The Russia-China Plan For North Korea
Moscow
has been busy building agreements that would extend Eurasian
connectivity eastward. The question is how to convince the DPRK to play
along
By Pepe Escobar
September 15, 2017 "Information Clearing House"
- The United Nations Security Council’s 15-0 vote to impose a new set
of sanctions on North Korea somewhat disguises the critical role played
by the Russia-China strategic partnership, the “RC” at the core of the
BRICS group.
The
new sanctions are pretty harsh. They include a 30% reduction on crude
and refined oil exports to the DPRK; a ban on exports of natural gas; a
ban on all North Korean textile exports (which have brought in US$760
million on average over the past three years); and a worldwide ban on
new work permits for DPRK citizens (there are over 90,000 currently
working abroad.)
But
this is far from what US President Donald Trump’s administration was
aiming at, according to the draft Security Council resolution leaked
last week. That included an asset freeze and travel ban on Kim Jong-un
and other designated DPRK officials, and covered additional “WMD-related
items,” Iraqi sanctions-style. It also authorized UN member states to
interdict and inspect North Korean vessels in international waters
(which amounts to a declaration of war); and, last but not least, a
total oil embargo.
“RC”
made it clear it would veto the resolution under these terms. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the US’ diminishing Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson Moscow would only accept language related to
“political and diplomatic tools to seek peaceful ways of resolution..”
On the oil embargo, President Vladimir Putin said, “cutting off the oil
supply to North Korea may harm people in hospitals or other ordinary
citizens.”
“RC”
priorities are clear: “stability” in Pyongyang; no regime change; no
drastic alteration of the geopolitical chessboard; no massive refugee
crisis.
That
does not preclude Beijing from applying pressure on Pyongyang. Branch
offices of the Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural
Bank of China in the northeastern border city of Yanji have banned DPRK
citizens from opening new accounts. Current accounts are not frozen yet,
but deposits and remittances have been suspended.
To
get to the heart of the matter, though, we need to examine what
happened last week at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok – which
happens to be only a little over 300 km away from the DPRK’s Punggye-ri
missile test site.
It’s all about the Trans-Korean Railway
In
sharp contrast to the Trump administration and the Beltway’s bellicose
rhetoric, what “RC” proposes are essentially 5+1 talks (North Korea,
China, Russia, Japan and South Korea, plus the US) on neutral territory,
as confirmed by Russian diplomats. In Vladivostok, Putin went out of
his way to defuse military hysteria and warn that stepping beyond
sanctions would be an “invitation to the graveyard.” Instead, he
proposed business deals.
Largely
unreported by Western corporate media, what happened in Vladivostok is
really ground-breaking. Moscow and Seoul agreed on a trilateral trade
platform, crucially involving Pyongyang, to ultimately invest in
connectivity between the whole Korean peninsula and the Russian Far
East.
South Korean Prime Minister Moon Jae-in proposed to Moscow to build no less than “nine bridges” of cooperation: “Nine
bridges mean the bridges of gas, railways, the Northern Sea Route,
shipbuilding, the creation of working groups, agriculture and other
types of cooperation.”
Crucially, Moon added that the trilateral cooperation would aim at joint projects in the Russian Far East. He knows that
“the development of that area will promote the prosperity of our two
countries and will also help change North Korea and create the basis for
the implementation of the trilateral agreements.”
Adding
to the entente, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono and South Korean
Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha both stressed “strategic cooperation”
with “RC”.
Geo-economics
complements geo-politics. Moscow has also approached Tokyo with the
idea of building a bridge between the nations. That would physically
link Japan to Eurasia – and the vast trade and investment carousel
offered by the New Silk Roads, aka, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
and the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU). It would also complement the
daring plan to link a
Seoul
wants a rail network that will physically connect it with the vast
Eurasian land bridge, which makes perfect business sense for the fifth
largest export economy in the world. Handicapped by North Korea’s
isolation, South Korea is in effect cut off from Eurasia by land. The
answer is the Trans-Korean Railway.
deliver
Russian pipeline gas to Korea and integrate the power lines and railway
systems of Russia, the Republic of Korea and North Korea. The
implementation of these initiatives will be not only economically
beneficial, but will also help build up trust and stability on the
Korean Peninsula.”
Moscow’s strategy, like Beijing’s, is connectivity: the only way to integrate Pyongyang
is to keep it involved in economic cooperation via the
Trans-Korean-Trans-Siberian connection, pipelines and the development
of North Korean ports.
The
DPRK’s delegation in Vladivostok seemed to agree. But not yet.
According to North Korea’s Minister for External Economic Affairs, Kim
Yong Jae: “We are not opposed to the trilateral cooperation [with Russia
and South Korea], but this is not an appropriate situation for this
to be implemented.” That implies that for the DPRK the priority is the
5+1 negotiation table.
Still,
the crucial point is that both Seoul and Pyongyang went to Vladivostok,
and talked to Moscow. Arguably the key question – the armistice that
did not end the Korean War – has to be broached by Putin and the
Koreans, without the Americans.
While
the sanctions game ebb and flows, the larger strategy of “RC” is clear –
a drive aimed at Eurasian connectivity. The question is how to convince
the DPRK to play along.
This article was first published by Asia Times -
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