Will Karzai get the Diem treatment?

April 16, 2010 EIR International 39

April 7—Outside of Afghanistan, President Hamid
Karzai has two formidable enemies—Pakistan and
Britain. What has kept him in power and out of harm’s
way, during these eight-plus years of war in Afghanistan,
is the protection of the United States. However,
the breakout of acrimonious relations between Kabul
and Washington in recent months makes one wonder
how long Washington will be willing to continue providing
full protection to the Afghan President. The
latest news, that the White House may disinvite Karzai,
who is scheduled to visit Washington next month, is an
indication that Washington is no longer interested in
further discussions with Kabul.
The good news, is that while every Tom, Dick, and
Harriet associated with the Obama Administration, who
wears the garb of an Afghan expert, blames Karzai and
his “corrupt administration” for the eight-plus years of
mess, the so-called “search” for an alternative leader to
replace him has not yet turned up any viable candidates.
With the advent of the Obama Administration, and
induction of Obama’s Af-Pak envoy, Richard Holbrooke,
into the Afghan theater, Karzai began to come
under pressure. Although Washington never made
transparent what its plans were for Afghanistan, Karzai
was nonetheless pressured to accept them. As the security
situation worsened, with the insurgents gaining
control of more and more territory by pushing the U.S.
and NATO-led troops onto their bases, and maintaining
security of major towns, Washington and NATO headquarters
in Brussels became increasingly reckless, killing
Afghans by the hundreds, and identifying all of
them as “Taliban.”
Random Killing of Pushtuns, Alienation
of Karzai
Those killings, however, did not go off well with
Karzai, a Pushtun, and created intense mistrust of him
among the majority of his fellow Pushtuns. Kabul repeatedly
spoke out against killing of the innocents, but
it was to no avail. In retaliation, Washington heaped
blame on Karzai, blaming his “corrupt” administration
for all the ills and misfortunes. However, no one
talked about why and how opium production in Afghanistan
multiplied 25-fold from 2001 to 2007, under
the watch of the British and U.S. troops, bringing in
oodles of cash to all and sundry, including the socalled
Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents battling and
winning ground rapidly against the foreign troops.
This was “business as usual” in Afghanistan
throughout 2006-09. A noticeable shift began to emerge
with the Jan. 28, 2010 London Conference, which was
attended by high-level diplomats from almost 70 countries.
What came out of that conference, was a tacit
agreement among the participants, under pressure from
Karzai’s enemy, Britain, that called for reconciliation
with some “good Taliban,” with the intent of bringing
them in to share power in Kabul. How that would be
achieved, remained a big question mark, but, Karzai
got the message. For Karzai, the options left to him at
that point were: to hand over power to the “good Taliban,”
and leave Afghanistan to spend the rest of his
life in exile; or, to fight back, and somehow gain the
confidence of a majority of the Pushtun community, a
small fraction of which supports the Taliban—“good”
or “bad.”
Following the London Conference, Karzai visited
Riyadh, where he spoke to Saudi King Abdullah, a
strong proponent of bringing the Taliban to power,
and Islamabad, where he met the Pakistani Army
chief. Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who made no bones
about the fact that the arrival of the Taliban in Kabul
would provide Islamabad, once more, with an opportunity
to set up Afghanistan as its “strategic depth” to
counter any potential Indian plan to invade Pakistan.
Karzai realized that he will have to buck the tide, and
‘Khuda Hafez,’ Hamid Karzai
The Farsi phrase means, “May God protect you,” and is usually said at leavetaking.
Ramtanu Maitra reports, and warns: Don’t forget Ngo Dinh Diem!
40 International EIR April 16, 2010
go for the second option.
Prior to his visit to Pakistan, Karzai invited
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
to Kabul, on the heels of a trip there
by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.
Gates was still in Afghanistan on March 10
when the Iranian President predicted, from
Tehran, that American efforts in Afghanistan
would fail. Later, at a news conference with
Karzai at the Presidential Palace, Ahmadinejad
charged that the United States was using
the excuse of fighting “terrorists that they
themselves created, supported, and financed,”
to maintain its occupation of Afghanistan.
This visit of Ahmedinejad did not go over
well in Washington. Only two days before it, ,
Gates told reporters, while traveling to Kabul
for his own talks with Karzai, that Iran was
“playing a double game in Afghanistan.”
“They want to maintain a good relationship
with the Afghan government,” Gates said.
“They also want to do everything they possibly
to can to hurt us, or for us not to be successful.”
He said he believed that Iran was
providing money and “some low level of support”
to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Asked
about those comments by Gates, Ahmadinejad responded:
“What are you doing in this region? You are
12,000 kilometers away from here, your country is the
other side of the world. And what are you doing here?
This is a serious question.”
Karzai’s China and Iran Gambit
Karzai’s next move was to embark on his first-ever
visit to China, where he found a warm reception. Chinese
President Hu Jintao and the Afghan President
signed three deals on March 24, which covered economic
cooperation, technical training, and preferential
tariffs for some Afghan exports to China. China is
seen as a key player in an international coalition seeking
to secure and rebuild Afghanistan, particularly
after U.S. troops pull out, analysts said, adding that
Beijing is striving to help boost security and revive the
economy in Afghanistan. It was earlier reported that
the state-owned China Metallurgical Group promised
to invest a record US$3 billion in Aynak, one of the
world’s largest copper mines, south of Kabul. Afghan
Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul told China Daily on
March 24 that China has contributed tremendously to
Afghan economic development, especially in infrastructure
building.
“There are some security issues. We are trying to
deal with it, and I hope the security situation will allow
Chinese investment to operate without any risks,” Rassoul
said. Afghanistan is heavily dependent on international
aid, but its government hopes the vast reserves of
minerals will provide the key to eventual financial independence,
Rassoul added.
Gong Shaopeng, a professor in international politics
at China Foreign Affairs University, said the major
goal of the Afghan government is to revitalize the
country’s economy. He said China’s step-by-step aid
has helped stabilize the country and provide job opportunities.
“We have helped Afghanistan rebuild facilities
damaged by the war, like roads and canals,” he
said.
Subsequently, Karzai antagonized his Western allies
further, when he joined leaders from the region to cel-
U.S. Army/Spc. Michael Zuk
Afghan President Hamid Karzai doesn’t have many good options left, since
the January London Conference, where a tacit agreement was reached, that
the “good Taliban,” should be brought into a power-sharing arrangement
in Kabul.
April 16, 2010 EIR International 41
ebrate the first festival of the International Day of
Nawrooz, held in celebration of the Persian New Year
in Tehran on March 27. Leaders from Iran, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Iraq, the Turkish deputy prime minister,
and senior representatives from 20 other countries attended.
Thanking leaders of the regional countries for
taking part in the festival, Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki said that celebrations at the regional
level were first observed in 2008 in Dushanbe,
Tajikistan, with the participation of the foreign ministers
from Afghanistan, Iran, and Tajikistan. The following
year, he said, it was celebrated more gloriously
in Afghanistan’s northern city of Mazar-e-
Sharif. President Karzai was among the
speakers on that important day and expressed
the hope that 2009 would be a year
of peace, stability, and progress for Afghanistan.
On March 30, 2010, under the cover of
darkness, U.S. President Barack Obama
made a surprise visit to Kabul. Before he departed,
also after sundown, Obama had a
long talk with Karzai. While the discussion
was not made public, reports indicate that
Obama made clear that he was highly displeased
with the Afghan President’s performance.
On the substance of this quarrel, the
Washington Post, in its lead editorial on
April 6, said that Obama has been pressuring
Karzai “to crack down on the rampant
corruption in his government, especially in
the southern provinces where U.S. troops
are trying to break the hold of the Taliban.”
The White House also resisted Karzai’s attempt
to exclude UN representatives from
the election commission. The Afghan President’s
claim of electoral interference, according
to the Post, although perhaps
prompted by that pressure, is not credible;
his steps toward initiating negotiations with
insurgent leaders appear premature, at best,
the editorial concluded.
It is evident that it was the substance of
his discussions with the U.S. President that
enraged Karzai. On April 1, addressing the
Independent Election Commission (IEC),
Karzai lashed out against Washington’s accusations
against him, that he had committed vote fraud in his
reelection last October. He said: “There is no doubt
that the fraud was very widespread, but this fraud was
not committed by Afghans, it was committed by foreigners.
. . . This fraud was committed by Galbraith,
this fraud was committed by Morillon, and this fraud
was committed by embassies.” Karzai was referring to
Peter W. Galbraith, the deputy United Nations special
representative to Afghanistan at the time of the election,
and the person who helped reveal the fraud, and
Philippe Morillon, the chief election observer for the
European Union.
DoD/USAF Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison
Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters, while traveling to Kabul for
talks with Karzai, that Iran was “playing a double game in Afghanistan.”
“They want to do everything they possibly can to hurt us, or for us not to be
successful.” He is being interviewed on Afghan television, in this December
2009 photo.
42 International EIR April 16, 2010
Karzai’s Principal Enemies: Britain
and Pakistan
Later in the speech, Karzai accused the Western coalition
fighting against the Taliban of being on the verge
of becoming invaders—a term usually used by insurgents
to refer to American, British, and other NATO
troops fighting in Afghanistan. “In this situation, there
is a thin curtain between invasion and cooperation/assistance,”
said Karzai, adding that if the perception
spread that the Western forces were invaders, and the
Afghan government their mercenaries, the insurgency
“could become a national resistance.”
That speech, particularly the formulation that implied
that the insurgency could become a national resistance,
got Washington’s goat. There was a hue and cry
in the U.S. capital, where Obama Administration officials
expressed dismay at the “outrageous” allegations
by a “corrupt” Afghan administration. But Karzai was
in no mood to back down.
Three days later, on April 4, Karzai, visiting his
home town, Kandahar, the seat of Pushtun royalty and
the birthplace of the Taliban, spoke to local parliamentarians,
chastising the U.S. for “interference” in
Afghanistan’s politics. His statements centered chiefly
on attacking the U.S. and its NATO allies, as well as
parliament itself, warning that if the parliament didn’t
assent to his takeover of the Electoral Complaints
Commission, it would give the impression that Afghanistan
was dominated by the West, thereby granting
legitimacy to the Taliban. Some parliamentarians
present say that Karzai even threatened to join the insurgency.
President Karzai is not only fighting back, but has
put himself at a great personal risk. Unless he is able to
garner quick support from China, Iran, and Russia—the
three major nations in the immediate vicinity not antagonistic
to him—he will be the main target of a
number of recognized, and not-so-well-recognized,
killers gunning for him.
His principal threat comes from Britain and Pakistan.
He has crossed swords, over the years, with the
British. To begin with, London never liked the appointment
to the Presidency of an Afghan Pushtun close to
the United States and India. In 2005, Karzai spoke out
against the explosion of opium production in southern
Afghanistan’s Helmand province, accusing the British
troops stationed there of allowing the large-scale growth
of opium production.
He expelled two British MI6 agents on Dec. 27,
2007, on charges that they posed a threat to national
security. Afghan government officials said the decision
to expel them was taken at the behest of the CIA, after
the two agents were caught funding Taliban units. One
of the agents, Mervyn Patterson, worked for the United
Nations, while the other, Michael Semple, worked for
the European Union. Both were alleged Afghan specialists
who had been operating in the country for over
20 years; that means they must have been interacting,
on behalf of London, with the al-Qaeda and Taliban
leaders there. The London Times wrote that, when Patterson
and Semple were arrested, they were in possession
of $150,000 cash, which was to be given to Taliban
commanders in Musa Qala, in the opium-infested
Helmand province.
An unnamed Afghan government official told the
London Sunday Telegraph at the time, that “this warning”—
that the men had been financing the Taliban for
at least ten months—“came from the Americans, who
were not happy with the support being provided to the
Taliban. Washington gave the information to our intelligence
services, who ordered the arrests,” the
source added, “The Afghan government would never
have acted alone to expel officials of such a senior
level. This was the information that was given to the
NDS [National Directorate of Security] by the Americans.”
