However, it is hard for the Uighur militants outside China to slip into
the mainland to trigger any unrest at home due to the high security
measures along its borders since 2009.
Since
the July 2009 inter-ethnic clashes between local Uighur and Han people
that left nearly 197 dead and 1,700 injured most of whom were ethnic
Hans, China has increased its security presence in the province. The
police has conducted widespread house-to-house searches and made
hundreds of arrests as part of the counter-measures against what it projects as “three
evils” – terrorism, extremism and separatism. Currently, there are more
than 40,000 closed-circuit television cameras, roughly 600 police boxes
and 756 traffic police checkpoints that operate 24 hour in Urumqi, the
capital of Xinjiang.
In the process of ensuring security in key areas, China has also suppressed peaceful protests, causing a significant
portion of the Uighur youth to turn to militancy. Militant groups such
as the ETIM will easily exploit the grievances of the Uighurs. The 28
October 2013 suicide attack in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square is an example.
The ETIM recruited local Uighurs – a 33-year-old man, his wife and
70-year-old mother who were not battle-trained militants – to carry out
the attack. The attack killed five people including the three of them
and injured at least 38 others.
For
lasting peace and stability China needs to take an enlightened approach
to address the root causes of ethnic tensions in Xinjiang. Violence in
Xinjiang has often been in protest against Beijing’s policy towards the Uighurs and in defence
of their ancestral lands from the massive influx of inhabitants from
outside. Ethnic Uighurs conceive of themselves as a diminishing
population. They insist on preservation of the cultural and social
distinctiveness of their society. The core demand of Uighurs has been
demographic and cultural “non-interference”.
For Uighurs, safeguarding their ethnic
identity is much more important than any promised economic development.
To reduce persistent discontent among local Uighur people, China needs to think out of the box and address these issues.
Nodirbek
Soliyev is a Research Analyst at the International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.
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