Thursday, October 4, 2012

Terrorism Tradecraft

from STRATFOR

Terrorism Tradecraft
October 4, 2012 | 0900 GMT

Stratfor

By Scott Stewart

One of the distinctive features of Stratfor's terrorism and security analysis is its focus on the methodology of attacks. Of course, identifying those responsible for an attack is important, especially in ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice. But Stratfor believes that analyzing the way in which an attack was conducted is more important because it can prevent future attacks and protect potential victims. It is likewise important to recognize that even if a terrorist is killed or arrested, other groups and individuals share terrorist tactics. Sometimes this comes from direct interaction. For example, many of the Marxist terrorist groups that trained together in South Yemen, Lebanon and Libya in the 1980s employed similar tactics. Otherwise, a tactic's popularity is derived from its effectiveness. Indeed, several terrorist groups adopted airline hijacking in the 1960s and 1970s.

The mechanics of terrorism go far beyond target selection and the method of attack. This is especially true of aspiring transnational terrorists. Basic military skills may be helpful in waging terrorist attacks in areas where a militant group has access to men, weapons and targets -- such was the case with Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, Libya -- but an entirely different set of skills is required to operate in a hostile environment or at a distance. This set of skills is known as terrorist tradecraft.
Foundational Skills

Before an attack can be planned, an aspiring terrorist group must be organized, funded and trained. Would-be terrorists in Libya, Yemen or Pakistan's North Waziristan agency can achieve these things relatively easily. However, aspiring terrorists in New York, London and Paris encounter more difficulty. The recent arrests of such terrorists in the West, most recently the Sept. 15 arrest of a would-be jihadist in Chicago, show just how difficult it can be to find like-minded individuals to organize a terrorist cell.

Therefore, operational security is a critical skill that must be mastered to protect the fledgling organization from infiltration by law enforcement or intelligence agencies. Every person brought into the group decreases the group's operational security. So the very existence of the group must remain hidden, and every new member must be thoroughly vetted to ensure they are not plants. As the organization matures and becomes involved in actual attacks, operational security will continue to be vitally important to the organization's success and survival.

A key sub-skill to operational security is the ability to procure false identification documents. False identification is required for more than just international travel; these documents are required for domestic travel as well as for commercial transactions, such as buying or renting vehicles, procuring safe-houses and purchasing firearms, explosives and other components of manufactured explosives and improvised explosive devices. False documents are more important for operatives or organizations that want to attack continually than they are for suicide bombers, provided the authorities do not know the identity of the bomber and provided the bomber can travel to the operational destination.

Establishing a secure form of communication is also a priority. As a terrorist group grows, communication tradecraft must evolve beyond the verbal communication. Naturally, the more members a group has, and the farther away they are from one another, the more challenging secure communication becomes.

Once a group is securely organized, the members must fund their operations. Indeed, the ability to transfer funds clandestinely is a skill closely related to communication. Funding varies greatly from organization and location. Some terrorist groups obtain funding from the surrounding population. In places where the group is seen as fighting a colonial power or a dictator, financial support may be willingly given. In other circumstances, the population may give support grudgingly through extortion or informal taxes levied by the terrorist group.

State sponsors are another source of funding, as are wealthy individuals sympathetic to the terrorists' causes. Terrorists also are funded through illegal activity, including large-scale narcotics sales, which are frequently used by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Taliban. Hezbollah generates revenue through cigarette tax fraud and through selling counterfeit goods and fake prescription drugs. Kidnapping is also an age-old method of funding terrorism.
The Attack

With organizational structure and funding in place, the terrorist organization can then turn to acquiring the skills necessary to conduct an attack. But to understand the tradecraft skills required to conduct an attack, one must first recognize that attacks do not happen randomly. They are the result of planning that follows a discernable attack cycle.

VIDEO: Stratfor on the Terrorist Attack Cycle
The specific skills required to conduct an attack can range from constructing an improvised explosive device to marksmanship, to driving a truck or even piloting a jumbo jet. Sometimes these skills can be acquired legally by joining a gun club or attending driver or pilot training. In other instances, skills like bombmaking must be learned illicitly, either by trial and error or by attending a terrorist training camp. 

Perhaps the most important tradecraft skill in the attack planning cycle is surveillance tradecraft, or the ability to observe a potential target without alerting anyone that the target is being watched. The vulnerabilities noted during surveillance are frequently used in selecting the target. Further surveillance is often used to plan the attack, and then another round of surveillance may be conducted as part of the attack to track the target's progress to the attack site.

Planning the attack is another tradecraft skill, which requires the ability to observe a target, identify a security weakness and then contrive a means to exploit the vulnerability. The best planners devise novel approaches, such as using jumbo jets as human-guided cruise missiles, or invent ways to disguise more traditional devices, like improvised explosive devices, in such items as dolls, radios, shoes, underwear, bottles of contact lens solution, brassieres and pregnancy prosthetics.

An attack tradecraft component that has often proved vulnerable during the attack planning cycle is weapons acquisition. In fact, many attacks were disrupted when the plotters attempted to procure firearms or explosives.

Operational security continues to be important during the attack planning phase. Operatives must be able to create believable cover stories to explain their presence and actions in certain locations. This cover ranges from clothing -- wearing a telephone company uniform while conducting a kidnapping or dressing as a road repair crewmember to plant an improvised explosive device, for example -- to renting a farm in order to purchase large quantities of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, a common ingredient in improvised explosive mixtures.
Projecting Power

Generally, these tradecraft skills are not concentrated in one member of a terrorist organization. Some people will be proficient at surveillance while some have a knack for making money or procuring weapons. Others may be good at manufacturing improvised explosive mixtures or assembling improvised explosive devices. However, this is true only of groups operating in their native areas.

The problem comes when a group wants to project power and conduct transnational attacks outside its core territory. In such a case, the group must identify a person proficient in a number of these tradecraft skills who can conduct an operation alone or with the assistance of a small group. This person must also be able to travel to the targeted country -- a requirement that has caused groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to attempt transnational strikes from afar. The fact that the al Qaeda franchise's attempts to go long have all failed -- the underwear bomber and the printer bomb plots, for example -- demonstrates how difficult such plots are.

Many groups simply cannot plan and execute complex transnational attacks like the 9/11 plot and the Mumbai attacks. However, this does not mean they are not threats. Operating in their home territory, they are very capable of causing carnage. This holds true not only for jihadist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq or the Haqqani network in Pakistan, but also for groups like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Somalia's al Shabaab and Nigeria's Boko Haram -- all of which have a demonstrated ability to conduct devastating attacks against targets located in their home territories. In fact, the impact of Ansar al-Sharia's Benghazi attack may be regarded as a pattern, which shows how an attack that required very little transnational terrorist tradecraft nonetheless had a large international impact.

Wednesday, October 3, 2012

American Drones for Covert Underwater Warfare against Iran

American Drones for Covert Underwater Warfare against Iran
By Julie Lévesque
Global Research, September 28, 2012
Url of this article:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/american-drones-for-covert-underwater-warfare-against-iran/

Obscuring the devastating effects of U.S. drones killing innocent civilians around the world, it is with a touch of rather inappropriate humor and enthusiasm that the military consulting company Strike Fighter Consulting speaks highly of the U.S. Navy’s new Unmanned Underwater Vehicles in its recently published article, Unmanned Drones Take to the Seas:

“It looks like drone pilots are going to need swimming lessons.

The US Navy is currently experimenting with a new breed of drone submarines in the waters next to Newport, Rhode Island. Their hope is that these drones will take the first steps (or the first doggy paddle, if you will) into a future of autonomous submarines.

These drones, which are technically known as Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (of course) could be a “game changer” for the Navy, said Christoper Egan, a program manager at the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. Every single thing that makes aerial drones so effective can just as easily be applied to submarines. (Dabney B., Unmanned Drones Take to the Seas, Strike Fighter Consulting Inc, September 19, 2012, emphasis added.)

Unmanned Drones Take to the Seas

What kind of “efficiency” are we talking about here?

Drone warfare has been mostly “efficient” in killing innocent civilians, including children, according to a study by Stanford University and New York University:

According to the new study, just one in fifty victims of the CIA programme of “targeted” drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas are known militants, while between 2,562 and 3,325 people were killed in Pakistan between June 2004 and mid-September this year – of whom between 474 and 881 were civilians, including 176 children. (The News International (Pakistan), Pakistan. CIA Annihilation From The Air: Drone Warfare’s Invisible Dead, September 26, 2012)

We are told that these new “cost-efficient” underwater drones “could be used to map the ocean floor, detect enemy mines, gather surveillance, or assist in anti-submarine warfare [...] The Navy hopes that the Razor would be virtually undetectable by enemy systems.” (Dabney B., op. cit.)

Earlier this year Aviation Week published an article on Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) which confirms that the underwater drone technology is not well established. The new Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) is slated to be used no later than 2014:

The Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) will be large and highly autonomous, carrying out missions at long distances for months. It will act as a mothership, deploying and operating static and mobile sensors for persistent surveillance in coastal waters. Ultimately, it is likely to be armed. The program sounds ambitious, but much of the technology has already been proven.

[...]

The LDUUV will have a large payload bay, making it capable of releasing sensors, communication buoys, smaller UUS and weapons. The Navy’s current emphasis is on persistent surveillance “over the horizon.” However, its most significant impact could be in mine warfare, both offensive and defensive.

And the LDUUV could make offensive mine laying more controllable and clandestine. In the transformational mine concept, the LDUUV lays networked sensors across a wide area. These track and identify every vessel within range. Depending on the situation, any vessel can be engaged, by either an anchored weapon or a torpedo from the UUV itself.

[...]

The Navy plans to release a request for proposals for the LDUUV in 2014. Last October Rear Adm. Barry Bruner, the Navy’s undersea warfare director, indicated that up to 10 LDUUVs would be procured. The LDUUV is being pitched as a helper to complement manned submarines. However, if it achieves the technology goals for endurance and autonomy, it will pose serious questions of what exactly large unmanned craft could not ultimately do. (David Hambling, Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Steaming Ahead, Aviation Week, April 1, 2012, emphasis added. )



If this technology has been proven, it can be used for underwater warfare.

Will unmanned armed submarines be used for “clandestine mining” against Iran in the Persian Gulf?

Reports confirm, in this regard, that military exercises are currently (September 2012) being conducted near Iran’s territorial waters, and are “intended to simulate Iran’s response to a US-Israeli attack, namely what actions will be taken by allied forces in response to military retaliation by Iran”. (Michel Chossudovsky, “Warship Diplomacy”: A Prelude to All Out War against Iran?, Global Research, September 26, 2012.)

Underwater drones are part of the war games, Bloomberg reports:

“The BAE Systems Plc (BA/) 25mm guided ‘‘Mark 38 Mod 2,” and Kingfish unmanned underwater vehicle are among the programs the Pentagon this year accelerated under a “Fast Lane” initiative to counter Iranian naval weapons. One of the most serious threats, the Navy says, are Iranian speedboats that can employ “swarming” tactics.” (Bloomberg, September 19, 2012. emphasis added. )

A recent statement by the Director of Research of the Neocon think tank Washington Institute for Near East Policy has suggested that the US should provoke Iran into “firing the first shot”.

“We are in the game of using covert means against Iranians. We can get nastier at that [...] The United States—along with as many international partners as it can mobilize—should move to more forceful action, be it covert or overt, publicly proclaimed or deniable.” (Patrick Clawson, cited in Michel Chossudovsky, Neocon Washington Think Tank: The US should Provoke Iran into “Firing the First Shot”, September 26, 2012.)

Underwater drones seem to constitute the perfect weapon to be used in acts of provocation.
Copyright © 2012 Global Research

Defence of Narrow Seas in Southeast Asia


RSIS presents the following commentary Defence of Narrow Seas in Southeast Asia by Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg



No. 184/2012 dated 3 October 2012
Defence of Narrow Seas in Southeast Asia
 By Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto       
Synopsis

Southeast Asia is in the midst of an unprecedented level of naval modernisation. Given that Southeast Asian waters constitute both enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, how do these geographical conditions affect maritime defence?
Commentary
SOUTHEAST Asian states are pursuing an unprecedented level of naval modernisation as tensions in the South China Sea test their abilities to find diplomatic solutions to their territorial disputes. According to projections by a US-based naval consulting company, AMI International, Southeast Asia is set to spend more than US$25 billion on new naval acquisitions through 2030, with the core of future projects to include fast attack craft and submarines. However, the configuration of Southeast Asian seas as enclosed and semi-enclosed seas (“narrow seas”) could affect and influence maritime defence in the area.

Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Sea
Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas are defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as “a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more states and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states”. As argued by Milan Vego of the US Naval War College, enclosed sea “lies wholly within the continental shelf, and is surrounded by a landmass except for a strait or several straits that connect it to an ocean or another enclosed or semi-enclosed sea”. Semi-enclosed sea is more characterised by large tidal ranges that are oceanic in nature.

Vego defines narrow seas militarily as “bodies of water that can be controlled from both its sides”. As such, maritime forces operating in narrow seas are much less immune from the land-based weapons of coastal states than in open seas. This makes defence of, and in, narrow seas different from that of the open seas, including in Southeast Asia.

Defence of Narrow Seas
Defence of narrow seas is primarily characterised by two caveats: The lack of physical space and closer proximity to land. As Vego asserts, these would bring consequences for maritime forces in terms of their manoeuvrability, combat intensity, battlespace spectrums, and the use of airpower. In narrow seas, large surface combatants are much more difficult to manoeuver due to more restrictions in depth, width, and access.

Maritime combat operations will also be more saturated and intense since most narrow seas are relatively within the effective range of land-based weapons. It can also be multi-dimensional across all spectrums of battlespace: air and space, surface and subsurface, coastal, and electromagnetic, as the propensity to confront the whole fleet of a coastal state is much greater than in open seas.

Furthermore, narrow seas are still within the range of land-based combat aircraft which makes it relatively easier for coastal states to challenge sea control and conduct sea denial operations without actually having robust naval combat assets at sea. Sea control aims to use the sea for oneself, and if necessary, prevent the enemy from using it; whereas sea denial aims to deny the enemy’s fleet from operating in a particular sea area, but does not aim to use it for oneself.

Narrow seas often constitute the territorial seas and exclusive economic zone of a coastal state that makes control over them desirable due to social and economic necessities. It is also in narrow seas that a weaker coastal state can effectively challenge a superior maritime power using an array of “asymmetric” maritime capabilities such as naval mines, coastal missile batteries, and submarines.

Presumably, more investment toward these capabilities might be more destabilising as they could only be used for warfighting purposes. This could generate misunderstanding and miscalculation, especially when they are deployed in disputed narrow seas, like the South China Sea.

Southeast Asian Context
  
In Southeast Asia, there is no shortage of narrow seas to influence regional maritime defence. Historical precedents from World War II offer salutary examples of defence in narrow seas. The capital ships of the British Royal Navy, the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse, were sunk entirely from the air for the first time in combat in the South China Sea by Japanese bombers off the east coast of Malaya. Hence, control over narrow seas often requires control over the air above and water column below.

Amidst the growing maritime competition between the key powers in the South China Sea, the coastal states seem to be gearing themselves up to meet this challenge. Submarines are already in the fleets of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and in the top shopping list of Vietnam, with Thailand and Philippines mulling acquisition too. Maritime strike aircraft, like the Sukhoi Su-30, have entered the inventories of Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. The Philippines would also start procuring fighter and surface attack aircraft, apart from boosting its depleted air surveillance capability.

