Putin warns of thermonuclear war

October 31, 2014 EIR International 53
Oct. 26—Russian President Vladimir Putin used the
occasion of the annual Valdai Club dialogue in Sochi,
Russia, Oct. 24 to deliver a sweeping assessment of the
present danger of global war, and the efforts that Russia
is taking to avert that outcome.
Coverage of Putin’s speech in
the Western media was either
slanderous mis-characterization
(“Putin is blackmailing the
West”), or simply non-existent.
The essence of the Russian
President’s message was that
the Western powers, particularly
the United States, are
tearing apart the world order,
and attempting to impose a
take-it-or-leave-it unilateral
system, that violates all of the
core principles of the post-
World War II order that was
established to avoid thermonuclear
holocaust. Putin
pointed to Washington’s 2002
cancellation of the ABM
Treaty, and the building of a
unilateral global missile defense
system, along with the
development of new, precision,
high-intensity conventional
weapons that have put
the world on the brink of pre-emptive thermonuclear
war.
He detailed the West’s promotion of Islamist terrorism,
dating back to the Afghanistan War of the 1980s,
warning that the use of al-Qaeda
and the Taliban against the
former Soviet Union is now
backfiring in the face of the U.S.
and its allies, a process which
began with the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks
on New York and Washington.
The West, he warned, is
promoting radical jihadists and
the revival of neo-Nazi movements
(viz., Ukraine), which
will turn on their sponsors at
some point soon.
He identified the new form of
color revolution regime-change
that has torn apart the core principle
of national sovereignty,
citing the case of Syria as the
most clear, ongoing example.
Putin also juxtaposed the
emergence of new cooperative
arrangements among leading
Eurasian nations, through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
the BRICS, and the Eurasian
Economic Union. Nations
Putin Speaks the Truth about
NATO’s War Provocations
by Jeffrey Steinberg
EIR International
Presidential Press & Information Office
In his speech to the Valdai International Discussion
Club Oct. 24, President Putin delivered a stark
assessment of the war danger, and Russia’s efforts
to prevent it.
54 International EIR October 31, 2014
are looking to develop bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements outside the control of the dollar. This is in
part in response to the out-of-control use of punitive
sanctions against any nation that dares to challenge the
new unipolar system.
The Battle for Kobani
Putin’s warnings came at a moment when events on
the ground in the Middle East were dramatizing his case.
The conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya all moved in a
direction where larger regional conflicts could erupt at
any moment. Turkey remained at odds with its NATO
partners, in blocking Kurdish fighters from crossing the
border into northern Syria, where the town of Kobani
remains under siege by the Islamic State (IS). Intense
negotiations between Washington and Ankara were reported
to have reached an agreement by which several
hundred Iraqi Kurdish fighters were to be allowed to
cross Turkish territory to reach Kobani; however, Turkey
stalled on allowing the fighters to cross into Syria.
IS is now preparing to send heavy reinforcements
into the Kobani battle, while also launching new military
operations in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Turkey’s
refusal to allow U.S. fighter planes to use the Incerlik
Air Base, just 100 miles from Kobani, has greatly hampered
the air campaign against IS in Iraq and Syria, because
U.S. planes are flying long distances from bases,
and an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf.
According to news accounts in the past 24 hours,
one of the Islamic State’s top commanders, Omar Al-
Shishani (Omar the Chechen), is being sent to take over
the Kobani offensive. He has vowed to bring the Islamic
State’s war back to the Caucasus to bring down
the Putin government.
Bearing out Putin’s warnings, the Obama State and
Treasury departments are using heavy-handed pressure
to force two key Asian allies—Australia and South
Korea—to back out of plans to become founding signers
on the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
a Chinese initiative to invest in New Silk Road infrastructure
through new long-term credit. In the case of
Australia, Secretary of State John Kerry personally
arm-twisted Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot into
cancelling plans to sign an MoU in Beijing on Oct. 24.
Twenty-one countries have signed the agreement, including
China, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In
the case of South Korea, sources in Seoul indicated that
Washington offered a bunch of carrots to the Park
Geun-hye government, to keep it from signing, including
an agreement to postpone the transfer of command
of the joint U.S.-South Korean force on the peninsula to
South Korea’s armed forces.
The effort to sabotage the start-up of the AIIB comes
at the same time that the U.S. military is increasing
coastal surveillance of China’s major submarine facilities,
and deepening military ties to Japan. The underlying
premise of Washington’s AirSea Battle doctrine is
that the U.S. would launch preemptive attacks on strategic
facilities that are part of Beijing’s anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Like the color revolution
and global missile defense deployments aimed against
Russia, the AirSea Battle plans greatly increase the
chances of a thermonuclear showdown.
When combined with the out-of-control Ebola epidemic
and the crisis in the trans-Atlantic financial system,
the war danger from the policies of the Obama Administration
poses an existential threat to the survival of mankind.
Lyndon LaRouche has made clear that, while there
are readily available solutions to each of these three existential
threats, no solution is possible so long as British
stooge Barack Obama remains in the Presidency.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/world/asia/china-corruption-general-xu-caihou/index.html?hpt=wo_c2

China's biggest 'military tiger' Xu Caihou confesses to taking bribes

By Paul Armstrong and Steven Jiang, CNN

updated 1:18 AM EDT, Wed October 29, 2014

Xu Caihou was also expelled from the Communist Party and had his rank of general revoked.

STORY HIGHLIGHTS

• Xu was a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
• Statement: He took advantage of his position to promote others and take bribes
• Xu is the most senior military leader to face corruption charges in recent memory
• Was one of four senior members to be expelled from the ruling Communist Party

Hong Kong (CNN) -- A top retired general has confessed to taking bribes, becoming the highest-profile figure in China's military to be caught up in President Xi Jinping's war on corruption.

Xu Caihou, formerly the vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission that runs the two-million strong People's Liberation Army (PLA), was also expelled from the Chinese Communist Party and had his rank of general revoked, according to a statement from military prosecutors cited by the state-run Xinhua news agency Wednesday.

The seven-month investigation, which began in March this year, found that Xu took advantage of his position to assist the promotion of other people, accepting huge bribes personally and through his family.

He was also found to have sought profits for others in exchange for bribes taken through his family members. The amount of bribe was "extremely huge", the statement added.

The allegations against Xu, 71, were announced on June 30 when President Xi presided over a leadership meeting to expel the retired general and three other senior members from the ruling Communist Party.

China's Xi snares an 'untouchable' tiger

Are corruption arrests just politics?

Anti-corruption campaign surprises many

Zero tolerance

In a statement released after that meeting, President Xi and other Chinese leaders reiterated their "zero tolerance" for corruption in the government and military -- long a lightning rod for mass discontent across the country -- but they also acknowledged the anti-graft task would be "ongoing, complex and formidable."

The three other former senior officials ousted from the Communist Party for corruption were Jiang Jiemin, a former minister in charge of state assets; Li Dongsheng, a former vice minister of public security; and Wang Yongchun, a former deputy head of state-owned oil behemoth China National Petroleum Corporation.

State media characterized Xu as a big "military tiger" caught in the massive anti-graft campaign launched by President Xi, who is also the commander-in-chief. After becoming the head of the Communist Party in late 2012, Xi banned official extravagance -- from banquets to year-end gifts -- and vowed to target "tigers and flies" alike in his fight against corruption when describing his resolve to spare no one regardless of their position.

OPINION: China corruption charges no longer shock

Xinhua recently touted the catching of 30 "tigers" since Xi took power less than two years ago.

Zhou Yongkang

Some China watchers have noted ties between an increasing number of disgraced officials to Zhou Yongkang, the former domestic security czar who has been rumored to be under investigation for some time. Jiang, Li and Wang have long been considered Zhou protégés.

State media has reported official probes into many of Zhou's family members as well as former associates in the domestic security apparatus, state oil industry and southwestern Sichuan Province -- three places Zhou once ruled. If announced, Zhou would become the highest-ranking official ever to face corruption charges in the history of the People's Republic.

In 2013, some 182,000 officials were disciplined while courts nationwide tried 23,000 corruption cases, according to the Communist Party's disciplinary commission.

State media has cited the trial and conviction last year of former high-flying politician Bo Xilai -- though called politically motivated by Bo supporters -- as one prime example of President Xi's determination to clean up the Party.

READ: Xi serious about cracking down on corruption?

China’s Global Agricultural Strategy: An Open System to Safeguard the Country’s Food Security

The RSIS Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author(s), and do not represent the official position of RSIS. This publication may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior written permission obtained from RSIS and due credit given to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg for further editorial queries.

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No. 282 dated 28 October 2014

China’s Global Agricultural Strategy: An Open System to Safeguard the Country’s Food Security

By Cheng Guoqiang and Zhang Hongzhou

National food security will continue to be the top strategic issue confronting Chinese policymakers. In the next two decades of rapid income growth, China’s total demand for agricultural products will increase in the face of diminishing water and land resources, and the task of feeding the 1.3 billion Chinese people will be even more challenging. The authors suggest that a global agricultural strategy is the strategic choice for China because it enables China to safeguard national food security and at the same time, tackle its rising domestic demand for agricultural resources in the face of environmental pressures.

Click on the following link to download the working paper

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/WP282.pdf

Bio

Dr Guoqiang Cheng is Senior Fellow and Director General of Department of International Cooperation, Secretary General of Academic Committee of Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council P. R. China. He joined DRC in 2001. Before his appointment to the present position, Dr Cheng worked as fellow of Department of Rural Economy, Deputy Director General of Institute for Market Economy, Deputy Director General of General Office, and Director General of Information Center. Dr Cheng won the honorable award supported by the Chinese National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars. He serves as Adviser for several government agencies and holds concurrent posts as Vice Chairman of the Chinese Association of Grain Economy, Vice Chairman of Chinese Society of Foreign Agricultural Economy, and Adjunct Professor of several universities such as Renmin University of China and University of International Business and Economics. Dr Cheng participated in conducting research and drafting agricultural policy documents of Chinese central government. Dr Cheng completed six distinguished years in the mission of China’s WTO accession negotiation as a special agricultural advisor to Chinese Chief Negotiator during 1997 to 2001. He has also been productively cooperating with international organisations such as OECD for decades with rich research accomplishments. Dr Cheng was awarded the Second Prize of National Awards for S&T Progress, Second Prize of Ministerial Awards for S&T Progress, DRC Outstanding Study Report Award, etc. Dr Cheng’s research covers areas of agricultural policy and rural development, international economy and global governance, multilateral and bilateral negotiation.

Mr Zhang Hongzhou is Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He previously worked as a Research Analyst with the Maritime Security Programme at RSIS. He received his Master’s degree in International Political Economy from RSIS and Bachelor’s degree in Maritime Studies from NTU. His main research interests include China and regional resources security (food, water and energy), agricultural and rural development, and maritime security. He has contributed papers to peer reviewed journals, edited volumes and participated in international conferences on a wide range of topics and is frequently interviewed or featured by national and international news media.

Principle, Rigor and Execution Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy

Geopolitical Weekly

Tuesday, October 28, 2014 - 03:00 Print Text Size

Stratfor

By George Friedman
U.S. President Barack Obama has come under intense criticism for his foreign policy, along with many other things. This is not unprecedented. Former President George W. Bush was similarly attacked. Stratfor has always maintained that the behavior of nations has much to do with the impersonal forces driving it, and little to do with the leaders who are currently passing through office. To what extent should American presidents be held accountable for events in the world, and what should they be held accountable for?