In 2006, U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan
had loudly protested the British decision, in a deal with
local tribal leaders, to withdraw troops from Musa Qala,
opening the door for a Taliban takeover of the region.
Michael Semple has since been laundered, and currently
holds a fellowship with the Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School. He
is now in the seminar circuit of various American think
tanks, proffering his “expertise” on issues concerning
insurgency, reconciliation, and political developments
in Afghanistan.
In addition to throwing out the two MI6 agents,
Karzai also drew the wrath of the British Empire establishment
when, in January 2008, he turned down the
joint effort of Washington and London to appoint Lord
Paddy Ashdown as the UN’s super-envoy to Afghanistan.
Ashdown, a “liberal” and a “democrat,” who wears
his vainglorious feudal title on his shirtsleeves, was
ready to pinch-hit for London and Washington, which
had begun to look increasingly like colonial powers
April 16, 2010 EIR International 43
trying to occupy Afghanistan and further
undermine the “duly elected”
President.
The second powerful threat to
Karzai emanates from Pakistan.
Karzai has reiterated over the years,
the existence of a tacit agreement between
Pakistani intelligence, the ISI,
and the insurgents. He has claimed,
over and over again, that the insurgents,
who have committed terrorist
acts inside Kabul, had the fingerprints
of Pakistan’s ISI. He has also insisted,
on a number of occasions, that the insurgents
were not only sheltered
inside Pakistan, but also protected. It
is widely known that Karzai is intensely
hated by a section of the Pakistani
military, and by the political
grouping close to both the Pakistani
Taliban and Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, the Pakistani Army
may conclude that Karzai, developing
an independent base among a
large section of the Pushtun community, may prevent
the Pakistan-backed Taliban from gaining control in
Kabul. Also, Karzai is close to India, and his coming
to power on his own strength will necessarily allow a
larger Indian presence in Afghanistan in the future. On
the other hand, if Karzai can bring both China and
Iran, in full force, into Afghanistan, Pakistan will have
to give the elimination of Karzai a second thought.
The Elimination of Ngo Dinh Diem
It is evident that Islamabad has strong reasons to
eliminate Hamid Karzai. If one jogs one’s memory, it is
not difficult to fathom that the scenario developing in
Afghanistan, vis-á-vis Karzai, is not much different
from what occurred during the Vietnam War. On Nov.
2, 1963, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem,
who years earlier was eulogized by Washington’s policymakers
and American media as the “demigod” and
“savior,” was removed, and killed a day later, along
with his brother, Nhu Dinh Diem, his close collaborator,
by a military coup carried out by Gen. Duong Van
Minh. The coup was carried out hours after Diem met
with President Kennedy’s envoy, Henry Cabot Lodge,
and Adm. Harry D. Felt.
According to The Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2, “Washington
was deeply concerned about Diem’s unpopularity
and was confronted with the following choices: The
choices were: (1) continue to plod along in a limited
fashion with Diem—despite his and Nhu’s growing unpopularity;
(2) encourage or tacitly support the overthrow
of Diem, taking the risk that the GVN (Government
of the Republic of Vietnam, or, South Vietnam)
might crumble and/or accommodate to the VC (Viet
Cong); and (3) grasp the opportunity—with the obvious
risks—of the political instability in South Vietnam
to disengage.
“The first option was rejected because of the belief
that we [Washington—ed.] could not win with Diem-
Nhu. The third was [sic] very seriously considered a
policy alternative because of the assumption that an independent,
non-communist SVN [South Vietnam] was
too important a strategic interest to abandon—and because
the situation was not sufficiently drastic to call
into question so basic an assumption. The second course
was chosen mainly for the reasons the first was rejected—
Vietnam was thought too important; we wanted
to win; and the rebellious generals seemed to offer that
prospect. . . .”
U.S. National Archives
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was killed in a 1963 U.S.-backed coup.
There are lessons to be learned here.