Vietnam has acquired two Russian Bastion coastal missile systems that could hit a ship 300 km away from the coast. For Indonesia, naval mine warfare has been designated as a crucial element of its naval strategy. More importantly, coastal states could also exploit the islands in the area by building infrastructures to support exertion of sea control over the surrounding waters. Control over maritime choke-points and passes are also crucial as they guarantee access for maritime powers to transit in regional narrow seas.

For the maritime powers, too, they need to adapt to more agile and versatile platforms, like corvettes, frigates, and littoral combat ships. Without the latter adequate escort, there is a great risk to deploy large platforms like amphibious assault ships or aircraft carriers in hostile narrow seas.

However this development should not be a cause for alarm. Regional maritime forces still have a long way to go to transform platforms into real capabilities. There are some important questions about their capacities to effectively operate them, ensure safety during their operational use, as well as quality maintenance. Unless these questions are properly addressed, one should doubt the utility of these capabilities beyond being a psychological deterrent.


Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is a Senior Analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He was previously a researcher at the Centre for East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS), University of Indonesia.

Libya: How Many Dirty Western Hands?

Libya: How Many Dirty Western Hands?
By Felicity Arbuthnot
Global Research, October 01, 2012
Url of this article:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/libya-how-many-dirty-western-hands/


Oh what a tangled web they weave

When first they practice to invade

A sovereign nation and deceive

The world about their dark crusade.

(Michael Leunig, Poet, Cartoonist, 1945:)



This weekend a detailed article (i) suggested that a: “French secret serviceman, acting on the express orders of the then President Sarkozy, is suspected of ”the murder of Colonel Quaddafi”, on 20th October last year.

Whilst bearing in mind that the NATO-backed insurgents now in power, who have near destroyed much of Libya, de-stabilised, terrorized and hope to carve up Libya’s resources for their, rather than the country’s benefit, have every reason to wish to disassociate themselves from the butchery of Colonel Quaddafi’s terrible death, the new allegations illuminate interesting points.

The French assassin, it is claimed, infiltrated the mob rabidly manhandling the Colonel, and shot him in the head.

“The motive, according to well placed (Libyan) sources”, was to prevent any chance of interrogation into Sarkozy’s links with Colonel Quaddafi.

The Mail previously revealed (ii) quoting a French governmental briefing note published by an investigative website, that fifty million euros has been: “laundered though bank accounts in Panama and Switzerland ... from Colonel Quaddafi, to fund (Sarkozy’s 2007) election as President”, which if correct: “would have broken political financing laws.” Sarkozy’s: “numerous visits to Libya” were also cited.

Further claims are that: “The Swiss account was opened in the name of the sister of Jean-Francois Cope, the leader of Mr Sarkozy’s ruling UMP party, and the President’s right-hand-man.”

Quaddafi’s son, Saif alIslam, whose life hangs in the balance and no doubt further so, should he be subject to the Libyan “judicial system”, has stated unequivocally regarding the Sarkozy campaign funding: “We have all the details and are ready to reveal everything ... We funded it.”

No wonder Saif, also generous funder (£1.5 million) to his former place of, advanced study, the prestigious London School of Economics – where he also delivered the annual Ralph Miliband Lecture in May2010, named for the renowned academic and father of the former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband and his brother Ed, current Leader of the Labour Party – has been abandoned by the Western powers who had formerly welcomed him – then conspired in another illegal coup, this time in his country.

Sarkozy of course, on becoming President, memorably welcomed Colonel Quaddafi on a State Visit to Paris in December 2007, greeting him as “Brother Leader” and hosting his famed Bedouin tent next to the Elysee Palace.

Tony Blair, of course visited Quaddafi on many occasions, even flying in the Colonel’s private plane, pushing mega business deals. He too is mute on the horrors of the death and the fate of his children, grandchildren and country.

The Mail also makes the points that: “ The United Nations mandate which sanctioned (the misnamed ‘no fly zone’) expressly stated that the Western allies could not interfere in the internal politics of the country.”

“Instead the almost daily bombing runs ended with Quaddafi’s overthrow, while both French and British military ‘advisors’ were said to have assisted on the ground.”

“Now Mahmoud Jibril, who served as interim Prime Minister following Gaddafi’s overthrow, has told Egyptian TV: ‘It was a foreign agent who mixed with the revolutionary brigades to kill Gaddafi.’ “

Another Tripoli source, according to the paper, stated: “Sarkozy had every reason to try to silence the Colonel and as quickly as possible”, with a further “diplomatic source” also stressing Quaddafi’s threats to reveal the financial details of the funding to the 2007 French Presidential elections donations.

An interesting point, if correct, is made by Rami El Obeidi, the : “former head of foreign relations for the Libyan Transitional Council (who) said he knew that Quaddafi had been tracked through his satellite telecommunications system as he talked to: “the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.” Which begs an elephantine question: are the two murderous Western backed rampages against Libya and Syria and their leaders connected?

How much of alleged murky financial deals does Syria’s President also know?

