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Inside TAO:
Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit
Google Earth
The NSA's TAO
hacking unit is considered to be the intelligence agency's top secret weapon. It
maintains its own covert network, infiltrates computers around the world and
even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant back doors in electronics ordered
by those it is targeting.
In
January 2010, numerous homeowners in San Antonio, Texas, stood baffled in front
of their closed garage doors. They wanted to drive to work or head off to do
their grocery shopping, but their garage door openers had gone dead, leaving
them stranded. No matter how many times they pressed the buttons, the doors
didn't budge. The problem primarily affected residents in the western part of
the city, around Military Drive and the interstate highway known as Loop
410.
It
was thanks to the garage door opener episode that Texans learned just how far
the NSA's work had encroached upon their daily lives. For quite some time now,
the intelligence agency has maintained a branch with around 2,000 employees at
Lackland Air Force Base, also in San Antonio. In 2005, the agency took over a
former Sony computer chip plant in the western part of the city. A brisk pace of
construction commenced inside this enormous compound. The acquisition of the
former chip factory at Sony Place was part of a massive expansion the agency
began after the events of Sept. 11, 2001.
On-Call Digital Plumbers
One
of the two main buildings at the former plant has since housed a sophisticated
NSA unit, one that has benefited the most from this expansion and has grown the
fastest in recent years -- the Office of Tailored Access Operations, or TAO.
This is the NSA's top operative unit -- something like a squad of plumbers that
can be called in when normal access to a target is blocked.
According
to internal NSA documents viewed by SPIEGEL, these on-call digital plumbers are
involved in many sensitive operations conducted by American intelligence
agencies. TAO's area of operations ranges from counterterrorism to cyber attacks
to traditional espionage. The documents reveal just how diversified the tools at
TAO's disposal have become -- and also how it exploits the technical weaknesses
of the IT industry, from Microsoft to Cisco and Huawei, to carry out its
discreet and efficient attacks.
The
unit is "akin to the wunderkind of the US intelligence community," says Matthew
Aid, a historian who specializes in the history of the NSA. "Getting the
ungettable" is the NSA's own description of its duties. "It is not about the
quantity produced but the quality of intelligence that is important," one former
TAO chief wrote, describing her work in a document. The paper seen by SPIEGEL
quotes the former unit head stating that TAO has contributed "some of the most
significant intelligence our country has ever seen." The unit, it goes on, has
"access to our very hardest targets."
A Unit Born of the Internet
Defining
the future of her unit at the time, she wrote that TAO "needs to continue to
grow and must lay the foundation for integrated Computer Network Operations,"
and that it must "support Computer Network Attacks as an integrated part of
military operations." To succeed in this, she wrote, TAO would have to acquire
"pervasive, persistent access on the global network." An internal description of
TAO's responsibilities makes clear that aggressive attacks are an explicit part
of the unit's tasks. In other words, the NSA's hackers have been given a
government mandate for their work. During the middle part of the last decade,
the special unit succeeded in gaining access to 258 targets in 89 countries --
nearly everywhere in the world. In 2010, it conducted 279 operations
worldwide.
Indeed,
TAO specialists have directly accessed the protected networks ofdemocratically
elected leaders of countries.
They infiltrated networks of European telecommunications companies and gained
access to and read mails sent over Blackberry's BES email servers, which until
then were believed to be securely encrypted. Achieving this last goal required a
"sustained TAO operation," one document states.
This
TAO unit is born of the Internet -- created in 1997, a time when not even 2
percent of the world's population had Internet access and no one had yet thought
of Facebook, YouTube or Twitter. From the time the first TAO employees moved
into offices at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, the unit was housed in
a separate wing, set apart from the rest of the agency. Their task was clear
from the beginning -- to work around the clock to find ways to hack into global
communications traffic.
Recruiting the Geeks
To
do this, the NSA needed a new kind of employee. The TAO workers authorized to
access the special, secure floor on which the unit is located are for the most
part considerably younger than the average NSA staff member. Their job is
breaking into, manipulating and exploiting computer networks, making them
hackers and civil servants in one. Many resemble geeks -- and act the part,
too.
Indeed,
it is from these very circles that the NSA recruits new hires for its Tailored
Access Operations unit. In recent years, NSA Director Keith Alexander has made
several appearances at major hacker conferences in the United States. Sometimes,
Alexander wears his military uniform, but at others, he even dons jeans and a
t-shirt in his effort to court trust and a new generation of employees.