Expectations and Reality

I have always been amazed when presidents take credit for creating jobs or are blamed for high interest rates. Under our Constitution, and in practice, presidents have precious little influence on either. They cannot act without Congress or the Federal Reserve concurring, and both are outside presidential control. Nor can presidents overcome the realities of the market. They are prisoners of institutional constraints and the realities of the world.
Nevertheless, we endow presidents with magical powers and impose extraordinary expectations. The president creates jobs, manages Ebola and solves the problems of the world -- or so he should. This particular president came into office with preposterous expectations from his supporters that he could not possibly fulfill. The normal campaign promises of a normal politician were taken to be prophecy. This told us more about his supporters than about him. Similarly, his enemies, at the extremes, have painted him as the devil incarnate, destroying the Republic for fiendish reasons.
He is neither savior nor demon. He is a politician. As a politician, he governs not by what he wants, nor by what he promised in the election. He governs by the reality he was handed by history and his predecessor. Obama came into office with a financial crisis well underway, along with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. His followers might have thought that he would take a magic wand and make them go away, and his enemies might think that he would use them to destroy the country, but in point of fact he did pretty much what Bush had been doing: He hung on for dear life and guessed at the right course.
Bush came into office thinking of economic reforms and a foreign policy that would get away from nation-building. The last thing he expected was that he would invade Afghanistan during his first year in office. But it really wasn't up to him. His predecessor, Bill Clinton, and al Qaeda set his agenda. Had Clinton been more aggressive against al Qaeda, Bush might have had a different presidency. But al Qaeda did not seem to need that level of effort, and Clinton came into office as heir to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And so on back to George Washington.
Presidents are constrained by the reality they find themselves in and the limits that institutions place on them. Foreign policy is what a president wishes would happen; foreign affairs are what actually happen. The United States is enormously powerful. It is not omnipotent. There are not only limits to that power, but unexpected and undesirable consequences of its use. I have in mind the idea that had the United States not purged the Baathists in Iraq, the Sunnis might not have risen. That is possible. But had the Baathists, the party of the hated Saddam Hussein, remained in power, the sense of betrayal felt by Shiites and Kurds at the sight of the United States now supporting Baathists might have led to a greater explosion. The constraints in Iraq were such that having invaded, there was no choice that did not have a likely repercussion.
Governing a nation of more than 300 million people in a world filled with nations, the U.S. president can preside, but he hardly rules. He is confronted with enormous pressure from all directions. He knows only a fraction of the things he needs to know in the maelstrom he has entered, and in most cases he has no idea that something is happening. When he knows something is happening, he doesn't always have the power to do anything, and when he has the power to do something, he can never be sure of the consequences. Everyone not holding the office is certain that he or she would never make a mistake. Obama was certainly clear on that point, and his successor will be as well.

Obama's Goals

All that said, let us consider what Obama is trying to achieve in the current circumstances. It is now 2014, and the United States has been at war since 2001 -- nearly this entire century so far. It has not gone to war on the scale of 20th-century wars, but it has had multidivisional engagements, along with smaller operations in Africa and elsewhere.
For any nation, this is unsustainable, particularly when there is no clear end to the war. The enemy is not a conventional force that can be defeated by direct attack. It is a loose network embedded in the civilian population and difficult to distinguish. The enemy launches intermittent attacks designed to impose casualties on U.S. forces under the theory that in the long run the United States will find the cost greater than the benefit.
In addition to these wars, two other conflicts have emerged. One is in Ukraine, where a pro-Western government has formed in Kiev to the displeasure of Russia, which proceeded to work against Ukraine. In Iraq, a new Sunni force has emerged, the Islamic State, which is partly a traditional insurgency and partly a conventional army.
Under the strategy followed until the chaos that erupted after the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi in Libya, the response to both would be to send U.S. forces to stabilize the situation. Since 1999 and Kosovo, the United States has been the primary actor in military interventions. More to the point, the United States was the first actor and used military force as its first option. Given the global American presence imposed by the breadth of U.S. power, it is difficult to decline combat when problems such as these arise. It is the obvious and, in a way, easiest solution. The problem is that it is frequently not a solution.
Obama has tried to create a different principle for U.S. operations. First, the conflict must rise to the level that its outcome concerns American interests. Second, involvement must begin with non-military or limited military options. Third, the United States must operate with an alliance structure including local allies, capable of effective operation. The United States will provide aid and limited military force (such as airstrikes) but will not bear the main burden. Finally, and only if the situation is of grave significance and can be dealt with only through direct and major U.S. military intervention, the United States will allow itself to become the main force.
It is a foreign policy both elegant and historically rooted. It is also incredibly complicated. First, what constitutes the national interest? There is a wide spread of opinion in the administration. Among some, intervention to prevent human rights violations is in the national interest. To others, only a direct threat to the United States is in the national interest.
Second, the tempo of intervention is difficult to calibrate. The United States is responding to an enemy, and it is the enemy's tempo of operations that determines the degree of response needed.
Third, many traditional allies, like Germany, lack the means or inclination to involve themselves in these affairs. Turkey, with far more interest in what happens in Syria and Iraq than the United States, is withholding intervention unless the United States is also involved and, in addition, agrees to the political outcome. As Dwight D. Eisenhower learned in World War II, an alliance is desirable because it spreads the burden. It is also nightmarish to maintain because all the allies are pursuing a range of ends outside the main mission.
Finally, it is extraordinarily easy to move past the first three stages into direct interventions. This ease comes from a lack of clarity as to what the national interest is, the enemy's tempo of operations seeming to grow faster than an alliance can be created, or an alliance's failure to gel.
Obama has reasonable principles of operation. It is a response to the realities of the world. There are far more conflicts than the United States has interests. Intervention on any level requires timing. Other nations have greater interests in their future than the United States does. U.S military involvement must be the last step. The principle fits the strategic needs and constraints on the United States. Unfortunately, clear principles frequently meet a murky world, and the president finds himself needing to intervene without clarity.