Interestingly, Ben Oman Shaaban (22) one of those who attacked Colonel Quaddaffi was badly injured, seemingly by those loyal to the Colonel, in an attack in July. Flown to Paris for treatment, he died in hospital last week. Shabaan was said to have frequently brandished the handgun said to have killed the Colonel. If true, he would have interesting knowledge about the appalling events of the day.

Sarkozy has consistently denied receiving money from the Libyan Leader and was not available to give a comment to the Mail. Enquiries into “alleged financial irregularities “, are ongoing.

Worthy of mention is that in November 2007, just before Quaddafi’s Paris visit: “A US State Department cable had warned that those ‘who dominate Libya’s political and economic leadership are pursuing increasingly nationalistic policies in the energy sector’ and that there was ‘growing evidence of Libyan resource nationalism.’ ”

“The cable cited a 2006 speech in which Quaddafi said: ‘Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them. Now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money.’ ”

“Quaddafi’s government had forced oil companies to give their local subsidiaries Libyan names. Worse, ‘labor laws were amended to ‘Libyanize’ the economy’, that is, turn it to the advantage of Libyans.” Goodness, shocking.

“Oil firms ‘were pressed to hire Libyan managers, finance people and human resources directors.’ ” (iii)

Perhaps then it is no wonder all round, that on hearing of Colonel Quaddafi’s horrific death, President Nobel Obama declared it was a: “momentous day.” (BBC, 20th October 2011.) Madam Clinton followed with a raucous laugh and: “We came, we saw, he died.”

There is only one certainty, in the whole shaming “regime change” in Libya, there are no clean hands.

And where is Colonel Quaddafi’s body?

Notes

i. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2210759/Gaddafi-killed-French-secret-serviceman-orders-Nicolas-Sarkozy-sources-claim.html#ixzz282zW9AoQ

ii. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2113910/Colonel-Gaddafi-gave- French-President-Nicolas-Sarkozy-42MILLION-fund-2007-election-campaign.html#ixzz283FmeGE0

iii. http://gowans.wordpress.com/2012/05/06/gadhafis-crime-making-libyas-economy-work-for-libyans/




Copyright © 2012 Global Research

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Salafism and Arab Democratization


from STRATFOR

Salafism and Arab Democratization
October 2, 2012 | 0900 GMT

Stratfor

By Kamran Bokhari
Vice President of Middle Eastern & South Asian Affairs

The outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 brought significant attention to groups -- known as Islamists -- seeking to establish Islamic states in countries once ruled by secular autocrats. The bulk of this attention went to already established political groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which caused consternation in the West when its Freedom and Justice Party won control of both Egypt's parliament and its presidency.

Much less attention was paid to the Brotherhood's principal Islamist competitors, members of the ultraconservative Salafist movement, despite their second-place finish in Egypt's parliamentary elections. This changed in late September when certain Salafists played a key role in the unrest in reaction to an anti-Islamic video posted on the Internet.

Since then, Salafism has become the subject of much public discourse -- though as is often the case with unfamiliar subjects, questions are vastly more numerous than answers. This is compounded by the rapidity of its rise from a relatively minor, apolitical movement to an influential Islamist phenomenon.

Origins and Goals of Salafism

Modern Salafism is based on an austere reinterpretation of Islam, calling for Muslims to return to the original teachings outlined in the Koran and the practices of the Prophet Mohammed as understood by the earliest generation, i.e., the Companions of the Prophet. From the Salafist perspective, non-Islamic thought has contaminated the message of "true" Islam for centuries, and this excess must be jettisoned from the Islamic way of life.

Salafists are a minority among the global Muslim population and even among Islamists. Unlike members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists do not belong to a singular organization. Instead, the movement comprises a diffuse agglomeration of neighborhood preachers, societal groups and -- only very recently -- political parties, none of which are necessarily united in ideology.

In many ways, Salafism can be seen as a rejection of the political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. For most of the movement's existence, it shunned politics -- and thus Islamism -- in favor of a focus on personal morality and individual piety, arguing that an Islamic state could not exist without Muslims first returning to the tenets of "true" Islam. This means Salafism also was at odds with the concept of jihadism -- itself a violent offshoot of Salafism -- as practiced by groups such as al Qaeda that sought to use force to manifest their Islamist ideology.

The Salafist movement could also afford to stay away from political activism in large part because it had a political backer in the government of Saudi Arabia. While many Salafists didn't agree with some of Riyadh's policies, its historical role as the birthplace of Salafism and role as the patron underwriting the global spread of Salafist thought kept the movement within the Saudi orbit.

This remained the case until the 1991 Gulf War, in which Saudi Arabia was forced to allow some 500,000 U.S. troops into the kingdom to protect itself from Baathist Iraq, after the latter's brief occupation of Kuwait. The move caused an uproar over the religious legitimacy of allowing non-Muslim soldiers on what many consider to be holy grounds, and it also gave way to a wider debate about the political state of affairs of the Saudi kingdom. Prominent scholars began publicly calling for reform, which led to Salafists in general engaging in political discourse and, eventually, to the concept of Salafism as an Islamist philosophy.

