File photo shows French soldiers preparing to launch an unmanned aerial vehicle.
France
is insisting on ‘rapid’ military intervention in Mali. Its unmanned
drones have reportedly been scouring the desert of the troubled West
African nation - although it claims that the drones are seeking the
whereabouts of six French hostages believed to be held by al-Qaeda.
The French are likely to get their wish, especially following the
recent political fiasco engineered by the country’s strong man and coup
leader Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo. The Americans also covet intervention,
but one that would serve their growing interests in the Sahel region.
African countries are divided and have no clear alternative on how
to restore Mali’s territorial integrity - and equally important
political sovereignty - disjointed between Tuareg secessionists and
militants in the north and factionalized army in the south.
The current crisis in Mali is the recent manifestation of a
recurring episode of terrible suffering and constant struggles. It goes
back much earlier than the French officials in particular wish to
recall. True, there is much bad blood between the various forces that
are now fighting for control, but there is also much acrimony between
Mali and France, the latter having conquered Mali (then called French
Sudan) in 1898.
After decades of a bitter struggle, Mali achieved its independence
in 1960 under the auspices of a socialist government led by President
Modibo Keita. One of his very early orders of business was breaking away
with French influence and the Franc zone.
Former colonial powers rarely abandon their ambitions,
even after their former colonies gain hard-earned freedom. They remain
deeply entrenched by meddling in various ways that destabilize the
former colonies. Then, when opportune, they militarily intervene to
uphold the status quo. In 1968, Keita was ousted from power, and few
years later in 1977, he died in a lonely cell. His death ushered in mass
protests, compelling few cosmetic gestures towards a new constitution
and half-hearted democracy.
Turmoil defined Mali for many years since then, even after the
country achieved a level of political stability in 1992. At the time it
was believed that Mali was fast becoming a model for democracy, at least
in the West Africa region. Few years later, thousands of refugees from
the ever-neglected and under-represented Tuaregs began returning to
their towns and villages mostly in the vast desert region in northern
Mali.
That return was introduced by a peace agreement signed between
Tuaregs and the central government. Little on the ground has changed.
Various bands, some homegrown, others fleeing fighting in neighboring
countries, especially Algeria, found haven in Mali’s north and west. At
times, they fought amongst each other, at times they served some unclear
agendas of outside parties, and at times they created temporary
alliances amongst themselves.
While France attempted to keep Mali in its sphere of influence -
thus its decision in 2002 to cancel over a third of Mali’s debt - the
United States was also taking interest in Mali’s crucial position in the
Sahel regions and the prospects created by the un-governability of the
northern regions.
Of course, the all-inclusive definition of al-Qaeda
served as the ever-convenient ruse to justify American involvement.
Al-Qaeda has been used by Washington to rationalize the establishment of
the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). It was set up in 2008 to manage US
military interests in the whole continent with the exception of Egypt.
The US State Department claimed that AFRICOM “will play a supportive
role as Africans build democratic institutions and establish good
governance across the continent.”
The importance of the al-Qaeda narrative to the American role in the
Sahel was highlighted in the last presidential debate between President
Barack Obama and his Republican opponent, Mitt Romney. To flex some
political muscles, perhaps Romney warned of “al-Qaeda type individuals”
threatening to turn Mali into a new Afghanistan.
Other western experts on the Sahel dispute the analogy, however
claiming that Mali is descending into a Sudan-like model instead. Either
way, the people of Mali are currently suffering the consequences of the
burgeoning conflict, which reflects a convoluted mix of foreign
agendas, extremist ideologies and real grievances of Malian tribes in
the north and west.
The south of the country is not exactly an oasis of stability. The
ongoing territorial struggle and political volatility are threatening
the whole country, which has been battling a cruel famine and pitiless
warlords. The most dominant faction in the Malian army is led by
US-trained Army Capt. Amadou Sanogo, who on March 22 led a coup against
President Amadou Toumani Toure. Sanogo’s reasoning - blaming Toure for
failing to stamp out growing militant influence in the north - sounded
more like a pretense than a genuine attempt at recovering the
disintegrating country.
It remains unclear who Sanogo’s backers are, especially since France
and the US are relatively tolerant of his political transgressions and
violent conduct. Sanogo’s coup came shortly before elections, scheduled
for last April. While the African Union (AU) reacted assertively to the
coup by suspending Mali’s membership, western powers remained
indecisive. Despite a half-hearted handing over of power from the coup
leaders to a civilian government of President Dioncounda Traore, Sanogo
remain firmly in charge. In May, the junta struck again, retaking power,
as pro-Sanogo mobs almost beat president Traore to death inside his
presidential compound.
Sanogo, empowered by the lack of decisiveness to his conduct,
continued to play some political game or another. A short lived
“national unity government” under Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra
was more or less toppled when Diarra was arrested by Sanogo’s men. He
was forced to concede power and install a little known government
administrator as his predecessor.
Sonogo’s political show continues, especially as the West African
regional grouping (ECOWAS), along with the AU remains focused on what
they perceive as a more urgent priority: ending the territorial
disintegration in the north and west.
The conflict in the north is in a constant influx. Alliances change,
thus the nature of the conflict is in perpetual alteration. Large
consignments of weapons that were made available during NATO’s war in
Libya early last year, made their way to various rebel and militant
groups throughout the region. The Tuaregs had received support from the
ousted Libyan government and were dispersed during and following the
war. Many of them returned to Mali, battle-hardened and emboldened by
the advanced weapons.
Fighting in the north began in stages, most notably in January 2012.
Sanogo’s coup created the needed political vacuum for Tuaregs' National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) to declare independence in
the north a mere two weeks later. The declaration was the result of
quick military victories by MNLA and its militant allies, which led to
the capture of Gao and other major towns.
These successive developments further bolstered Islamic and other
militant groups to seize cities across the country and hold them hostage
to their ideologies and other agendas. For example, Ansar al-Din had
reportedly worked jointly with the MNLA, but declared a war "against
independence" in June, as soon as it secured its control over Timbuktu.
Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad, along with AQIM made their moves. The allies soon
became bitter enemies.
Last September, rebels from various groupings in control of the
north began advancing onto other strategic areas in the center and
south-west parts of the country. Their territorial advances are now made
against government-held towns and areas that are still controlled by
Azawad Tuareg rebels.
There is now semi-consensus on the need for military intervention in
Mali, although some differences persist over the nature and scope of
that intervention. Sanogo himself has little interest in seeing other
West African powers jockeying for influence in Bamako, which could
threaten his thus far unchallenged rule. Moreover, it is unclear how
affective military force can be, as the territorial fragmentation, many
militant groupings and political discord throughout the country are
almost impossible to navigate.
The stability of West Africa is surely at stake. The chances of a
political solution are all but completely dissipated. The growing chaos
will likely benefit interventionist states - France and the US in
particular. A long-drawn new “war on terror,” will justify further
intervention in West Africa and more meddling in the affairs of ECOWAS
countries.
A few years ago, a new “scramble for Africa” was unleashed due to
China’s growing influence in the continent. It was heightened by a more
recent North African turmoil caused by the so-called Arab Spring.
Opportunities are now abound for those ready to stake more claims over a
long exploited region.
RB/HMV
Ramzy Baroud is a widely published and translated author. He is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. He has authored several books and contributed to many books, anthologies and academic journals. His books include Searching Jenin, Eyewitness Accounts of the Israeli Invasion, and The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People’s Struggle. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (Pluto Press, London). Visit his website: ramzybaroud.net. More Press TV articles by Ramzy Baroud
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