Presidents' Limited Control

The president is not normally in control of the situation. The situation is in control of him. To the extent that presidents, or leaders of any sort, can gain control of a situation, it is not only in generating principles but also in rigorously defining the details of those principles, and applying them with technical precision, that enables some semblance of control.
President Richard Nixon had two major strategic visions: to enter into a relationship with China to control the Soviet Union, and to facilitate an alliance reversal by Egypt, from the Soviet Union to the United States. The first threatened the Soviet Union with a two-front war and limited Soviet options. The second destroyed a developing Mediterranean strategy that might have changed the balance of power.
Nixon's principle was to ally with nations regardless of ideology -- hence communist China and Nasserite Egypt. To do this, the national interest had to be rigorously defined so that these alliances would not seem meaningless. Second, the shift in relationships had to be carried out with meticulous care. The president does not have time for such care, nor are his talents normally suited for it, since his job is to lead rather than execute. Nixon had Henry Kissinger, who in my opinion and that of others was the lesser strategist but a superb technician.
The switch in China's alignment became inevitable once fighting broke out with the Soviets. Egypt's break with the Soviets became inevitable when it became apparent to Anwar Sadat that the Soviets would underwrite a war but could not underwrite a peace. Only the United States could. These shifts had little to do with choices. Neither Mao Zedong nor Sadat really had much of a choice.
Where choice exists is in the tactics. Kissinger was in charge of implementing both shifts, and on that level it was in fact possible to delay, disrupt or provide an opening to Soviet counters. The level at which foreign policy turns into foreign affairs is not in the enunciation of the principles but in the rigorous definition of those principles and in their implementation. Nixon had Kissinger, and that was what Kissinger was brilliant at: turning principles into successful implementation.
The problem that Obama has, which has crippled his foreign policy, is that his principles have not been defined with enough rigor to provide definitive guidance in a crisis. When the crisis comes, that's when the debate starts. What exactly is the national interest, and how does it apply in this or that case? Even if he accomplishes that, he still lacks a figure with the subtlety, deviousness and frankly ruthlessness to put it into place. I would argue that the same problem haunted the George W. Bush and Clinton administrations, although their challenges were less daunting and therefore their weakness less visible.
There is a sphere in which history sweeps a president along. The most he can do is adjust to what must be, and in the end, this is the most important sphere. In another sphere -- the sphere of principles -- he can shape events or at least clarify decisions. But the most important level, the level on which even the sweep of history is managed, is the tactical. This is where deals are made and pressure is placed, and where the president can perhaps shift the direction of history.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not had a president who operated consistently and well in the deeper levels of history. This situation is understandable, since the principles of the Cold War were so powerful and then suddenly gone. Still, principles without definition and execution without precision cannot long endure.

Read more: Principle, Rigor and Execution Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy | Stratfor
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Asia: Displacing Europe as a Centre of Defence Innovation?

RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical issues and contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS and due recognition to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email: RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg for feedback to the Editor RSIS Commentary, Yang Razali Kassim. 

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No. 212/2014 dated 28 October 2014

Asia:
Displacing Europe as a Centre of Defence Innovation?

By Richard A. Bitzinger

Synopsis

Europe’s relative decline as a military-technological power has provided an opportunity for Asian-Pacific powers to rise in its stead. Europe’s military-technological establishment could recover, but it requires significant additional funding and a renewed commitment to international arms collaboration that currently does not exist.
Commentary

WHENEVER EUROPEAN defence experts gather to talk about the future of their regional military capabilities, the debate invariably descends into despair and resignation. And with good reason: criticisms of Europe's failure to dedicate sufficient resources to defence, to spend these monies efficiently, and to keep pace with the technological state-of-the-art are not new. For decades, there have been grumblings about Europe’s failure to devote sufficient resources to regional defence, and yet little has ever been done to arrest this decline.

Now, however, this debate is taking place against a backdrop of new urgencies. Russian aggression against Ukraine, growing instability in the Middle East, and even rising insecurities in Asia caused by the challenges of China’s military rise, are all creating new worries that these developments could threaten stability and security in Europe. In this light, many are calling for a programme of regional military renewal. It is still highly uncertain, however, whether Europe will heed the call.

European defence’s never-ending death spiral
As already stated, Europe’s decaying military capabilities – and the ensuing disparagements over this fact – are nothing new. European defence officials and experts have for decades been lamenting shrinking defence budgets and diminishing military capacities. European defence spending contracted 12 percent in real terms between 2005 and 2012, according to data put out by the European Defence Agency. The number of Europe’s ground troops that can take part in sustained NATO operations is less than 8 percent of all regional land forces.

Perhaps even more important, military research and development (R&D) spending – the seed corn of future military capacity – has fallen by half, from €9.8 billion (S$15.7 billion) in 2006 to €4.8 billion (S$7.7 billion) in 2012.

One result is that the trans-Atlantic gap in defence capabilities is, if anything, widening. The United States outspends its NATO allies by better than 3:1 when it comes to procurement, and it spends more than ten times as much as Europe on military R&D. Moreover, European defence R&D activities are spread thinly across a highly fragmented and zealously protected European arms market, diluting its impact on technology development and defence innovation.

More ominously, however, the Asia-Pacific began to challenge Europe for the number two spot when it comes to military expenditures. While European defence spending has collapsed, it is soaring in Asia. Some of the world’s biggest military spenders are located in Asia, including China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and South Korea. China, in fact, is already the world’s second largest defence spender; its estimated military R&D budget (perhaps S$13 billion) is twice as great as all of Europe combined.
Asian defence-technological innovation: Catching up

When it comes to defence innovation and acquiring new military capabilities, therefore, Asia – and especially China – could catch up simply by benefit of Europe basically standing still. While it is true that Asian militaries still import large chunks of their arms from the West, this trend will not last. Most of the biggest military spenders in Asia also possess sizable arms industries, and their governments are committed to reducing their reliance on foreign suppliers by increasing their purchases from local manufacturers.

Consequently, the epicentre of global armaments production is gradually shifting from the North Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. Europe’s relative decline as a defence innovation cluster is evident in the absence of new cutting-edge R&D programmes. At present, there is little going on in the European defence industry at the level of R&D. For example, the European aerospace industry has no indigenous fifth-generation fighter programmes (that could compete with the US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) in the works. Asia, meanwhile, has at least four such projects in development.

Beijing could especially benefit from this hiatus in European defence R&D. While China may not supplant Europe as the world’s second most important centre of defence innovation, it does appear to be gaining capacities to at least match Europe in certain niche areas.

Can Europe turn things around?

At a recent conference in Estonia on the future of technology and its impact on military affairs (to which the author was the only Asia-based expert to be invited), there was considerable discussion on how to maintain the West’s military-technological dominance. The solutions most often put forth were not novel: more money for defence, and more international (and particularly more pan-European) cooperation when it comes to defence R&D.
   