Nevertheless, Salafists would not become a political force for another two decades, simply because it takes time for an apolitical religious movement to develop a political philosophy. At the same time, the Saudi leadership was rallying the country's religious establishment to contain these newly politicized Salafists. The 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. actions against jihadism further advanced Salafist thought as the sect tried to hold on to its core values amid U.S.-led international pressure for reform, distinguish itself from jihadists and come up with a viable political alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Arab Spring

By the end of the 2000s, Salafism had spread across the Arab world, most notably to Egypt and Tunisia, expanding both the number of its adherents and its institutional scope, which now included social organizations engaged in charity, relief and community work. They stopped short of formal political groups, largely because of the autocratic regimes under which they lived, but they quietly developed the infrastructure for such groups. It was under these circumstances that the Salafists found themselves at the beginning of the Arab Spring.

The case of Egypt's Salafists is the most telling. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, they were caught unprepared when the popular agitation largely led by liberal youth groups broke out and began to consume decades-old secular autocratic regimes. While they eventually were able to overshadow the largely non-Islamist forces that played a key role in forcing the ouster of then-President Hosni Mubarak, they lacked the political machine that the Brotherhood had developed over the course of some 80 years. The result was the rise of various Salafist forces haphazardly trying to assert themselves in a post-authoritarian Egypt.

Several Egyptian Salafist groups applied for licenses to form political parties. Two prominent parties -- al-Nour and al-Asala -- emerged along with a host of individuals, such as Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, who ran as an independent candidate for president. The two Salafist parties banded together with the newly formed political wing of the former jihadist group Gamaa al-Islamiya -- the Building and Development Party -- to form the Islamist Bloc. The alliance was able to garner more than a quarter of ballots cast in the parliamentary polls late last year, coming in second place behind the Brotherhood.

What was most important about these Salafists participating in mainstream politics is that they embraced the electoral process after decades of having denounced democracy as un-Islamic. In other words, they ultimately adopted the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they had hitherto vehemently rejected. This transformation has been more a rushed affair stemming from expediency rather than a natural ideological evolution.

There is an expectation that radical forces joining the political mainstream could, over time, lead to their de-radicalization. That may be true in the case of states with strong democratic systems, but in most Arab countries -- which are just now beginning their journey away from authoritarianism -- the Salafist embrace of electoral politics is likely to delay and perhaps even disrupt the democratization process and destabilize Egypt and by extension the region.

Much of this chaos will stem from the fact that the move to accept democratic politics has led to further fragmentation of the Salafist landscape. Many Salafists still are not comfortable with democracy, and those who have cautiously adopted it are divided into many factions. The result is that no one Salafist entity can speak for the bulk of the sect.
What Lies Ahead

Clearly, the Salafists are bereft of any tradition of civil dissent. That said, they have exhibited a strong sense of urgency to exercise their nascent freedom and engage in political activism. The outcome of this was the rioting that took place in reaction to the anti-Islamic film.

The Salafists are not just suffering from arrested political development; they face an intellectual discrepancy. On one hand, they wish to be part of the new democratic order and a mainstream player. On the other, they subscribe to a radical agenda that dictates the imposition of their stern interpretation of Islamic law across the Arab and Muslim world.

Their envisioned order is not just a problem for secularists, Christians, Jews and other minorities but also for more moderate Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood lost its monopoly on Islamism close to four decades ago but back then it didn't matter because the Brotherhood was an opposition movement. Now that the group has won political power in Egypt, the Salafists represent a threat to its political interests.

Some of the more politically savvy Salafists, especially the political parties, are willing to work with the Muslim Brotherhood toward the common goals of furthering the democratic transition and containing radical and militant tendencies. Ultimately, however, they seek to exploit the Brotherhood's pragmatism in order to undermine the mainstream Islamist movement's support among religious voters. Additionally, the Salafists are also trying to make use of their role as mediators between the Brotherhood-led government and the jihadists active in the Sinai region to enhance their bargaining power and lessen the Brotherhood's.

Salafists -- whether they operate through legal means or through raw street power -- can be expected to create problems for Egypt's new government led by President Mohammed Morsi, especially when it comes to foreign policy matters. A prime example is the recent case of the film-related violence, during which Morsi had a difficult time balancing the need to placate the masses at home and maintain a working relationship with the United States, upon which Egypt relies for its economic well-being. While the anger over the film is a passing phenomenon, the underlying dynamic persists.

There is also no shortage of issues for right-wing Islamists to exploit. U.S. imperatives in the region will continue to place the Morsi government in a tight spot and provide reasons for the Salafists to oppose Cairo's policies. Even more volatile than the dealings between the Morsi administration and Washington will be Israeli-Egyptian relations.

So far, Morsi has managed to avoid dealing too directly with Israel. But the Egyptian president and the Brotherhood cannot avoid this for too long. They know that they will face situations where they could be caught between the need to maintain peaceful relations with Israel and deal with Salafists taking advantage of the widespread anti-Israeli sentiment among Egyptians. This is one of the reasons Morsi and his associates have been speaking of revising the peace treaty with Israel, which is an attempt to manage the inevitable backlash on the home front.

Egypt's difficulties are particularly pronounced given the country's status as the leader of the Arab world, but Salafists of various stripes are slowly emerging as political stakeholders across the region, especially in Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Democratization by its very nature is a messy affair in any context, but in the case of the Arab spring, Salafist entities can be expected to complicate political transitions and undermine stability and security in the Middle East.