The
recruitment strategy seems to have borne fruit. Certainly, few if any other
divisions within the agency are growing as quickly as TAO. There are now TAO
units in Wahiawa, Hawaii; Fort Gordon, Georgia; at the NSA's outpost at Buckley
Air Force Base, near Denver, Colorado; at its headquarters in Fort Meade; and,
of course, in San Antonio.
One
trail also leads to Germany. According to a document dating from 2010 that lists
the "Lead TAO Liaisons" domestically and abroad as well as names, email
addresses and the number for their "Secure Phone," a liaison office is located
near Frankfurt -- the European Security Operations Center (ESOC) at the
so-called "Dagger
Complex" at a US military compound in the Griesheim suburb of Darmstadt.
But
it is the growth of the unit's Texas branch that has been uniquely impressive,
the top secret documents reviewed by SPIEGEL show. These documents reveal that
in 2008, the Texas Cryptologic Center employed fewer than 60 TAO specialists. By
2015, the number is projected to grow to 270 employees. In addition, there are
another 85 specialists in the "Requirements & Targeting" division (up from
13 specialists in 2008). The number of software developers is expected to
increase from the 2008 level of three to 38 in 2015. The San Antonio office
handles attacks against targets in the Middle East, Cuba, Venezuela and
Colombia, not to mention Mexico, just 200 kilometers (124 miles) away, where the
government has fallen into the NSA's crosshairs.
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Mexico's
Secretariat of Public Security, which was folded into the new National Security
Commission at the beginning of 2013, was responsible at the time for the
country's police, counterterrorism, prison system and border police. Most of the
agency's nearly 20,000 employees worked at its headquarters on Avenida
Constituyentes, an important traffic artery in Mexico City. A large share of the
Mexican security authorities under the auspices of the Secretariat are
supervised from the offices there, making Avenida Constituyentes a one-stop shop
for anyone seeking to learn more about the country's security apparatus.
Operation WHITETAMALE
That
considered, assigning the TAO unit responsible for tailored operations to target
the Secretariat makes a lot of sense. After all, one document states, the US
Department of Homeland Security and the United States' intelligence agencies
have a need to know everything about the drug trade, human trafficking and
security along the US-Mexico border. The Secretariat presents a potential
"goldmine" for the NSA's spies, a document states. The TAO workers selected
systems administrators and telecommunications engineers at the Mexican agency as
their targets, thus marking the start of what the unit dubbed Operation
WHITETAMALE.
Workers
at NSA's target selection office, which also had Angela Merkel in its sights in
2002 before she became chancellor, sent TAO a list of officials within the
Mexican Secretariat they thought might make interesting targets. As a first
step, TAO penetrated the target officials' email accounts, a relatively simple
job. Next, they infiltrated the entire network and began capturing data.
Soon
the NSA spies had knowledge of the agency's servers, including IP addresses,
computers used for email traffic and individual addresses of diverse employees.
They also obtained diagrams of the security agencies' structures, including
video surveillance. It appears the operation continued for years until
SPIEGEL first
reported on it in October.
The
technical term for this type of activity is "Computer Network Exploitation"
(CNE). The goal here is to "subvert endpoint devices," according to an internal
NSA presentation that SPIEGEL has viewed. The presentation goes on to list
nearly all the types of devices that run our digital lives -- "servers,
workstations, firewalls, routers, handsets, phone switches, SCADA systems, etc."
SCADAs are industrial control systems used in factories, as well as in power
plants. Anyone who can bring these systems under their control has the potential
to knock out parts of a country's critical infrastructure.
The
most well-known and notorious use of this type of attack was the development of
Stuxnet, the computer worm whose existence was discovered in June 2010. The
virus was developed jointly by American and Israeli intelligence agencies to
sabotage Iran's nuclear program, and successfully so. The country's nuclear
program was set back by years after Stuxnet manipulated the SCADA control
technology used at Iran's uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz, rendering up
to 1,000 centrifuges unusable.
The
special NSA unit has its own development department in which new technologies
are developed and tested. This division is where the real tinkerers can be
found, and their inventiveness when it comes to finding ways to infiltrate other
networks, computers and smartphones evokes a modern take on Q, the legendary
gadget inventor in James Bond movies.
Having Fun at Microsoft's Expense
One
example of the sheer creativity with which the TAO spies approach their work can
be seen in a hacking method they use that exploits the error-proneness of
Microsoft's Windows. Every user of the operating system is familiar with the
annoying window that occasionally pops up on screen when an internal problem is
detected, an automatic message that prompts the user to report the bug to the
manufacturer and to restart the program. These crash reports offer TAO
specialists a welcome opportunity to spy on computers.