Now, arms industries believe in larger defence budgets the same way that a drowning man believes in life jackets. That said, Europe is going to require a shock even greater than the current crises in Ukraine, the Middle East, or the South China Sea before it raises defence spending significantly.

In the second place, increasing defence budgets has, paradoxically, often turned out to be counterproductive when it comes to encouraging military-technological collaboration. More money for defence R&D has usually meant less incentive to cooperate with other parties – unless that cooperation is the price for getting the money in the first place.

In other words, funding and commitments to collaborative defence R&D have to proceed in parallel – a daunting challenge to say the least, politically, militarily, and economically. It can be done, but Europe’s recent history when it comes to devoting more effort and resources to defence development makes one sceptical that it will reverse its decline anytime soon.
 
Richard A. Bitzinger is Senior Fellow and Programme Coordinator of the Military Transformation Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Formerly with the RAND Corp., the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, and the Defence Budget Project, he has been writing on defence issues for more than 20 years.
Click HERE to read this commentary online.

‘Swarms of Cooperative, Autonomous’ Robots To Hit Battlefields

‘Swarms of Cooperative, Autonomous’ Robots To Hit Battlefields

October 28, 2014 | Adam Kredo

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Swarms of highly intelligent militarized robots are predicted to hit the battlefield in the near future and could spark a modern day arms race, according to a report released Monday by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

Teams of interconnected robots will change the way America and other countries fight their wars, providing them with more range and the ability to conduct “suicidal missions” without risk to living humans, according to the report, entitled, “Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm.”

The study predicts that in the very near future, advances in technology will allow “swarms of robotic systems” to effect “dramatic, disruptive change to military operations”—and that the United States must significantly step up its focus on these technologies or risk losing its status as the world’s preeminent fighting force.

“Swarms of robotic systems can bring greater mass, coordination, intelligence, and speed to the battlefield, enhancing the ability of warfighters to gain a decisive advantage over their adversaries,” the report states.

While the United States and other major powers have made great advances in unmanned technologies—such as drones and other remotely piloted devices—the report predicts that global militaries will soon enter a race to perfect the tactic known as “swarming,” in which droves of militarized robots act together on the battlefield.

“Many of the game-changing innovations that enable swarming … will be widely available to a range of actors,” the reports states.

However, severe U.S. defense budget cuts known as sequestration threaten to stymie America’s investment into these critical new technologies and could leave the country vulnerable to enemies, according to the report.

“Today the U.S. military faces a pernicious cycle of ever rising platform costs and shrinking quantities,” it states. “As a result, the number of combat ships and aircraft in the U.S. inventory has steadily declined, even during periods of significant growth in defense spending.”

“Today’s acute fiscal pressures only exacerbate these trends, forcing a crisis not only in military modernization and readiness, but also in the ability to field sufficient quantities to be relevant in future fights,” the report warns.

The United States continues to make major investments in “increasingly exquisite systems” in order to compensate for its lack of more nimble robotic technologies. This model, however, “is not sustainable,” according to the report, and could allow even rogue state-actors to gain an upper hand over U.S. forces.

“As precision-guided munitions proliferate to other adversaries—both state and non-state actors—the shrinking numbers of U.S. combat assets becomes a major strategic liability,” the report warns. “Adversaries can concentrate their weapons, which are becoming increasingly accurate and capable at ever-longer ranges, on the relatively small number of U.S. ships and bases, overwhelming their defenses.”

The American military is not yet investing enough in these interconnected unmanned systems, which would actually cost less in the long run, the report says.

“A new paradigm is needed, one that sustains the qualitative superiority of U.S. forces in aggregate, but that disperses combat power among a greater number of platforms, increasing resiliency and diversity and imposing costs on adversaries,” the report says.

“Militaries that figure out how best to employ swarms, along with the doctrine, training, command-and-control structures, and other key enablers needed to support them, will have a significant advantage over those who do not,” the report concludes.

The CNAS report goes on to suggest that the Pentagon begin studying “swarming platforms” and allocate funding for “a multi-year series of experiments” to test various technologies.

A “Defense Robotics Systems Office” also should be created in the Pentagon to coordinate such activities.

The Army, Air Force, and Navy also should be investigating and pursuing fleets of unmanned, interconnected robot technologies, according to the report.

Read more at http://www.prophecynewswatch.com/2014/October28/281.html#Pldwjg8TqkbjU5ju.99

Left-Right Divide Destroying America

Left-Right Divide Destroying America

Divide and conquer of the political rabble designed by the elite

Turn on CNN, MSNBC and Fox News and chances are you will see staunchly partisan Democrats and Republicans engaged in heated verbal pugilism.

A relevant example of this sort of behavior passing as political dialogue occurred on Sunday when Democratic National Committee Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz and Republican National Committee Chairman Reince Priebus discussed the coming midterm election. Wasserman Schultz rhetorically accused the Republican Party and its loosely affiliated tea party wing of ISIS-brand extremism.
On October 15 National Public Radio ran a piece covering a report titled Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization co-authored by Shanto Iyengar of Stanford University and Sean J. Westwood of Princeton University. According to Lyengar and Westwood, unlike “race, gender and other social divides where group-related attitudes and behaviors are constrained by social norms… there are no corresponding pressures to temper disapproval of political opponents.”
The authors observe this behavior is not only now acceptable, it is often encouraged and regarded as preferable. It is appropriate to “express animus and engage in discriminatory behavior toward opposing partisans.”
The artificial political divide devised and enforced by the state and relentlessly pushed by its corporate media propaganda machine now affects all facets of social life, from the composition of neighborhoods to marriage. “Actual marriage across party lines is rare,” the report notes. “In a 2009 survey of married couples, only nine percent consisted of Democrat-Republican pairs.”
Ryan McMaken, writing for Mises Daily, expands on the report by noting how government shapes the political environment. “In a society where a government is weak, decentralized, and unable to enact the more radical wishes of any majority group, a losing side is less likely to regard the winning side as a genuine threat to one’s daily life. Winning or losing elections remains important, but is not considered to be determinant of the losing side’s ability to keep one’s property, livelihood, and way of life relatively safe from the winners. On the other hand, if a state is very powerful, and the winning side is able to regulate, tax, and coerce in an ever more heavy-handed fashion, the stakes of each election are very high indeed,” he writes.
America is now experiencing the latter as the recent IRS political scandal vividly demonstrates. The Obama administration used the taxation agency to punish and marginalize the tea party, a political opposition it determined posed a serious threat, unlike the mainstream Republican party that remains argumentative within accepted parameters instituted and enforced by the establishment.
Democrats in particular have built an industry around “hit piece journalism” designed to sully the reputations and diminish the political capital of their enemies. Characterized by radio personality Rush Limbaugh as “drive-by journalism,” Democrat operatives and their supporters excel at misrepresentation, cheap shots and innuendo. Republicans also engage in this sort of behavior, as the legacy of Karl Rove and his dirty tricks and Fox News histrionics reveal.
McMaken states the obvious, at least for those of us outside the political mainstream. For the upper echelon of the inner party, where there is little substantial difference between Democrat and Republican, the animosity is far less pronounced and, when expressed, is primarily for theatrical effect.
“Now, many keen observers of politics will note that there’s indeed precious little difference, in the big scheme of things, between the political parties,” McMaken writes. “Anyone who’s paying attention can see that party elites get along fine while most of the rancor can be found among the naive rank and file. There’s a reason for this. Regardless of who wins, virtually nothing will be contemplated that might lead to meaningful reductions in regulation, taxation, or the punitive excesses of the criminal justice system. The larger trend in the growth of the state overwhelms any tiny adjustments that DC is willing to make in the present political climate.”
In other words, the battle is designed to divide and conquer the rabble while the political elite continue the political and economic agenda at hand. This process was summarized by insider Carroll Quigley, who wrote:
“The argument that the two parties should represent opposed ideals and policies, one, perhaps, of the Right and the other of the Left, is a foolish idea acceptable only to doctrinaire and academic thinkers.”