The major challenge to stability in the Arab world thus lies only partially in the transition to democracy from autocracy. Greater than that is the challenge mainstream Islamists face from a complex and divided Salafist movement.

Read more: Salafism and Arab Democratization | Stratfor

Monday, October 1, 2012

China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications for Southeast Asia

RSIS presents the following commentary China’s Aircraft Carrier: Implications for Southeast Asia by Koh Swee Lean Collin. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg



No. 183/2012 dated 1 October 2012
China’s Aircraft Carrier:
Implications for Southeast Asia
 By Koh Swee Lean Collin       
Synopsis

The induction of China’s first aircraft carrier by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is no cause for overreaction by Southeast Asian governments, from the strategic and operational perspectives. Still, China’s aircraft carrier programme may provide greater grounds for concern by 2020.
Commentary
THE INDUCTION into service of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, amidst ongoing tensions in the East and South China Seas, could not have been more coincidental. Inevitably this could provoke regional concerns in regard to whether China would use its newfound capability against competing claimants in those disputes.

This might be especially so for comparatively weaker countries in Southeast Asia which have viewed China’s growing naval might over the past decade with at least some concern. However, should Southeast Asia be overly concerned about this development?

Carrier in confined littorals
The accepted consensus amongst naval analysts is that building a full-fledged carrier capability takes time. More than just having the aircraft carrier, it involves providing supporting elements such as escorting warships and replenishment vessels, not to mention a fully-developed carrier-borne aviation complement, all of which constitute a typical carrier battle group (CBG).

A CBG is still not considered a fully-operational fighting force until the necessary doctrine and operational and technical knowhow of carrier operations are acquired, diffused and mustered throughout the entire CBG. The time taken for a whole CBG to train to operate together as one cohesive fighting force can be considerably lengthy.

Moreover, the Southeast Asian maritime confines, characterised by narrow and semi-enclosed waters, do not favour the operation of large-sized carriers. A typical CBG presents a large and highly visible target with its accompanying fleet train, which increases its vulnerability to detection.

In confined littorals, large warships could be particularly vulnerable to well-concealed asymmetric countermeasures, exploiting local geography, such as submarines and long-range missiles. The encounters between US Navy carriers and PLAN submarines in 1994 and 2006 as well as the successful attack on the Israeli Navy corvette INS Hanit in 2006 by a Hezbollah shore-based anti-ship missile highlight such vulnerability.

No surprise for regional governments
The Chinese carrier programme should not have come across as a surprise regionally. China’s aircraft carrier dream dated from the Kuomintang period in the 1940s and this was revived by the communist government in the 1980s. High-profile purchases of decommissioned Australian and Soviet medium-sized carriers in the mid-1980s and early-1990s exemplified Beijing’s intent. This meant that over these decades, regional governments have at least been partially desensitized to the Chinese carrier prospect.

Since the 1990s, even if it does not constitute the primary motivation behind Southeast Asia’s naval modernisation, China’s aircraft carrier intent could have spurred regional acquisition of such ‘cheaper’ anticipatory countermeasures as long-range missiles, aerial maritime surveillance and submarines. These could have helped in mitigating the potential materialisation of China’s aircraft carrier programme. In sum, Southeast Asia is generally prepared for such a contingency.

Therefore, China’s first aircraft carrier should not warrant any overreaction on the part of Southeast Asian governments. However, China’s carrier programme may potentially present a real source of concern by 2020 when the two planned indigenous carriers, according to PLAN sources, are expected to enter service in 2020 and 2022 respectively. The indigenous carrier is reported to be based on but larger than the Varyag design, implying a vastly more capable vessel displacing more than 70,000 tonnes full-load.

One needs also to pay attention to Beijing’s overall attempts to build up its CBG capacity. This is well exemplified by the recent induction and construction of new destroyers optimised for fleet air defence coverage, conceivably with CBG air defence in mind. This means that China is seriously bent on pursuing a long-term carrier capability which is more than just a prestige pet project.

Benign aspect of aircraft carrier
  
Given that a full-fledged CBG capability for China will require more time to materialise, it is premature to strike the alarm bells; the actual use of a carrier is arguably more crucial than the mere possession of it. And it could have a benign impact as well.

Prior to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami for instance, Singapore’s force of new Endurance-class amphibious landing ships projected a somewhat aggressive image but their humanitarian deployment off Aceh in the aftermath of the disaster aptly demonstrated that these otherwise offensive-looking platforms do have their benign aspect.

The Americans for instance deployed their carriers to good effect after the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 East Japan Sea tsunami. The Thai Navy used her ‘pocket carrier’ RTNS Chakri Naruebet for the southern floods disaster relief. The Chinese could take note of these instances and strive to utilise its future carrier capabilities for such benign purposes. In fact, Beijing should be aware of the peaceful utility of such large naval platforms, as its hospital ship Anwei had demonstrated in its international goodwill voyages.

Less glamorous power projection

If Southeast Asians are worried that the new carrier could be used to assert Beijing’s maritime claims in the region, based on recent patterns of Chinese gunboat diplomacy, this worry could be exaggerated. China has been relying increasingly on lightly-equipped civilian law-enforcement vessels for such functions instead of PLAN warships and this trend is projected to continue as China rapidly builds up such capacities.

In times when its emergence as a great power has come under intense international scrutiny, the last thing Beijing would want is to be seen as overly aggressive by exploiting its newfound naval might. The deliberate low-profile induction of this first aircraft carrier is one such gesture of China’s reluctance to be portrayed as using disproportionate force in its exercise of gunboat diplomacy.

Also, rather than an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, greater efficacy and credibility can be achieved through ‘less glamorous’ power projection capabilities such as Beijing’s rapidly expanding amphibious assault forces, or fourth-generation land-based airpower supported by mid-air refueling aircraft. That would provide more immediate ramifications to the regional naval balance. In the shorter term, these aspects instead of the carrier programme deserve greater attention of China’s Southeast Asian neighbours.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He is pursuing doctoral studies focusing on naval modernisation in the Asia-Pacific, especially Southeast Asia.

South China Sea Disputes: Can Satellite Imagery Help?


RSIS presents the following commentary South China Sea Disputes: Can Satellite Imagery Help? by Youna Lyons. It is also available online at this link. (To print it, click on this link.). Kindly forward any comments or feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, at  RSISPublication@ntu.edu.sg



No. 182/2012 dated 1 October 2012
South China Sea Disputes:
Can Satellite Imagery Help?
 By Youna Lyons       
Synopsis
Satellite imagery makes publicly available information about the disputed islands and rocks in the Spratlys. It can also shape the scope of the debate.
Commentary
TO WHAT extent do the Spratlys comprise features that qualify to be islands or rocks under international law and therefore subject to appropriation? Satellite imagery of geographical features in the sea offers a greater degree of visual clarity of what an island or rock may look like and of their location relative to each other.

Distinguishing islands and rocks
To qualify as an island or a rock under international law a feature, which is surrounded by water, must be a naturally formed area of land and above water at high tide. These two conditions are cumulative and both can be usefully informed by satellite imagery.

With respect to the second condition, a satellite image showing a vegetated feature will undoubtedly demonstrate that it remains above water at high tide as a feature submerged at high tide, even occasionally, cannot present terrestrial vegetation. However, if a satellite image shows a barren sand bar, cay or reef just above water, complementary information is necessary to determine whether this area of land is always above water or whether it is submerged at high tide.

If a feature is submerged at high tide and dries at low tide, it is a low tide elevation (not an island or a rock) and it cannot be appropriated. If it is located within 12 nautical miles of the coastline, it is deemed to be a part of that coastline. As a result, the 12 nautical miles territorial sea can be calculated from this low tide elevation instead of being calculated from the coastline.

The verification of whether a feature can qualify as a rock or an island also involves an examination of whether the feature in question is naturally formed or whether it is a man-made feature. In the latter situation two questions arise: was the feature built on a submerged feature or low tide elevation to extend vertically above water at high tide; or does the feature consist of land reclamation on a naturally formed area of land above water, even of a small size.

For this analysis satellite images will also be very informative. As an example, areas of land which have been reclaimed tend to exhibit noticeably different shapes than the rest of the feature. Similarly, coastal works designed to limit natural erosion are often visible.

Spratly Islands
A review of the features of the Spratlys (which are claimed by four to six claimants) would be particularly informative. Of the 130 or more features in the Spratlys, the various reports available relate that up to 25% to 30% of these features are above water at high tide.

Google Earth further shows that the combined surface area of the 13 largest features in the Spratlys total less than two square kilometre of dry land. This is less than half of Sentosa Island, a small island attached to Singapore Island. The largest island of the Spratlys, Itu Aba, is itself less than half a square kilometre.

The greater part of all other features visible in Google Earth may uncover at low tide or remain always submerged. Some of these features also present man-made artificial structures, some of which rest on a small portion of a submerged feature or on a small area of reclaimed land.

Islands and rocks on atolls
  
Satellite images make it possible to zoom out from any given feature to the surrounding islands, reefs and low tide elevations. Such images clearly show that the Spratlys are not one archipelago but a collection of atolls located on seamounts. Many of the very small islands and rocks in the Spratlys were once part of a single atoll, the surrounding reef of which subsided over time. The now submerged parts of the atoll remain visible on satellite images if they have not subsided below 10 to 20 metres (depending on the satellite resolution and water clarity).

This raises the question whether these partly submerged atolls can still be treated as atolls and whether the inside lagoon can in some circumstances constitute internal waters of the State having sovereignty over the island on the atoll. Another question which arises is whether the outer side of the atoll ring can determine the baseline of the territorial sea or whether each rock or island in the atoll should have its own baseline and territorial sea. Where the atoll is mostly submerged, it seems that the latter solution will be preferred.

Satellite imagery is, however, no panacea. It only contributes to the debate of what is a rock, what is an island and what is neither but may be a low tide elevation. Google Earth does not determine sovereignty over islands or rocks. It does not determine the extent of the maritime zone to which an island or rock may be entitled.

It may however, limit the temptation of claimants to make spurious allegations which could be disproved by a single Google Earth picture and thus call into question the credibility of the claim.

The writer is a Senior Research Analyst with the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore. She contributed this article specially to RSIS Commentaries, a publication of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.