Revealed: What You Need to Know About the Iranian Nuclear 'Framework'
Guy Benson
4/2/2015 6:45:00 PM - Guy Benson
The deal is not done -- as the Iranians are
eager to remind
everyone -- because various particulars must still be hammered out
between now and the end of June. The devil still lurks in crucial
details, and potential sticking points abound. That said, the framework
announced earlier today is more specific that many had expected. It
contains elements that both sides will point to as meaningful wins,
though Iran appears to have gotten the better of the agreement on the
whole. Based on a State Department
"fact sheet" summary -- worded, unsurprisingly, to reassure skeptical Americans -- and other reporting, here's what we know:
What Iran Gets:
(1) An active nuclear program with international legitimacy: The Obama administration's original goal at the outset of these talks was to eliminate Iran's nuclear program; the
Washington Post's editors write
that the White House's stance has since "evolved into a plan to
tolerate and temporarily restrict [Iran's nuclear] capability." Their
infrastructure stays intact. They don't have to shut down
any existing nuclear sites, including the ones they illegally developed in secret.
(2) Thousands of operational centrifuges: Despite agreeing to effectively uninstall (but not destroy) roughly two-thirds of their centrifuges (although that statistic is
actually inflated),
Iran is permitted to keep 6,100 on line, with just over 5,000 actively
enriching low-grade uranium. The US' reported initial aim was to reduce
this number to between
500 and 1,500.
Hundreds of centrifuges (sans uranium) will continue to spin in Iran's
once-covert, difficult-to-penetrate Fordow mountain facility, which was
discovered by Western intelligence agencies in 2009. Iran says it will
convert the facility into a nuclear "research" center, used for purely
peaceful purposes.
(3) Expiration dates on restrictions: Virtually
all of the major Western-imposed restrictions on Iran's program
"sunset" after a period of 10 to 15 years. Iran's chief negotiator
described these limitations as temporary, lasting only "for a period of
time." These are gigantic, consequential concessions. President Obama
confirmed these points in his Rose Garden statement this afternoon, but
Sec. Kerry later told reporters that there was "
no sunset" in the deal. Kerry may have been referring to the
IAEA inspections regime,
which does not appear to have any expiration date, meaning that Iran
has, in theory, agreed to perpetual inspections over an unlimited time
horizon.
(4) Major sanctions relief: Crucially,
all American and international nuclear-based sanctions against Iran are
to be lifted immediately upon an initial IAEA (the UN's nuclear
watchdog) affirmation that Tehran has so far lived up to its end of the
bargain. Kerry stated that the exact timing of this major event is
still under discussion, but if it goes through, Iran will receive
immense sanctions relief in exchange for going along with the program at
its earliest stages. There does not appear to be any phase-in of
sanctions reductions over time, contingent on continued
Iranian compliance. This would be an enormous boon to Iran's economy
(freeing up cash for the regime to fund its continued malfeasance around
the world), with Western "strings attached" getting severed very early
on. In addition to the sanctions, existing anti-Iran UN resolutions
will be ripped up. They would be extremely challenging to re-impose,
for reasons discussed below.
(5) No action on other abuses and rogue programs: The
regime's sponsorship and direct facilitation of terrorism,
malignant meddling in the region, egregious human rights abuses, and
rogue missile program are all untouched by this agreement. Obama
acknowledged all of these ongoing sins in his statement, noting that US
sanctions attached to the regime's other bad behavior will remain in
place. America is cutting a deal with a regime that it admits is still
engaging in international lawlessness and terrorism on a massive scale.
What America and the West Get:
(1) A relatively robust-sounding inspections/verification regime:
Again, this might have been what Kerry meant when he was boasting about
the deal's lack of a "sunset." In fact, really important parts of the
agreement would expire after just ten years, but it seems as though the
inspections aren't among them. We'll see if indefinite, unlimited
inspections makes the final cut of this still-unwritten "deal." It
appears for now that by accepting the IAEA's so-called "
additional protocol,"
Iran has effectively agreed in principle to allow "snap," or
unannounced, inspections. They've also granted international inspectors
access to known
and suspected nuclear sites.
(2) Limiting Iran's enrichment to low levels, with rudimentary technology:
For now,
that is. These limitations start to go away after 10 years, with
others following five years on. The discussed restrictions would apply
to the number of centrifuges enriching uranium, the important
enrichment levels (which determine whether nuclear materials can be used
in a bomb), and the sophistication of centrifuges being used and
developed by Tehran.
(3) A lengthened Iranian nuclear "breakout" period:
At present, Iran is estimated to be two-to-three months away from
achieving "breakout" (the process of enriching enough nuclear material
to the necessary level of purity to make the bomb). The terms of this
framework would extend Tehran's breakout period to one year. That's an
improvement that would theoretically allow the world community extra
time to identify and punish any Iranian subterfuge. Why
"theoretically"? Stay tuned.