When
TAO selects a computer somewhere in the world as a target and enters its unique
identifiers (an IP address, for example) into the corresponding database,
intelligence agents are then automatically notified any time the operating
system of that computer crashes and its user receives the prompt to report the
problem to Microsoft. An internal presentation suggests it is NSA's
powerful XKeyscore spying tool that is used to fish these
crash reports out of the massive sea of Internet traffic.
The
automated crash reports are a "neat way" to gain "passive access" to a machine,
the presentation continues. Passive access means that, initially, only data the
computer sends out into the Internet is captured and saved, but the computer
itself is not yet manipulated. Still, even this passive access to error messages
provides valuable insights into problems with a targeted person's computer and,
thus, information on security holes that might be exploitable for planting
malware or spyware on the unwitting victim's computer.
Although
the method appears to have little importance in practical terms, the NSA's
agents still seem to enjoy it because it allows them to have a bit of a laugh at
the expense of the Seattle-based software giant. In one internal graphic, they
replaced the text of Microsoft's original error message with one of their own
reading, "This information may be intercepted by a foreign sigint system to
gather detailed information and better exploit your machine." ("Sigint" stands
for "signals intelligence.")
SPIEGEL ONLINE
An NSA internal slide: "This
information may be intercepted by a foreign SIGINT system to gather detailed
information and better exploit your machine."
One
of the hackers' key tasks is the offensive infiltration of target computers with
so-called implants or with large numbers of Trojans. They've bestowed their
spying tools with illustrious monikers like "ANGRY NEIGHBOR," "HOWLERMONKEY" or
"WATERWITCH." These names may sound cute, but the tools they describe are both
aggressive and effective.
According
to details in Washington's current budget plan for the US intelligence services,
around 85,000 computers worldwide are projected to be infiltrated by
the NSA specialists by the end of this year. By far the majority of these
"implants" are conducted by TAO teams via the Internet.
Increasing Sophistication
Until
just a few years ago, NSA agents relied on the same methods employed by cyber
criminals to conduct these implants on computers. They sent targeted attack
emails disguised as spam containing links directing users to virus-infected
websites. With sufficient knowledge of an Internet browser's security holes --
Microsoft's Internet Explorer, for example, is especially popular with the NSA
hackers -- all that is needed to plant NSA malware on a person's computer is for
that individual to open a website that has been specially crafted to compromise
the user's computer. Spamming has one key drawback though: It doesn't work very
often.
Nevertheless,
TAO has dramatically improved the tools at its disposal. It maintains a
sophisticated toolbox known internally by the name "QUANTUMTHEORY." "Certain
QUANTUM missions have a success rate of as high as 80%, where spam is less than
1%," one internal NSA presentation states.
A
comprehensive internal presentation titled "QUANTUM CAPABILITIES," which SPIEGEL
has viewed, lists virtually every popular Internet service provider as a target,
including Facebook, Yahoo, Twitter and YouTube. "NSA QUANTUM has the greatest
success against Yahoo, Facebook and static IP addresses," it states. The
presentation also notes that the NSA has been unable to employ this method to
target users of Google services. Apparently, that can only be done by Britain's
GCHQ intelligence service, which has acquired QUANTUM tools from the NSA.
A
favored tool of intelligence service hackers is "QUANTUMINSERT." GCHQ workers
used this method to attack
the computers of employeesat partly government-held Belgian
telecommunications company Belgacom, in order to use their computers to
penetrate even further into the company's networks. The NSA, meanwhile, used the
same technology to target
high-ranking members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) at the
organization's Vienna headquarters. In both cases, the trans-Atlantic spying
consortium gained unhindered access to valuable economic data using these
tools.
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The
insert method and other variants of QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
network operated by the NSA alongside the Internet, with its own, well-hidden
infrastructure comprised of "covert" routers and servers. It appears the NSA
also incorporates routers and servers from non-NSA networks into its covert
network by infecting these networks with "implants" that then allow the
government hackers to control the computers remotely. (Click here to read a related
article on the NSA's
"implants".)
In
this way, the intelligence service seeks to identify and track its targets based
on their digital footprints. These identifiers could include certain email
addresses or website cookies set on a person's computer. Of course, a cookie
doesn't automatically identify a person, but it can if it includes additional
information like an email address. In that case, a cookie becomes something like
the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
A Race Between Servers
Once
TAO teams have gathered sufficient data on their targets' habits, they can shift
into attack mode, programming the QUANTUM systems to perform this work in a
largely automated way. If a data packet featuring the email address or cookie of
a target passes through a cable or router monitored by the NSA, the system
sounds the alarm. It determines what website the target person is trying to
access and then activates one of the intelligence service's covert servers,
known by the codename FOXACID.
This
NSA server coerces the user into connecting to NSA covert systems rather than
the intended sites. In the case of Belgacom engineers, instead of reaching the
LinkedIn page they were actually trying to visit, they were also directed to
FOXACID servers housed on NSA networks. Undetected by the user, the manipulated
page transferred malware already custom tailored to match security holes on the
target person's computer.
The
technique can literally be a race between servers, one that is described in
internal intelligence agency jargon with phrases like: "Wait for client to
initiate new connection," "Shoot!" and "Hope to beat server-to-client response."
Like any competition, at times the covert network's surveillance tools are "too
slow to win the race." Often enough, though, they are effective. Implants with
QUANTUMINSERT, especially when used in conjunction with LinkedIn, now have a
success rate of over 50 percent, according to one internal document.
Tapping Undersea Cables
At
the same time, it is in no way true to say that the NSA has its sights set
exclusively on select individuals. Of even greater interest are entire networks
and network providers, such as the fiber optic cables that direct a large share
of global Internet traffic along the world's ocean floors.
One
document labeled "top secret" and "not for foreigners" describes the NSA's
success in spying on the "SEA-ME-WE-4" cable system. This massive underwater
cable bundle connects Europe with North Africa and the Gulf states and then
continues on through Pakistan and India, all the way to Malaysia and Thailand.
The cable system originates in southern France, near Marseille. Among the
companies that hold ownership stakes in it are France Telecom, now known as
Orange and still partly government-owned, and Telecom Italia Sparkle.
The
document proudly announces that, on Feb. 13, 2013, TAO "successfully collected
network management information for the SEA-Me-We Undersea Cable Systems
(SMW-4)." With the help of a "website masquerade operation," the agency was able
to "gain access to the consortium's management website and collected Layer 2
network information that shows the circuit mapping for significant portions of
the network."
It
appears the government hackers succeeded here once again using the QUANTUMINSERT
method.
The
document states that the TAO team hacked an internal website of the operator
consortium and copied documents stored there pertaining to technical
infrastructure. But that was only the first step. "More operations are planned
in the future to collect more information about this and other cable systems,"
it continues.
But
numerous internal announcements of successful attacks like the one against the
undersea cable operator aren't the exclusive factors that make TAO stand out at
the NSA. In contrast to most NSA operations, TAO's ventures often require
physical access to their targets. After all, you might have to directly access a
mobile network transmission station before you can begin tapping the digital
information it provides.
Spying Traditions Live On
To
conduct those types of operations, the NSA works together with other
intelligence agencies such as the CIA and FBI, which in turn maintain informants
on location who are available to help with sensitive missions. This enables TAO
to attack even isolated networks that aren't connected to the Internet. If
necessary, the FBI can even make an agency-owned jet available to ferry the
high-tech plumbers to their target. This gets them to their destination at the
right time and can help them to disappear again undetected after as little as a
half hour's work.
Responding
to a query from SPIEGEL, NSA officials issued a statement saying, "Tailored
Access Operations is a unique national asset that is on the front lines of
enabling NSA to defend the nation and its allies." The statement added that
TAO's "work is centered on computer network exploitation in support of foreign
intelligence collection." The officials said they would not discuss specific
allegations regarding TAO's mission.
Sometimes
it appears that the world's most modern spies are just as reliant on
conventional methods of reconnaissance as their predecessors.
Take,
for example, when they intercept shipping deliveries. If a target person, agency
or company orders a new computer or related accessories, for example, TAO can
divert the shipping delivery to its own secret workshops. The NSA calls this
method interdiction. At these so-called "load stations," agents carefully open
the package in order to load malware onto the electronics, or even install
hardware components that can provide backdoor access for the intelligence
agencies. All subsequent steps can then be conducted from the comfort of a
remote computer.
These
minor disruptions in the parcel shipping business rank among the "most
productive operations" conducted by the NSA hackers, one top secret document
relates in enthusiastic terms. This method, the presentation continues, allows
TAO to obtain access to networks "around the world."
Even
in the Internet Age, some traditional spying methods continue to live on.
REPORTED BY JACOB APPELBAUM,
LAURA POITRAS, MARCEL ROSENBACH, CHRISTIAN STÖCKER, JÖRG SCHINDLER AND HOLGER
STARK
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