(4) Iran reduces its current stockpile of nuclear materials:
In addition to cutting its number of operational centrifuges, Iran
agrees to scale back its stockpile of existing low-enriched uranium from
10,000 kg to 300 kg. The West insisted upon removing that stockpile
from the country, but the Iranians
started resisting
that course of action as a deal-breaker in the last few days. The
State Department's summary doesn't make clear what happens to the
nuclear material in question. Does it get shipped out of Iran? Does it
get diluted by international monitors? Unclear.
Outstanding Problems and Concerns:
Well, let's start with Iranian officials'
various triumphant pronouncements,
including throwing serious shade at the State Department's "fact
sheet," which is dismissed as "spin." Which of its elements does Tehran
view as illegitimate or misleading? One supposes that Kerry and company
will find out in the next few months, as the nuclear clock ticks away,
of course:
Beyond that, the agreement
appears to punt
on the important question of how Iran will address concerns about
previous alleged military applications of their nuclear program, which
the IAEA has been insisting they do for some time. "Coming clean" about
past activities a developments is an important step in ensuring that
the international community can effectively monitor Iran's nuclear
progress, or lack thereof. How this gets resolved is another TBD
component of the "understanding." Also, let's say Iran
were to violate the terms of a finalized deal (as they did with the interim deal, which was dismissed as a "
mistake"
by the Obama administration). Then what? Then, in theory, the
international community could quickly reimpose "snap back" sanctions,
and consider other options -- including even harsher sanctions, or
military action. But this would require a
difficult-to-achieve consensus at the UN Security Council, with
always-looming vetoes resting in the hands of the Chinese, and...
Putin's Russia,
which rarely misses a chance to frustrate American designs and
embarrass our leaders. And this all assumes the vaunted
international community would even be able to agree that Iran was
cheating at all. These disputes could drag out for
long periods of time,
experts warn, presenting logistical and geopolitical delays of which
Tehran would no doubt take full advantage. In other words, reinstating
lapsed sanctions and taking corrective action against will be a
laborious, improbable undertaking. Iran also knows that it doesn't
necessarily need to push its luck with dramatic breaches; the regime can
cheat at the margins, and wait out certain restrictions in the deal,
after which they'd be legally free to move ahead with an extensive
nuclear program, the existence of which had been effectively blessed by
the West. The Israelis, who have the
most to lose at the hands of an
intensely anti-Semitic nuclear-armed Mullahocracy, are, shall we say,
alarmed:
Finally, a few notes on President Obama's Rose Garden remarks, after
which he took no questions: He gave a short history lesson about recent
US-Iranian relations, correctly stating that stepped-up sanctions hurt
Iran's economy and forced them to the negotiating table. He didn't
mentioned that he'd
strenuously resisted
those very sanctions. This is a reflection on his judgment. Obama
went on to claim that the current interim agreement has worked
flawlessly, despite cynics' complaints when it was unveiled. This brag
ignores an inconvenient little "
mishap"
that we oughtn't worry about. Let's also recall that a major reason
that additional sanctions were slapped on Iran in the first place is
that they were
caught cheating on another international nuclear treaty -- because that's what they do.
They cheat.
The State Department's fact sheet assures us that even when various
provisions of the new would-be deal expire, Iran would still be bound by
that same treaty (NPT) it has
already breached. In an attempt
to fortify the mullah's good intentions on the nuclear front, Obama
cited a religious order, or "fatwa," issued by Ayatollah Khamenei
that forbids nuclear weapons.
Two problems:
The fatwa doesn't actually exist, and Iran has a history of ignoring
their own fatwas in order to achieve their military goals. Obama's
reference to this nonexistence edict is misleading and naive.
Obama also stated his administration's intention of "fully briefing"
Congress on any eventual deal, and to seek out a "constructive role" for
them to play. Will the president deign to "allow" a coequal branch of
the United States government to vote on what amounts to a foreign
treaty, as required by the Constitution? He didn't say. Perhaps
encouragingly, he warned Congress not to kill the deal (which may signal
that a vote will be held, as key leaders on the Hill are
pushing hard),
lest the failure of international diplomacy be "blamed" on America.
He, of course, resurrected his straw man that opposition to a very
flawed deal is tantamount to adopting a pro-war stance. He basically
said straight-up that only a negotiated agreement, not harsh sanctions
or military action, can solve the Iranian nuclear problem -- which at
the very least
undermines is own leverage
moving forward. Last but not least, Obama is asking the country to
trust him that this "good deal" is "by far" our best option. This is a
man who repeatedly made
false assertions to Americans about his healthcare overhaul, was
humiliated and routed by adversaries in the Syrian 'red line' debacle, and green-lit and (attempted to whitewash) an
unpopular (and
unlawful) deal
trading five top-level terrorists back to the Taliban in exchange for
an accused American deserter. His credibility on foreign policy is
quite low, as is the American public's overall opinion of Iran's trustworthiness and intentions: